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Foreword
The European Union has a terrestrial, although not a marine, presence in the 
Arctic as a result of parts of the territory of Finland and Sweden lying north 
of the Arctic Circle. The EU has for some years been engaged in the Arctic in a 
variety of ways, including through its partnership agreements with Greenland, 
its participation in the Northern Dimension policy, its membership of the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and its financial support for research in and con-
cerning the Arctic. The likely disappearance of sea ice cover in the Arctic, at 
least in the summer, by the middle of this century offers the prospect of new 
uses of the Arctic, including the development of commercial shipping routes 
between the Far East and Western Europe, fisheries in the high seas part of 
the central Arctic Ocean, and exploration and exploitation of oil and gas off-
shore. The EU has a potential role to play in all these developments. Since 2008 
the EU has been developing an integrated and comprehensive policy for the 
Arctic through a series of communications from the European Commission, 
endorsed by the Council and the European Parliament.
The three editors of the book have brought together a formidable team of 
experts to explore the issues raised by the EU’s increasing engagement in the 
Arctic. The result is a series of papers of great intellectual weight, many of 
them ground-breaking. Recent years have seen the publication of a consider-
able number of books on Arctic law and politics—so much so that one long-
time commentator on Arctic affairs has observed rather wistfully that such 
publication has become a cottage industry. However, these books have little 
or nothing to say about the EU and the Arctic. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first book, at any rate in English, to deal exclusively and comprehen-
sively with the EU’s interest and involvement in the Arctic. For this reason its 
publication is much to be welcomed, and I hope that it will attract a large and 
appreciative readership.
Robin Churchill
Emeritus Professor of International Law, University of Dundee, UK
November 2016
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CHAPTER �
Introduction
Nengye Liu, Elizabeth A. Kirk and Tore Henriksen
The European Union (EU) is a global actor, which considers itself
well placed to shape international ocean governance on the basis of its 
experience in developing a sustainable approach to ocean management, 
notably through its environmental policy, integrated maritime policy, 
reformed common fisheries policy, action against illegal, unregulated 
and unreported (IUU) fishing and maritime transport policy.1
Over the past decade, the EU has adopted a number of pieces of legislation 
regarding ocean governance with internal and external dimensions, such as 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive2 and the Maritime Spatial Planning 
Directive.3 The Arctic is also on the EU’s Agenda. The EU aims to ensure sus-
tainable development in and around the Arctic region on the basis of interna-
tional cooperation.4
Climatically, ecologically, culturally, socially and economically, the Arctic is 
changing in many ways with implications throughout the region and around 
the world.5 For example, Arctic sea ice has been retreating rapidly over the 
past decade. The extent of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean has set a new record low 
* Dr Nengye Liu, Senior Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide, Australia; 
Prof Elizabeth A. Kirk, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, United 
Kingdom; Prof Tore Henriksen, K.G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, UiT/Arctic 
University of Norway.
1   Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2016 on International ocean gover-
nance: an agenda for the future of our oceans, JOIN (2016) 49, 4.
2   Directive 2008/56/EC of 17 June 2008 on establishing a framework for community action in 
the field of marine environmental policy [2008] OJ L164/19.
3   Directive 2014/89/EU of 23 July 2014 on establishing a framework for marine spatial planning 
[2014] OJ L257/135.
4   JOIN (2016) 49, 7.
5   Introduction, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, Arctic Council Working Group Conservation 
of Arctic Flora and Fauna, 2013. <https://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/index.php/the-report/
chapters/introduction> accessed 7 April 2017.
 Please provide footnote text
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for the wintertime of 2017.6 Due to climate change, increased human access 
to formerly ice-covered areas, and the potential for increased activities such as 
fishing, shipping, tourism, bioprospecting, mining, and oil and gas operations, 
present significant legal challenges.7 Questions therefore arise as to whether 
the Arctic governance regime is adequately designed to address global envi-
ronmental change, or needs to evolve to tackle challenges. One example of 
how governance is responding is the establishment of a legally binding regime 
to achieve sustainable management of fisheries in the high seas portion of the 
central Arctic Ocean.8 Another development of the current regime is the regu-
lation of maritime activities through the adoption of the International Code 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)9 in the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO). In this book, our focus is what roles the EU can, and 
should play in shaping the Arctic governance regime to ensure sustainable 
development in the Arctic region.
The EU is inextricably linked to the Arctic region by a unique combination 
of history, geography, economics and scientific achievements.10 Three Arctic 
countries are EU Member States (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the 
EU maintains close relations with Iceland and Norway through the European 
Economic Area.11 Canada, Russia and the United States are also strategic part-
ners of the EU. The EU has a strategic interest in playing a key role in the Arctic 
region12 and strong political will to enhance Arctic governance. In 2007, the EU 
6    ‘Arctic Ice Sets New Record Law for Winter’ (MarineLink, 22 March 2017) <http://www 
.marinelink.com/news/arctic-record-winter423442> accessed 7 April 2017.
7    R. Rayfuse, ‘Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in a Warming 
World’ (2007) 16 (2) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental 
Law 268.
8    For details of the negotiations among five Arctic coastal States (Norway, Denmark, 
Canada, Russia and United States) and five key high sea fishing entities (China, Japan, 
South Korea, Iceland and the EU)—Arctic 5+5 process, see Chapter 10.
9    IMO, Res. MEPC. 264 (68) (May 15, 2015) and IMO, Res. MSC.385 (94) (Nov. 21, 2014). 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, adopted 15 May 2015 <http://
www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20CODE%20
TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf> accessed 9 April 2017.
10   European Commission Communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union 
and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763, 1.
11   The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1 January 
1994, brings together the EU Member States and the three EEA EFTA States—Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway—in a single market, referred to as the “Internal Market” 
<www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eea-agreement/Main%20Text%20
of%20the%20Agreement/EEAagreement.pdf> accessed 9 April 2017.
12   JOIN (2016) 49, 2.
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published the Integrated Maritime Policy,13 which has a strong international 
dimension. The European Commission tends to “promote Europe’s leadership 
in international maritime affairs, enhance the impact of the EU at multilateral 
level, strengthen regional cooperation with neighbouring countries in shared 
sea basins, and develop and extend bilateral relations with key partners.”14 The 
European Commission has specifically set out the EU’s interests in the Arctic 
and has published three Arctic policy documents between 2008 and 2016.15 
In April 2016, the EU adopted its latest Arctic policy. It focuses on advancing 
international cooperation in responding to the impacts of climate change on 
the Arctic’s fragile environment, and on promoting and contributing to sus-
tainable development, particularly in the European part of the Arctic.16
However, it must be pointed out that the EU does face constraints on its 
involvement in Arctic governance, given the fact the EU has no coastline 
bordering the Arctic Ocean. Five coastal States of the Arctic Ocean, the so 
called Arctic Five—the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark through 
Greenland—believe that they hold the stewardship of the Arctic.17 While the 
EU is willing to, and has been trying to shape Arctic governance, several ques-
tions need to be addressed: 1) What internal challenges is the EU facing in the 
European Arctic? 2) How could the EU pursue its involvement within relevant 
Arctic governance regimes at the multilateral level (e.g., the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Convention on Biological Diversity)? 3) At 
regional level, how could the EU strengthen regional cooperation in the Arctic, 
while the EU has yet to be officially accepted as an observer to the Arctic 
Council—the most important forum for regional cooperation? 4) What strat-
egies should the EU develop regarding effective engagement with the Arctic 
Five? 5) Over which Arctic issues, such as climate change, biodiversity, eco-
system-based management, marine protected areas, energy, fisheries, tourism, 
13   European Commission Communication of 10 October 2007 An Integrated Maritime 
Policy for the European Union, COM (2007) 575.
14   International dimensions of the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy: questions and answers, 
Brussels, 15 October 2009 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-453_
en.htm?locale=en> accessed 13 April 2017.
15   COM (2008) 763; Joint Communication of the European Commission and High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 June 
2012 on Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 
2008 and Next Steps, JOIN (2012) 19; JOIN (2016) 49.
16   JOIN (2016) 49, 2.
17   The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/080525_arctic_ocean_conference-_
outcome.pdf> accessed 9 April 2017.
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international navigation and indigenous people, could the EU exert most influ-
ence, and even play a leadership role?
“The European Union and the Arctic” brings together academics from 
international law and political science to address the questions outlined 
above. The book is divided into three parts. The first part examines the EU’s 
current Arctic policy framework and the EU’s participation in various inter-
national and regional Arctic forums. The second part encompasses the EU’s 
engagement with the Arctic Five, providing analysis of examples of some of 
those relationships. The third part identifies shipping, fisheries, marine mam-
mals and offshore activities as four key areas in which the EU could exert its 
influence in the Arctic. It explores the EU’s potential contributions to regulate 
those human activities in the Arctic.
1 Part 1: The EU’s Arctic Policy Framework
This part primarily focuses on the first three questions outlined above: the 
internal challenge the EU is facing in the European Arctic; how could the EU 
pursue its involvement within relevant Arctic governance regimes at the multi-
lateral level; and how the EU can strengthen regional cooperation in the Arctic, 
while it has yet to be officially accepted as an observer to the Arctic Council.
In chapter 2, Adam Stępień and Timo Koivurova discuss challenges and 
opportunities for effective EU Arctic policy-making, which addresses the 
first and second research question of the book. They draw out the two dis-
tinct dimensions of the EU’s Arctic policies—one addressing the Circumpolar 
Arctic and one the European Arctic. The questions of coherence and added 
value of the EU Arctic policy are considered, leading to three challenges for the 
EU: balancing between Circumpolar and European Arctic policy spaces; influ-
encing general sectoral EU policy-making; and managing multiple channels of 
interaction with Arctic actors and stakeholders.
Chapter 3 by the late Alyson J.K. Bailes and Krismundur Ólafsson of the 
University of Iceland argues that questioning whether the EU is an Arctic 
actor is redundant when the Union is clearly present through a number of sub- 
regional structures and partnerships. As a founding member of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC, since 1993), through its own Northern Dimension 
(ND, since 1999), and through its increasing bilateral engagement with the 
‘West Nordic’ nations of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The chapter 
thus addresses the third question outlined in our introduction—how the EU 
can strengthen regional cooperation in the Arctic, while it has yet to be offi-
cially accepted as an observer to the Arctic Council.
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2 Part 2: The EU and the Arctic Region
Part 2 of the book explores the EU’s effective engagement with the Arctic Five 
in Arctic governance. Chapter 4 by Mar Campins Eritja deals with the EU’s rela-
tionship with Greenland, which has, due to its location in the Arctic, acquired 
a unique strategic relevance for the EU and other economic powers interested 
in the Arctic’s resources. The chapter describes how an enhanced relationship 
between the EU and Greenland may support the EU’s policy objectives in the 
Arctic. The chapter focuses on the recognition of the Greenlandic population’s 
rights as indigenous peoples by the EU in the achievement of Arctic sustainable 
development. Special attention is paid to the exploitation of offshore oil and 
gas resources in Greenland’s waters, and the participation of the Greenlandic 
population in the decision making process according to Greenland’s regula-
tion and the applicable EU secondary law.
In chapter 5 Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspontik investigate the 
complex and ambiguous relationship between Norway and the EU. Although 
Norway has pro-actively worked to get the EU more involved in Arctic gover-
nance issues, it has, from the European Commission’s first Communication on 
Arctic issues in 2008, been sceptical of various policy and legal steps taken by 
the EU. This chapter demonstrates that the EU’s manifold Arctic policy endeav-
ours hold a distinct regional element in Norway, beyond the characterisation 
of the High North (Norwegian Arctic) as a distinct foreign policy. The chapter 
argues that Norway’s relationship with the EU in the Norwegian Arctic must be 
understood as a continuation of Norway’s larger EU-policy, where the balance 
between separation and further integration is crucial.
Chapter 6, written by two of Canada’s leading experts on Arctic sovereignty 
and foreign policy issues—Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde, seeks 
to correct misconceptions about the state of the Canada-EU Arctic relation-
ship. In Canada, the EU’s efforts to constructively engage in the Arctic have 
been met with scepticism and distrust. In turn, Canada’s Arctic policy is often 
cast in a harsh light in the EU. To explain Canada’s approach to Arctic issues, 
they provide a rich overview of Canada’s historical engagement with the region 
and the development of its Northern Strategy, explaining why it places a high 
priority on sovereignty, economic development for the benefit of Northerners, 
environmental protection, and governance (particularly by Arctic States and 
Northern Indigenous peoples). The authors then bring the Arctic policies 
of Canada and the EU into dialogue, suggesting that evolving policy posi-
tions point towards an increasingly convergent, cooperative agenda between 
Canada and the EU on Arctic issues. Nevertheless, divergent interests and mes-
saging associated with shipping and freedom of the seas/navigation rights, 
Liu, Kirk and Henriksen6
the rights of Indigenous peoples and the trade in marine mammals, resource 
development, and environmental stewardship could continue to complicate 
the relationship.
Tina Hunter in chapter 7 examines the relationship between the EU and 
Russia in the Arctic, focusing on the development of the Arctic petroleum 
resources, combined with further development of the Northern Sea Route. 
This chapter compares Russian policy and conduct in the Arctic with that of 
the EU. In undertaking this comparative analysis, it necessarily examines simi-
larities and differences in policy of these two actors in the Arctic, and the co-
operative nature of their relationship.
Chapter 8 by Michael Fakhri compares the US marine mammal conserva-
tion laws and the 2015 EU trade import ban on seal products. This chapter 
argues that whoever regulates animals is in effect regulating land and water of 
where animals live. To regulate a space leads to regulating people by restricting 
their activities. The seal regimes are principal ways each authority negotiates 
its relationship with Arctic indigenous communities and expresses power in 
the Arctic. The chapter therefore considers seal hunting laws as part of a much 
broader jockeying for control and authority—sovereign power—in the Arctic. 
Sovereignty is employed as an analytical concept that is pluralist and relation-
al, involves the regular negotiation of authority and jurisdiction, and consti-
tutes a complex relationship to land. It claims that sovereign power is only as 
legitimate and as good as one’s relation to Arctic indigenous communities.
3 Part 3: The EU and Regulating Human Activities in the Arctic
Part 3 discusses the EU’s potential role in regulating human activities in the 
Arctic. This part identifies shipping, fisheries, marine mammals and offshore 
operations as key areas where the EU exerts most influence. The EU’s role in 
relation to Arctic shipping is explored by Henrik Ringbom in Chapter 9. This 
chapter explores whether the EU’s cautious policy on Arctic shipping is dic-
tated by legal necessity or could there be ways to take a more assertive stance, 
if the political situation permitted? The EU’s own statements related to Arctic 
shipping are discussed, while legal options and restraints for EU measures in 
this area are assessed. A number of non-regulatory ways in which the EU could 
play a role in Arctic shipping are mentioned as well.
In Chapter 10 Nengye Liu examines the EU’s potential contributions to the 
governance of high sea fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean. Due to Arctic sea 
ice melting and other impacts of climate change, it is now widely recognized 
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that fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean may occur both within areas under cur-
rent fisheries’ jurisdiction of the coastal States, and in the high seas portion 
of the central Arctic Ocean. To achieve sustainable management of fisheries 
in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean, non-Arctic States, es-
pecially high sea fishing States, such as the EU, must also be involved in any 
regulatory efforts. Based on both desk-top studies and field research, this chap-
ter focuses on the EU’s possible internal and external actions that could help 
achieve sustainable management of potential fisheries in the high sea part of 
the central Arctic Ocean.
In chapter 11, Martin Hennig and Richard Caddell evaluate the legal con-
troversies surrounding the regulation of marine mammals under EU law. This 
issue has long presented considerable regulatory difficulties for the EU, which 
has sought to balance its longstanding support for the traditional rights of 
indigenous peoples against its legal obligations to address popular concerns 
over animal welfare. This chapter examines the effectiveness of the specific 
policies introduced by the EU in respect of the hunting of seals and whales 
by Arctic indigenous peoples, weighed against its overarching policy objec-
tives towards the High North. As regards seal hunting, this chapter demon-
strates that the legislative intervention of the EU may have achieved its aim of 
enhancing animal welfare, yet at the same time it has fundamentally under-
mined the interests of Inuit sealers. Similarly, this chapter argues that while 
the EU has pledged to promote Arctic interests within relevant international 
organisations, it has proved to be a somewhat inconsistent ally to the indige-
nous communities of the High North in their bid to secure subsistence hunting 
and trade entitlements for marine mammal products.
In Chapter 12 Henning Jessen explores the role of the EU in influencing off-
shore oil and gas operations in the Arctic and the way in which its activities 
may link with the activities of other organisations working on these issues. 
The EU actively seeks to contribute to the existing efforts of the Arctic States 
“to develop joint approaches and best practice to address the potential envi-
ronmental impact and safety concerns related to increasing activities in the 
region”. This referral also relates (inter alia) to the new intra-EU standards on 
offshore oil and gas drilling as governed by Directive 2013/30/EU on the safety 
of offshore oil and gas operations. Some of the existing “joint approaches and 
best practices” applicable in the Arctic are highlighted in this chapter. This 
discussion includes both the EU approach and the wider legal framework of 
best practices and safety standards relating to offshore operations that deserve 
enhanced future political attention and support—both by the EU and other 
stakeholders. 

Part 1
The EU’s Arctic Policy
∵
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CHAPTER �
Formulating a Cross-cutting Policy: 
Challenges and Opportunities for Effective 
EU Arctic Policy-making
Adam Stępień and Timo Koivurova
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been developing its over-arching Arctic policy for 
almost ten years, starting with the EU Parliament’s Resolution1 and European 
Commission’s Communication2 in 2008. Over the years, the Union has made 
much progress in clarifying its approach to the Arctic, moving towards more 
nuanced and cautious approaches, as visible from the Joint Communication3 
*   Adam Stępień, Researcher, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland, corresponding 
author, astepien@ulapland.fi.
**  Timo Koivurova, Professor, Director of the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland.
***  The chapter draws upon: Adam Stępień, Timo Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää, ‘Strategic 
Assessment of Development of the Arctic: Assessment Conducted for the European 
Union’ (2014) <www.arcticinfo.eu/sada> accessed 7 March 2016; Adam Stępień, Timo 
Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää, The Changing Arctic and the European Union (Brill/
Nijhoff 2016); Timo Koivurova and others, ‘The Present and Future Competence of the 
European Union in the Arctic’ (2012) 48 Polar Record 361; Adam Stępień, ‘The EU Needs 
a Two-Tier Approach towards the Arctic: A General Policy for the Circumpolar Arctic 
and a Concrete Strategy for the European Arctic’ [10 December 2015] <http://www.the 
arcticinstitute.org/2015/12/EU-needs-two-tier-approach-towards-the-arctic.html> accessed 
7 March 2016.
1    European Parliament, Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance [2008] 
P6_TA(2008)0474.
2    European Commission Communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union 
and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763.
3    Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 June 2012 on Developing 
a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 and Next Steps, 
JOIN (2012) 19.
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from 2012, EU Council Conclusions,4 and the latest Joint Communication5 from 
2016. The latest of this series of policy statements is even titled ‘An integrated 
European Union policy for the Arctic”. Yet, the EU Arctic policy remains a work 
in progress and faces a number of structural challenges.
The EU exerts an influence on Arctic regions in a variety of forms. This 
includes affecting regional development in Northern Fennoscandia, the EU’s 
environmental and economic footprint, shaping international Arctic-relevant 
norms and taking part in regional governance. It is not easy for the EU to act in 
a coherent manner in the Arctic given the broad scope of the Union’s presence, 
as well as the fact that the EU itself is a very complex governance entity and the 
Arctic is a very heterogeneous policy environment. Consequently, we need to 
ask whether establishing an overarching EU Arctic policy framework, first, can 
make EU Arctic activities more coherent (i.e. synergetic and lacking contradic-
tions), and second, whether—as is often assumed without reflection—it can 
actually enhance the EU’s performance as an actor in the Arctic. If yes, what 
policy instruments could lead to such an enhancement? While much exist-
ing literature discusses the EU’s participation in Arctic co-operation and its 
relations with Arctic States, this chapter focuses on the EU policy-making rel-
evant for the Arctic, predominantly of internal nature. A large part of the EU’s 
Arctic policy is about what the EU can do itself that is of importance for Arctic 
regions. We believe that in the long-term, the EU’s constructive influence in 
the Arctic will depend primarily on mechanisms and instruments enhancing 
procedural coherence, which entails setting up a coherent Arctic-relevant de-
cision-making process in the EU.
This chapter begins with the presentation of a broad spectrum of the EU 
Arctic-relevant policies and the way in which these have been brought togeth-
er under the umbrella of the “EU Arctic policy”. Building on this overview, we 
consider the questions of coherence and added value (within the EU’s overall 
policy system) of the EU Arctic policy. This yields three challenges: balancing 
between Circumpolar and European Arctic policy spaces, influencing general 
EU decision-making within various policy fields, and managing multiple chan-
nels of interaction with Arctic actors and stakeholders. We offer some ideas as 
regards addressing these challenges.
4   Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Developing a European Union Policy 
Towards the Arctic Region, Brussels [14 May 2014].
5   Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 27 April 2016 on An Integrated 
European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN (2016) 21.
 �3Formulating a Cross-cutting Policy
2 The EU Arctic Policy: “A Sum of Many Parts”
In 2013, the former EU Commissioner for maritime affairs and fisheries referred 
to the 2012 EU policy statement on the EU Arctic policy an “all-encompassing 
policy document”.6 At the same time, EU institutions acknowledge “the cross-
sectoral nature of Arctic issues” that Arctic policy strives to encompass.7 What 
are “all” the issues and sectors that the EU Arctic policy is to cut across?
Tonami and Watters8 described Japanese Arctic policy as a “sum of many 
parts”. This could be said about every Arctic policy adapted by Arctic and non-
Arctic States over the last decade. In particular, the policies of Arctic States are 
multifaceted, combining matters of typically internal and external nature. They 
refer to socio-economic development and environment of their northernmost 
regions, to investments in the North, alongside international co-operation. The 
EU-Arctic nexus is similarly complex. The EU originally emphasized the exter-
nal dimension of its Arctic policy (international co-operation remains a central 
aspect of the EU’s presence in the region). However, the Union’s Arctic policy 
increasingly encompasses questions of regional socioeconomic development 
in the northernmost parts of Europe as well as issues—of primarily internal 
character—where the EU acts towards the Arctic, such as climate change miti-
gation. The multidimensional—internal, cross-border and external—charac-
ter of the EU’s Arctic policy is visible especially in the Joint Communication 
published in 2016.9
Within this broad EU-Arctic landscape, two distinct yet interconnected geo-
graphical and policy spaces can be distinguished: the pan-Arctic, Circumpolar, 
maritime space of external affairs and the European Arctic policy domain, pri-
marily of a terrestrial and internal nature. The EU influences both the European 
and Circumpolar Arctic by three channels: its internal regulations, its funding 
programs and co-operation with international partners.
Firstly, the EU makes policies and legislates in areas where the Union has 
acquired competences from its Member States. The EU is a sui-generis orga-
nization that has pooled competences from its Member States and manages 
some policy areas at the supranational level. Some of these competences are 
exclusive, such as commercial policy or the conservation of living biological 
6   Maria Damanaki, speech at Arctic Frontiers conference, Tromsø, Norway, 21 January 2013.
7   See Council of the European Union 2014, n. 5 above, 35.
8   Aki Tonami and Stewart Watters, ‘Japan’s Arctic Policy: The Sum of Many Parts’ [2012] Arctic 
Yearbook 2012, 93, <http://www.arcticyearbook.com/index.php/articles/21-japan-s-arctic 
-policy-the-sum-of-many-parts> accessed 7 March 2016.
9   JOIN (2016) 21.
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resources.10 In some areas, the EU shares competences with its Member States, 
including in the fields of transport, energy, economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, as well as the environment. Shared competence means that once 
the EU regulates a particular issue, actions of Member States are limited. 
There are also fields of complementary competence, where the EU institutions 
are allowed to act without constraining Member States’ competences, includ-
ing tourism, culture and education.11
Secondly, the EU’s influence is visible via numerous funding instruments. 
The Union budget is a major source of financing for Arctic research with about 
EUR 150 million on Arctic-related research spent during the previous multian-
nual seven-year financial perspective (which encompassed the International 
Polar Year).12 That effort is likely to be matched or exceeded under Horizon 
2020 program running from 2014.13 Further, the EU provides funding for 
regional development and cross-border co-operation. EU structural programs 
are of key importance for northernmost Finnish and Swedish regions, which 
face challenges of remoteness and sparse population, in some cases being 
among the poorest regions with the lowest development potential in their 
respective states.14 The same can be said about the EU-supported cross-border 
co-operation programs in the North (such as Northern Periphery and Arctic 
Program or Northern Dimension partnerships). Moreover, the EU provides 
support for development of education and training in Greenland as a part of 
the EU-Greenland Partnership Agreement.15
Thirdly, the EU takes part in co-operation with other actors (including 
Arctic States). For example, the EU, Canada and the US adopted the Galway 
Statement on Atlantic Ocean Co-operation,16 which includes joint efforts in 
Arctic research. Since 2010, and in the aftermath of the seal ban, the EU has 
10   Article 3, The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] OJ C326/47.
11   Articles 3–6, TFEU.
12   JOIN (2012) 19.
13   JOIN (2016) 21.
14   Lise Smed Olsen and others, ‘Sustainable Business Development in the Nordic Arctic’ 
(Nordregio Nordic Centre for Spatial Development 2016).
15   Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union 
on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, [2014] 
OJ L76/1, together with Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of 
Greenland 2014–2020, 2014/137/EU.
16   Galway Statement on Atlantic Ocean Co-operation. Launching a European Union—
Canada—United States of America Research Alliance [24 May 2013] <https://ec.europa.eu/
research/iscp/pdf/galway_statement_atlantic_ocean_co-operation.pdf> accessed 7 March 
2016.
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organized regular meetings with representatives of Arctic indigenous people.17 
The EU’s special relationship with Greenland18 revolves primarily around fish-
eries and enhancing human resources.19 The EU’s Raw Materials Initiative20 
emphasizes resource diplomacy and securing resource imports from stable 
and well-governed regions. The co-operation with Greenland (and potentially 
Canada) is supposed to be a step towards achieving that objective.21 The EU is 
also involved in developments in northwest Russia via its regional and cross-
border funding (e.g. Kolarctic program).22 EU funding finds its way to the 
Russian Arctic also via the Northern Dimension (ND), a Finnish initiative from 
the 1990s, which developed into a common policy of the EU, Iceland, Norway 
and Russia from 2006. Different “partnerships”—through which ND coopera-
tion is organized—support, among others, feasibility studies for much desired 
East-West transport connections in the European North or environmental in-
frastructure in northern Russian settlements.23
The EU can also influence development of international norms and decision-
making that are of relevance for the region. EU competences as regards setting 
rules for maritime transport make the European Commission’s Directorate 
General Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) (responsible for transport) an 
important actor in any international negotiation referring to maritime traffic. 
This has included negotiations in the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)24 as regards the mandatory Polar Code (International Code for Ships 
17   Adam Stępień, ‘Incentives, Practices and Opportunities for Arctic External Actors’ 
Engagement with Indigenous Peoples: China and the European Union’, in Timo Koivurova 
and Tianbao Qin (eds) Arctic Law and Governance: the role of China, the EU and Finland 
(Hart Publishing, 2017).
18   Greenland left the European Economic Community—the EU’s predecessor—in 1985.
19   The government of Denmark, itself a member of the EU, represents the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland (as parts of the Kingdom of Denmark) as non-EU territories in a number of 
policy areas.
20   European Commission Communication of 4 November 2008 on the raw materials 
initiative—meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe, COM (2008) 699.
21   For example, European Commission—MEMO/12/428 13/06/2012 Greenland’s raw materi-
als potential and the EU’s strategic needs <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
12-428_en.htm> accessed 7 March 2017. However, so far Greenlandic raw materials 
production and export to the EU has not materialized.
22   Kolarctic (ENPI, 2007–2014) Program’s website at <http://www.kolarcticenpi.info/en> 
accessed 7 March 2016.
23   European External Action Service website, Northern Dimension <http://www.eeas 
.europa.eu/north_dim/> accessed 7 March 2017.
24   The European Union or the European Commission is not a member of the International 
Maritime Organization. However, as many aspects under discussion in the IMO are in the 
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Operating in Polar Waters), concluded in 2015 (in force 1 January 2017).25 The 
European Commission is also one of the key players in the inter national nego-
tiations on the protection of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction;26 
a process that is potentially of high importance for the future governance of 
the Central Arctic Ocean. Owing to the exclusive EU competence as regards 
conservation of marine biological resources under common fisheries policy, 
the European Commission would be among key non-Arctic actors in the dis-
cussion on any future Arctic fisheries management scheme.27 In addition, as 
a party to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)28 
as well as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention 
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)29—international in-
struments targeting POPs—the EU can influence the placing of new Arctic-
relevant POPs on the list of substances to be eliminated or restricted.
At the regional level, the European Commission is a full member of the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council and provides a significant portion of the funding 
for cross-border co-operation in the Barents region. In the Arctic Council, the 
EU acts in practice as an observer and its representatives are active in several of 
the Arctic Council’s working groups, including the Conservation of Arctic Flora 
and Fauna (CAFF) and the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).
The EU’s regulatory power, its relations with trade partners and its influence 
on international processes are relevant for the Arctic because the EU’s internal 
market, its economy and population exert a noticeable environmental and eco-
nomic footprint on the region. Among others, the 2010 EU Arctic Footprint and 
scope of competences shared between the Member States and the Union, the EU and 
Member States meet before the IMO (and its committees) meetings in order to speak, 
where possible, with a single voice.
25   International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), MEPC 68/21/
Add.1, <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20
CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf> accessed 7 March 2016.
26   For example, Stephen Hodgson, Andrew Serdy, Ian Payne, Johan Gille, ‘Towards a Possible 
International Agreement on Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’ 
(2014) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/536292/IPOL_STU 
(2014)536292_EN.pdf> accessed 7 March 2016.
27   For example, establishing a Regional Fisheries Management Organization for the Arctic 
Ocean.
28   Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 22 May 2001 (entry into force 
17 May 2004), 2256 UNTS 119; 40 ILM 532 (2001).
29   Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13 November 1979 (entry into 
force 16 March 1983), 1302 UNTS 217; 18 ILM 1442 (1979).
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Policy Assessment Report30 and the 2014 Strategic Assessment of Development 
of the Arctic report31 outlined the scope of such EU’s links with the Arctic. For 
example, a relatively high percentage of emissions produced in the EU find 
their way into the Arctic,32 as Europe is the closest highly industrialized region 
to the Arctic. Various EU policies that influence European emissions of per-
sistent organic pollutants, such as Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), mercury, 
acidifying pollutants (sulphur and nitrogen oxides) or short-live climate pol-
lutants (black carbon and methane), contribute to the amount of contamina-
tion reaching the Arctic environment via wind patterns and ocean currents. 
Approximately a quarter of the mercury emissions reaching the Arctic from 
southern latitudes is emitted within the EU, primarily due to Europe’s proxim-
ity to the region. In 2013, the EU contributed 11% to global carbon dioxide emis-
sions (although the figure would be different if it included the EU consumption 
of goods produced elsewhere in the world).33 The EU accounts for 30%–40% of 
fish imports from Arctic countries, and 24% of final demand for products from 
the Arctic oil and gas industry.34
The Arctic footprint of the European population, economy and market is 
influenced by various EU policies, making the EU one of the actors shaping—
albeit often from afar—Arctic realities. Climate and energy policies provide 
the clearest examples. Climate change is widely considered one of key drivers 
of the Arctic’s transformation.35 The EU introduced mitigation actions, includ-
ing via energy transition, regulations supporting renewables, energy efficiency 
and the emissions trading system.36 The EU also significantly supports climate 
research including Arctic research projects.37 Furthermore, the EU action on 
30   Sandra Cavalieri and others, ‘EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment: Final Report’ 1 
<http://www.endseurope.com/docs/101119a.pdf> accessed 7 March 2016.
31   Stępień, Koivurova and Kankaanpää 2014, n. 1 above.
32   Cavalieri and others 2010, n. 31 above.
33   Jos GJ Olivier and others, ‘Trends in Global CO2 Emissions 2014 Report’ (2014) PBL 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the Institute for Environment and 
Sustainability (IES) of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre ( JRC) Report.
34   Cavalieri and others 2010, n. 31 above.
35   Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. Status and Trends in Arctic Biodiversity (2013) <http://www 
.abds.is/> accessed 7 March 2016; Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic [2011] AMAP 
Report to the Arctic Council chapter 4 59 <http://amap.no/swipa/> accessed 7 March 
2016.
36   See, for example, the website of the EU Climate Action at <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/index_en.htm> accessed 7 March 2016.
37   Website of the Horizon 2020 EU Framework Program for Research and Innovation at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/programs/horizon2020/> accessed 7 March 2016.
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climate change should in principle affect European long-term demand for 
Arctic hydrocarbons.
The EU can also set rules for maritime traffic via its Member States’ port 
state and flag state authority. For instance, EU legislation requires Member States 
to provide information on ice conditions, recommend routes and icebreaking 
services, as well as request from vessels certification documents commensu-
rate with the ice conditions.38
REACH Regulation39 and POPs Regulation40 are good examples of EU poli-
cies affecting long-range pollution. While these policies are primarily impor-
tant for the environment of highly industrialized regions in Europe, they are 
also relevant for regulating contaminants reaching the Arctic.
The best-known case of the EU’s formally internal rules influencing Arctic 
regions—owing to the EU’s leverage as a major market—is the regulation ban-
ning the placing of seal products on the EU market.41 Originating both from 
animal welfare concerns and the introduction (or the processes leading to the 
introduction) of bans by several Member States, and underpinned by powerful 
campaigns by animal rights organizations, the so-called seal ban significantly 
affected the livelihoods of both commercial sealers in Canada and Inuit hunt-
ers. The latter, while in principle exempted from the ban, claimed they were 
impacted owing to the overall collapse of the global seal skin market follow-
ing the introduction of the EU ban.42 The ban caused outrage among many 
Arctic communities as well as Inuit organizations and—for several years—led 
Canada to prevent the EU from gaining formal observer status in the Arctic 
Council.
38   Directive 2009/17/EC of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a 
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system [2009] OJ L131/101.
39   Regulation 1907/2006/EC of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 
793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/
EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC [2006] 
OJ L396.
40   Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 of 29 April 2004 on persistent organic pollutants and 
amending Directive 79/117/EEC [2004] OJ L158/7.
41   Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products [2009] OJ 
L286/36.
42   Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The goals of the Eu seal products trade regulation: from effectiveness to 
consequence’ (2015) 51(3) Polar Record 274; Dorothee Cambou, ‘The Impact of the Ban on 
Seal Products on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A European Issue’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of 
Polar Law 389.
 �9Formulating a Cross-cutting Policy
The EU’s influence on the Arctic could also entail setting examples of 
standards and best practices. This becomes of particular importance as 
increasing number of countries currently call for defining Arctic standards for 
various activities.43 However, while the EU has certainly exerted influence as 
a standard-setter in regions such as Central-Eastern Europe, the EU’s sway in 
the Arctic is comparatively minimal, as Arctic actors usually have confidence 
in their own Arctic expertise and management/governance frameworks.44 
Nonetheless, there are a few promising areas for the EU’s “rule by example” 
to be also visible in Arctic affairs. SafeSeaNet45 (information on ships, ship 
movements, hazardous cargoes, etc.) and CleanSeaNet46 (mainly oil spill mon-
itoring) run by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) are good exam-
ples of internal EU solutions that could be presented as good practices to be 
reproduced—in the long-term—in Arctic waters.47
The EU’s influence on the Circumpolar Arctic is significant, but the Union is 
even more important in the policy space of the European Arctic. There, the EU’s 
influence is much more direct, repositioning the Union as an Arctic internal—
rather than external—actor and a key player in the European Arctic affairs. 
The northernmost territories of Finland and Sweden are located in the Arctic 
region48 and the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement49 means that 
large parts of EU legislation are applicable in Iceland and Norway.
The early EU policy reflection on the Arctic—manifested in documents 
published between 2007 and 2010—clearly had an external and maritime 
43   For example, U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership, 
16 March 2016, The White House, Office of Press Secretary <https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-climate-energy-and-arctic 
-leadership> accessed 13 June 2016.
44   Piotr Kobza, ‘Civilian Power Europe in the Arctic: How Far Can the European Union Go 
North?’ (2015) EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2015, Brugge and Natolin: Collage of Europe.
45   European Maritime Safety Agency website at <http://www.emsa.europa.eu/ssn-main 
.html> accessed 7 March 2016.
46   European Maritime Safety Agency website at <https://portal.emsa.europa.eu/web/csn> 
accessed 7 March 2016.
47   Gunnar Sander and others, ‘Changes in Arctic Maritime Transport’ in Adam Stępień, 
Timo Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää (eds), The Changing Arctic and the European 
Union (Brill/Nijhoff 2016).
48   As defined by the Arctic Human Development Report or Arctic Council’s Arctic Moni-
toring and Assessment Program, while there are many definitions of “the Arctic”. See, 
Joan Nymand Larsen and Gail Fondahl (eds.) Arctic Human Development Report: Regional 
Processes and Global Linkages, TemaNord 2014:567, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2014, 
doi:10.6027/TN2014–567.
49   Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3.
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focus.50 The Arctic Ocean, interactions with Arctic coastal States and sea-
dependent indigenous peoples (like the Inuit) comprised Arctic policy space 
for the EU policy-makers. However, the idea that the EU should develop its 
own overarching approach to the Arctic activated various actors from the 
European part of the Arctic, who felt that the EU formulates Arctic policy 
ignoring the part of Europe located above the Arctic Circle, that is the northern-
most regions of Finland, Sweden and Norway.51 Crucially, these actors would 
like to use the greater EU interest in the Arctic to emphasize their own priori-
ties and to encourage the Union’s support to developing responses to various 
economic, demographic, social or accessibility challenges faced by Europe’s 
northern communities. Reacting to these calls, the EU Arctic policy had gradu-
ally acquired a second, European Arctic dimension. That has become particu-
larly visible in the 2016 Joint Communication.
European Arctic regions are directly affected by EU environmental, trans-
port, energy and competition legislation. For example, the EU’s Natura 2000 
network—based on the Habitats and Bird Directives52—establishes a very 
strong conservation framework for large swaths of European Arctic eco-
systems. In the 1990s, for example, a major hydropower project in Northern 
Finland did not come to pass due to the requirements of Natura 2000 and the 
threat of the European Commission’s legal action against Finland.53 Similar ex-
amples of the EU’s central role in the region are numerous. The EU legislation 
creates baselines for environmental impact assessment procedures.54 Policies 
supporting renewable energy developments55 boost wind power investments 
50   COM (2008) 763; Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance [2008] 
P6_TA(2008)0474.
51   See, for example, Northern Sparsely Populated Areas network, The NSPA position on the 
future EU Arctic Policy, <http://www.nspa-network.eu/media/11809/nspa%20position% 
20on%20arctic%20final.pdf > accessed 7 March 2016. Norwegian northernmost regions 
are not part of the EU, but are strongly affected by EU regulations via the EEA Agreement 
and take part in numerous EU funding programs. They have proven over the years to be 
particularly active in lobbying for the EU Arctic policy.
52   Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora [1992] OJ L206/7; Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 on the con-
servation of wild birds [2010] OJ L20/7.
53   Timo Koivurova, ‘The Case of Vuotos: Interplay Between International, Community and 
National Environmental Law’ (2004) 13 Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law 47.
54   Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain pub-
lic and private projects on the environment [2012] OJ L26.
55   European Commission 2013 <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm> 
accessed 29 January 2014; Renewable energy in 2011 accounted for 31.8% of energy pro-
duced in Finland (90% of energy produced regionally in Lapland), Finland’s 2020 national 
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in the North. The decisions on the structure of trans-European transport 
networks have implications for the chances of infrastructural projects in the 
North obtaining funding. Various pieces of legislation influence how mining—
one of the key industries in Northern Fennoscandia—is conducted, including 
rules on waste management or chemicals.56 The EU’s Raw Materials Initiative57 
calls for increased domestic EU production of metals and other minerals.58 In 
the mid-term, the EU Climate Adaptation Strategy59 and its implementation 
will likely be of importance in the northernmost part of Europe, the fastest 
warming region in the continent.60 The priorities of EU funding programs also 
influence northern regional development strategies.61
As elsewhere, not all Arctic stakeholders judge EU policies to be advanta-
geous. Not untypically, perceptions of specific EU rules vary between differ-
ent interest groups. A few instances can be mentioned here. Reindeer herders 
are often unhappy with what they consider too high a population of preda-
tors (wolves, bears, wolverines, lynxes), which is partly linked to protective EU 
environmental regulations.62 The EU directive enforcing new international 
standards on sulphur content in marine fuels63 establishes emission limits 
 
target is 38%; 46.8% in Sweden (2020 target–49%); 65% in Norway (2020 target–67.5%). 
See: Eurostat data on the share of energy from renewable resources <http://epp.eurostat 
.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/database> accessed 7 March 2016.
56   For example, Directive 2006/118/EC of 12 December 2006 on the protection of ground-
water against pollution and deterioration [2006] OJ L372/19; Directive 2006/21/EC of 
15 March 20106 on the management of waste from the extractive industries and amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC [2006] OJ L102/15.
57   N. 21 above.
58   See also Kim van Dam and others, ‘Mining in the European Arctic’ in Adam Stępień, Timo 
Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää (eds), The Changing Arctic and the European Union 
(Brill/Nijhoff 2016).
59   European Commission Communication of 16 April 2013 “An EU Strategy on Adaptation 
to Climate Change”, COM (2013) 216.
60   See, for example, Santtu Mikkonen and others, ‘Trends in the Average Temperature in 
Finland, 1847–2013’ (2015) 29 Stoch Environ Res Risk Assess 1521.
61   For instance, Finnish Lapland formulated the so-called Arctic smartness portfolio as a 
part of the regional “smart specialization” within the EU. Regional Council of Lapland, 
Arctic Smartness Portfolio, <http://www.lappi.fi/lapinliitto/arctic-smartness-portfolio> 
accessed 7 March 2016.
62   See, for example, Hannu Heikkinen and others, ‘Managing Predators, Managing Reindeer: 
Contested Conceptions of Predator Policies in Finland’s Southeast Reindeer Herding 
Area’ (2011) 47 Polar Record 218.
63   Directive 2012/33/EU of 21 November 2012 amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as 
regards the sulphur content of marine fuels [2012] OJ L327/1.
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for Finnish maritime transport in the Baltic Sea. This could potentially raise 
transport costs for Lapland’s resource exports, and therefore it resulted in criti-
cal industry voices as regards the EU policy.64 While for some stakeholders the 
Natura 2000 constitutes a welcome additional protection for the highly fragile 
sub-Arctic environment, for others it appears to be a far-reaching constraint on 
regional development, disproportionally affecting northernmost regions.
In sum, on one hand, the EU shares a number of similarities with other 
external Arctic actors, such as China or Japan. The EU’s industrialized centers 
are far from the region, but influence the Arctic in various ways. On the other 
hand, owing to direct EU presence as a policy-maker and funding-provider 
in Northern Europe, the EU is a sui generis case in the landscape of Arctic 
governance. It is an influential yet secondary external player as regards cir-
cumpolar affairs, and at the same time a crucial actor in the European part of 
the Arctic.
3 Coherence and Added Value of the Overarching EU Arctic Policy
The above overview suggests that an overarching EU Arctic policy is bound 
to be a “sum of many parts”, and the spectrum of issues that the EU Arctic 
policy is to encompass is very broad. The resulting “all-encompassing” Arc-
tic policy framework is bound to be multifaceted. Moreover, the EU Arctic 
policy is also component-driven,65 which means that it brings together issues 
anchored in various sectoral policies, policies that are primary/antecedent—
in terms of time and the position in the policy system—to the cross-cutting 
Arctic framework. These characteristics of the EU Arctic policy raise questions 
as to whether a framework bringing together these different “parts” can genu-
inely facilitate better EU performance as a polity affecting the Arctic.
The 2012 Joint Communication of the Commission and High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy together with accompanying 
Staff Working Document66 were the most wide-reaching EU Arctic policy doc-
uments. They brought together a large number of EU Arctic-relevant policies, 
64   Discussions during the 2013 9th Fennoscandian Exploration and Mining Conference, 
Levi, Finland, 30 October 2013.
65   See, Peter J May and others, ‘Policy Coherence and Component-Driven Policymaking: 
Arctic Policy in Canada and the United States’ (2005) 33 Policy Studies Journal 37.
66   European Commission and the High Representative of the EU, The inventory of activi-
ties in the framework of developing a European Union Arctic Policy, Joint Staff Working 
Document Accompanying JOIN (2012) 19, SWD (2012) 183 final.
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activities and projects. However, wide-reaching did not mean more coher-
ent and “bringing together” did not signify anything else than a new labelling 
of existing activities under vague and abstract headlines of “knowledge, 
responsibility and engagement”.67 Adele Airoldi stated in her analysis of the 
EU Arctic policy68 that these “three abstract catchwords […] do not quite trans-
late into a clearer vision nor in a better defined and developed program than in 
2008” (when the first Arctic policy document was published). Many measures 
or actions listed in the Communication were “statements of fact rather than 
commitments to action, which appear to be in great part a continuation or 
intensification of existing activities at EU, bilateral or multilateral level”.69
The 2016 Joint Communication70 is an attempt to introduce more focus 
into the EU’s key Arctic statement. To a certain degree that has been achieved, 
as the emphasis is on fewer issues—those where the EU’s leverage in Arctic 
affairs is the clearest. The document identifies three “priority areas” for the 
EU’s action in the Arctic:
 • Climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment
 • Arctic (primarily European Arctic) and Arctic-related economic development
 • International cooperation
However, these areas still encompass a variety of issues including climate 
research, adaptation, investments, coordination of EU funding, biodiversity 
protection, innovative Arctic technologies, transport and communication 
links, space technologies, maritime safety, dialogue with indigenous people 
and the EU’s participation in regional co-operation. It is unclear how these 
aspects are interrelated, though the relative chaos of the 2012 document has 
not been repeated. There are still no overarching objectives that guide the EU’s 
approach towards the region. Regional development trajectories to which the 
EU funding and policies are to contribute are not defined. Many mentioned 
actions are already ongoing or are included in the “Arctic policy” as a part of 
pre-existing general EU policy frameworks, such as climate mitigation, invest-
ments, research, or air pollution policy. Some statements that refer to future or 
planned activities are vague and do not include clear commitments on the side 
67   JOIN (2012) 19.
68   Adele Airoldi, ‘The European Union and the Arctic: Developments and Perspectives 2010–
2014’ (2014), TemaNord 2014:565, Nordic Council of Ministers.
69   Ibid. See also, Andreas Østhagen, ‘The European Union—An Arctic Actor?’ (2013) 15 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 71.
70   JOIN (2016) 21.
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of the EU. That should not be seen as criticism, rather an acknowledgement 
that the formulation of an “integrated” EU Arctic policy is highly unlikely, 
despite the claim contained in the title of the 2016 policy document.
Rather than providing direction and consistency for the multifaceted EU 
activities, the 2012 and 2016 joint communications still serve primarily as pub-
lic relations statements directed towards both Arctic actors and the public 
of the EU. They justify EU Arctic engagement and highlight the role of the EU 
in the Arctic.
Can the EU Arctic policy-making go beyond listing activities and justifying 
the EU’s interests in regional affairs? Can the Arctic policy-making truly bring 
together various EU activities and make a positive difference in the EU’s pres-
ence in the Arctic? These questions invoke two interrelated notions: added 
value (making a positive difference) and coherence (bringing together).
First, an overarching Arctic policy is expected to “make a difference”. Added 
value can be understood as something that appears when a cross-cutting pol-
icy is more than just a “sum of its parts”, when the act of bringing together is 
followed by changes in policies and actions or in new activities.
“Bringing together”71 means not only producing an inventory but also 
introducing some minimal degree of coherence and coordination into the EU 
Arctic-relevant policies and activities. Østhagen72 submits that the “natural 
end goal of the EU’s Arctic policy development is a coordination of EU policies 
interlinked with, or influencing, the Arctic region”. Coordination can be seen 
as a set of practices and arrangements (institutional, functional) to enhance 
the coherence of the polity’s activities,73 a crucial element of “procedural 
coherence”.74 On the one hand, coherence can be understood as minimizing 
contradictions between different aspects of EU regional presence (consistency, 
negative coherence). On the other hand, enhancing positive coherence means 
finding synergies in order for different actions to strengthen one another, to 
71   Carmen Gebhard, ‘Coherence’ in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds), International 
Relations and the European Union (Oxford University Press 2011).
72   See Østhagen, n. 70 above, 84–85.
73   Tom Jones, ‘Policy Coherence, Global Environmental Governance and Poverty Reduction’ 
(2002) 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 389; Evert 
Meijers and Dominic Stead, ‘Policy Integration: What Does It Mean and How Can It 
Be Achieved? A Multi-Disciplinary Review’, Human Dimensions of Global Environment 
Change: Greening of Policies—Interlinkages and Policy Integration (2004) <http://userpage 
.fu-berlin.de/ffu/akumwelt/bc2004/download/meijers_stead_f.pdf> accessed 7 March 2016.
74   Gebhard 2011, n. 72 above.
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avoid duplications and to use resources more efficiently.75 Coordination and 
coherence can have horizontal (various EU institutions and agencies), vertical 
(EU and its Member States) and regional (EU and other Arctic actors) dimen-
sions. EU policies so far refer primarily to the horizontal coherence between 
various DGs of the European Commission and the European External Action 
Service’s Arctic-relevant activities. They do not advance coordination with and 
among Member States.
The EU institutions have pronounced that one of the tasks of the EU 
Arctic policy framework is to introduce more coherence into the EU policy-
system (across its external and internal dimensions) as regards the Arctic. The 
2012 Joint Communication was described as a pathway towards a “coherent 
approach”.76 In 2014, the European Parliament called for the formulation of 
a “united EU policy on the Arctic” and a “coherent strategy and concretized 
action plan on the EU’s engagement in the Arctic”,77 while the Council of the 
European Union (EU Council) requested the European Commission to work 
towards “further development of an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy”.78 
Following the EU Council’s request, the 2016 Joint Communication is present-
ed as an “integrated EU policy”. It is unclear what “integrated” is to mean in the 
EU Arctic context. It certainly does not refer to establishing an overarching 
policy, the objectives of which would overshadow sectoral approaches, as is 
supposed to be the case, for instance, with the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy. 
Rather, integration refers to juxtaposing different policies and actions and—
confusingly—integrating (i.e. anchoring) the “Arctic policy” into the EU’s pre-
existing regulatory and policy system.79
The challenge of introducing coherence or integration is a result of the com-
ponent-based character of the Arctic policy. Policy statements are collections 
of actions arising from general policies. These actions are thus not designed or 
chosen based on an Arctic-specific assessment of needs or on Arctic-specific 
75   Ibid.; Stefano Bertea, ‘Looking for Coherence within the European Community’ (2005) 
11 European Law Journal 154 DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2005.00255.x>; 
Hartmut Mayer, ‘The Challenge of Coherence and Consistency in EU Foreign Policy’ in 
Mario Telò and Frederik Ponjaert (eds), Globalisation, Europe, Multilateralism Series: EU’s 
Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? (Ashgate 2013).
76   JOIN (2012) 19, 17.
77   European Parliament, Joint Motion for a Resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic, 10/12 
March 2014. B7-0229/2014, B7-0230/2014, B7-0231/2014, B7-0232/2014.
78   Council of the European Union, Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy to-
wards the Arctic Region 2014.
79   Adam Stępień and Andreas Raspotnik, ‘The EU’s new Arctic Communication: Not-so-
integrated, not so-disappointing?’, ArCticles: Arctic Centre Papers 1/2016.
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objectives. Moreover, the identification of focused and concrete objectives 
would require making political choices. In the case of the 2012 and 2016 docu-
ments, the EU policymakers wanted to satisfy all stakeholders and include all 
relevant issues. Policymakers circumvent politicized policy choices by avoiding 
controversial topics such as extraction of hydrocarbons and minerals or seal-
ing and whaling. Furthermore, tensions between different objectives and val-
ues are obscured by labelling developments, technologies, actions or desired 
outcomes as sustainable, responsible or resilient, without providing details on 
the contextualized meaning of these words.
The abovementioned shortcomings of the EU Arctic policy documents and 
lack of synergies between actions are not, however, a result of the failure of EU 
policymakers. Rather, they are outcomes of the character of this region-focused 
policy field as a component-based framework. Aiming at formulating a coher-
ent set of EU-Arctic objectives and drafting comprehensive yet focused docu-
ments is extremely challenging if not impossible. Instead, the EU policymakers 
should focus on strengthening the procedural dimension of coherence which 
comprises mechanisms for enhancing consistency in Arctic decision-making.80
The questions of procedural coherence and added value of the EU Arctic 
policy have three practical challenges for the Arctic policy-making in the 
EU. The first challenge is how to bring together various policy fields, in par-
ticular those specifically aimed at European and Circumpolar Arctic. The sec-
ond challenge is how to facilitate the relatively marginal cross-cutting Arctic 
policy framework to make a tangible difference in the way the EU interacts 
with the region through sectoral policies and actions. The third challenge is 
managing the EU’s interactions with Arctic stakeholders and actors. The 2012 
Joint Communication rendered all three challenges visible. The 2016 Joint 
Communication constitutes a step towards addressing them.
4 Challenge One: Balancing Diverse Spaces: European and 
Circumpolar Arctic
The diverse set of issues that fall under the umbrella of the EU Arctic policy-
making reflects two dimensions of the EU’s presence in the region. Marine 
issues, energy and the Arctic Council belong to the Circumpolar Arctic, 
global Arctic or Arctic Ocean policy space. Regional economic development, 
80   As argued by one of the authors in Adam Stępień. “Internal Contradictions and External 
Anxieties: One ‘Coherent’ Arctic Policy for the European Union”, (2015) 7 Yearbook of Polar 
Law 249.
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 investments, European Economic Area, Barents co-operation, transport and 
raw materials comprise the European Arctic dimension of the EU’s Arctic poli-
cy. We believe that the challenge of bringing together different Arctic-relevant 
EU policies and actions is to a great extent about balancing and clarifying 
the EU’s role in these two interconnected but distinct policy areas.
The confusion between these two spaces is visible in interactions between the 
EU and Arctic stakeholders, in the European Parliament debates,81 as well as, 
most recently, the reactions and misinterpretations of the content of the 2016 
Joint Communication.82 Often different actors refer to divergent understand-
ings of what constitutes “the Arctic”. Some policy-makers and stakeholders talk 
about the distant, exotic High Arctic, populated by Inuit hunters and symbol-
ized by diminishing Arctic Ocean sea-ice and currently very limited offshore 
oil extraction. Climate change, shipping and pan-Arctic co-operation stand 
out as key issues to be tackled. Others, when they discuss the Arctic in the EU 
context, think about Northern Fennoscandia and the North Atlantic. The chal-
lenges of regional development, reindeer herding and transport accessibility 
in remote, sparsely populated areas are therefore highlighted.
The Circumpolar and European Arctic policy spaces entail different prob-
lems, issues, and roles for the EU. Circumpolar Arctic questions are primarily 
of a maritime nature and the EU’s presence is mainly visible via international 
co-operation, where the EU has encountered a discouraging backlash mani-
fested in the lack of formal status as an observer in the Arctic Council.83 
Involvement in circumpolar affairs yields interactions with stakeholders from 
maritime industries, fisheries, energy and global environmental NGOs.
81   See for example, the European Parliament, Debate on the EU Strategy for the Arctic, 
17 April 2013, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE
&reference=20130417&secondRef=ITEM-018&language=EN> accessed 7 March 2016; see 
also, Andreas Østhagen, ‘The Arctic and the Need for Greater Differentiation in a Non-
Coherent Region’ (2012) The Arctic Institute <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/02/
arctic-and-need-for-greater.html> accessed 15 March 2015.
82   Based on the authors observations from a number of meetings and seminars following 
the publication of the 2016 Joint Communication.
83   However, in the Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna in May 2013, the Arctic Council accepted 
the EU’s application for observer status. The implementation of this positive decision 
was then suspended until the EU resolves problematic questions with Arctic Council 
members (primarily, the seal ban dispute). Notwithstanding the suspension, the EU was 
allowed to observe Council meetings on par with other observers and is often called 
“observer-in-principle”, that is. without having a formal, symbolic status (Arctic Council, 
‘Kiruna Declaration’ <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/
category/5-declarations> accessed 7 March 2016.).
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In contrast, European Arctic challenges are chiefly terrestrial. In this 
European Arctic policy space, the EU is a policy-maker, regulatory actor and 
a source of funding. Among relevant stakeholders in this policy space are 
Europe’s northernmost regions (in Brussels grouped within the Northern 
Sparsely Populated Areas network),84 the Sámi, reindeer herders, local busi-
nesses, the mining industry, and national environmental NGOs.
In the Circumpolar Arctic, the EU occupies a back seat, and for many 
Arctic stakeholders it remains a secondary actor. In the European Arctic, the 
EU is a key player, and EU institutions are targets of intense regional lobby-
ing. Some actors in the Circumpolar Arctic appear to be anxious about the 
EU’s presence,85 while many in the European Arctic are contrastingly anxious 
that the EU’s interest and involvement in the Arctic are not strong enough.
The 2016 Joint Communication is clearer than previous documents in terms 
of distinguishing the two geographic policy spaces. However, introducing 
clearer wording may not be enough to accommodate diverse interests that play 
out within the EU-Arctic nexus. In an analysis for the Arctic Institute, Stępień86 
proposed to resolve the intermingling of European Arctic and Circumpolar 
Arctic policy fields by formulating the EU Arctic policy as a two-tier frame-
work: an overarching policy for the Circumpolar Arctic, and within it, a focused 
strategy for the European Arctic. A Circumpolar Arctic policy could then retain 
its current set of general, vague objectives or policy keywords. It would include 
maritime issues, climate change mitigation, climate and ocean research, earth 
observation, involvement in the Arctic Council, and the EU’s role in shaping 
Arctic-relevant international norms.
A focused strategy for the European Arctic would address challenges arising 
from the Arctic transformation as they are manifested in the Europe’s north-
ernmost regions. A short list of specific goals or targets would need to be identi-
fied together with Nordic States, northernmost regions and local stakeholders, 
with the involvement of the EEA partners. Relevant issues here include co-
operation within the Barents region (Barents Euro-Arctic Council, where the 
European Commission is a full member) and transport networks extending to 
Russia and Norway.
84   Northern Sparsely Populated Areas (NSPAs) network website at <http://www.nspa- 
network.eu/> accessed 7 March 2016.
85   See Stępień, 2015, n. 81 above.
86   Stępień, 2015, n. 1 above.
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Building on the experiences of the EU macro-regional strategies,87 the pre-
condition for the feasibility and effectiveness of such a strategy is that con-
crete action plans are agreed and that all relevant actors commit to the targets 
and to the implementation of actions. “Strategy” is a word often avoided by 
external Arctic actors. This is owing to the notion that strategy entails a certain 
degree of control over the geographic space and is aimed at achieving concrete 
goals towards securing specific interests. Calling the whole EU (Circumpolar) 
Arctic policy “a strategy” could therefore trigger anxiety among Arctic states.88 
However, the EU’s more coherent approach towards the European Arctic could 
certainly constitute “a strategy”; exactly because the EU institutions, Member 
States and EU actors have a great deal of control over developments in the 
region and have direct, tangible interests in its sustainable development. 
Indeed, when the calls for a “coherent strategy” are voiced—such as in the 2014 
European Parliament Resolution—usually they refer to the European Arctic 
affairs.89
The 2016 Joint Communication makes a step towards devising a European 
Arctic strategy. In 2017, the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum together with 
a network of EU funding programs attempt to identify overarching key invest-
ment and research priorities for the European Arctic. The Forum is to include 
regional and national authorities as well as other stakeholders, with participa-
tion of Norway, Iceland and Greenland. The Forum is supposed to deliver its 
proposals for priorities by the end of 2017.
Several possible goals for the European Arctic strategy could be envisaged. 
Actors will face the need to jointly address climate adaptation in Europe’s 
fastest warming region, with increased flooding, impacts on winter roads and 
winter tourism raised among future concerns.90 Strategic targets could include 
also the North-South and intra-regional (East-West) transport networks, digi-
tal connectivity, as well as tackling developmental or demographic problems 
specific to these sparsely populated areas. The challenges faced by the Sámi 
have to be highlighted, including energizing traditional livelihoods in light of 
87   European Commission, ‘Report Concerning the Added Value of Macro-Regional 
Strategies’ (2013) SWD (2013) 233.
88   It was for this very reason that the word “strategy” was not used in, for instance, the United 
Kingdom’s Arctic policy statement, according to the statement by a UK official at the “In 
the Spirit of Rovaniemi Process” conference on 25 November 2015 in Rovaniemi, Finland.
89   European Parliament 2014; European Parliament, Debate on the EU Strategy for the 
Arctic, quoted above.
90   Mikkonen and others 2013; Lapin Liitto (Regional Council of Lapland), Lapin 
Ilmastostrategia 2030 (Lapland’s Climate Strategy 2030). 2011. Julkaisu 27/2011.
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expanding resource extraction.91 Further, the development of Arctic towns 
could be supported, as in the Europe’s northernmost regions these relatively 
small settlements play a socio-economic role similar to large population cen-
tres in Central Europe. The challenges they experience do not fit well to either 
urban or rural development programs.92
Owing to economic, demographic and social challenges that trouble north-
ern Fennoscandia,93 a policy referring to the European Arctic is likely to 
acquire emphasis on economic development. The 2016 Joint Communication 
stands as clear proof of such dynamics.
It is unlikely that the strategy will include long-term institutional arrange-
ments, mechanisms for policy co-ordination, and dedicated funding instru-
ments supporting specific European Arctic priorities, adding to existing 
programs. The EU has adopted an approach to its macro-regional strategies 
(for the Baltic Sea Region, Danube, the Alps, Adriatic-Ionian Region or for 
Atlantic) based on the principles that no new institutions are to be created, 
no new funding instruments established and no new regulations adopted 
(“3xNO”). Therefore, the proposed Arctic Stakeholder Forum is to be a tempo-
rary, short-lived mechanism—finalizing its work in 2017—with its legacy to be 
carried on in the framework of loose annual stakeholder conferences rather 
than any institutionalized arrangement.
Instead of creating new programs, the strategy would streamline existing 
financing, prevent duplications and in the long-term affect priorities for fund-
ing instruments. The concept of the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum is 
heading precisely in that direction. In addition, ideas indirectly supporting 
European Arctic strategic priorities within already operating programs could 
be considered. A good example of such a mechanism is the Seed Money Facility 
within the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR).94 It provides seed 
grants for work on proposals directed to various EU programs for projects that 
match the EUSBSR priorities.
91   Based on the consultations leading towards the drafting of the Strategic Assessment of 
Development of the Arctic report, as well as consultations on “Streamlining EU fund-
ing in the European Arctic carried out by the European Commission, see European 
Commission, Public consultation on streamlining EU funding in the European Arctic, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/arctic-eu-funding/
doc/consultation-paper_en.pdf> accessed 14 February 2015.
92   Adam Stępień and others, ‘Socioeconomic and Cultural Changes in the European Arctic’ 
in Adam Stępień, Timo Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää (eds), The Changing Arctic and 
the European Union (Brill/Nijhoff 2016).
93   Ibid.
94   Seed Money Facility website at <http://seed.eusbsr.eu/> accessed 7 March 2016.
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In terms of institutional arrangements, currently the EU Arctic policy is 
coordinated jointly by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare), with the involvement of various 
Commission DGs and agencies such as the European Environment Agency and 
European Maritime Safety Agency. The coordination is conducted via the Arctic 
Inter-Service Group, which serves primarily information purposes.95 However, 
the European Arctic strategy could be ultimately led by the Commission’s units 
responsible for regional development, transport or environment. While any 
additional organizational arrangements may be difficult for the Arctic policy 
as a whole, the European Arctic strategy—similarly to macro-regional strat-
egies—could be supported by networks of responsible officials from differ-
ent Member States, EEA States and regions.96 Moreover, regional stakeholder 
forums and conferences—as proposed in the 2016 Communication—could 
strengthen the long-term interaction between actors.
5 Challenge Two: Influencing Sectoral Policy-making in the EU
The precondition for a cross-cutting framework to have added value is its 
capacity to influence EU sectoral decision-making processes.97 Only actions 
dedicated to coordination, dialogue and outreach have been so far carried out 
within the EU Arctic policy itself.98 In order for Arctic policy to enhance the 
EU’s presence in the Arctic, the actions need to be taken within sectoral poli-
cies, such as environment, transport, energy, external relations, or internation-
al ocean governance. The critical aspect is therefore the interlinkage between 
the Arctic policy-making and sectoral, substantial policies.
95   Personal communication (by A. Stępień, on file), policy officer, European Commission DG 
Environment (August 2015); policy officer, European Environment Agency (July 2015).
96   Jonathan Metzger and Peter Schmitt, ‘When Soft Spaces Harden: The EU Strategy for the 
Baltic Sea Region’ (2012) 44 Environment and Planning A 263; Sandrine Moretti and Jan 
Martinsson, ‘Multi-Level Governance in the European Union for the Baltic Sea Region: An 
Actor’s Mapping Perspective’ 1 <http://groupspaces.com/eusbsr-governance/> accessed 
7 March 2016.
97   Basing on David Dery, ‘Policy by the Way: When Policy Is Incidental to Making Other 
Policies’ (1998) 18 Journal of Public Policy 163; Grant Jordan and Darren Halpin, ‘The 
Political Costs of Policy Coherence: Constructing a Rural Policy for Scotland’ (2006) 26 
Journal of Public Policy 21.
98   Albeit even such coordinating activities entail using existing sectoral structures and pro-
grams, as no arrangements exist for the EU Arctic policy.
Stępień and Koivurova3�
May et al.99—building on Dery’s100 concept of a “policy by the way”— 
proposed a notion of “component-driven policies” to describe the Arctic poli-
cies of Canada and the USA. May et al. and Dery suggest that for identity-based 
and space-based policy domains (such as youth policy or regional policies) it 
is sectoral, primary policies that determine the content of cross-cutting frame-
works. That undermines the possibility for these frameworks to be coherent, 
but also limits the influence of the cross-cutting policies on polities’ tangible 
actions. Sectoral policies have a much longer history, established communities 
of stakeholders and advocacy coalitions, as well as well-grounded institutional 
arrangements. The component-driven character of the EU Arctic policy is vis-
ible from the policy documents, which so far have simply collected existing 
Arctic-relevant activities. The role of EU Arctic policy-makers has been not 
to propose new objectives and set a course for EU Arctic action, but rather to 
choose among different possible sets of Arctic-relevant actions, prioritize and 
organize them in a sensible manner.
Arctic policy within the EU is a rather marginal policy topic. EU services are 
not willing to invest any greater resources even in coordination activities.101 It 
is unlikely that it will follow the path of, for instance, environmental or climate 
policies, which over the years have moved to a central position in policy sys-
tems worldwide.
In some cases, the new “Arctic dimension” is primarily an act of re-labeling. 
The 2007–2013 Northern Periphery Program was renamed for the current finan-
cial perspective102 as the Northern Periphery and Arctic Program, but without 
adding any tangible Arctic dimension that would distinguish it from its 2007–
2013 predecessor. Conversely, the changes that occurred in program priorities 
and operation are connected with the new set-up and objectives of the overall 
EU regional and cross-border policies, not with a new Arctic labelling.103
Notwithstanding, the very fact of considering issues from a new, Arctic per-
spective constitutes an intrinsic added value. The increased attention and vis-
ibility of Arctic issues within the EU has had a certain leverage. This is visible, 
99   May and others 2005, n. 66 above; also, Peter J May, Joshua Sapotichne and Samuel 
Workman, ‘Policy Coherence and Policy Domains’ (2006) 34 Policy Studies Journal 381.
100   Dery 1998, n. 98 above.
101   Personal communication (by Adam Stępień, on file), policy officer from European 
Commission DGs for Environment (August 2015) and Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
(April 2015), European Environment Agency (July 2015).
102   The EU’s multiannual budget operates via seven-year financial perspectives.
103   Personal communication (by Adam Stępień, on file), Ole Damsgaard, Northern Periphery 
Program Secretariat, February 2014.
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for instance, in the process of adopting the EU Directive on the safety of off-
shore oil and gas extraction,104 which includes several references to the Arctic. 
Another good example is research. In a survey conducted among European 
research organizations,105 several respondents suggested that a strong visibil-
ity of Arctic topics in the Horizon 2020 research program could be partly attrib-
uted to EU Arctic policy-making.106 The interest in the Arctic resulted also in 
the launch of the EU-Polarnet project, which is to develop the European Polar 
Research Program and enhance the coordination of European Polar research 
infrastructures.107
The process of developing a cross-cutting Arctic policy also translates to 
increased EU exposure to Arctic actors and stakeholders. For instance, the EU 
adopted a conciliatory position in the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES)108 as regards banning international trade in polar 
bear products. Instead of trade prohibition, the EU proposed requesting infor-
mation on health of polar bear populations, on the levels of harvesting and 
trade and on feasibility of tagging regime for polar bear products.109 The EU 
action in this way demonstrated sensitivity to Inuit, Greenlandic and Canadian 
concerns.
In the future, Arctic policy-making may play a role in the EU’s actions 
regarding international ocean governance and as regards the protection of 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction and establishing marine pro-
tected areas in the high seas. The preparatory work on a new global agreement 
104   Directive 2013/30/EU of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations [2013] OJ 
L178/66.
105   A survey conducted by one of the authors via surveymonkey.com among participants to 
the EU-Polarnet network in November 2015.
106   It is worth noting that the Horizon 2020 program follows Seventh Framework Program, 
which encompassed research efforts within the International Polar Year 2007–2009. 
In addition, major EU satellite surveillance and observation programs (Galileo and 
Copernicus) include services critical for Arctic navigation and environmental monitoring.
107   However, the respondents highlighted that there are many drivers shaping research pri-
orities and the eight-year long increased interest in the Arctic is only one of them.
108   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, con-
cluded 3 March 1973, entry into force 1 July 1975, 27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243.
109   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Sixteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties Bangkok (Thailand), 3–14 March 2013, 
European Union Proposal Regarding Ursus Maritimus (Polar Bear), CoP16 Inf. 44, <https://
www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/16/inf/E-CoP16i-44.pdf> accessed 7 March 2016.
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has already started under the UN General Assembly.110 While these issues are 
of special importance for the Central Arctic Ocean, the EU position is likely to 
be shaped primarily by global concerns and balancing with developing States’ 
interests.111
While the new Arctic perspective on problems and stronger interactions 
with stakeholders is of intrinsic value, the EU should build on these qualities 
and consider procedural opportunities for enhancing the way Arctic policy-
making influences the EU’s sectoral activities and actions.
The primary means is facilitating internal flows of information, in order to 
raise awareness of the specific impacts EU actions have in the North. The Arctic 
Inter-Service Group of the European Commission serves such information 
purposes, but it operates only among lower officers responsible for Arctic mat-
ters. How, if at all, that information is conveyed within specific DGs depends 
on the particular case and on the personal interest of policy officers.112 The tan-
gible co-operation going beyond information exchange within the EU services 
occurs, not on an on-going basis, but during the work on policy statements 
(2012 or 2016 communications and accompanying staff working documents) 
or cross-sectoral activities, such as preparation of a survey for Streamlining EU 
Arctic funding consultations.113 Some policy ideas and instruments are, how-
ever, worth exploring in this context.
One such policy idea is “Arctic footprint management”. Major external actors 
take part in shaping Arctic realities owing to long-range pollution, economic 
influence via market leverage and resource demand, as well as via influence 
on private actors under their jurisdiction. Due to these “Arctic footprints”, poli-
ties like China, the EU and Japan have in their policy arsenals the capacity 
to control their impact on the Arctic. “Footprint management” requires three 
steps. First, polities need to assess and acknowledge their impact on the Arctic. 
110   See, Oceans and Law of the Sea website of the United Nations, (‘Preparatory Committee 
established by General Assembly resolution 69/292’) at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/
biodiversity/prepcom.htm> accessed 7 March 2017.
111   Sébastien Duyck, ‘Conservation of Marine Living Resources and Fisheries Management 
in the Arctic: Perspectives from Non-Arctic Actors’ in Timo Koivurova and Tianbao 
Qin (eds), Arctic Law and Governance: the role of China and Finland, pp. 181–204 (Hart 
Publishing / Bloomsbury, 2017). Also, the European Commission has carried out major 
consultation process before its stances towards international ocean governance ques-
tions are formulated.
112   Personal communication (by Adam Stępień, on file), European Commission policy 
officers, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (April 2015), DG Environment (August 2015).
113   Personal communication, policy officers (by Adam Stępień, on file), European 
Commission DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (April 2015).
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Second, there needs to be a mechanism for communicating the knowledge on 
Arctic footprints to sectoral—primarily domestic—policy-making. This way, 
the awareness of Arctic footprints becomes a part of policy processes. Third, 
a regular monitoring of the polity’s footprint has to be carried out.
The EU has shown a responsible approach early in its Arctic policy-making 
by commissioning the EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment Report.114 
Following the project results, the EU partly acknowledged its own responsibil-
ity for the Arctic environment in the 2012 Joint Communication.115 However, 
EU officials have not been successful in channeling Arctic-specific concerns 
into general policy-making yet. Moreover, despite suggestions from the 
European Environment Agency116 and the EU Arctic Information Centre ini-
tiative network,117 a periodic monitoring and reassessment of the EU’s Arctic 
footprint has not been adopted. On the other hand, the footprint approach 
has proven interesting enough that the European Commission is conduct-
ing studies—based on a similar methodology—for EU policy impacts on the 
South Mediterranean region and the Eastern Partnership countries.118
Better coordination among EU institutions, between the EU and its Member 
States as well as coordination with the activities of other actors present in the 
Arctic is in principle a basis for better flow of information. It could prevent any 
unnecessary overlaps and could help to identify gaps that the EU policies and 
EU funding could fill. Certainly, the very process of Arctic policy-making leads 
to a better overview of what Arctic-relevant activities different departments, 
agencies and EU actors engage in. The European Commission also commis-
sioned an inventory of a broad range (EU, Member States, institutions and pri-
vate sector) of European Arctic initiatives.119 The 2016 Joint Communication 
proposed establishing the European Parliament’s delegation and the Council’s 
working party dedicated to northern cooperation and Arctic issues. While espe-
cially the latter is unlikely to be established, neither addresses the key need for 
114   The authors of this chapter were involved in the work on the Arctic Footprint study 
(Cavalieri and others 2010, n. 31 above).
115   JOIN (2012) 19 4.
116   Personal communication (by Adam Stępień, on file), policy officer, European Environment 
Agency (July 2015).
117   The authors work at the Arctic Centre which has been leading this network.
118   Personal communication (by Adam Stępień, on file), European Commission policy 
officer, DG Environment (August 2015).
119   Björn Dahlbäck and others, ‘European Arctic Initiatives Compendium’ (2014) <www 
.arcticinfo.eu> accessed 7 March 2016. The study was carried out in the framework of the 
“Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of development of the Arctic” project.
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the intra-EU flow of information: from the officers responsible for Arctic affairs 
to the teams working on Arctic-relevant policy and regulatory developments.
One concrete way in which Arctic concerns (including Arctic footprints) 
can be communicated to general policy-making processes is via regulatory 
impact assessments (IAs). IAs are conducted by the European Commission 
and EU services—sometimes with input from external experts or consultan-
cies—in order to consider different alternatives and review the expected im-
pacts of applied policy instruments, including for different constituencies and 
regions.120 The European Commission’s IAs of proposed policies or regulations 
could incorporate a special focus on how new policy or legislative proposals 
influence the Arctic.121 Due to the complexity of both Arctic realities and EU 
policy frameworks, the identification of policies that have consequences in 
the Arctic constitutes a major challenge and requires stakeholder engagement. 
Taking Arctic issues into account is particularly important in areas where EU 
policies designed for a broad European constituency may yield specific conse-
quences in the context of Arctic-specific challenges, such as remoteness, long 
distance, Arctic nature-based livelihoods, sparse population or vulnerability of 
Arctic environment. This is likely the case for regulations or policies in fields 
like transport, environment, ocean governance or rural policy.122
A significant part of information on Arctic-specific concerns and impacts 
would need to be acquired from a broad spectrum of Arctic actors and stake-
holders. This leads us to the third problem related to coherence and added 
value of EU Arctic policy-making, namely handling interactions between EU 
institutions and Arctic stakeholders.
6 Challenge Three: Managing Multiple Interactions with Arctic 
Actors and Stakeholders
More effective and meaningful participation of Arctic stakeholders in 
decision-making processes is a vital component of a response to social and 
120   More transparent and better impact assessments are at the core of the new Better 
Regulation agenda of Juncker’s Commission (Better regulation for better results—An EU 
agenda, Communication from the Commission 2015.).
121   As was already partly suggested (regarding environmental impacts) in the Commission’s 
2008 Arctic Communication. See European Commission (2008). Communication 
COM/2008/0763 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—The 
European Union and the Arctic Region.
122   Kirsi Latola and others, ‘Activities Affecting Land Use in the European Arctic’ in Adam 
Stępień, Timo Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää (eds), The Changing Arctic and the 
European Union (Brill Nijhoff 2016);
 37Formulating a Cross-cutting Policy
environmental changes and to the rising complexity of Arctic governance. It is 
crucial to enhance two-way communication between Arctic stakeholders and 
EU decision-makers as well as to facilitate spaces for stakeholders to enter into 
dialogue with each other. So far, Arctic inhabitants, communities, businesses, 
local governments and organisations still lack appropriate information on the 
EU’s role, interests and relevant activities in the region.123
Enhanced participation enables understanding of values and livelihoods 
that might be neglected from the perspective of densely populated European 
economic centres, where human-environment relations (e.g. subsistence use 
of forests) may not be as vital for culture and identity as in the North.124 EU 
cohesion and co-operation programs in the North are an example of added 
value provided by stakeholder involvement. There, the key role of local actors 
in setting objectives has resulted in the alignment of local perceptions of needs 
and challenges and the goals of EU-funded programs.125
However, when carrying out stakeholder engagement activities, the EU 
institutions need to take into account the limited capacities of many Arctic 
actors126 and better coordinate various stakeholder consultations mecha-
nisms. Recently, a number of processes carried out by different EU ser-
vices have involved the same groups of stakeholders, including: ‘Strategic 
Environmental Impact Assessment of Development of the Arctic’ commis-
sioned by the DG Environment; operation of the Arctic NGO Forum (overseen 
by DG Environment project on creating space for exchange between NGOs 
focused on Arctic, primarily environmental, issues);127 the DG MARE consulta-
tions on streamlining Arctic funding; and the work with stakeholders within 
the EU-Polarnet process leading to the European Polar Research Program, 
supervised by the DG Research. The 2016 Joint Communication adds to these 
processes the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum, goal of which is to identify 
overarching investment and research priorities, partly overlapping with the 
aims of the EU-Polarnet. Moreover, annual stakeholder conferences and the 
EU Arctic Policy Assessment128 process are to complement this landscape of 
spaces for engagement.
123   This assessment is based on ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic’, n. 1 
above.
124   Latola and others 2016, n. 123 above.
125   According to feedback received in the stakeholder consultations.
126   Adam Stępień and others, ‘Arctic Indigenous Peoples and the Challenge of Climate 
Change’ in Elizabeth Tedsen, Sandra R Cavalieri and Andreas Kraemer (eds), Arctic 
Marine Governance: Opportunities for Transatlantic Co-operation (Springer 2014).
127   Arctic NGO Forum website at <http://arcticngoforum.org/> accessed 7 March 2016.
128   The EU Arctic Policy Assessment process is to examine the implementation of the EU’s 
Arctic policy until 2019, see the Arctic Centre website at <http://www.arcticcentre.org/
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Furthermore, the EEAS and the European Commission have engaged Arctic 
indigenous organizations within the format of the so-called Arctic Dialogue. 
First taking place in 2010, this dialogue has become more regular starting from 
2013. However, these meetings are mainly filled with presentations on various 
indigenous-relevant EU projects rather than discussing challenging issues. 
The discussions should be more focused and concrete, including practical, 
pressing matters and EU strategic interests in the Arctic. Possible questions 
could include the EU’s strategic interest in developing EU-domestic resource 
extraction or infrastructural projects potentially supported by the EU.129 The 
interaction with indigenous peoples needs to be linked up to other stakeholder 
engagement processes.
In the context of stakeholder engagement it must be remembered that 
indigenous people are also rights-holders. The participation of indigenous 
people (in particular the Sámi) in decision-making should be addressed in the 
light of evolving international indigenous rights (including land rights and 
the principle of free, prior and informed consent), primarily the UN Declaration 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.130 Responsible decision-making with 
regard to EU policies that may affect Arctic indigenous communities requires 
their meaningful participation. The concept of establishing a more permanent 
presence of the Arctic indigenous peoples or the Sámi in Brussels remains 
relevant.131 Such representation has to be independent from state and regional 
authorities and would need to address the constraints of indigenous organisa-
tions’ human and financial capacities.
Better streamlining of different consultation mechanisms would avoid 
stretching the capacities and patience of Arctic academics, NGOs, policy-
makers, and in particular local and indigenous communities. The 2016 Joint 
Communication does not deliver on such streamlining. Moreover, clear feed-
back on how consultation outcomes influenced specific decision-making is 
necessary to ensure participants remain engaged.132
EN/News/uutinen?ln=x4ueznur&id=6244f2bc-27a7-4bec-8e69-bf5b097b03df> accessed 
23 July 2017.
129   Stępień 2015, n. 1 above.
130   United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), General Assembly 
Resolution 61/295, New York, 13 September 2007.
131   This was already suggested at the 2010 ‘Arctic Dialogue’ meeting. See the website of the 
European Commission’s DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries at <https://webgate.ec.europa 
.eu/maritimeforum/content/1831> accessed 4 March 2014.
132   See, for example, Stepien and others 2014, n. 1 above.
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7 Conclusion
The scope of EU engagement in the Arctic is vast. The broad set of Arctic-
relevant issues brings two distinct dimensions to the EU’s presence in the 
Arctic: the Circumpolar and European Arctic. These spaces entail different 
foci (maritime versus terrestrial, environmental versus economic) and differ-
ent composition of relevant stakeholders. In the European Arctic the Union 
is a key player, while in the pan-Arctic affairs it takes a back seat. The very 
diversity of Arctic-relevant policies, activities and external interactions sug-
gests that it is unlikely that concrete, focused and operationalizable objectives 
of EU Arctic policy will ever be proposed. While abstract objectives may be 
necessary in order to give EU Arctic policy a recognizable identity and a narra-
tive, such objectives will not translate into policy coherence across sectors and 
will not cause the EU Arctic policy to have an added value within the EU’s pol-
icy system. The EU needs to focus on procedural mechanisms and instruments 
for coherent policymaking. Three challenges can be highlighted in this con-
text: first, balancing between European Arctic and Circumpolar policy spaces; 
second, exerting effective influence on general policy and decision-making 
processes in the EU; and third, managing the multiplicity of interactions with 
Arctic actors and stakeholders. There are options that the EU should con-
sider in order to address these three challenges. Distinguishing between the 
European and Circumpolar Arctic affairs and maybe even adopting a separate 
focused strategy for the European Arctic could lead to a clearer overarching 
framework. The 2016 Joint Communication takes the first steps in this direc-
tion. There is a need for better visibility of Arctic issues in EU policy-making, 
including via assessment, acknowledging and monitoring of the EU’s Arctic 
environmental, economic and regulatory footprints. The intra-EU coordina-
tion and information flows regarding Arctic concerns could be improved, with 
regulatory impact assessments supported by stakeholder engagement playing 
a central role. Eventually, the numerous instances of interactions with Arctic 
actors should be streamlined in order to avoid overstretching the limited ca-
pacities of Arctic stakeholders. Considering the character of a cross-cutting 
policy dedicated to a transnational region, the EU Arctic policy is likely to 
remain a constant work in progress. By focusing now on procedural aspects 
of its interaction with the Arctic region, the EU can in a more realistic fashion 
make an increasingly positive contribution to the state of the Arctic and its 
governance in the long-term. 
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CHAPTER 3
The EU Crossing Arctic Frontiers: The Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, and 
EU-West Nordic Relations
Alyson J.K. Bailes and Kristmundur Þ. Ólafsson
1 Introduction and Background
When the Arctic Council’s Ministerial meeting of April 2015 decided to further 
defer a decision on the European Union’s (EU) application for observership,1 
this represented at worst a symbolic and diplomatic setback. In reality, the EU 
was extending its footprint into the Arctic zone well before the current public 
excitement over the region began. By 1995 it had three members—Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden—who were also founders of the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS), the leading platform for Arctic-wide inter-govern-
mental cooperation on which the Arctic Council (AC) was founded in 1996.2 
The fact that Denmark’s autonomous territories of the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland opted out of their motherland’s EU membership was balanced by 
the entry of Norway and Iceland into the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
Schengen Treaty system in the 1990s. The remaining State members of the AC—
Canada, the Russian Federation and the United States—are all long-standing 
partners of the EU and have concluded many cooperation agreements that 
include their Far Northern regions. In these and other ways, including sub-
stantial business and trade links, and sectoral policies e.g. on shipping, fish-
ing and climate change, the EU helps to shape both the network of political 
and economic relationships and the regulatory landscape characterizing the 
*  Alyson J.K. Bailes, Adjunct Professor, University of Iceland, Iceland. Alyson Bailes sadly 
passed away on 29 April 2016.
**  Kristmundur Þ. Ólafsson, Senior Advisor, Icelandic Centre for Research, Iceland.
1   See para. 51, Iqaluit Declaration (communiqué of the Arctic Council Ministerial meet-
ing, 24 April 2015) <https://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurslodir/ACMMCA09_
Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Ministerial_Declaration_2015_signed.pdf> accessed 17 July 2016.
2   See <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/20-year-anniversary> 
accessed 17 July 2016.
 4�The EU Crossing Arctic Frontiers
Euro-Atlantic segment of the Arctic.3 It has also, of course, engaged in an open 
process of policy-forming on Arctic issues since 2008 and recently published 
an integrated EU policy for the Arctic outlining the Unions’ ambition to play a 
key role in the Arctic region.4
There remains one mode of EU involvement that has been little noticed in 
policy discussions or academic study, but which arguably owes much of its 
value precisely to its low profile and non-contentious nature. Like most other 
parts of the greater European space, the High North is crisscrossed by what will 
here be called sub-regional5 groupings of neighbour countries linked by land 
and/or a common sea space. The oldest and smallest, Nordic Cooperation, 
is limited to the five Nordic States with their special-status territories.6 One 
of Europe’s most successful post-Cold War creations, the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC) launched in 1993, has however counted the European 
Commission (now the European Union) as a full member from the start.7 In 
1999, moreover, the EU created its own Northern neighbourhood framework 
in the form of the Northern Dimension (ND),8 which continues today—follow-
ing a make-over in 2006—as a four-way grouping of Iceland, Norway, Russia 
and the EU with its Member States. To complete the picture,9 the West Nordic 
Council (WNC)10 has been growing in prominence since it adopted that name 
in 1997 (formerly the West Nordic Parliamentarian Council). It consists of the 
three non-EU members Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes and has no formal 
link to Brussels, but each of its member nations is increasingly engaged with 
the EU on issues fully relevant to the Arctic.
3    These connections are discussed at greater length in Alyson J.K. Bailes, The Arctic as 
European Periphery, International Security Network 2015 <https://www.stratfor.com/the 
-hub/arctic-european-periphery> accessed 17 July 2016.
4    The relevant documents including contributions by the European Parliament, European 
Commission papers of 2008 and 2012, and Council conclusions of 2009 and 2014, are avail-
able at the EEAS webpage <http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/> accessed 17 July 2016.
5    The rationale for the term is that the UN considers Europe as a whole to be a ‘region’. 
Similar localized institutions are found within other large ‘regions’, notably in Africa and 
the Americas.
6    <http://www.norden.org> accessed 17 July 2016.
7    <http://www.beac.st/en/About/Members> accessed 17 July 2016.
8    <http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/index_en.htm> accessed 17 July 2016.
9    The Nordics, Russia and the EU also take part in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS, 
<http://www.cbss.org> accessed on 17 July 2016) together with Poland and Germany, but 
since it has (so far) no Arctic connections or activities the CBSS is not covered in this 
paper.
10   <http://www.vestnordisk.is/english/> accessed 17 July 2016.
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the BEAC, ND and WNC in 
greater detail and to consider what place they hold in the bigger picture of 
EU-Arctic relations. What are their capabilities, prospects, and limitations? 
Does the EU itself recognize their importance within its potential Arctic 
tool-box? How effectively has it been using them in pursuit of general influ-
ence and standing, and concrete impacts corresponding to its policy goals? Is 
anything changing and could anything be improved in this respect?
To set the analytical scene, this introduction concludes with some gen-
eral remarks on sub-regional institutions, their role in international gover-
nance, and how the EU has interacted with them historically. The next three 
sections—II, III and IV—apply the paper’s research questions in turn to the 
BEAC, the ND, and the WNC with its individual members. Section V presents 
the conclusions.
1.1 Sub-regional Institutions
Sub-regional groupings in Europe and elsewhere vary greatly in size and mem-
bership. Their frequently overlapping boundaries reveal how often they reflect 
‘constructed’, rather than natural spaces;11 and they tend to cluster in some areas 
more than others—for instance, in Northern and Central rather than Western 
and South-western Europe. The smallest groups, such as Benelux, Nordic 
Cooperation, and the Visegrad cooperation of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia,12 are easy to explain as sets of like-minded neighbours 
with shared historical/cultural features, who find advantage in pooling efforts 
and forming common fronts to deal with larger partners. One co-author of this 
paper has in another context called them ‘brotherhood’ groupings.13
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Europe generated several larger groups that 
could more neutrally be called ‘neighbourhood’ ones, with members who were 
not necessarily homogenous in nature or interests, but held the management 
of a given physical space in common. These were explicitly designed to cross 
east-west dividing lines and help avoid, or at least limit the impact of new 
dividing lines with countries remaining outside the EU and NATO.14 The regional 
11   Iver B. Neumann, Uses Of The Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
12   <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about> accessed 17 July 2016.
13   Alyson J.K. Bailes, ‘Understanding the Arctic Council: A “Sub-regional” Perspective’ (2013) 
15(2) JMSS 31 <http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/527/513> accessed 
27 July 2016.
14   Andrew Cottey, ‘Sub-regional Cooperation in Europe: An Assessment’ (2009) 3 Bruges 
Regional Integration and Global Governance Papers <http://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu 
.edu/files/BRIGG_3-2009_revised_version.pdf> accessed 17 July 2016.
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cooperation frameworks were a way to work for understanding and stabili-
zation through the new contacts involved as much as through their concrete 
actions. In the fluid environment created by the collapse of Communism in 
Europe they also often sought to stimulate local democracy and empower 
the oft-neglected peripheries of nations through profitable cross-border 
cooperation.15 Russia was drawn into them in the South-east (Black Sea group-
ings), as well as in the Northern instances already mentioned.
The typical weaknesses of such groups are dictated above all by the diversity 
of their members. Differences of size and wealth, as well as of strategic stance 
and political culture, tend to rule out common binding legislation or system-
atic harmonization of standards. A fortiori such groups cannot become defence 
unions, and they more typically operate by sidelining difficult security issues 
and bilateral disputes (a process conceptually recognized as de-securitization).16 
In institutional typology they are easily viewed as ‘weak’ for these reasons, but 
also because of the lightness of their governance structures, without large (or 
any) secretariats, with minimal budgets or project management capacities, and 
with typically low political and public profiles.17 Some groupings, notably on 
the Eastward periphery of Europe and in Central Asia, can fairly be described 
as paper institutions that offer little except a chance for their members to talk 
discreetly and for countries to show off when hosting meetings.
The better functioning groups, however—and the BEAC is often cited in 
this category—can be remarkably productive using ‘softer’ or ‘messy’ gover-
nance methods such as politically binding declarations, coordinated spending 
programmes, externally funded infrastructure designs, exercises and training, 
and networking activities.18 These measures can bring tangible benefits in 
areas of non-military security such as border control (with anti-crime, anti-
smuggling and anti-trafficking elements), environmental safety including 
15   Alyson J.K. Bailes ‘The Role of Subregional Cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe: 
Integration, Security, Democracy’ in Andrew Cottey (ed.) Sub-regional Cooperation in 
the New Europe, (London, 1999). This effect was often cited in the 1990s in relation to the 
BEAC, when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev was also the MP for Murmansk and en-
couraged initiatives by the local authorities.
16   De-securitization is the opposite of securitization and means declining to recognize 
something as a security issue even if it has the obvious characteristics of a threat. Actors 
may do this if they are powerless to respond, but also in order to establish communica-
tion and cooperation with prima facie opponents. For a classic statement of the theory 
see Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner publishers 1998).
17   Dai, Xinyuan. International Institutions and National Policies (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).
18   For a systematic listing of such strengths and weaknesses see Bailes, n. 13 above.
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nuclear clean-up, coordinated infrastructure planning inter alia for energy 
supply, disease control, and response to civil emergencies (accidents and natu-
ral disasters). Further, the primary sub-regional institution may gain ‘depth’ by 
sponsoring sub-state networks of neighbouring provincial authorities, sectoral 
experts and researchers, and non-State analogues (banks, hospitals, universi-
ties, youth groups etc).19
The interaction of sub-regional groupings with more powerful regional ones 
is by no means free of contradictions. In the early 1990s, some applicants for 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU membership mistrusted 
Western support for groups like the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and 
Central European Initiative because they feared they might get trapped perma-
nently in such ‘waiting rooms’: condemned to a second-best that denied them 
true strategic protection or full free market access. The fact that the Visegrad 
cooperation (and its economic counterpart, CEFTA) manifestly helped the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to get into NATO faster had eased such 
concerns by the mid-1990s and made it possible to see the groups as useful 
training schools for the integration-minded.20 NATO and the EU for their part, 
however, were nervous of candidates ‘ganging up’ and responded by strength-
ening their emphasis on individual entry negotiations based on individual mer-
its. In retrospect, they probably failed to grasp how important the sub-regional 
groups were in sublimating historical disputes that would otherwise have dis-
turbed candidates’ progress, or even the peace, in more parts of Europe than 
just the Western Balkans.
The EU had a more concrete reason for concern because the adoption of 
economic and functional standards at neighbourhood level might have pre-
empted and diverged from its own regulatory requirements, thus making adap-
tation unnecessarily hard for countries once started on the accession track. It 
was, in fact, in the North European cases—CBSS and BEAC—that Brussels first 
chose to address this problem proactively by entering the groups concerned 
and seeking to lead on issues related to Community competence. As it turned 
out, countries bent on accession concentrated on EU models from the start 
in frameworks like the PHARE programme;21 and their efforts to find ways of 
19   See Bailes, n. 15 above.
20   See Cottey, n. 14 above.
21   The PHARE programme was a specific EC programme as was the main funding 
instrument used to prepare Central and Eastern European countries for accession. 
Implementation of PHARE was largely de-centralised to the recipient countries and 
among the sub-programmes provided were cross-border programmes that were intended 
to support cooperation between PHARE countries and the adjoining border regions of 
the EU. The PHARE was the predecessor of the ‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
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Table � Comparison of the three sub-regional structures, key facts
Organization BEAC ND WNC
Website www.beac.st http://www.eeas. 
europa.eu/north_dim/
http://www.
vestnordisk.is/
Year founded 1993 1999 1997*
Secretariat? Kirkenes (Varies for each 
programme)
Reykjavik
Members Denmark Denmark as EU State Greenland
Finland** Finland as EU State Faroe Islands
Iceland Iceland*** Iceland
Norway Norway ****
Sweden Sweden as EU State
Russian Fedn. Russian Federation
European European Union
Commission (+other EU member  
States in national role)
Observers Canada, France, Canada, US
Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands,
Poland, UK, US
* Existed from 1985 as West Nordic Parliamentarian Council of Cooperation
** Those in italics can hold the rotating chairmanship and participate in regional-level cooperation
*** Those in bold are the formal signatories and ‘owners’ of the forum
**** The Western coastal provinces of Norway are included for some cultural/social purposes
cooperating—nonetheless—with non-candidates like Russia often provided 
useful groundwork for the EU’s own neighbourhood strategies.22 This link was 
(IPA)’ used for the current enlargement countries. European Parliament, Briefing: The 
PHARE Programme and the enlargement of the European Union, No 33 /1998. <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm> accessed on 22 July 2016.
22   Based on interviews conducted by Alyson J.K. Bailes with EU Commission officials con-
ducted in May 2015.
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manifest when the EU in 2009 adopted its first Baltic Sea regional strategy,23 
taking the work of the CBSS as one of its main inspirations and foundations.24 
In this regard, as well as through the practical solutions they sought for geo-
graphically limited and specialized challenges, the more successful regional 
groups could be seen both historically and today as relating to Brussels in a 
mode of rational subsidiarity.25 This hypothesis can be explored in more detail 
through the case-studies of sections 2 and 3.
2 The Barents Euro-Arctic Council26
The Barents Euro-Arctic Council was founded on a Norwegian initiative in 
1993, with the five Nordic countries, Russia and the European Commission as 
members and several other NATO members as observers (see Table One). Its 
focus area is the Northernmost segment of Scandinavia (historically known 
as ‘Nordkalotten’) which includes the Norwegian-Russian frontier and the 
northernmost provinces of Sweden and Finland. From the start, BEAC has 
had a two-tier structure, with the inter-governmental Council complemented 
by a Barents Regional Council (BRC)27 where representatives of the provincial 
authorities (and of the Sami community) meet to discuss cross-border issues 
including the use of project funding.
The Council was strengthened in 2008 by the establishment of a dedicated 
secretariat in Kirkenes; it is however still relatively small, having just three em-
ployees with very limited financial means.28 Much still depends on the energy 
23   European Commission, Communication: European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region, Brussels, 10.6.2009 COM(2009) 10 June 2009. <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
sources/docoffic/official/communic/baltic/com_baltic_en.pdf> accessed on 17 July 2016.
24   See Bailey, n. 22 above.
25   As used in the EU, subsidiarity is the principle that tasks should be handled at the lowest 
(in this context, most local) feasible level.
26   This section draws largely on Ingmar Oldberg, The role of Russia in Regional Councils: A 
comparative study of neighbourhood cooperation in the Baltic Sea and Barents Euro-Arctic 
regions, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies (Reykjavik, 2014) <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/The-role-of-Russia_Online.pdf> accessed on 17 July 2016; and on Alyson 
J.K. Bailes and Kristmundur Þ. Ólafsson, ‘Northern Europe and the Arctic Agenda: Roles 
of Nordic and other Sub-regional Organizations’ (2013) 5 The Yearbook of Polar Law 45–73.
27   The Barents Regional Council (BRC) comprises 13 regions/provinces in the north of 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Russia.
28   It is funded by the ‘inner four’ BEAC members only. For an insight into its work see <http://
www.beac.st/newsletter/Newsletter-1-2015> accessed 17 July 2016.
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and priorities of the Chairmanship, which rotates annually between the 
four contiguous countries (only): Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Russian 
Federation. Added ‘depth’ is given to the structure through 16 working groups 
serving either or both of the Councils—five of them report to both the region-
al and governmental levels. There are several multi-functional programmes 
such as the Action Plan on Climate Change in the Barents Region29 and the 
Cooperation Programme on health and social issues (2012–2015).30 The scope 
and importance of this regional cooperation has increased steadily as econom-
ic activity and the utilization of natural resources in the region has increased.
Original Norwegian motives for launching the initiative were both Russia-
related and EU-related.31 In the early 1990s when Russia’s internal develop-
ment was uncertain, there were fears of a collapse of public services in the 
country’s industrialized and militarized North-west that could trigger a surge 
of Westward migration. Meanwhile, Russia’s troop withdrawals from Central 
Europe made its remaining capacities in the Kola peninsula loom propor-
tionally larger as a cause of concern for Norway in particular. Against this 
background BEAC was designed not only to ease tension and to build under-
standing and shared interests for general stabilization purposes, but to find 
acceptable ways of aiding the population in the Russian Western Arctic so 
that pressures for migration were reduced. The prospect of EU funding was 
attractive in this context, but the Commission’s participation had two larger 
merits in Norwegian planners’ eyes. First, it signalled multilateral backing for 
the small Nordic countries as they sat down to work with a much larger and 
still potentially threatening neighbour. Secondly, in the run-up to Norway’s EU 
membership referendum, it was hoped that the distinctly Euro-sceptic North 
Norwegian population might be won over by using EU money for local proj-
ects. This last hope was proved vain by the ‘No’ vote on Norwegian accession in 
1995, but the other rationales for EU participation still hold good and seem to 
be well appreciated by other actors.
The BEAC’s main fields of activity have been: local economic development, 
including the fostering of trade and investments; transport, visa matters and 
29   Barentsinfo, Workshop on Development of a Draft Action Plan on Climate Change for 
the Barents Region <http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/ClimateChangeActionPlanWork 
shopMarch2012Minutes.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
30   Barentsinfo, 4th Co-operation Programme on Health and Related Social Issues in the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region 2012–2015 <http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/JWGHS_
Cooperation_Programme_2012_2015_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
31   This paragraph is based on one of the author’s own (Alyson J.K. Bailes) observations as a 
diplomat at Oslo in 1991–4.
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cooperative border management (to ease movement for the ‘good’ and keep 
out the ‘bad’); energy cooperation; environment protection—especially pollu-
tion clean-up on the Russian side—and climate policy; health issues; support 
for indigenous peoples; democratic development, culture, education and sci-
ence; and cooperation in civil emergency management. On the face of it, suc-
cessful activities in all these fields can claim a ‘subsidiarity’ role: they address 
and are adapted to the region’s very distinct local needs—and can be kept 
close to the people through the BRC—without risk of challenging or duplicat-
ing the EU’s regulatory framework, which all five Nordics adhere to in relevant 
fields under the EEA. Locally generated finance, which in practice has mostly 
come from Norway, eases the burden on collective European funds. From the 
EU viewpoint, the BEAC (like the ND, see below) is particularly helpful in ad-
dressing important issues at regional level and which can have a substantial 
impact on local communities facing new challenges and opportunities. While 
the EU is channeling funds to the region under several of the EU’s regional 
schemes32 it has recognized the need to both increase the funding level and 
make it more coordinated and effective.33 BEAC provides a platform that the 
EU could potentially look towards in order to achieve goals that fit a wider 
regional strategy at the same time the Union could count on other Council 
members’ buy-in.
Secondly, the BEAC’s effectiveness in stabilizing relations with Russia eases 
tensions in a delicate border zone that might otherwise have demanded a high-
er pitch of attention and engagement from both the EU and NATO. While in the 
nature of things non-quantifiable, this effect seems to be real and has been 
credited,34 notably, with paving the way for the Russian-Norwegian Treaty 
on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean, signed in 2010.35 Further, the BEAC’s low profile and ‘de-securitized’ 
32   These include €24 million for the ‘Kolarctic’ border region, €21 for Karelia, €34.4 mil-
lion for ‘Botnia-Atlantica’ (northernmost provinces of Norway, Sweden and Finland), the 
‘Interreg IVA North’ and ‘Northern Periphery and Arctic’ programmes, and funds appli-
cable in the North from the Baltic Sea basin programme.
33   Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 27 April 2016 on An Integrated 
European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN (2016) 21.
34   This can be seen at the joint declaration made after the joint Barents Summit in Kirkenes, 
Norway 2013 held at ministerial level. <http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Barents_
Summit_Declaration_2013.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
35   Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (adopted 
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nature have allowed it to continue functioning quite normally through periods 
of Russia-West strain (not least in 2014–15), thus inter alia providing a channel 
for informal messages and explanations between the two sides. This facility may 
be helpful not least for the Commission in cases where the EU is embroiled in 
the given dispute.
Last and not least as an aspect of the BEAC’s value, it is indisputably—and 
more clearly so than the ND—an organ of Arctic management, offering the EU 
a direct corridor of involvement into the latter. The Nordkalotten region lies 
largely above the Arctic Circle, and (as just noted) is a local test-place for the 
Russia-West relationship that provides the main diplomatic challenge in Arctic 
cooperation generally. Its material challenges are a microcosm of those affect-
ing the whole populated Arctic, especially in terms of climate change; the con-
tradictions and choices in economic development; the strains on the human 
population; and the daunting risks of civil emergencies (accidents and natural 
disasters) for which response capacities are all too slight. Its waters constitute 
the Western end of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) over Russia which has so far 
witnessed the main, though not consistent, growth in trans-Arctic shipping.36 
On land, the Barents region includes some of the largest population centres 
above the Arctic Circle: Russia’s Murmansk and Arkhangelsk both have around 
300,000 inhabitants, offering a useful reminder that not only the indigenous 
peoples need help in navigating a changed Arctic future. In governance terms, 
the BAEC and Arctic Council may learn from each other about viable solutions 
in building consensus: the latter’s 2011 agreement on Search and Rescue (S&R) 
cooperation was preceded by the signing in 2008 of an equivalent agreement 
among the BEAC’s six states members.37
15 September 2010, entered into force 7 July 2011). <http://www.un.org/depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/NOR-RUS2010.PDF> accessed 27 July 
2016. This Treaty resolved long-standing disputes on the two States’ maritime demarca-
tion line, with positive knock-on effects also for fisheries and shipping cooperation. While 
the BEAC has no direct competence in the matter, relationships built through the Barents 
cooperation are credited by both sides with having eased the negotiations.
36   While BEAC’s agenda has traditionally been land-focused, the Ministerial session of 
October 2013 issued a communiqué including (para. 18) reference to the importance of 
the NSR and commending the International Maritime Organisation’s proposed safety 
code for polar shipping. <http://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/BEAC_14_Session_
Tromso_29_October_2013_Communique_final_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
37   Agreement Between The Governments In The Barents Euro-Arctic Region On Cooperation 
Within The Field Of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness And Response (Adopted 
11 December 2008, entered into force 17 May 2012). <https://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/
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All the Nordic states as well as the EU have noted the BEAC’s relevance 
and value in their national Arctic strategy documents,38 it is clear that this 
EU recognition goes beyond mere words: the BEAC is consciously used—at 
least by the EU’s External Action Service (and the EU member states who par-
ticipate)—as a practical, low-key and low-risk channel for consolidating the 
Union’s place and the impact of its funds and policies in the Euro-Arctic zone. 
The institutional set-up lends itself to this notably through the EEAS’s atten-
dance at meetings of the BEAC’s Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) which 
both oversees lower-level activities, and prepares Ministerial decisions. Like 
the BEAC itself, it is a discreet mechanism for European influence that gains 
most of its value exactly from being so little known or scrutinized.
3 Northern Dimension
First established as an EU policy initiative under the Finnish Presidency in 
1999, the Northern Dimension has since 2006 been renewed as a common pol-
icy framework,39 where the EU as an institution, Russia, Norway and Iceland 
participate on an equal footing and co-financing is the general rule. The re-
vamping of the organization in 2006 addressed earlier complaints40 that it was 
EU-dominated and over-focused on bilateral interests—especially, the needs 
of the Finnish-Russian border; it seems to have succeeded in creating a broader 
and stronger sense of co-ownership, as well as attracting more Russian funds.41 
docs/Agreement_Emergency_Prevention_Preparedness_and_Response_English.pdf> 
accessed 27 July 2016.
38   Such references are found in all five Nordic nations’ Arctic strategy documents, and in 
those of Russia and the European Commission. The EU mentions the BEAC a couple of 
times in its new Integrated policy for the Arctic, JOIN (2016) 21.
39   This was done at the Helsinki Summit in November 2006 with the adoption of the 
Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document <http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/
docs/frame_pol_1106_en.pdf> accessed on 19 July 2016 and the Political Declaration on 
the Northern Dimension Policy <http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/docs/pol_dec_1106_
en.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
40   Haukkala, Hiski, The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in 
International Relations (Routledge, 2010) 159–165.
41   Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, (Speech delivered at a meeting with Association 
of European Businesses in the Russian Federation, Moscow, 14 October 2014). <http://
aebrus.ru/upload/iblock/b7f/15_10_2014-lavrov_s-briefing-with-aeb-members-eng.pdf> 
accessed 28 July 2016. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is quoted as saying (of the 2006 
re-negotiation): ‘Talks were launched, the text was clarified and a concept coordinated, 
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The parties’ common priorities for the future were defined in the 2006 docu-
ments as to promote dialogue and concrete cooperation; strengthen stability, 
well-being and intensified economic cooperation; and promote economic 
integration, competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe.
While providing a forum for general political dialogue between the part-
ners, the ND primarily operates through the design and funding of coopera-
tive projects, handled through the four sectoral ND partnerships and other ND 
structures.42 These are the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
(NDEP), the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social 
Well-being (NDPHS), the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport 
and Logistics (NDPTL) and the Northern Dimension Partnership on Culture 
(NDPC). Specific policy goals are discussed in each partnership group to guide 
the related project spending. This cooperation is supported43 in depth by a 
network of participants, observer states, International Financial Institutions,44 
EU Member States, universities and research centers. The result might be seen 
as a kind of hybrid between a technical investment scheme and a regional 
‘partnership’ in the sense used elsewhere by Brussels; but it escapes some 
of the quandaries of the latter (for example, in the Eastern Partnership) by 
which was jointly conceived by the European Union, Russia, Norway and Iceland. This is 
the main secret of the Northern Dimension’s success. Unlike the EU’s Black Sea and Baltic 
strategies, this project continues to function on the basis of consensus for charting gener-
ally acceptable approaches’.
42   The secretariat of the NDPHS is co-located with the CBSS, that of the NDPC with the 
NCM secretariat in Copenhagen, and that of the NDPTL with the European Investment 
Bank. There are also—at non-state level—a Northern Dimension Institute, a Northern 
Dimension Business Council and a Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum.
43   Most of the supporting actors are mentioned in the Northern Dimension Policy Framework 
Document, see note 39 above. This excludes the Northern Dimension Institute which pre-
pares Northern Dimension-related studies and reports, and coordinates the collection 
of funding for research projects. A good example of the support international financial 
institutions bring to the partnerships is the NDEP support fund, which is managed by the 
European Bank for Recronstruction and Development (EBRD). The Fund is intended to 
catalyse environmental investments by mobilising grant co-financing for leveraging loans 
from the IFIs, this is intended to have a multiplying effect on environmental investment 
in the area as they make possible larger IFI loans that finance the major share of the 
investments. Observer States are cooperation partners in some of the action undertaken 
an have the ability to support initiatives on an ad-hoc basis.
44   The main International Financial Institutions involved are the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the 
Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
(NEFCO).
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focusing on physical development and avoiding overt political conditional-
ity. In this it resembles other, even more specialized EU instruments for High 
Northern regional funding.45
The ND also puts considerable emphasis on cooperation with the other 
Regional Councils including BEAC,46 and the Northern Dimension Institute 
in 2012 published a study suggesting some kind of amalgamation between 
these groups for project-financing and priority setting purposes.47 This may 
45   As mentioned in n. 32 above.
46   E.g., the Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM).
47   A Coherent Northern Dimension, text at <http://www.ndinstitute.org/images/documents/ 
coherent%20nd_final.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
Figure � The northern dimension structure.
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be a bridge too far, but all ND participants have committed themselves to 
‘enhance regional cooperation, improving synergies of regional organization 
in Northern Europe while avoiding possible duplication’.48 Pace some issues 
discussed at the end of this section, reinforcing the ND’s centrality should offer 
the most direct way to strengthen the EU’s steering position and hence, the 
chances of mainstreaming its own priorities into the Councils’ work.
As its name suggests, the Northern Dimension’s geographical coverage 
extends over the whole northern fringe of Europe from the European Arctic 
and sub-Arctic areas to the southern parts of the Baltic Sea, and from North-
West Russia in the East to Iceland and Greenland in the West. However, the 
scale of ND activities within this region differs substantially, with the bulk of 
programmes and projects hitherto taking place—in order of magnitude—in 
the Baltic Sea area, and then in North-west Russia, the Barents region and the 
Arctic region respectively.
The four ND partners are formally equal, but it is the strategic EU-Russia 
relationship that sets the pace regarding cooperation in the Baltic Sea re-
gion and North-west Russia. There, the Northern Dimension is designed to 
serve the broader cause of partnership, as seen in the way that ND policies 
and project prioritization mirror those defined in the ‘EU-Russia Common 
spaces’.49 At the level of project design, the EU has consistently mainstreamed 
its global priorities into the ND agenda: thus in environmental terms, the EU 
prioritizes protection measures including water and wastewater treatment, 
waste management and nuclear safety, and works for energy efficiency in sup-
port of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region. In the field of transport and 
logistics, the NDPLT fosters the EU’s infrastructure priorities and supports mea-
sures in line with the revised TEN-T priorities50 that are to develop intercon-
nections and eliminate bottlenecks to mobility, complete cross-border routes, 
cross natural barriers and improve interoperability.51
48   This is one of the stated objectives of the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Docu-
ment, see n. 39 above.
49   <http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/about/index_en.htm> accessed 19 July 2016.
50   The priorities are to 1) establish and develop key links and interconnections to elimi-
nate existing bottlenecks to mobility, 2) to fill missing sections and complete the main 
routes especially their cross-border sections, 3) cross natural barriers and 4) improve 
interoperability on major routes. The overall objective is to stimulate sustainable eco-
nomic growth at regional level by increased cohesion, interconnection and interoperabil-
ity of a trans-European transport network, or in the case of NDPLT by focusing priority 
projects mutually beneficial for EU countries and the non-EU countries in the region.
51   European Commission, Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instru-
ment (ENI)—2014–2020 Regional East Strategy Paper (2014–2020) and Multiannual 
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While the ND’s cooperative activities in the Baltic Sea and North West 
Russia are well established and documented, its extension to the Arctic is a 
work in progress and still somewhat hard to characterize. In principle, the ND’s 
project-based character should allow it to help, like BEAC, in channeling and 
targeting the EU’s existing contributions in the High North, which include a 
sizeable Arctic research programme52 and the above-mentioned regional 
development funds for specific sub-areas.53 The initial description of the ND’s 
Arctic-related role as an ‘Arctic window’, however, disturbed the Russians who 
insisted on limiting the programme to the Euro-Arctic zone, not wishing the 
ND to become a back door into pan-Arctic governance. More recently, Iceland 
and Norway have called for ‘developing the Northern Dimension’s contribu-
tion to cooperation in the European Arctic area … deepening and system-
atizing cooperation between the ND and BEAC, as well as seeking synergies 
with other relevant cooperation formats and programmes in the Euro-Arctic 
region.’ Concrete proposals in this regard were expected to be presented to an 
ND Ministerial scheduled for 2015 in Iceland (but see below), while the EU and 
Russia agreed to develop ideas for the Baltic segment.
For the present, the practical role of the ND in the High North varies from 
partnership to partnership. The NDEP has a broad remit with regard to pro-
moting environmental protection in various parts of the region. The part-
nership includes a specific ‘nuclear window’ through which the partnership 
contributes to nuclear safety, cross-border impacts and environmental protec-
tion in the Arctic (Kola peninsula, Archangelsk and Murmansk regions). As 
part of its everyday work the NDEP supports projects that support municipal 
infrastructure modernisation in Northern Russia and Belarus (waste water 
treatment and district heating modernisation) with the aim of tackling pol-
lution (nutrient input to the sea, CO2 emissions and black carbon emissions).54 
The ND Partnership on Transport and Logistics (NDPTL)55 has a mandate to 
facilitate improvement of transport links and logistics—supporting interna-
tional trade and people-to-people contacts—in the whole ND area, including 
Indicative Programme (2014–2017). (2014) <https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-the 
-enp/regional_east_strategy_paper_2014_2020_and_multiannual_indicative_programme_ 
2014_2017_en_.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
52   European Commission, Report: Arctic Research Funded by the European Union (European 
Commission 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/arctic_research_funded_
by_the_research_and_innovation_eu_en.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
53   See n. 32 above.
54   <http://ndep.org/projects/> accessed 19 July 2016.
55   <http://www.ndptl.org/home> accessed on 19 July 2016.
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the European Arctic and Barents regions. Providing the only current forum for 
transport ministries in the Baltic Sea and Barents/Euro-Arctic regions to meet 
and plan together, it holds much potential for connecting these areas and link-
ing them to global developments in transport and logistics. The remaining two 
ND partnerships have covered High North issues in a more generalized way, 
one exception being an NDPHS working group on indigenous health which 
was however discontinued when Canada left the partnership. In all these fields 
the ND structures maintain good contact with BEAC counterparts.
Despite the many similarities between the Northern Dimension and the 
other inclusive Councils of the region—the BEAC, AC and CBSS—its linkages, 
both political and practical, with the direct EU-Russia relationship are unique 
and raise special issues. When West-Russia relations are troubled, the ND offers 
the EU—and its member states—a kind of ‘back door’ for positive cooperation 
and the exchange of messages.56 In terms of strategy and political sensitivity, 
this role of the organization arguably outweighs its potential as an extra entry 
point into Arctic governance, where it is anyway ill-suited to channel issues of 
high policy. The question is whether the EU (as a whole) is willing and able to 
behave accordingly, and whether Moscow can be counted on to comply.
At the time of writing, despite Russian anger over and counter-measures 
against the EU’s Ukraine-related sanctions,57 Russia’s tactics in all the regional 
groups seem to be to compartmentalize that issue and continue low-key coop-
eration as normal.58 It is the EU side that has needed to think twice, given the 
range of feelings among such members as the Baltic States—who are present 
in the ND (unlike in the BEAC) with veto rights, and who have faced more se-
rious Russian threats and provocations since 2014 than most nations of the 
Northern flank. Not only had the regular ND Ministerial planned for 2015 been 
56   Utilizing meetings within regional constructs for the exchange of messages and to have 
special bilateral meetings is common practice especially during high level meetings. This 
is based on the author’s (Kristmundur Þór Ólafsson) own observations as an employee of 
CBSS in Stockholm 2010.
57   European Parliament Briefing: Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine 
conflict, (European Parliament, 2015). <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
58   The most striking success for this tactic was the positive outcome of the Arctic Council 
meeting at Iqaluit in April 2015 (n. 1 above), followed by an ad hoc meeting in Washington 
that brought together the US and Russian Foreign Ministers.
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postponed,59 but the EU’s economic sanctions60 have been interpreted in such 
a way as to block EU-sourced financing for new ND-related projects.61 Care 
has been taken to avoid damage to purely humanitarian and shared causes 
such as public health; but whether transient or not, this situation prompts the 
question whether an institution combining membership of all EU states with a 
local focus can durably match the success of the smaller High Northern groups 
(so far) in de-politicization and crisis avoidance. While it delays any stronger 
ND entry into Arctic affairs, it might also raise doubts over how that develop-
ment might affect the apparent political stability of other organizations work-
ing there.
4 The West Nordic Council and Its Member
The West Nordic Council (WNC) started as a purely inter-parliamentary group-
ing by bringing together delegations from the parliaments of Iceland and the 
self-governing nations of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The Council now 
has a one-person secretariat based in Reykjavík and, impelled largely by Arctic 
developments, ministers and officials from the three member territories have 
in the last couple of years also started meeting systematically to discuss West 
59   By contrast, a meeting of the ND’s Public Health and Social Well-being partnership ‘at 
Ministerial level’ took place in November 2015 in Berlin, see the NDPHS website at <http://
www.ndphs.org/?mtgs, pac_11__berlin> accessed on 19 July 2016. States can of course opt 
to send a lower-level delegate. A meeting of the ND Parliamentary Forum has already 
taken place as planned at Reykjavik on 10–11 May 2015, where all participants (includ-
ing Baltic parliamentarians) agreed on ‘encouraging all the Partners to continue regional 
cooperation enhancing mutual understanding in the interest of the peaceful and sus-
tainable development of the ND region’. See <http://www.ndptl.org/c/document_library/
get_file?folderId=10722&name=DLFE-2409.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
60   The reference is to the EU’s Ukraine-related measures progressively adopted since 
March 2014 <http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_
en.htm#5> accessed 19 July 2016. They include suspension of EIB and EBRD funding for 
regional cooperative projects, though it is stated that ‘projects dealing exclusively with 
cross-border cooperation and civil society will be maintained’.
61   In the ND context this has been interpreted to preclude funding for any activity discussed/
agreed later than 16 July 2014, and it has serious implications for future action under the 
four ND partnerships many of whose projects are EIB- or EBRD-dependent. It remains to 
be seen whether Russia might counter-withdraw its own funding which stands at some 
€60 million for the NDEP alone. There are obvious implications also for the CBSS, where 
high-level meetings appear to have been suspended since early 2014.
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Nordic cooperation, with a current focus on building a common trade area.62 
The WNC has been increasing its ambitions in international relations and has 
a pending application for observer status of the Arctic Council.63 What sets the 
WNC apart from the other regional formats discussed above is that none of its 
member is an EU member state while all of the partners have a close associa-
tion with the EU.
Developments in the Arctic have increased the importance of North-West 
Atlantic and brought new challenges, responsibilities, opportunities and 
interest from the world’s leading powers. The willingness of the WNC coun-
tries to have a say in shaping the future of the Arctic coordination has led to 
an increased international scope for the Council which could provide a useful 
fora in which the WNC countries could share experience, expertise and infor-
mation on issues of regional concern strengthening their position in consulta-
tions with leading nations and the EU.
There is no formal link between the EU and the WNC and EU policies and 
programmes therefore are not directly influencing the decision making of the 
WNC, but, along with important bilateral cooperation agreements between 
the EU and the members of the WNC, help form the background against which 
those decisions are taken. The recently published EU Arctic Strategy64 does 
not mention the WNC specifically as a multilateral fora with Arctic relevance 
like the BEAC and ND, but rather mentions Greenland and the EEA countries 
as important partners where the EU can play an influential role in the applica-
tion of EU rules relevant for the Arctic through the EEA. This is not surpris-
ing in light of the limited capacities and scope of the Council hitherto. It is 
however possible that the WNC could be a platform where the EU could try to 
engage more actively and consult with the WNC countries on matters relevant 
to the region in order to mobilize local actors to contribute to EU objectives 
in the area of climate change and sustainable development. The EU’s role as a 
major contributor to Arctic research and the association of West Nordic states 
to European funding programmes is an example of this EU angle where joint 
research projects especially relating to issues like environmental sustainability 
62   There is already a free trade agreement (Hoyvik Agreement) between Iceland and the 
Faroes although this has thrown up some problems. For a general introduction to West 
Nordic cooperation see Egill Þór Nielsson, ‘The West Nordic Council in the Global Arctic, 
Centre of Arctic Policy Studies (Reykjavik, 2014) <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/03/the_west_nordic_council.pdf> accessed on 19 July 2016.
63   <http://arcticportal.org/library/news/1294-west-nordic-council-annual-meeting> accessed 
on 24 July 2016.
64   JOIN (2016) 21.
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and climate change, create a basis for discussion and reactions to Arctic devel-
opments. Each WNC member nation is increasingly engaged with the EU on 
issues fully relevant to the Arctic and that has also been the case with the WNC 
council itself.
Each year the WNC holds an Annual General meeting which is the Council’s 
supreme authority and which in turn is usually followed by a themed con-
ference, devoted to studying issues of joint concern in more detail.65 Recent 
thematic topics have included the management of natural resources, the ques-
tion of food safety, and the idea of creating a common Arctic strategy.66 This 
last effort is now mandated to go ahead and will draw upon strategies already 
adopted by the Icelandic and Faroese parliaments.67 A joint West Nordic 
approach to Arctic cooperation can be rationally given, on the one hand, the 
small size of the three players and their separateness, politically as well as geo-
graphically, from the mainstream of European integration. On the other they 
all have similar aims in Arctic affairs that combine interests in drawing profit 
from new economic development in the Arctic (shipping, fisheries, and pos-
sible oil/gas finds in their waters), and concern over the disruptive environ-
mental changes and the growing risks of major civil emergencies in the region.
The relationship of the EU with the Faroes and Greenland68 are quite par-
ticular as the Faroes voted to opt out when Denmark joined the EU in 1973,69 
and Greenland followed suit right after it gained Home Rule and withdrew 
from the Community in 1985.70 Today the EU maintains a strong relationship 
65   <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deea/dv/0503_/0503_11 
.pdf> accessed 19 July 2016.
66   <http://www.vestnordisk.is/vestnordisk-rad-holder-temakonference-i-grindavik/> accessed 
on 25 July 2016.
67   See the texts at, respectively, <http://www.mfa.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A- 
Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-approved-by-Althingi.pdf> accessed 19 July 
2016, and <http://www.government.fo/foreign-relations/the-faroe-islands-and-the-arctic/> 
accessed 19 July 2016.
68   Today it belongs to the EU’s Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) scheme. <http://
ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/greenland_en> accessed 19 July 2016.
69   For further information see: <http://www.government.fo/foreign-relations/missions-of 
-the-faroe-islands-abroad/the-mission-of-the-faroes-to-the-european-union/the-faroe 
-islands-and-the-european-union/> accessed 19 July 2016.
70   A Treaty on Greenland’s withdrawal from the Community was made—the Greenland 
Treaty, <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Greenland-Representation-to-the 
-EU/European-Union-and-Greenland/The-Greenland-Treaty-of-1985> accessed 19 July 2016.
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with the Faroes71 through bilateral agreements while with Greenland the basis 
for relations is the Greenland Treaty of 1985.72 Iceland being a member of 
the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Shengen treaty it remains out-
side the EU. Iceland did apply for EU membership and made fast progress in 
negotiations; but a more traditional centre-right government taking over in 2013 
has effectively reversed that step.
Through these relatations the footprint of EU regulation and the influence 
of EU polices reach far northwards in the Arctic as they provide an opportunity 
for the EU to have a strong influence on the economic, social and environmen-
tal policies in the Arctic. As a major trading partner and consumer of pruducts 
coming from Arctic it is only natural to assume that the emphasis put on sus-
tainable development, climate change and safeguarding of the Arctic environ-
ment in the new EU Arctic policy translate into how the EU conducts itself in 
its relations to all of those countries. The new Arctic strategy mentions the new 
EU-Greenland Partnership agreement since 2014 and that ‘The EU will further 
engage in policy dialogue at the appropriate political and technical levels on 
issues of common concern, such as global issues (energy, climate change and 
the environment, and natural resources)73 and Arctic issues.‘and furthermore 
adds that‚ Arctic policy and Arctic issues will continue to remain an impor-
tant element of the EU’s close relations with Iceland and Norway.’ Their new 
approach to Greenland extends the room for direct dialogue with the home-
rule government without running into Danish objections. The presentation 
of EU Arctic policy as such has become steadily more nuanced, to the point 
where Icelandic specialists acknowledge it as almost identical with their own 
approach—and thus, potentially, with the concerted goals to be adopted by 
the three West Nordic players. As a result, Arctic issues not only offer a life-
line for maintaining positive Iceland/EU relations after the halt of accession 
talks, but could even inject new substance into that relationship, independent 
71   See n. 69 above. The Faroes have a bilateral fisheries agreement and a free trade agree-
ment with the EU (as well as similar agreements with Norway and Switzerland) and since 
1998 they have maintained an office in Brussels to work directly with the EU institutions.
72   See n. 70 above.
73   This is a particularly sensitive issue in Greenland given current proposals for new min-
eral mining, where China has been an interested partner and where observers (i.a. in 
Denmark) have voiced concern about the environmental and social consequences. One 
of the schemes would, moreover, involve extracting uranium ore as a by-product: see 
Cindy Westergaard, ‘The European Union, its Overseas Territories and Non-Proliferation: 
The case of Arctic yellowcake’, SIPRI Non-Proliferation Papers no. 25. 2013, at <http://
www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/nonproliferationpapers/cindyvestergaard 
50f42aa9586fe.pdf > accessed 19 July 2016.
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of what happens over the EU’s AC observership (which, incidentally, Iceland 
supports).
Is there a case for the EU also to seek institutional relations with the WNC 
itself? It is certainly in the broader European interest to encourage rational 
cooperation among the three small and vulnerable nations involved, and to 
make sure that their emergent joint policies take account of relevant EU posi-
tions and instruments. However, there are also arguments against haste. The 
WNC is the smallest and institutionally weakest of the North’s sub-regional 
groups, already facing other demands for association and partnership that 
risk over-burdening it. The most effective outlet for WNC proposals is through 
the larger Nordic Council74 and it would be wrong to distract attention and 
resources from that channel. Moreover, the tolerance of West Nordic élites for 
an EU role—not only as a milch-cow, but in the interests of wider Arctic bal-
ance and governance—does not necessarily extend to their less well informed 
and more suspicious publics. The best near-term approach could be for the 
EU to keep itself informed on West Nordic developments, and inject ideas as 
appropriate, through its bilateral diplomacy with Iceland and Greenland in 
particular.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The contributions of sub-regional bodies to Arctic affairs is shaped by their 
own strengths and weaknesses. The strategic value and functionality of these 
structures offers the EU venues to work with and through to have an influ-
ential role in shaping the future developments of the European part of the 
Arctic by the promotion of its policies and financial instruments. The ‘weak’ 
features of bodies like the BEAC and ND gives them opportunity to operate in 
de-securitized and almost de-politicized mode even amidst serious strategic 
tensions.
The regional structures have provided a common platform where State and 
non-State actors have been able to find common position and solutions on the 
great challenges being faced in the Arctic region and their loose governance 
methods threaten neither sovereignty, nor distinct State and ethnic identities; 
and the money they draw in and/or redistribute is welcome to all. Anything 
that they do for stability, understanding, and non-military cooperation among 
74   While not discussed in this paper, the Nordic group’s institutional engagement with and 
influence in Arctic affairs is considerable and growing: see Bailes and Ólafsson, n. 26 
above.
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Arctic neighbours is in the broad interests of the EU, as a ‘soft-power’ actor that 
relies on its regulatory strength, funds, and image rather than military might.75 
Anything the groups can do for economic, social and functional development 
in Arctic land areas expands the chances of profitable trade and cooperation 
for the rest of Europe, both with and through these zones. It may even be 
argued that the successes of ‘soft’ or ‘weak’ institutionalization in the European 
segment of the Arctic have made European models and influences more effec-
tive across the whole circumpolar space than the prima facie clout of the small 
Nordic nations might suggest.76 Last and not least, should Greenland and/
or the Faroes gain full independence at any time, the sub-regional networks 
would offer them a ‘home to go to’ for support, guidance and restraint, even if 
they continued to reject more direct EU links.77
Pace many Arctic analysts, moreover, the groups’ cumulative limitations 
are only damaging for the Arctic’s chances of stability and sustainable devel-
opment if the gaps they leave are not or cannot be filled by others. In fact, 
some key Arctic challenges are covered by global instruments like the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,78 the military balance is looked after (for 
good or ill) by the Russia-NATO relationship;79 and as this paper has tried to 
show, the EU itself influences economic, social and functional development in 
far more ways than most analyses give credit for.
From published facts and the testimony of officials interviewed for this 
project, it is clear that these realities are not lost on officials in Brussels. The 
75   Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor (2nd Edn, 
Routledge, 2006).
76   There are no comparable inter-governmental groups in the Pacific segment. For more on 
this see Bailes, see n. 3 above.
77   A further point might be made that strengthening a European common front in the Arctic 
could help offset growing Chinese (and other Asian) efforts to play a role there. However, 
it is Russia that in reality has most reason for concern about infiltration and competi-
tion from a rising China, and the small European Arctic nations have welcomed rather 
than resisted Chinese overtures. See Marc Lanteigne, ‘China’s Emerging Arctic Strategies: 
Economics and Institutions’ Centre forArctic Policy Studies, Occational paper (Reykjavík, 
2014) <http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Marc_Lanteigne2.pdf> accessed 22 July 
2016.
78   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994 31363 UNTS 1833, 1834, 1835.
79   For more on this argument see Alyson J.K. Bailes, ‘Institutions and Stability in Lassi 
Heininen and Regis Rouge-Oikarinen (eds), The Arctic Case’ in NGP Yearbook 2011: 
Sustainable development in the Arctic region through peace and stability, (Nordia 
Geographical Publications, 2012) 43–56.
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strategic vision and practical coordination of EU Arctic policies has been 
steadily improving since 2008, with the fact that the Commission’s 2012 
report was co-authored by the High Representative80 was one milestone. The 
recently published EU policy for the Arctic is also co-authored by the High 
Representative recognized the value of regional cooperation fora, not only 
for the value of sharing experience, expertise and information but as part-
ners to be included in developing an ambitious climate adaption agenda for 
the Arctic region. The policy mentions the importance of relations with the 
EEA countries and Greenland and gives honourable mention to the BEAC and 
ND policy frameworks as successful cooperation frameworks. The policy does 
however emphasize the need to enhance the collaboration and coordination 
between different EU funding programmes as well as bring together the EU 
institutions, Member States and regional and local authorities in order to help 
identify investment and research priorities in the region. Behind such words 
lie concrete EU interests and ambitions to place a European mark on Arctic 
developments (at least in the Euro-Atlantic zone); to promote generic EU poli-
cies where applicable; to use neighbourhood cooperation funds in a more tar-
geted, coherent and productive way; and to its deepen relations with both state 
and non-state players active in the region.
By and large, the EU’s approach in recent years has registered steady 
improvements on all these fronts. It will remain important for Brussels to 
avoid an over-assertive Besserwisser (‘one who knows better’) approach, and 
to accept more indirect ways of spreading European ideas on occasion— 
notably through the Nordics, and perhaps also through private sector actors 
and NGOs. The Russian side is currently more sensitive than ever to European/
Western ‘ganging up’, and it remains to be seen whether the Northern 
Dimension in particular can avoid lasting damage from some EU members’ 
insistence on extending sanctions to the financing of its collectively sponsored 
projects. The de-politicization and humble profile that allow sub-regional 
cooperation to make its most characteristic contributions may, it seems, be 
among the hardest characteristics for EU politicians to absorb and emulate. 
That could raise questions in some minds about how the EU would use any 
stronger status it may eventually gain in the Arctic Council. The answer mat-
ters, because a peaceful Arctic is ultimately in the interest of all Europeans. 
80   European Parliament and European Council, Communication on Developing a European 
Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps, JOIN(2012) 
19, 26 June 2012. <http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf> accessed 
19 July 2016.
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CHAPTER 4
Strengthening the European Union—Greenland’s 
Relationship for Enhanced Governance of the Arctic
Mar Campins Eritja
1 Introduction
Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat: “the Country of the Greenlanders”) is the largest 
island in the world, with an area of about 2.2 million square km (of which 80% 
is permanently covered by ice), more than 44,000 km of coastline,1 and a popu-
lation density of 0.14 inhabitants per square km in the ice-free areas.2
Due to its location in the Arctic, Greenland, an autonomous territory still 
dependent on Denmark, has acquired a unique strategic relevance for the 
European Union (EU). In an international context where economic powers 
such as China or South Korea have expressed great interest in the Arctic and 
especially in the huge potential of natural resources, hydrocarbons and strate-
gic minerals, the EU’s presence in the region is undoubtedly connected with 
the need to strengthen its relationship with Greenland, a matter that is back 
into focus in the political debate.
This Chapter aims to describe the current legal framework concerning the 
relationship between Greenland and the EU, as well as some of the reasons 
for the interest of the EU in Greenland with special attention to those spe-
cially related to the exploitation of hydrocarbons. To ensure the effectiveness 
of its collaboration with Greenland and, by extension, its presence in the 
Arctic region, the EU intervention must be “accepted” and seen as “legitimate” 
* Mar Campins Eritja, Professor, Department of International Law and Economics, Universitat 
de Barcelona; Centre d’Estudis de Dret Ambiental de Tarragona (CEDAT).
** This paper is part of a larger research project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Competitiveness (Reference: DER2013-44009-P): “From sustainable development to 
environmental justice: Towards a conceptual template for global governance”, led by Antoni 
Prigrau Sole, Universitat Rovira i Virgili.
1   NASA, Ice-Bridge Arctic 2015 <http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/icebridge/index.html# 
.Vb-xELfTOf4> accessed 1 September 2015.
2   Government of Greenland, Greenland in Figures (2014) <www.stat.gl/publ/da/GF/2014/pdf/> 
accessed 1 September 2015.
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by local players. Therefore, this Chapter will also discuss the recognition by 
the EU of the Greenlandic population’s rights concerning participation in the 
context of offshore extractive operations. Although the issue has never been 
high on the EU political agenda, indigenous rights protection is one of the rea-
sons why the EU has justified its interest in the Arctic. However, EU law has so 
far been scarcely affected by the evolution of international law regarding the 
rights of indigenous peoples. Finally, this Chapter will focus on how the cur-
rent EU—Greenland relationship can be used to strengthen this dialogue. The 
privileged and unique position of Greenland may serve potentially to strength-
en the role of the EU in the region, and ultimately, an enhanced cooperation 
has mutual benefit.
2 The General Current Legal Framework for the Greenland and the 
EU Relationship
Greenland and the EU have a special relationship. Greenland is an autonomous 
territory of a Member State (Denmark) of the EU that has exercised its right of 
withdrawal from the EU. In spite of not being a part of the EU, Greenland his-
torically remains closely associated to the EU through an important partner-
ship. Besides, as one of main EU Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), 
Greenland has a geostrategic location between Europe and America. At the 
same time, Greenland is also strategically important to ensure the EU’s pres-
ence in the Arctic.
2.1  Greenland’s Self-governance Process
In order to fully understand the role of Greenland in the EU’s Arctic strategy, 
it is necessary to refer briefly to the State-building process in which this terri-
tory has been immersed since the 1970s. Greenland has been and still is a ter-
ritory dependent on Denmark. Political parties on the island were established 
in the 1970s, which have been pressing for a new institutional relationship 
with Denmark and strengthening aspirations towards independence. This is 
a process that began with the adoption of the Home Rule Act of 1978,3 which 
was adopted as a result of Denmark’s accession to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973. Through the Home Rule Act, a wide autonomy 
3   Act No. 577 of 29 November 1978, The Greenland Home Rule Act, English translation avail-
able at <http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html> accessed 1 September 2015.
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regime for Greenland was established. Until the early 2000s, the position of the 
Greenlandic government under the leadership of Premier Jonathan Motzfeldt 
was to urge slow construction of a politically and economically viable State 
and prioritize the relations with the Nordic countries. It was not until the turn 
of the century that Greenland had to face the choice between building a new 
independent State through a process of expedition, an option at that time 
presented by the government of Premier Hans Enoksen (between 2002 and 
2009); or first turn Greenland into an economically autonomous actor and deal 
with the political process of independence later, a more pragmatic approach 
which has been defended by the government of the Premier Kuupik Kleist 
since 2009.4
2009 marked a turning point in this process. On 25 November 2008, 75.5% 
of Greenlanders voted in favour of a proposal for broad autonomy developed 
by the Greenlandic-Danish Self-Rule Commission. As a result of this decision 
Act Nº 473 on Greenland Self-Government (AGSG) was passed by the Danish 
Parliament on 12th June 2009,5 which replaced the Home Rule Act of 1978. The 
Act of 2009 allows the government of Greenland to assume legislative, execu-
tive and judicial powers, which Danish authorities had until then. By virtue 
of the Act, Denmark keeps its power regarding foreign affairs, defence and 
economic policy. However, the importance of being an “Arctic State” is clear 
to Denmark. For this reason, its Arctic strategy, which was presented in 2011,6 
focuses on cooperation with the Faroe Islands and Greenland in a win-win 
approach to Arctic issues.
The preamble to the AGSG refers to “the people of Greenland” and acknowl-
edges their capacity as “a people pursuant to international law with the right 
of self-determination.” Consistent with this provision, the Act contains a spe-
cific regulation on the access of Greenland to independence. Its chapter eight 
4   Alex Kjoer Sorensen, Denmark-Greenland in the Twentieth Century (Commission of Scientific 
Research in Greenland-Kristen Caning, Greenland, 2006); Damien Degeorges, The role of 
Greenland in the Arctic, (2012) 7 Laboratoire de l’IRSEM, 16 <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/
irsem/publications/laboratoire/laboratoire-de-l-irsem-2012/laboratoire-de-l-irsem-n-7-2012> 
accessed 1 September 2015.
5   Act no. 473 of 12 June 2009, Act on Greenland Self-Government, English translation available 
at <http://www.stm.dk/_a_2957.html> accessed 1 September 2015.
6   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Danish Government, Department of Foreign Affairs of the 
Government of Greenland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Faores, 
Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 
(2011) <http://usa.um.dk/en/~/media/USA/Arctic_strategy.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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establishes that if the people of Greenland adopt a decision in favour of inde-
pendence by referendum, appropriate negotiations should be started between 
the Danish government and the Greenlandic government (Naalakkersuisut), 
so as to adopt an agreement that regulates Greenland’s way out of Denmark’s 
territory. This agreement, which must be submitted again to referendum, must 
have the consent of the Danish Parliament, as established in Section 19 of the 
Danish Constitution.7
2.2 Current Relationship between Greenland and the EU
Denmark’s accession to the EEC in 1973 was strongly opposed in Greenland. 
Although 70.8% of the Greenlandic population voted against the accession 
in the referendum of October 1972,8 they could not prevent the incorporation 
of the territory into the EEC as a part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Again, in 
February 1982 Greenland’s population expressed its position against its contin-
uance in the EEC with a negative vote of 53.02%. As a consequence, the Danish 
government presented a proposal to change the legal status of Greenland 
within the EEC, signing a new Treaty in 1984. Greenland formally withdrew 
from the EEC in 1985.9 Therefore, the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not apply to 
Greenland. The island, as part of a EU Member State, has been associated 
to the EU as one of the OCTs, a status created to incorporate former French, 
Dutch and British colonies. Since then, the current legal framework for rela-
tions between the EU and Greenland consists of three main instruments: the 
Decision of Association10 together with the Joint Declaration on relations 
7    Translation in English available online at <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/da00000_ 
.html> accessed 1 September 2015.
8    On the whole process, see Alex Kjoer Sorensen, n. 4 above, 145.
9    Treaty of 30 March 1984 amending with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities, [1985] OJ L29. See also, Friedl Weiss, “Greenland’s with-
drawal from the European Communities” [1985] 10 European Law Review 173; and Frederik 
Harhoff, “Greenland’s Withdrawal from the European Communities” [1983] 20 Common 
Market Law Review 13.
10   Council Decision 2014/137/EU, of 14 March 2014, on relations between the European 
Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, [2014] 
OJ L76.
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between the EU and Greenland;11 the Fisheries Agreements;12 and the Overseas 
Association Decision with the OCTs.13
Greenland has had constant cooperation with the EU since 2007, which 
has been consolidated by the Decision of the Council 2014/137/EU for the 
2014–2020 period. The Council Decision 2014/137/EU has a twofold aim: first, 
the Decision pursues strengthening the cooperation with Greenland to face 
its major challenges—sustainable diversification of its economy in particu-
lar. Second, the EU’s action aims to contribute to improving the capacity of 
Greenland’s administration to formulate and implement national policies, 
particularly in areas of mutual interest.
According to Article 3 of the Council Decision 2014/137/EU, the main areas 
for cooperation for the 2014–2020 period are: a) education and training, tour-
ism and culture; b) natural resources, including raw materials; c) energy; 
d) climate; e) the social sector, mobility of the workforce, social protection 
systems, food safety and food security issues; and f) research and innovation 
in areas such as energy, climate change, disaster resilience, natural  resources, 
including raw materials and the sustainable use of living resources. The 
11   At that time, Joint Declaration by the European Community, on the one hand, and the 
Home Rule Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other, on 
partnership between the European Community and Greenland, [2006] OJ L208; and Joint 
Declaration by the European Union of 19 March 2015, on the one hand, and the Govern-
ment of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other, on relations between 
the European Union and Greenland, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/
signed-joint-declaration-eu-greenland-denmark_en.pdf> accessed 2 February 2016.
12   At that time, Council regulation (EEC) 224/85 of 29 January 1985, on the conclusion 
of the Protocol on the conditions relating to fishing between the European Economic 
Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the local 
Government of Greenland, on the other, [1985] OJ L29; Council Regulation (EC) 753/2007 
of 28 June 2007, on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between 
the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the Home 
Rule Government of Greenland, on the other hand [2007] OJ L172; and Council Decision 
2015/2103 of 16 November 2015, on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and the 
provisional application of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial 
contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European 
Community on the one hand and the Government of Denmark and the Home Rule 
Government of Greenland, on the other hand [2015] OJ L305.
13   At that time, Council Decision 80/1186/EEC of 16 December 1980, on the Association of 
Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Economic Community, [1980] OJ 
L361; and Council Decision 2013/755/EU on the association of the overseas countries and 
territories with the European Union [2013] OJ L344.
Campins Eritja70
amount of financial assistance from the EU is EUR 218 million for the 2014–
2020 period. This amount is allocated almost entirely to the education sector. 
In turn, this financial contribution is executed by the Greenlandic adminis-
tration through a Programming Document for the Sustainable Development 
of Greenland (PDSD),14 which defines the priorities for the 2014–2020 period 
(education, professional training and secondary schooling). The Association 
has been strengthened by the Joint Declarations on relations between the EU 
and Greenland and Denmark in 2006 and 2015.15 While it is a programme docu-
ment and so is not legally binding, it confirms the EU’s ties with Greenland and 
reiterates the geostrategic importance of Greenland to the EU.
The first fishery agreement between the EU and Greenland was carried out 
in 1985 following the withdrawal of this territory from the EEC.16 In 2007, the 
Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 753/2007 of 28 June 2007 on 
the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European 
Community and the Government of Denmark and the Home Rule Government 
of Greenland.17 In January 2013, Council Regulation (EU) No 927/2012 of 16 July 
2012,18 set out fishing opportunities in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
of Greenland and the EU financial contribution. It was followed by Council 
Decision 2014/48/EU on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fish-
ing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement.19 With the current EU Decision 2015/2103/EU,20 a new 
Protocol applying to the fishing relations between the EU and Greenland for 
the period January 2016 to December 2020 was adopted and completes this EU 
regulation.
Finally and according to Annex II of the TFEU concerning OCTs, Greenland 
also benefits from the special regime described in Part IV of the TFEU and 
Protocol nº 34 applicable to OCTs. This regime is developed in the Overseas 
14   Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of Greenland 2014–2020, 
annexed to Council Decision 2014/137/EU on relations between the European Union on 
the one hand and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, [2014] OJ L76.
15   [2006] OJ L208 and Joint Declaration by the European Union, on the one hand, and the 
Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other, on relations 
between the European Union and Greenland, 19 March 2015 <https://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/sites/devco/files/signed-joint-declaration-eu-greenland-denmark_en.pdf> 
accessed 2 February 2016.
16   [1985] OJ L29.
17   [2007] OJ L172.
18   [2012] OJ L293.
19   [2014] OJ L28.
20   [2015] OJ L305.
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Association Decision 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association 
of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union,21 which 
replaces the former Decision of 2001.22 The main purpose of the Decision 
2013/755/EU is to establish an association with the OCTs on the basis of “objec-
tives, principles and values shared by the OCTs, the Member States to which 
they are linked and the Union”.23 This specially means “the enhancement of the 
OCTs competitiveness, the strengthening of the OCTs’ resilience, the reduction 
of their economic and environmental vulnerability and the promotion of 
cooperation between them and other partners” and respect for “the fundamen-
tal principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the rule of law, good governance and sustainable development”.24
In Decision 2013/755/EU two specific situations are found with regard 
to Greenland, which has a different position comparing to the rest of OCTs. 
Firstly, Article 3 of Annex II of the Decision provides that all OCTs other 
than Greenland receive EUR 229.5 millions to carry out the objectives of the 
Decision. Greenland alone receives EUR 218 millions for the same period. 
Secondly, the Decision mentions specifically the importance of proper waste 
management in fragile island environments of the OCTs and refers to the 
application of Article 198 of the EURATOM Treaty regarding radioactive waste. 
Greenland again is an exception that the EURATOM Treaty does not apply to.25
3 The Recognition and Development of the Rights of the Greenland 
Population by the EU
The EU has expressed great interest in the huge potential of Arctic natural 
resources, especially hydrocarbons. The offshore exploration and exploita-
tion of hydrocarbons involve several activities from seismic exploration to 
dismantling the infrastructure when the operation ceases. Depending on 
their dimensions and the technology used, offshore activities have consider-
able economic, social and environmental impact.26 In particular this is a very 
21   [2013] OJ L344.
22   [2001] OJ L314 and [2001] OJ L324.
23   Para. 1, Article 3, Overseas Association Decision 2013/755/EU.
24   Para. 2, Article 3, Overseas Association Decision 2013/755/EU.
25   Para. 23, Preamble, Overseas Association Decision 2013/755/EU.
26   National Research Council of the National Academies, Responding to Oil Spills in the US 
Arctic Marine Environment (The National Academies Press, 2014). The Arctic Council 
has also addressed the issue through several instruments: See Ruling adopted within the 
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sensitive issue for the indigenous communities inhabiting the Arctic region 
and therefore for Greenlandic population, of whom 85% are Inuit. Although 
it has positive impacts such as economic growth (i.e. employment opportu-
nities, better health and education), its social and cultural impact on Arctic 
indigenous communities has been questioned (i.e. urbanization of the region, 
alteration of landscape and cultural, economic and traditional issues, reduc-
tion of hunting).27 Therefore it is necessary to clarify indigenous peoples’ 
rights to participate in the decision-making processes relating to offshore 
exploration and exploitation.
3.1 The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in General International Law
Contemporary international law addresses the situation of indigenous peoples 
from a quadruple perspective:28 i) international treaties protecting human 
rights at the universal level (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 
and the International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966);29 ii) the establish-
ment of specific UN bodies (Working Group on Indigenous Populations, UN 
Arctic Council Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic, (2011) <https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/N813EN.pdf>; and Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013) 
<http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/agreement-on-cooperation-on-marine-oil-pollu 
tion-preparedness-and-response-in-the-arctic> accessed 1 September 2015; See also the 
non mandatory Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, Arctic Council (PAME Working 
Group, 3rd edition, 2009) <http://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/offshore-oil-and-gas> 
accessed 1 September 2015.
27   National Research Council of the National Academies, Cumulative environmental effects 
of oil and gas activities on Alaska‘s North Slope (The National Academy Press 2003) <http://
dels-old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/north_slope_final.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015. 
See also, Rachel Lorna Johnstone, Offshore Oil and Gas development in the Arctic under 
International Law: Risk and Responsibility, (Brill, 2015) 59.
28   See Antoni Pigrau Solé, “Los pueblos indígenas ante el Derecho Internacional”, in Antoni 
Pigrau Solé, (Ed.), Pueblos indígenas, diversidad cultural y justicia ambiental. Un estudio de 
las nuevas constituciones de Bolivia y Ecuador (Tirant lo Blanch 2013) 61. See also, Siegfried 
Wiessner, “La Déclaration des Nations Unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones” in 
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law (UN Bureau des Affairs Juridiques 
2009) 2 <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_61-295/ga_61-295_f.pdf> accessed 1 September 
2015; and Patrick Thornberry, The Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, in Forum 
Deusto, Los Derechos Humanos en un mundo dividido, (Deusto University 1999) 163, 165–
185 and 168–169.
29   Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, UNGA Resolution 217 A (III); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Resolution 2200 A (XXI) AGNU, 16 December 1966.
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Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, replaced in 2007 by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations); 
iii) the consideration of indigenous people in the framework of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) in particular through the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention Nº 169 of 1989;30 and iv) the adoption of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.31 However, the case 
for the Greenlandic population is quite unique in that, if Greenland becomes 
fully independent, it will be the only Arctic country with a majority indigenous 
population.
At the international level, the rights of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples are 
fundamentally contained in two texts.32 ILO Convention Nº 169 of 1989 on 
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples has already had an impact on States’ pub-
lic policies. ILO Convention Nº 169 particularly recognizes the rights of own-
ership over the lands indigenous peoples traditionally occupy (Article 14); 
the right to participate in the use, management and conservation of natural 
resources on their land (Article 15); and the right not to be moved from the 
lands they occupy (Art. 16). The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 recognizes the 
right not to be forcibly moved from their lands or territories (Article 10); 
the right to the lands, territories and resources traditionally owned or oth-
erwise used or acquired (Article 26); the right to the preservation and pro-
tection of their environment and the productive capacity of their lands or 
territories and resources (Article 29) and the right to use their own means of 
subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their business activi-
ties, traditional and other (Article 20).
30   Convention Nº 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
of 27 June 1989 <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO
:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO> accessed 1 September 2015. So far only 22 
States have ratified it (amongst them only Denmark and Norway in the Arctic area); 
ILO <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/ f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_
INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO> accessed 1 September 2015.
31   Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly 61/295 United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
documents/DRIPS_en.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
32   For a deeper analysis, See Antoni Pigrau Solé, Mar Campins Eritja, Xavier Fernández 
Pons, “Union européenne et droits des peuples autochtones de l’Arctique: Terres, res-
sources et consentement”, in Nathalie Herve-Fournereau (Coord.), Peuples autochtones 
et intégrations régionales, Réseau Thématique Pluridisciplinaire BIODISCEE, CNRS INEE 
(Université de Rennes, forthcoming 2017), 2 ff.
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The right to be consulted appears in both texts. Article 6 of the ILO 
Convention Nº 169 states that
governments shall: (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropri-
ate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, 
whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative 
measures which may affect them directly; (b) establish means by which 
these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other 
sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective insti-
tutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and 
programmes which concern them.
In a more specific way, in other hypothetical cases, consultation is the obligatory 
procedure when any restriction over the rights of land and resources occurs. 
When the State is the owner of mineral or hydrocarbon resources including 
sub-surface resources, the governments “shall establish or maintain proce-
dures through which they shall consult these peoples, (…) before undertaking 
or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such re-
sources pertaining to their lands.” (Article 15); and “whenever consideration is 
being given to their capacity to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their 
rights outside their own community.” (Article 17)
The UNDRIP also refers to the obligation to take certain measures “in con-
sultation with the indigenous peoples” in various articles (Article 15.2, 17.2 36.2 
and 38). But in certain cases, the Declaration refers explicitly to the fact that 
the consultation should be carried out to obtain the free, prior and informed 
consent of the indigenous peoples. That is the case in Article 19, concerning 
the adoption and implementation of legislative or administrative measures, 
and in Article 32, regarding the right of indigenous peoples to determine and 
develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their land 
and other resources. The mention of obtaining the consent and the use of such 
adjectives as ‘prior’, ‘free’ and ‘informed’ show the way consultation should be 
done carried out, but that does not imply that there is an absolute right to veto 
from the indigenous community over the adoption of the measure. However, 
these considerations should apply to all regulations that stipulate consultation 
and not only those which explicitly mention free, prior and informed consent.33 
Moreover, the consultation should be a public process under the responsibility 
33   Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 September 2014, A/RES/69/2, Outcome 
Document of World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (2014) <http://wcip2014.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/03/N1446828.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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of the State involved and cannot be delegated to other actors such as private 
companies.34
Finally, concerning the right of participation, the ILO Convention Nº 169 
provides the right of indigenous peoples to participate in the formula-
tion, implementation and evaluation of national and regional development 
plans which may affect them directly (Article 7) and in the use, manage-
ment and conservation of their natural resources (Article 15). The UNDRIP 
also refers in a general way to the right of indigenous peoples to partici-
pate, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of 
the State (Article 5) and “in decision-making in matters which would affect 
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance 
with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own in-
digenous decision-making institutions” (Art. 18).35 Aware of this obligation, 
the indigenous communities of the Arctic have demanded a greater involve-
ment in decision-making processes that may affect them,36 in so far as the 
34   Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources. 
Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter‐American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II. Doc. 56/09 (2009), par. 291 <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/
ancestrallands.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
35   See also Articles 23, 27 and 41.
36   The Declaration of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference on sovereignty in the Arctic of April 
2009 considers that the right “to freely determine our political status, freely pursue our 
economic, social, cultural and linguistic development, and freely dispose of our natural 
wealth and resources” is fundamental as it refers to the rights recognised by the Declaration 
of 2007, which specifically mentions “the right to own, use, develop and control our 
lands, territories and resources and the right to ensure that no project affecting our lands, 
territories or resources”; Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on 
Sovereignty in the Arctic (2009) <http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/sovereignty-in-the 
-arctic.html> accessed 1 September 2015. In May 2011 a new Declaration on Resource 
Development Principles in Nunaat identifies “many principles that are relevant to 
the governance and carrying out of resource development in Inuit Nunaat, including the 
importance of the rule of law and recognition of the rights of Inuit as an Arctic indigenous 
people under both international and domestic law”; Inuit Circumpolar Council, Arctic 
Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat (2011) 
<http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/resource-development-principles-in-inuit-nunaat 
.html> accessed 1 September 2015. The Athabaskan Council also pointed out that: “It is 
important, however, that as European states and the institutions of the EU develop a 
policy or dimension for the Arctic that “common concern” is not confused with “com-
mon property.” Nordic Council of Ministers, Arctic Conference: Common Concern for the 
Arctic, Europe and the Arctic: A View From the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Ilulissat, (2008) 6 
<https://www.norden.org/no/nordisk-ministerraad/samarbeidsministrene-mr-sam/arktis/
common-concern-for-the-arctic/den-europeiske-union-og-arktis/europe-and-the-arctic 
-a-view-from-the-arctic-athabaskan-council-aac-pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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respect for their interests can only be ensured through more participatory 
processes.37
3.2 The Rights of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in the EU Law
Strictly speaking, although three of the EU Arctic Member States have indig-
enous peoples in their territories (Saami in Finland and Sweden, and Inuit in 
Denmark-Greenland), it cannot be said that the EU has a genuine policy for 
the protection of these communities. In fact, the Saami are the only indigenous 
peoples within the EU who are recognized as such and to whom participation 
in issues affecting their status as indigenous peoples is ensured. It is not a sur-
prise, then, that the EU founding Treaties have never made any mention of 
indigenous peoples. The only exception is a very short reference in the Act 
of Accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland of 4 May 1994. Protocol 3 refers 
to the Saami people.38 Its two articles recognize the dependence of the Saami 
regarding certain traditional activities and restrict the European Community 
(EC) competence on the internal market in terms of reindeer breeding, in 
which the Saami are attributed exclusive rights. However, the EU has been de-
veloping several initiatives for the protection of the indigenous peoples in two 
complementary dimensions: a) international cooperation and human rights 
protection, and b) the strategy for the Arctic.
3.2.1 International Cooperation and Human Rights Issues
The EU has incorporated cooperation and assistance to indigenous peoples 
as part of a wider cooperation and development programmes. The incorpora-
tion has been effected from a welfare perspective, in which it is assumed that 
these communities have to face economic, social and political marginalization 
and constant violation of human rights originating from and aggravated by the 
underdevelopment of the areas where they are located.39 This is indeed, 
the approach that has traditionally supported the EU action in this area. In this 
37   Anika E. Nilsson (Dir.), Arctic Resilence Interim Report 2013 (Stockholm Environment 
Institute—Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2013), 23 <http://www.sei-international.org/ 
mediamanager/documents/Publications/ArcticResilienceInterimReport2013-HighRes 
.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
38   Protocol Nº 3 on the Sami People, [1994] OJ C241, 352.
39   As an example, the 2002 Council’s position refers to the possibility of integrating the 
groups of indigenous peoples into political dialogue with the third country partners, 
as an integral part of the clauses of respect for human rights of the cooperation and as-
sociation agreements; See Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations of 
18 November 2002, 2463rd, General Affairs, 14183/02 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/73248.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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regard, the position adopted by the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission in December 200540 in which the primary objective was poverty 
eradication in the framework of sustainable development stands out. To do 
this, it establishes the use of social dialogue as the principal means to defend 
the rights of indigenous peoples and emphasizes the role of “full participation 
and free, prior and informed consent” of the indigenous communities in 
regards to those issues affecting them as the main mechanism to safeguard 
their rights. A key element is the participation of these communities in all 
stages of the adoption and implementation of projects and programmes that 
affect their livelihoods. The Commission has been establishing practical meth-
ods to guarantee the consultations, especially emphasizing the creation of 
contact points within the key services used to liaise with these groups,41 as well 
as the creation of an informal network comprising organisations of indigenous 
peoples.42
However, in contrast to what happens within the Arctic Council, which 
has significantly strengthened the participation of indigenous peoples in 
decision-making processes,43 the EU approach regarding these communi-
ties is much more limited. Despite the stance taken by the Commission and 
the European Parliament in this regard, the EU practice does not seem to be 
particularly sensitive to the demands of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic 
region. On the one hand, the EU approach is limited to the rights of minori-
ties, the only dimension that is included in the TEU (Article 2) and in the 
40   Statement of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the 
development policy of the European Union entitled “The European Consensus”, [2006] OJ 
C46, par. 97, 101 and 103.
41   The European Commission’s / RELEX’s Programming Guide for Strategic Papers—
Programming Cycle. Democracy and Human Rights [2008] <http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/sites/devco/files/programming-guide-strategy-papers-democracy-human-
rights-200812_en_2.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
42   Report from the Commission to the Council of 11 June 2002. Review of progress of working 
with indigenous peoples, COM (2002) 291 final <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:r12006> accessed 1 September 2015. There are contact points 
in the RELEX (Human Rights and Democracy Network), Development (Civil Society), 
Environment (CBD and Indigenous People Office) and the EuropeAid Co-operation 
Office (Human Rights and Democracy Network). The contact points cooperate closely 
with the geographical departments of the different services, the Commission delegations, 
and the representations of the Member States.
43   Timo Koivurova and Leena Heinamaki, “The participation of indigenous peoples in 
international norm-making in the Arctic” (2006) 42 (2) Polar Record 101.
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Preamble and Article 21).44 That 
said, it has to be remembered that the EU has no mechanism to apply these 
principles beyond the territory of its Member States (Article 6, TEU). On the 
other hand, from the perspective of the international recognition of the spe-
cific rights of indigenous peoples, it is worth noting the scant participation of 
the EU in different international instruments. The EU has an almost insignifi-
cant presence in the ILO Convention Nº 169, which has only been ratified by 
three Member States (Denmark in 1996, The Netherlands in 1998 and Spain 
in 2007). Furthermore, although the EU has repeatedly expressed its support 
for the UNDRIP of 2007,45 and allegedly uses this instrument as a basis for the 
periodic review of its human rights policy,46 it should not be forgotten that in 
the case concerning the trade ban in seal products, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) dismissed the mandatory character of the UNDRIP 
noting its non-binding nature. Regarding this instrument, it considered that
a measure adopted by virtue of those powers must be interpreted, and its 
scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of international law (…). 
The document relied on by the applicants is a declaration and thus does 
not have the binding force of a treaty. It cannot be considered that that 
declaration can grant the Inuit autonomous and additional rights over 
and above those provided for by Union law.47
It is noteworthy that the CJEU did not even consider any interaction between 
the UNDRIP and other sources of international law, for example, the ILO 
Convention Nº 169, the legal relevance of which was totally ignored. The CJEU 
therefore confined the rights claimed by the plaintiffs to the categories and 
44   [2010] OJ C83.
45   European Union Delegation to the United Nations, 20 October 2014, New York—European 
Union Statement delivered by H.E. Ioannis Vrailas, Deputy Head of the European Union 
to the United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Third Committee on Item 65 
a & b: Rights of Indigenous People <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15604_
en.htm> accessed 1 September 2015.
46   Declaration by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice-President on behalf of the European 
Union on the occasion of the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 
9 August 2013; 9 August 2014, Brussels—Statement by the Spokesperson on the occasion 
of the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples <http://eu-un.europa.eu/ 
articles/es/article_12500_es.htm> accessed 1 September 2015.
47   Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission [2013], Digital 
Reports (Court reports-general) ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, par. 112.
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specific parameters of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, the 
CJEU decided that, “the guarantees accorded by the rights to property cannot 
be extended to protect mere commercial interests or opportunities, the uncer-
tainties of which are part of the very essence of economic activity”.48 It also 
denied the indigenous peoples’ right to be heard, since the TEU did not estab-
lish any mandatory duty for consultation, and noted that the Commission had 
met several times with representatives of the indigenous peoples during the 
elaboration of the regulations.49
3.2.2  The EU’s Arctic Strategy and Indigenous Peoples
The interest of the EU for the Arctic region was initially very one-sided, and did 
not appear until the end of the 1990s, as part of the Finnish initiative that gave 
finally birth to the Northern Dimension.50 Within it, an “Arctic window” high-
lighted the need to involve Arctic indigenous peoples in the decision making 
process. In practice, it was not a big change, since the political interest that the 
region aroused then remained limited. However, it at least showed the recogni-
tion by the EU of the singularity of the Arctic with its special human, environ-
mental and socio-economic conditions. Since then, the EU has also developed a 
specific strategy for the Arctic, set out in three Commission’s Communications 
(2008, 2012 and 2016).51 However, the approach of the Commission concerning 
indigenous peoples appears to be fragmentary and limited.
48   Ibid. par. 109. For a deeper comment, See Antoni Pigrau Solé, Mar Campins Eritja, Xavier 
Fernández Pons, n. 32 above, 21.
49   Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission [2013], Digital 
Reports (Court reports-general) ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, par. 113.
50   Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy of 24 November 2006 and 
Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document of 24 November 2006 <http://ndep 
.org/wp-content/uploads/Political-Declaration-on-the-Northern-Dimension-Policy.pdf> 
and <http://ndep.org/wp-content/uploads/Northern-Dimension-Policy-Framework.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2015. The Northern Dimension represented a new approach to 
external borders of the EU and its adjacent areas and seeks to promote security and stabil-
ity in the region, while taking advantage of the potential of the region in terms of both 
natural resources and economic dynamism.
51   European Commission Communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union and 
the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763.; Joint Communication of the European Commission 
and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
of 26 June 2012 on Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: 
Progress since 2008 and Next Steps, JOIN (2012) 19; Joint Communication of the European 
Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy of 27 April 2016 on An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic, 
JOIN (2016) 21 final.
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In its 2008 Communication, the Commission identifies two political goals 
that are essential for this purpose: i) the protection and preservation of the 
Arctic in accordance with its population (avoiding and mitigating the negative 
impact of climate change and supporting adaptation to inevitable changes); 
and ii) the promotion of sustainable exploitation of Arctic resources. To achieve 
the first goal, the Commission included the requirement for the participation 
of Arctic indigenous peoples by establishing a regular dialogue, although it 
did not set up a specific institutional framework. In this context, the financial 
measures taken by the EU in several areas of this region have been of particu-
lar importance, especially the ones related to the European Neighbourhood 
Policy.52 The second of these goals has a particular impact on the right of in-
digenous peoples to exploit their land and resources, since climate change im-
pacts clearly on four areas essential for sustainable development of the Arctic 
and its populations, as mentioned in the 2008 Communication: hydrocarbons, 
fishing, transport and tourism.
Over the course of four years there were no major advances in the realisa-
tion of these goals. In the 2012 Communication, the Commission dilutes the 
significance of indigenous peoples’ involvement in a more general commit-
ment to dialogue with Arctic countries, indigenous peoples and other inter-
ested stakeholders. In addition, direct references to action for the protection of 
indigenous peoples are scanty. The Communication merely mentions, among 
a long list of measures carried out in each dimension since 2008 (within three 
big areas: knowledge, responsibility, commitment), the actions of financing 
sustainable development of local communities, conducting regular dialogues 
and creating platforms to ensure that representatives from indigenous commu-
nities are informed and consulted on EU policies.53 Even with this limitation, 
the Commission’s Communication highlights the role of the EU-Greenland 
relationships as being to promote “an enhanced dialogue on Arctic issues that 
would not only allow the EU to gain additional understanding of remote Arctic 
52   European Union, European Arctic Initiatives Compendium. Preparatory Action, Strategic 
Environmental Impact Assessment of development of the Arctic (Arctic Centre, 
University of Lapland 2014), <https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/61853/
European_arctic_initiatives_compendium_pdfA.pdf?sequence=2> accessed 1 September 
2015. In particular, Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme Secretariat, The Northern 
Periphery and Arctic Programme 2014–2020 (2014, updated 2016) <http://www.interreg-
npa.eu/fileadmin/Programme_Documents/Approved_Cooperation_Programme_
Jan2016.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
53   JOIN (2012) 19, p. 12. This materialised between 2008–2012 in several « Arctic Dialogues » 
supported by the Commission, the last one took place in October 2014 <https://webgate 
.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum/en/node/3655> accessed 1 September 2015.
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societies, and also allow for the sharing of valuable know-how on issues of 
mutual concern”.54
The Council welcomed these initiatives,55 but also required the Commission 
and the High Representative “to present proposals for the further development 
of an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy by December 2015”.56 Among its 
suggestions, it highlighted in particular the Council support to “strengthening 
the partnership between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland 
and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other which aims at promoting the sus-
tainable development of Greenland and the diversification of the economy” in 
a way that “also encourages an enhanced dialogue and cooperation on global 
and Arctic issues”.57 To this end, the 2016 Communication focuses on three 
main areas: climate change and the environment, sustainable economic de-
velopment and international cooperation. In particular, the Communication 
wish to enhance the cooperation with indigenous peoples in order to ensure 
respect for their rights in the development of the Arctic policy and in the pro-
motion of sustainable economic activities. Despite this focus on sustainable 
economic activities, the EU engagement is still too weak, it does not take into 
account the realization of specific actions and relies primarily on the annual 
dialogue with indigenous representatives organized by the Commission.
4 The Legal Framework for Offshore Oil Extraction and the 
Participation of the Greenlandic Population in the Decision 
Making Process
The protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples in relation to the 
exploitation of hydrocarbons is mostly addressed by the internal legal system 
of each Arctic State. Thus we need to examine Greenlandic law and in doing so 
we will check the issues raised against the EU specific regulations.
54   Ibid. p. 11.
55   Council Conclusions of 8 December 2009, on Arctic issues <http://ec.europa.eu/mari 
timeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/arctic_ocean/documents/arctic_council_conclusions_09_
en.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015; Council Conclusions of 12 May 2014, on developing 
a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142554.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
56   Ibid, par. 15.
57   Ibid, par. 13.
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4.1  The Relevance of Greenlandic Offshore Hydrocarbons Resources
From a geological point of view, Greenland is one of the most interesting 
countries in the world. Its mineral and other natural resources are particu-
larly important.58 In 2008 the US Geological Survey carried out an evaluation 
of existing resources in the Arctic Circle and estimated that three main basins 
around Greenland could hold around 50,000 million barrels of oil and gas. In 
offshore areas of Northeast Greenland there would be estimated 31,000 million 
barrels of oil, while in the seabed between Greenland and Canada there would 
be another estimated 17,000 million.59
For years, Greenland has been struggling to consolidate an economically 
viable as well as sustainable hydrocarbon industry. Its future development, 
however, faces double challenges: on the one hand, the exploitation of these 
hydrocarbons is essential for Greenland’s economic development. According 
to the vision of those in favour of political independence of Greenland from 
Denmark, the exploitation of those resources as well as fishing and naviga-
tion through Arctic waters are the basis for the construction of Greenland as a 
future sovereign State.60 On the other hand, from the environmental point of 
view, the management of these resources raises huge challenges in reconcil-
58   See Kenneth J. Bird, Ronald R. Charpentier, Donald L. Gautier et alt, Circum-Arctic Resource 
Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle (U.S. Geological 
Survey 2008) <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf> accessed 1 September 
2015.
59   As other Arctic States, this has led Denmark, jointly with Greenland, to submit three 
claims with regards to the extension of its Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
The first one (June 2012) affects the Continental Shelf south of Greenland, an area 
divided between the South-Western part of the Labrador Sea and Eastern part of the 
Irminger Sea. The second claim (November 2013) relates to the Continental Shelf off 
the Northeast of Greenland, affecting the area between Greenland and Svalbard. The 
third claim (December 2015) relates to the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland. See 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the continen-
tal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission 
by the Kingdom of Denmark, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_dnk_61_2012.htm> accessed 27 October 2015; <http://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_dnk_68_2013.htm> accessed 17 October 2015; and 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk76_14/dnk4_clcs76_2014_
en_fr.pdf> accessed 10 September 2016.
60   Vestergaard Pedersen, ‘“Regulation of Climate Matters in Greenland’ ” [2012] 1 Carbon 
& Climate Law Review 47. See also Marc Auchet, ‘ “Greenland at the crossroads. What 
strategy for the Arctic?’ [2011] 66 International Journal 957; Coco C.A. Smits, Jan P.M. 
van Tatenhove, Judith van Leeuwen, “Authority in Arctic governance: Changing spheres 
of authority in Greenlandic offshore oil and gas developments” [2014] 14 International 
Environmental Agreements 329.
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ing economic growth based on hydrocarbons extraction, which is managed by 
limited human resources, with the conservation of the Arctic’s highly sensitive 
environment.
Offshore oil drilling in the Arctic began in the mid-seventies. Since then, 
at least 61 large oil and gas fields have been located within the Arctic Circle. 
Norway and Russia are the main oil and gas exporters from the region; fur-
ther west, Iceland and Greenland are also actively working on oil and gas 
exploration in their areas of jurisdiction.61 However, technical difficulties 
of carrying out offshore extraction of hydrocarbons in the region are obvi-
ous. The cost of prospecting and exploiting these resources in such a remote 
place and under such tough weather conditions affect the viability of exploi-
tation. Navigation through Arctic waters, construction of artificial platforms, 
access to platforms through ice, and connecting sub-marine wells to onshore 
facilities are some of the difficulties.62 In addition, beyond geopolitical fac-
tors, the price of crude oil fell on the international market following the 2008 
financial crisis, which provides less incentive for offshore oil drilling in the 
Arctic. This explains why, since 2014 some major companies have announced 
their intention to stop prioritizing their operations in Greenland, despite the 
willingness of the Greenlandic government “(…) to promote prosperity and 
welfare by creating new income and employment opportunities in the area 
of mineral resources activities” and its optimism about opening new wells 
between 2014 and 2018.63 For example, the British petrochemical company 
61   Philip Budzik, Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy 
Information Administration, 2009) <http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/
arctic_oil.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
62   These difficulties meant that major projects in the region began to develop quite late. 
The KANUMAS project (Kalaallit Nunaat Marine Seismic) was not up and running until 
1989, with the granting of prospecting licenses by the Danish Government to a consor-
tium of companies (ExxonMobil, Statoil, BP, Japan National Oil Company, Texaco, Shell 
y Nunaoil) to investigate the oil potential in the Northwest and Northeast of Greenland. 
See Graça Ermida, “Strategic decisions of international oil companies: Arctic versus other 
regions” [2014] 2 Energy Strategy Reviews 265; Kevin Casey, Greenland’s New Frontier: Oil 
and Gas Licences Issued, Though Development Likely Years Off (The Arctic Institute, 2014) 
<http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/01/greenlands-new-frontier-oil-and-gas.html> 
accessed 1 September 2015; Joanna Kay and Stine Thorup, “Oil and Gas in Greenland—
Still on Ice?” (Notes From The Field—An English Law Perspective On The Oil & Gas Market, 
November 2014) <https://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-1165.html> 
accessed 1 September 2015.
63   Government of Greenland, Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014–2018, FM (2014) 133 
<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Raastof/ENG/Greenland 
%20oil%20and%20mineral%20strategy%202014–2018_ENG.pdf> accessed 1 September 
2015.
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Cairn Energy, which is the only company that has been continuously drilling 
in coastal areas of Greenland, has not yet achieved commercial use of these 
resources. This resulted in other oil companies, including Norwegian Statoil, 
French GDF Suez and Danish Dong Energy, giving up their exploration li-
censes. Currently, companies hold only 15 licenses to explore Greenlandic 
waters,64 but none of them seems to be actively drilling. However, that does 
not mean the hydrocarbon industry has given up exploiting the hydrocar-
bon resources in the region. In fact, the Greenlandic government has tried to 
maintain current levels of exploration activity in the hope that it will find 
other commercially viable wells. The Greenlandic government announced 
the launching of the first field with a reserve of about 500 million barrels of 
oil in 2020 and a second one in 2025 with a reserve of about 2,000 million bar-
rels. In order to facilitate the exploration operations the government commit-
ted to grant new licenses between 2014 and 2018 in five new areas: Jameson 
Land (2014, onshore, East Greenland), South-West Greenland (2014, offshore), 
Disko-Nuussuaq (2016, offshore, West Greenland), Baffin Bay (2016/2017, 
Northwest Greenland), and Davis Straight (2018, West Greenland).65
4.2  Greenland’s Domestic Legal Framework
Six months after the adoption of the Act Nº 473 on Greenland Self-Government 
(AGSG), the Greenlandic Parliament approved the Mineral Resources Act 
(MRA).66 The AGSG and the MRA are intimately related and should be read in 
light of the internal political context, which considers economic benefits from 
64   Mineral License and Safety Authority, List of Mineral and Petroleum Licences in Greenland, 
Government of Greenland [2015] <https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/minerals/
list_of_licences/list_of_licences.pdf> 14–17, accessed 1 September 2015. Exploration and 
exploitation licenses for hydrocarbons have been granted since 2002 (usually in joint 
ventures) to: Capricorn Greenland Exploration A/S (CAIRN: Edinburgh); NUNAOIL 
A/S (Greenland); Husky Oil Operations (Canada); PA Resources AB (Sweden); Conoco 
Philips Global NVE Greenland Ltd (Norway); Shell Greenland (Anglo Dutch); Maersk Oil 
Kalaallit Nunaat A/S (Greenland); Tullow Greenland Exploration Ltd (UK); ENI Denmark 
BV (Denmark); BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd (UK); DONG E&P Grönland 
A/S (Denmark); Statoil Greenland A/S (Norway); Chevron East Greenland Explora-
tion A/S (USA), Greenland Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd.
65   Government of Greenland, Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy 2014–2018, 8 February 2014, 
FM 2014/133, <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Raastof/ENG/ 
GOMS%202014%202018%20Appendices%20ENG.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
66   Act No. 7 of 7 December 2009 on Mineral Resources and Mineral Resource Activities, 
unofficial translation <https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/faelles/mineral_resources_ 
act_unofficial_translation.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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the exploitation of mineral and hydrocarbon resources to be inseparable from 
Greenland’s aspirations for greater political independence.
As mentioned above, the AGSG does not use the term indigenous peoples 
or Inuit to refer to the Greenlandic population, nor does it consider that being 
from Greenland implies belonging to a particular ethnic group. As such, the 
Greenlandic legislation does not give special acknowledgment to Greenlanders 
as “indigenous peoples”. Similarly, the MRA does not specifically refer to the 
subsistence or hunting activities of Greenland’s population in its description 
of the characteristics of indigenous peoples, but talks about the protection of 
cultural values and the protection of animal and plant environment, and calls 
for a “rightful utilization of the soil, the sea, the subsoil or natural resources.” 
Part 13 of the MRA relates specifically to environmental protection (Article 51 to 
54), climate protection (Article 55 to 58) and to nature conservation (Article 59 
to 62), in order “to help to protect the environment so that society can develop 
on a sustainable basis respecting human conditions of life and respecting pres-
ervation of animal and plant life.”
Since the MRA came into force in January 2010, the government of Greenland 
has acquired the “right of use of and the right to exploit mineral resources in 
the subsoil in Greenland” (Article 2(1)). Since then, the Greenlandic authorities 
have assumed full powers over mineral resources in the subsoil. In so doing, the 
system of joint management between Greenland and Denmark and Denmark’s 
power of veto, which had been in force since 1979, has come to an end. It is the 
government of Greenland which now grants drilling and exploitation licenses 
directly67 and it is entitled to all the revenue derived from mining and hydro-
carbon exploitation.68
The MRA seeks sustainable exploitation of mineral resources and hydrocar-
bons and proper use of the subsoil. Furthermore, it is intended to ensure that 
these activities are carried out in accordance with the requirements relating 
to health, safety, the environment, resource use and social sustainability, as 
well as in accordance with international best practice recognised in similar 
67   The summary of licenses granted until 2013 in Government of Greenland, Greenland’s 
oil and mineral strategy 2014–2018 (appendices), n. 65 above, 8–18, <http://naalakker 
suisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Raastof/ENG/GOMS%202014%202018%20
Appendices%20ENG.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
68   MRA Explanatory Notes, part 1.2.3, p.10, “The revenue definition”, cited on Lisa Campion, 
Catherine Peterson and Zhen Zhang, “Greenland”, in Vermont Law School Institute for 
Energy and the Environment, The Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in Greenland and 
The Russian Federation (Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines White Paper No. 5, 2011) 
1, note 9, p. 12 <http://www-assets.vermontlaw.edu/Assets/iee/Baker_ArcticOffshoreOil5 
.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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conditions, Best Available Technology (BAT) and Best Environmental Practices 
(BEP). To this end, the MRA (Article 55) establishes the obligation
to prevent, limit and combat pollution and other impacts on the cli-
mate from activities that may directly or indirectly: (i) Endanger human 
health; (ii) Damage animal or plant life or natural or cultural values on or 
in the soil, in the sea or in the subsoil; (iii) Obstruct the rightful utilisation 
of the soil, the sea, the subsoil or natural resources; (iv) Impair human 
conditions of life; (v) Impair recreational values or activities.
The rights granted to indigenous peoples can be explained by the special rela-
tionship, from a spiritual and material point of view, that they have with their 
land and territories. In the MRA, the protection of nature should take prior-
ity over the granting of operating licenses. Licenses are subordinated to the 
“consideration for avoiding impairment of nature and the habitats of species 
in designated national and international nature conservation areas and distur-
bance of species for which the areas have been designated” (Article 60).
The Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) prepares the 
Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) to identify existing gaps or 
to recommend specific measures of mitigation and monitoring. In turn, appli-
cants should prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as well as a 
Social Impact Assessment (SIA). Both proceedings require the participation of 
the interested public before the BMP and the government of Greenland sanc-
tioning of license applications.
Under the EIA, once the applicant identifies that an offshore hydrocarbon 
project has significant environmental impact, the BMP has to facilitate the 
exercise of the right to public participation. However, the MRA does not define 
the length or format that such participation should take, it only provides 
that an opportunity for a public hearing should be given. In addition to rely-
ing on the SEIA, the EIA is complemented with the documentation available 
in the National Environmental Research Institute (NERI), especially in what 
relates to environmental impact assessment of seismic activities in Greenland 
waters.69 This requirement reflects, albeit indirectly, the importance that 
the Greenlandic law assigns to the protection of marine mammals. The BMP 
 
69   David Boertmann, Jakob Tougaard, Kasper Johansen, Anders Mosbech, Guidelines to 
environmental impact assessment of seismic activities in Greenland waters (NERI Technical 
Report No. 785, National Environmental Research Institute—Aarhus University, 2nd ed. 
2010) <http://www2.dmu.dk/Pub/FR785.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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publishes specific guidelines for the preparation of EIAs, specifically related to 
the exploration or exploitation of hydrocarbons on the coast of Greenland, and 
which take into account “present use of natural resources,” including hunting, 
fishing, and tourism; and further requires that the “cumulative impacts with 
other human activities in and near the license area should be considered”.70
In the event that a project may have a significant impact on social conditions 
and human development, the applicant has to prepare a SIA in addition to the 
EIA, which must consider not only the consequences on land and resource use, 
the health and socio-cultural characteristics of the population, but also other 
factors such as the level of employment generated by the activity or degree 
of improvement of their socio-economic conditions. While it’s clear that the 
MRA does not detail when or to what extent impact should be assumed by 
the applicant, nor does it detail the criteria for assessing such impact, it is im-
portant that the law introduces the notion of social sustainability in the de-
velopment of this procedure. Thus, before the BMP grants a license to operate 
offshore, the applicant must engage in a process of consultation and public 
hearings with the population and relevant stakeholders.
However, it should be noted that even if the SIA results indicate a potential 
social impact, the MRA leaves the BMP with sufficient discretion to authorise 
the project should it deem it appropriate. Therefore, the Greenlandic gov-
ernment may decide that the economic benefits of a project outweigh dam-
ages arising from the socio-cultural impact generated, and grant the license. 
In these circumstances, the licensee and the BMP use the SIA to develop 
a Benefit and Impact Plan (BIP) that serves to develop and implement an 
Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA). In fact, this is one of the purposes of the SIA 
to “assist mining companies and their consultants in implementing the Impact 
Benefit Agreement.”71 Moreover, it is worth noting that one of the main aims 
of the SIA is to engage all relevant stakeholders in consultations. To do so, the 
applicant is required to provide a “non-technical brief” before the public hear-
ings in order to identify the issues and ensure that through the SIA concerned 
groups have an influence on topics to be studied by the SIA with the support 
70   BMP Guidelines—for preparing an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report for 
activities related to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation offshore Greenland (Danish 
National Environmental Research Institute, Greenland Institute of Natural Resources 
and Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, 2011) <https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/
petroleum/BMP_EIA_Guidelines_Jan_2011.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
71   Guidelines for Social Impact Assessments for mining projects in Greenland (Bureau of 
Minerals and Petroleum, Greenland, 2009) <https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/ 
minerals/sia_guideline/sia_guidelines.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
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of the BMP. Stakeholders may include—but are not limited to—the public 
sector, non-governmental organizations, affected communities, individuals 
and enterprises. The government itself usually provides a list of stakehold-
ers that the applicant should consider. It is questionable however, to what 
extent these stakeholders, and particularly indigenous peoples actually feel linked 
to the BMP (or more generally involved with the MRA’s process), when in fact, 
the main interest of this organization is the extraction industry, and not the 
interests the affected local communities may have. While the MRA promotes 
procedures to involve local communities in decision making with regards to oil 
exploration and exploitation, one of the main criticisms of it has been the lack 
of transparency on those processes. This is coupled with a lack of commitment 
by Greenland to ratify the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters.72 (Denmark’s signature does not include the territory and the areas 
governed by the AGSG.)73
4.3  The Applicable Secondary EU Law
Despite the actions of the EU institutions mentioned above, the lack of inte-
gration of indigenous peoples into specific EU policies is still significant. In 
fact, the biggest challenge is how to incorporate these issues into the specific 
measures taken by the EU institutions through the regular development of EU 
legislation. In this sense, it’s important to point out that the relevance of the 
above statements is compromised when put into practice in some of the poli-
cies most affecting sustainable development of the Arctic region. A clear ex-
ample is the case of offshore oil drilling in the Arctic. The EU law has so far 
been scarcely affected by the influence of the evolution of international law 
regarding the rights of indigenous peoples in the context of offshore hydrocar-
bons drilling and the extractive sector.
The EU Member States control hydrocarbon resources in their territories. 
They are also responsible for licensing the exploitation of these resources. 
In order to ensure that these licenses are granted in a way that is fair and 
72   UN/ECE Convention of 25 June 1998, on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, 
UNTS, vol. 2161, p. 447. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), 
“Greenland”, 2015 Yearbook <http://www.iwgia.org/images/stories/sections/regions/arctic/
documents/IW2015/Greenland_IW2015_web.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
73   Ibid., Declarations and reservations Upon Signature: Denmark <https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII13&chapter=27&lang=en#End 
Dec> accessed 1 September 2015.
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transparent, national governments are obliged to follow a common set of rules. 
The requirements for licensing procedures of EU companies to be used by 
Member States for the prospection, exploration, and exploitation of oil and gas 
under their jurisdiction are laid out in the Directive 94/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting 
and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons.74 This Directive ignores the participation of local populations 
on the process of granting those licenses. Concerning the indirect affect on 
their rights, the Directive merely provides in Article 4, on the delimitation 
of the geographical areas covered by a license, that it should be done “in such 
a way that it does not exceed the area justified by the best possible exercise 
of the activities from the technical and economic points of view”; and also that 
“the duration of an authorization does not exceed the period necessary to carry 
out the activities for which the authorization is granted.” According to Article 5, 
the procedures for granting authorizations should be established in a transpar-
ent way on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory criteria.
In order to prevent and respond to accidents at offshore drilling oil facili-
ties such as the 2010 Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, the EU adopted 
Directive 2013/30/EU on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations.75 
The Directive applies to the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf 
of Member States and Parties of the European Economic Area. The Directive 
mentions the Arctic in Recital 52 to point out its vulnerability to the phenom-
enon of climate change and in Article 33 to demand high safety standards for 
offshore oil and gas extraction operations, internationally and within global 
and regional powers. Under Article 33, the Directive 2013/30/EU states that 
“the Commission shall promote high safety standards for offshore oil and gas 
operations at international level in relevant global and regional fora, including 
those relating to Arctic waters”. This includes a series of mandatory actions: as, 
74   [1994] OJ L164. A flexible approach to the territorial scope of EU law has been applied 
by the European Court of Justice when considering that “Since a Member State has 
sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to it albeit functional and limited sover-
eignty (…) work carried out on fixed or floating installations positioned on the continen-
tal shelf, in the context of the prospecting and/or exploitation of natural resources, is to 
be regarded as work carried out in the territory of that State for the purposes of applying 
EU (…). A Member State which takes advantage of the economic rights to prospect and/or 
exploit natural resources on that part of the continental shelf which is adjacent to it can-
not avoid the application of the EU law provisions”, See Case C-347/10, A. Salemink v. Raad 
van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen [2012] Digital reports 
(Court Reports-general) ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2012:17, par. 35 and 36.
75   [2013] OJ L178.
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for EU registered companies, duties include establishing risk and emergency 
response plans; preparing a Major Hazard Report (MHR) for the offshore 
installation; keeping resources at hand in order to put them into operation 
when necessary; facilitating the independent verification of technical solu-
tions concerning safety operations, and becoming fully liable for environmen-
tal damages caused to protected marine species and natural habitats. National 
authorities of Member States are responsible to ensure that companies are 
well financed and have the necessary technical expertise, and to verify safety 
provisions, environmental protection measures, and emergency preparedness 
through the setting up of national supervisory mechanisms. In addition, citizens 
have the right to access the information on the installations’ safety.
However, Directive 2013/30/EU only covers accidental pollution related 
to oil or gas operations at sea, and does not directly deal with prevention of 
operational pollution. In case of an accident, “Member States shall require 
companies registered in their territory and conducting, themselves or through 
subsidiaries, offshore oil and gas operations outside the Union as licence hold-
ers or operators to report to them, on request, the circumstances of any major 
accident in which they have been involved.” (Article 20.1).76 Moreover, the 
Directive does not apply to major accidents occurring on the high seas (except 
in the case of operations carried out on the continental shelf of a Member 
State, or in the case “where there is a risk of the foreseeable transboundary 
effects of major accidents affecting third countries” according to Article 31.3).77 
The Directive states that Member States “shall require operators and owners 
to ensure that their corporate major accident prevention policy document 
referred to in paragraph 1 also covers their production and non-production 
installations outside of the Union” (Article 19.8). As a result, in this area, the 
Directive can be considered to have some extra-territorial effect. The absence 
76   Private stakeholder companies have noted that such a duty to report major accidents, even 
when occurring outside the EU “is in contradiction to Article 20 (…) which ascribes this 
duty to operators, who are the entities in overall control of offshore operations. In practi-
cal terms, it would be ineffectual to obtain a report from a contractor; in legal and con-
tractual terms, such a requirement would probably compromise the owner in the country 
where the incident occurs.” International Association of Drilling Contractors, “Letter on 
The implementation of Directive 2013/30/EU on the safety of offshore oil and gas opera-
tions addressed to the British Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Health 
and Safety Executive” (Department of Energy & Climate Change and Health & Safety 
Executive 2014) <http://www.iadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/IADC-response-to-
UK-CD-272-.pdf> accessed 1 September 2015.
77   Jose Juste Ruiz, “La directive européenne sur la securité des opérations petrolières et 
gazières en mer”, (2014) 23 (1) Revue juridique de l’Environnement 28.
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of any mention of indigenous peoples or local communities in the procedures 
for granting exploitation concessions is particularly striking. In fact, the obli-
gations included in the Directive regarding their participation are scarce and 
limited to Article 5 which requires that competent authorities “have previously 
ensured that early and effective public participation on the possible effects of 
planned offshore oil and gas operations on the environment pursuant to other 
Union legal acts, in particular Directive 2001/42/EC or 2011/92/EU as appropri-
ate, has been undertaken.” If this has not happened, Member States should 
ensure that “a) the public is informed (…); c) relevant information about such 
planned operations is made available to the public (…); d) the public is entitled 
to express comments and opinions at a time when all options are open before 
decisions to allow exploration are taken”.
In spite of the fact that there is a specific mention of Directive 2001/42/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assess-
ment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on environment78 and 
of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on environment,79 as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 
2014,80 none of these rules apply to the territory of Greenland.81
5 How a Strengthened EU-Greenland Relationship Contributes to the 
EU’s Policy Objectives in the Arctic
With limited population, Greenland’s main challenge is managing a vast terri-
tory rich in natural and mineral resources, which attracts the interest of some 
major world powers. In turn, the main challenge of the EU is strengthening 
its role as part of the inner circle of Arctic governance. To do so, it has to con-
sider its relationships with and its presence in the Arctic strategically. In such a 
78   [2001] OJ L197.
79   [2014] OJ L26.
80   [2014] OJ L124.
81   The same is true regarding the Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability, which 
addresses the liability for damage caused to the environment, including those caused 
by offshore installations; the Directive 85/337/EEC on Environmental Assessment, as 
amended by Directives 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC and 2009/31/EC, which harmonises the prin-
ciples of environmental impact assessments of projects; the Waste Framework Directive 
2008/98/EC; or the Directive 92/91/EEC on health and safety of workers in the mineral-
extracting industries through drilling.
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context, an enhanced cooperation between Greenland and the EU has mutual 
benefit.
Firstly, the governance system of the Arctic has traditionally been character-
ised by the predominance of, in particular, the five coastal States of the Arctic 
Ocean. The core of the Arctic cooperation has traditionally been identified 
with the “Arctic Five”. Greenland, as part of the “Arctic Five”, thanks to certain 
Danish benevolence, is a unique case in that context. Beyond its role as one of 
the “Arctic Five”, the Greenlandic sub-delegation takes the floor with its own 
representative in the Arctic Council meetings, though the national delega-
tion is led by Denmark. Greenland is also very proactive in other Arctic fora. 
It is represented at the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians, jointly with the 
representatives of the Arctic Council Member States and the representatives 
of the European Parliament. Greenland could therefore contribute to further 
involving the EU in the Arctic governance system.
Secondly, without being a sovereign State, Greenland is a territory that is 
directly responsible for many key areas related to the development of the 
Arctic. It is legally bound to a Member State of the EU as an autonomous 
territory. This situation could see future developments such as Greenland’s 
independence from Denmark or even a possible (re)joining of the EU.82 If 
Greenland becomes independent, it is very important for the EU to ensure it 
has a strong domestic economy. A politically independent but economically 
dependant Greenland would imply risk for the development of the whole 
Arctic region. This is because of the interest that some non-Arctic stakehold-
ers have in the region’s natural and mineral resources and the risk of them 
being capable of ‘informally’ driving Greenland’s natural resources manage-
ment policy. The EU assumes its role as an economic “safety net” for Greenland 
and defends a strong relationship that allows the EU and Greenland to jointly 
tackle global challenges in the management of the Arctic. On the one hand 
the EU is committed to promoting the development of Greenland, in particu-
lar, the diversification of its economy on the basis of a resources management 
policy which is environmentally, socially and financially sustainable; on the 
other hand, it demands Greenland considers the potential role it may have as 
supplier of strategic raw materials for the EU, according to the principles of 
free trade.
82   In that sense Damien Degeorges, The role of Greenland in the Arctic, n. 4 above and André 
Gattolin, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes 
sur l’avenir du Groenland, (Sénat française, session ordinaire de 2014–2015, Nº 152, 2014) 
<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/144000755/> accessed 1 Sep-
tember 2015.
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Thirdly, the identity of Greenland is closely linked to indigenous peoples of 
the Arctic, who are neither part of the “Arctic Five” nor Members of the Arctic 
Council (though they have the status as Permanent Participants). The role of 
Greenland as ambassador for Arctic indigenous peoples before regional and 
international fora is obvious. In that context, the EU has had a significant evo-
lution from the perspective of traditional human rights, to a mainstreaming 
approach towards indigenous peoples’ rights. Notwithstanding, it should be 
pointed out that on the EU’s side there is still room for greater coherence and 
consistency. It has been shown that the EU lacks mechanisms to guarantee the 
participation of local communities in the decision-making process concern-
ing offshore oil drilling operations. It is also worth mentioning some historical 
institutional miscommunications between representatives of Arctic indig-
enous peoples and the EU institutions. Although there are international legal 
instruments that are potentially applicable to prevent or alleviate the adverse 
impact on communities and the environment of Greenland’s offshore hydro-
carbon activities, the CJEU has given a very restrictive interpretation to the 
UNDRIP or the No. 169 of the ILO Convention. For this reason, it is essential to 
avoid any hint of condescension by the EU actions that may affect Greenland 
and the Arctic indigenous peoples. Two examples may illustrate to what extent 
certain aspects require more attention by the EU.
The first relates to the EU ban of seal products in the EU market, established 
under the Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009, on trade in 
seal products.83 Seal hunting is highly integrated in Greenlandic traditions. 
Although it is directly linked to the subsistence of indigenous communities, 
it is usually carried out on a bigger scale and has a considerable commercial 
component. Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 established an exception that re-
lates to the commercialisation of seal products captured specifically by indig-
enous communities, which entered into force in 2013.84 When the exception 
came into force, the Greenlandic authority was already prepared to imple-
ment the certification system required by the Regulation. It almost imme-
diately got acceptance by the EU as an authorised body to issue certificates 
83   [2009] OJ L286, 36. This has been amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/1775 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 737/2010, [2015] OJ L262 and Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) of 13 October 2015 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation 
(EC) 1007/2009 on trade on seal products, [2015] OJ L271.
84   [2010] OJ L216, 1.
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for seal products.85 With this, the Inuit communities of Greenland became at 
that time the only indigenous communities benefiting from the exception of 
the regulation, unlike the Canadian Inuit communities. The ban was finally 
amended in 2015 in order to reflect the WTO ruling of 22 May 2014.86 However, 
in spite of that change and although exports from seal products are becoming 
less important to the economy of Greenland, there is still a general feeling on 
the part of the Greenlandic population that the Greenland’s lifestyle and tradi-
tions continue to be misunderstood by the EU.
Whaling is another sensitive issue in the relationship between Greenland 
and the EU. According the International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling the number of whales killed under the Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling (ASW) provision must align with subsistence needs.87 Greenland, 
like other traditional whaling countries in the region (Norway or Iceland), 
is in favour of increasing the number of whale species for which hunting is 
permitted by the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This policy often 
clashes with the more conservationist EU perspective, which supports the set-
ting of catch limits for ASW in certain conditions and the 1986 moratorium on 
commercial whaling. This has caused some confrontations in IWC meetings, in 
which Denmark representing the interests of Greenland and Faroe Islands88 
85   See, Commission Decision of 25 April 2013, recognizing the Greenland Department of 
Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture for the purposes of Article 6 of Commission Regulation 
(EU) 737/2010 of 10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Regulation /EC) 1007/2009 on trade in seal products, C(2013)2277 final; and Commission 
Decision of 26 October 2015, recognizing the Greenland Department of Fisheries, Hunting 
and Agriculture in accordance with Article 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1850 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation /EC) 1007/2009 on trade 
in seal products, C(2015)7274 final.
86   WT/DS-EU-Measures prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm> accessed 10 March 
2017. See also Commission decision (EU) 2017/265 of 14 February 2017 including the 
Government of Northwest Territories of Canada as a recognized body in the list referred 
to in Article 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1850 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Regulation (EC) 1007/2009on trade in seal products, C (2017) 757, 
[2017] OJ L39.
87   International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling [1946], 161 UNTS 72, Art. I 
(Schedule). See also IWC, Aboriginal / Subsistence Whaling (with opened reference to 
the Alaska and Greenland Fisheries) (1982) and IWC White Paper on Management and 
Utilization of Large Whales in Greenland, (2013), IWC/64/ASW 8, 2012 <https://archive.iwc 
.int/pages/search.php?search=!collection84> accessed 30 November 2016.
88   Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which agreed the Treaty on 
European Union (1992), Declaration Nº 25.
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in international negotiations, had to reject common positions adopted by the 
EU. For example, the IWC rejected Denmark’s proposal to increase Greenland’s 
ASW quota in 2008, on the grounds that an increasing commercial use was 
being made of the catches.89 Confrontations were intensified in July 2012, 
when the IWC rejected again a new proposal to increase the Greenland’s ASW 
catch limit.90 Following this refusal, in 2013 Denmark threatened to withdraw 
from the IWC if it did not adopt a more flexible position regarding Greenland.91 
A compromise finally has been made, not without difficulties, between the op-
posing views of the EU and the Danish/Greenlandic authorities. Denmark suc-
ceeded at the September 2014 IWC meeting, and its proposed catch limits were 
approved with the backing of the EU.92
6 Final Remarks
Greenland is an important gateway to the Arctic for the EU and plays a bridging 
role as an EU partner. On the one hand, still bound to one of the EU Member 
States, it has a proactive role in distinct Arctic fora; on the other hand, while 
being granted the status of OCT, it has a strong relationship with the EU based 
on a partnership agreement which partially provides for its social and econom-
ic development.
One of the key elements of this relationship is the legitimacy that must 
necessarily support the EU’s action with regard to the Inuit community of 
Greenland. Therefore, this legitimacy must be built within the framework 
89   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009 (2010), 22 <https:// 
archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=64&search=!collection2&order_by=relevance&sort=
DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=4> accessed 1 September 2015.
90   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2012 (2013), 15 <https:// 
archive.iwc.int/pages/terms.php?ref=67&search=!collection2&k=&url=pages%2Fdown 
load_progress.php%3Fref%3D67%26size%3D%26ext%3Dpdf%26k%3D%26search%
3D%2521collection2%26offset%3D0%26archive%3D0%26sort%3DDESC%26order_
by%3Drelevance> accessed 1 September 2015.
91   Chair’s Report of the 2013 IWC Bureau Meeting, 3–4 September 2013, 4–5 <https://archive 
.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=1797&search=asw%2C+2013%2C+greenland%2C+year% 
3A2013&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=1> accessed 
1 September 2015.
92   IWC/65/ASW02, 65th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Aboriginal 
Subsistence Whaling Sub-Committee <https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3539
&search=!collection98&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&cur
pos=1> accessed 1 September 2015.
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of respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, an ele-
ment that should provide the EU with better possibilities to interact into the 
Arctic scenario.
Unfortunately, however, the current legal EU framework does not guaran-
tee a full commitment with Arctic indigenous peoples. From the EU point of 
view, protection of the Arctic local communities continues to be an area to be 
further developed as it still lacks effective mechanisms to guarantee their par-
ticipation in the decision-making processs related to the exploitation of hydro-
carbon resources. The study of EU regulation on oil and gas offshore extraction 
identified the limitations of their participation in the decision-making process 
and the right to be consulted through their representatives.
In the short and medium term, the EU should continue to have an essential 
role to enhance the diversification of Greenland’s economy. In the long term, 
though difficulties for Greenland’s independence do exist, new opportunities 
may appear in the EU-Greenland relationship, such as Greenland being con-
sidered as a third State or even Greenland’s accession to the EU. In this situ-
ation, the EU will be critical for Greenland to secure a sustainable economy. 
This is especially true in the context in which some other non-Arctic powers, 
such as China, have shown a much more pragmatic approach in their interest 
in Greenland. In turn, this vested economic contribution from the EU could 
result in reinforcing the EU’s political links with the island, and consequently, 
the EU presence in the Arctic. Playing a stronger and more constructive role 
in effectively helping solve the region-specific challenges related to meaning-
ful participation with local and indigenous peoples will also give the EU the 
opportunity to increase collaboration with other Arctic and non-Arctic inter-
ested players. 
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CHAPTER 5
Partners or Rivals? Norway and the European Union 
in the High North
Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik
1 Introduction
Ever since the European Union (EU) became actively engaged in Arctic affairs, 
its related relationship with Norway—as its immediate Arctic/northern neigh-
bour—can be characterised as paradoxical. Although Norway has pro-actively 
worked to get the EU more involved in Arctic (governance) issues, it has, from 
the European Commission’s (the Commission) first Communication on Arctic 
issues in 2008,1 been sceptical of various policy and legal steps taken by the 
EU. As a matter of fact, this apparent “enthusiasm and scepticism”, illustrates 
much of Norway’s relationship with the EU; not only in the Arctic, but also in 
the overarching relationship between these two international actors.
Norway’s liaison with the EU can generally be characterised as not ‘in’ but 
neither really ‘out’ of the EU. Although Norway is not a EU Member State, it is 
politically and economically closely connected to the Union via a broad range 
of agreements and other forms of cooperation.2 A member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) since 1994—when the bid for EU membership failed for 
a second time—Norway adheres to the majority of European legislative acts. 
Accordingly, Norway can be characterised as the “most integrated outsider” to 
the Union.3 And yet, in Norway, the EU is often portrayed as something far 
removed from its political processes, separated in the domain of foreign policy.
*  Andreas Østhagen, Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, Norway 
and PhD candidate, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Canada.
**  Andreas Raspotnik, Senior Fellow, The Arctic Institute, Washington DC, United States.
1   Commission of the European Communities, ‘The European Union and the Arctic Region’, 
COM (2008) 763.
2   K. Keil and A. Raspotnik, ‘The European Union’s Gateways to the Arctic’ (2014) 19(1) European 
Foreign Affairs Review 101, 104.
3   Christophe Hillion, ‘Integrating an Outsider: An EU Perspective on Relations with Norway’ 
(2011) Europautredningen Rapport #16 8.
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The Arctic, however, is closely linked to Norwegian national identity. As the 
region saw a surge in global attention almost a decade ago, Norway found itself 
faced with the EU pursuing a more active role in what constitute ‘core’ interests 
for Norway in a wide range of policy areas. Ever since this particular regional 
activeness by the Union, the Norway-EU relationship has been challenging. 
Norway is grappling with the desire to get European engagement in Arctic 
affairs, while simultaneously safeguarding its sovereign rights and interests.
This Chapter investigates the complex and ambiguous relationship between 
Norway and the EU. It asks: Why does the Arctic relationship between Norway 
and the EU take on these paradoxical traits? Which conditional elements can 
explain Norway’s ambivalence towards the EU in Arctic/northern affairs?
We will in turn argue that it is somewhat futile to separate the Arctic domain 
from the overarching Norway-EU relationship. Although useful for policy-
makers in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), such separation is 
a symbolic action that does not help explain the larger trends in the relation-
ship between the Scandinavian country and the politico-economic union of 
(currently) 28 Member States. At the same time, only discussing Norway-EU 
relations omits an essential and often neglected domestic actor in Norway, 
namely the Norwegian Arctic itself. Hence, we need to recognise how the 
EU’s Arctic quest relates not only to Norway and the Arctic as a foreign policy 
domain, but also to the northern parts of Norway and the Arctic as a domain 
linked to regional and economic development.
We examine these relationships in the light of three examples: (1) the discus-
sions embedded in the broader Arctic governance theme, (2) the EU’s impact 
on, and efforts to regulate, industrial policies of relevance to the Norwegian 
Arctic, and finally (3) regional development and the indigenous peoples’ 
aspects of the Union’s Arctic engagement. In sum, studying these domains will 
help to answer the questions laid out above. However, before scrutinising how 
the Arctic has figured in this ambiguous relationship, we first need to briefly 
conceptualise the larger context of Norway’s liaison with the EU. Afterwards, 
we will examine the EU’s Arctic relationship with Norway, through each of the 
illustrations described, before returning to the questions posed above.
2 Norway and the EU: It’s Complicated
Norway’s relationship with the EU can—at best—be characterised as am-
biguous. By 2017, the Norwegian government had twice initiated the process 
of negotiating membership terms, only for the prospect of membership to be 
rejected by national popular vote at the final stage. This section elaborates on 
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the broader relationship between these two actors, in which the Arctic is only 
one of many policy issues, albeit one of growing importance.
2.1 Rejecting the EU, Twice
In 1972, with Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom seeking European 
Community (EC) (the European Union’s predecessor) membership, Norwegian 
politicians surmised that it would serve the country’s interests to join the Union 
as well. Labour Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli strongly argued for Norwegian 
accession, motivated by both economic and security interests.4 Yet, when the 
choice was given to the Norwegian citizens, 53.5% voted against membership, 
while 46.5% were in favour of it. Norway consequently chose to stay out, as 
the EC went from its initial six founding members to a total of nine member 
states. After the end of the Cold War and the (re)-appearance of a range of 
new States across Central and Eastern Europe in early 1990s, accession talks 
were initiated to bring formerly non-aligned Austria, Finland and Sweden 
into the EU. It was at this point that Norwegian politicians again deemed it 
imperative for Norway not to be left behind again. Then Labour Prime Minister 
Gro Harlem Brundtland actively tried to persuade the Norwegian population 
using the same argument as in 1972 concerning economic benefits, but also 
emphasising the democratic imperative of joining the Union.5 It was thought 
that the effect of the Finnish and Swedish population having voted ‘yes’ a few 
months earlier, with 56.9% and 52.3% respectively in favour of EU member-
ship, would constitute the final rationale for Norway to join the EC. Norway 
could not afford to stand-alone when all of its Nordic neighbours apart from 
Iceland (Denmark joined in 1973) had joined. The referendum in 1994, how-
ever, produced almost the exact same result as 22 years earlier, namely 52.2% 
against and 47.8% in favour of the EC membership.
Albeit difficult to sum up, an extensive body of research has pointed to 
some factors about why Norway decided to stay out of the Union. One essen-
tial argument is that Norwegian geography and political structures determined 
the two negative outcomes. Yes-votes are more likely to come from the urban 
centres and capitals, but in Norway counties and local governments are con-
ceived as more autonomous than their Finnish and Swedish counterpart, so 
4   N.R.K. Skole, ‘Trygve Bratteli Om EEC’ (1967) <http://nrk.no/skole/klippdetalj?topic=nrk: 
klipp/507187> accessed 1 March 2016.
5   Gro Harlem Brundtland, Madam Prime Minister: A Life in Power and Politics (Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux 2002) 311–317.
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it lacks the urban centres and capitals to pull the vote towards yes.6 A second 
argument is concerned with the cost-benefit analysis of membership that each 
citizen performs before voting, where the former so far has outweighed the 
latter. This was in particular due to the EC’s poor track record in a few policy 
areas key to Norway, such as fisheries and agriculture.7 Finally, the idea, or con-
ceptualisation, of the EU as a liberal ‘project’ intent on eroding the arguably 
successful Norwegian social democratic model, is frequently used in anti-
membership campaigns.8 The influence of such ideas also ties into the argu-
ment that the no-votes are driven by an underlying apprehension concerning 
the Union’s supranational development, eventually eroding national State—
Westphalian—sovereignty. Assimilated under Danish rule for four centuries 
(1524–1814), Norway only became an independent State in 1814, and truly au-
tonomous after the dissolution with the imposed personal union with Sweden 
in 1905. Therefore, as the story goes, the EU constitutes a threat to a relatively 
‘young’ Norwegian State, resembling an all too familiar oppressive dominator 
to Norwegian citizens.9
It is not this Chapter’s purpose to question and validate the accurateness 
of the outlined arguments. However, in the context of Norway’s Arctic rela-
tionship with the EU, it is important to recognise and understand why Norway 
twice has chosen to remain outside the Union and looks likely to remain out-
side in the foreseeable future.
2.2 Current Relationship
Norway did not sever ties with the EU after the referendum in 1994. Instead, 
Norway—together with Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Sweden 
6   Clive Archer, Norway Outside the European Union: Norway and European Integration from 1994 
to 2004 (Routledge 2005); Ingrid Sogner and Clive Archer, ‘Norway and Europe: 1972 and Now’ 
(1995) 33(3) Journal of Common Market Studies 389; Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU), 
‘Utenfor Og Innenfor: Norges Avtaler Med EU’ (Utenriksdepartementet 2012) 2012:2 2.
7   Stephan Kux and Ulf Sverdrup, ‘Fuzzy Borders and Adaptive Outsiders: Norway, Switzerland 
and the EU’ (2000) 22(3) Journal of European Integration; Espen Barth Eide, ‘We Pay, but Have 
No Say: That’s the Reality of Norway’s Relationship with the EU’ The Guardian (27 October 
2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/27/norway-eu-reality-uk-voters-
seduced-by-norwegian-model> accessed 1 March 2016; Archer, n. 6 above.
8   Ibid.
9   Heming Olaussen, ‘Fortsatt Nei Til EU’ Aftenposten (27 November 2014) <http://www.aften 
posten.no/meninger/debatt/Fortsatt-nei-til-EU-7802845.html> accessed 1 March 2016; Tor 
Bjørklund, Mot Strømmen: Kampen Mot EF 1961–1972 (Universitetsforlaget 1982); Sieglinde 
Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc 2002) 60.
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and the then 12 EC member states—signed the European Economic Area 
(EEA) agreement, which eventually entered into force in 1994. The EEA was 
initially described as a staging platform for EU membership.10 Yet, for Norway, 
the agreement has come to constitute a permanent affiliation with the EU, 
standing outside the Union while simultaneously being inside the economic 
area.11 Accordingly, Norwegian politicians have described the EEA as the best 
and the worst of both worlds.12
The agreement provides access to the EU’s single market, but without the 
benefits, participatory or democratic rights that come with EU membership. 
Some policy areas are also specifically excluded, such as common fisheries 
and agriculture policies, justice and home affairs, foreign policy and mone-
tary coordination. The EEA implies that Norway has to accept and implement 
all EU legislation relating to the economic area without an official vote in 
the formation of the legislation. Nevertheless, it grants Norway a formal veto 
mechanism, in addition to several consultative mechanisms. Critiques argue 
that these measures do little to remedy the democratic deficit inherent in 
this set-up.13 As a matter of fact, a recent study concluded that Norway only 
issued reservations to 17 out of more than 6000 legal acts with EEA relevance.14 
Additionally, as European integration has expanded far beyond the realms of 
an economic area, Norway now participates in a number of other institutional 
constructions and political or financial commitments. For example, Norway is 
a member of the Schengen area, participates in EU programmes and actions, 
and contributes financially to economic and social cohesion in Europe.15
Debate on the potential for Norwegian membership of the EU has, since 
1994, been a somewhat dismal affair, and it is currently not high on the politi-
cal or academic agenda.16 Often trapped in a starch dichotomy between the 
‘yes’ and the ‘no’ interest groups, uncertainty about what membership would 
actually entail has left the debate dominated by speculation and scare tactics. 
Similarly, as the EU has increased tremendously both in terms of Member 
10   Brundtland, n. 5 above, 293–309.
11   Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU) 19.
12   Martin J. Kristofferesen, ‘EØS Var En Avtale Som Egentlig Ingen Ville Ha’ Nationen 
(11 October 2015) <http://www.nationen.no/politikk/eas-var-en-avtale-som-ingen-ville-
ha/> accessed 1 March 2016; Olaussen.
13   Ibid.
14   Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU) 20.
15   Hillion, n. 3 above, 9.
16   Keil and Raspotnik, n. 2 above, 104.
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States (from 12 in 1994 to 28 in 2016) and policy domains,17 the ability to under-
stand the full range of the EU’s machinery is a challenge for Member States, let 
alone Norway as a non-member. In turn, as Norway experienced an economic 
boom from the 2000s onwards that even surpassed its European partners, the 
prospects of an eventual EU membership dimmed. In 2014, polls responded 
that only 16.8% of Norwegians supported a membership bid, whereas 74% 
were against and 9.2% were undecided.18 With the subsequent crises over 
the Euro and migration engulfing EU politics, membership has not become 
more popular. At the same time, Norway’s economy has been sheltered by a 
relatively large public sector fuelled by natural resource industries, in tandem 
with financial regulations.19 With Iceland’s recent failed bid for membership 
in mind,20 a possible (inevitable?) economic downfall for Norway might make 
the prospects of EU membership seem more appealing. Similarly, as the UK 
embarks on leaving the Union, proponents of a renegotiation of the EEA treaty 
perceive potential room for manoeuvre to secure a better deal.21
17   Simon Bulmer, Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global 
Context (Blackwell 1995); Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to European 
Integration (4th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2010).
18   ‘Nordmenn Har Aldri Vært Mer Mot EU’ Dagens Næringsliv (28 November 2014) <http://
www.dn.no/nyheter/politikkSamfunn/2014/11/28/0550/nordmenn-har-aldri-vrt-mer-
mot-eu> accessed 1 March 2016.
19   Henrik Horjen, ‘Mener Eurokrisen Seiler Forbi Norge’ Aftenposten (13 June 2012) <http://
www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/Mener-eurokrisen-seiler-forbi-Norge-6848184.html> 
accessed 1 March 2016; Cecilie Langum Becker and Kari Vartdal Riise, ‘Derfor Bommer 
Eurokrisen På Norge’ Dagens Næringsliv (4 September 2012) <http://www.dn.no/
nyheter/2012/09/04/derfor-bommer-eurokrisen-pa-norge> accessed 1 March 2016.
20   Iceland initiated accession discussions with the EU after a parliamentary vote in 2009, 
but then abandoned negotiations in 2013 and officially withdrew its application in 
2015. The fisheries conflict regarding mackerel and herring was one of the motivating 
factors behind this decision, see inter alia Graham Avery, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Baldur 
Thorhallsson, ‘Iceland’s Application for European Union Membership’ (2011) LXIV Studia 
Diplomatica 93; Alyson J.K. Bailes and Baldur Thorhallsson, ‘Iceland and Europe: Drifting 
Further Apart?’ (Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) 2013) FIIA Briefing 
Paper 139 <http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp139.pdf> accessed 1 January 2014; 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Iceland, ‘Government Considers Iceland No Longer an EU 
Candidate (Reykjavík, 12 March 2015)’ <http://www.mfa.is/media/gunnar-bragi/Bref-ESB-
ENS-pdf.pdf>; Sigmar Arnarsson and Debra Justus, ‘Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries’ 
in Adam Stępień, Timo Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää (eds), Strategic Assessment of 
Development of the Arctic. Assessment conducted for the European Union (Arctic Centre, 
University of Lapland 2014) 64.
21   Kathrine Kleveland, ‘EØS Er Bedre Enn EU’ Dagbladet (4 November 2015) <http://www 
.dagbladet.no/2015/11/04/kultur/meninger/eos/storbritannia/kronikk/41796213/> accessed 
1 March 2016; ‘Sovereignty, Autonomy and Britain’s Relationship with Europe’ The 
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For now, however, Norway and the EU have come to a mutual understanding 
that arguably does not fully satisfy anyone. Norway contributes financially—
through the so-called EEA (and Norway) grants22—while also participating in 
EU policy implementation and the growing number of European-wide bod-
ies and agencies, yet without allowing full integration and/or having direct 
decision-making participation. Espen Barth Eide, former Foreign Minister of 
Norway put it rather critically when stating “We pay, but have no say: that’s the 
reality of Norway’s relationship with the EU”.23 Although a number of Norway’s 
policy areas are kept separate from the European market, it is important to note 
the extent to which EU legislation is incorporated—and even determines—
Norwegian policy on everything from safety regulations to public ownership 
and state aid.24 Hence, it can be concluded that Norway is “mainly a rule-taker 
rather than a rule-shaper of European policies”.25
One aspect, however, of the Norway-EU relations that is often neglected in 
literature, is the degree to which Norway can assert informal influence in the 
EU policy-making process. Norway is, by most definitions, a State with lim-
ited (global) capacities and influence. Yet, this is not to discount that Norway 
has capabilities in certain domains, where the country’s reputation, wealth 
and geography come into play. A disputed concept, the idea of the EU’s open 
decision-making procedures still enables a wide range of actors to participate 
in EU policy-making in Brussels. However, the key aspect here is participation. 
Many of the arenas where influence can be wielded and decisions are being 
made are informal, through lobbying procedures and public consultations. 
Norway did, eventually, awake to this new reality. Consequently, the Norwegian 
Delegation to the EU constitutes Norway’s largest diplomatic mission, with over 
60 employees.26 Similarly, a number of Norwegian stakeholders—ranging from 
regional representations to businesses—are present in Brussels, to monitor 
and potentially influence specific policy issues where they have key interests. 
Guardian (24 February 2016) <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/24/sov 
ereignty-autonomy-and-britain-relationship-with-europe> accessed 1 March 2016. On 
23 June 2016, a majority of 51.89% of UK citizens voted to leave the European Union in a 
non-legally binding referendum, the so-called Brexit referendum.
22   For the financial period 2009–2014 Norway contributed €951.78 million of the overall 
€993.50 million, that supported 86 programmes in 16 countries in Europe, from environ-
mental protection, climate change to human and social development issues, see <http://
eeagrants.org/Who-we-are/EEA-Grants> accessed 20 November 2016.
23   Ibid.
24   See Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU).
25   Keil and Raspotnik, n. 2 above, 104.
26   The Norwegian Mission to the EU, see <http://www.eu-norway.org/> accessed 20 Novem-
ber 2016.
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From an Arctic perspective and with the High North occupying centre state in 
Norwegian domestic policy, which is discussed in Section 2.3 below, Norway 
works to keep Arctic attention high in Brussels, aiming to lead EU Arctic debate 
and influence it from the outside.27
2.3 The Norwegian Arctic
Norway holds particular clout in the Arctic region, as it is one of only five coast-
al States (the Arctic Five or A5), and it has a considerable Arctic population 
and a key interest in the development of the region. In Norway, the Arctic is 
everything north of the Arctic Circle (66°34N), though there is arguably mini-
mal variation between the immediate areas north and south of the circle. In the 
northern region, Norway borders Finland, Sweden and Russia. The Norwegian 
Arctic is separated into three counties (from south to north) of Nordland, Troms 
and Finnmark, often just termed North Norway, and the Svalbard Archipelago 
north of the Norwegian mainland. In sum, about 480,000 people inhabit these 
three counties and about 2,700 people reside on Svalbard.28 Although it is diffi-
cult to specify exactly, the Sámi population in Norway is approximately 40,000 
to 50,000, and most of them live in North Norway.29 Albeit sparsely populated 
in a European context, the size of the population is relatively high compared 
to indigenous populations in the North American Arctic.30
In its foreign policy engagement, Norway distinguishes between the extreme 
Arctic (referring to the North Pole and the uninhabited areas in the so-called 
High Arctic) and the more hospitable and populated parts of North Norway 
27   Interview conducted by Andreas Raspotnik with two representatives from the Norwegian 
MFA working on Arctic matters in Oslo on 24 April 2014. Accordingly, Wegge ex pounded 
the Norwegian policy influence in both the Commission’s work on the Integrated Mari-
time Policy (IMP) and the first Communication on Arctic issues, see Njord Wegge, ‘Small 
State, Maritime Great Power? Norway’s Strategies for Influencing the Maritime Policy of 
the European Union’ (2011) 35(3) Marine Policy 335; Njord Wegge, ‘The EU and the Arctic: 
European Foreign Policy in the Making’ (2012) 3(1) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 6.
28   Statistics Norway (SSB), ‘Folkemengde Og Befolkningsendringar, 1. Januar 2016’ (Folke-
mengde, 19 February 2016) <https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/statistikker/folkemengde/
aar-berekna/2015-12-17> accessed 1 March 2016.
29   Nordic Sami Institute, ‘Hvor Mange Samer Er Det Egentlig…?’ (On Sami statistics, 
29 January 2008) <http://www.sami-statistics.info/default.asp?nc=2807&id=110> accessed 
1 March 2016.
30   See Timothy Heleniak and Dimitry Bogoyavlensky, ‘Arctic Populations and Migration’, 
Arctic Human Development Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages (Nordic 
Council of Ministers 2015).
 �05Partners or Rivals?
and Svalbard, deemed the ‘High North’ (nordområdene in Norwegian).31 It is 
essential to differentiate between the mainland and the Svalbard archipelago, 
while at the same time recognising that the latter is a part of the Kingdom of 
Norway.32 Norway was granted sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago with 
the Svalbard Treaty, signed in 1920 in Paris and entered into force in 1925.33 The 
Treaty stipulates that Norwegian sovereignty is, however, subject to certain 
conditions, e.g. limitations on Norway’s ability to tax and use the islands for 
military purposes, by simultaneously assigning the right of access for commer-
cial operations to nationals of all the contracting parties.34 Despite this early 
20th century diplomatic “package deal”,35 diverging (legal) views exist with 
regard to the maritime zones beyond Svalbard’s territorial sea and the ques-
tion of whether or not the Treaty applies in these maritime areas.36 Although 
claiming to have a right to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around 
Svalbard, Norway has not yet chosen to make use of it. Instead it established 
a Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) in 1977, for the purpose of the conservation 
and management of marine living resources.37 What is clear, however, is that 
31   Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘The High North and the Arctic: The Norwegian Perspective’ (2012) 2 
The Arctic Herald 8; Leif Christian Jensen, ‘Norway on a High in the North: A Discourse 
Analysis of Policy Framing’ (University of Tromsø UIT 2012); Leif Christian Jensen and 
Geir Hønneland, ‘Framing the High North: Public Discourses in Norway after 2000’ (2011) 
28(1) Acta Borealia 37, 44–52.
32   The Svalbard archipelago lies in the Barents Sea and includes all the islands situated 
between 74° and 81°N and 10°E and 35°E, inter alia Spitsbergen, Nordaustlandet, Edgeøya 
or Bjørnøya, with a total landmass of 62,400 km2.
33   Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (signed 9 February 1920, entered into 
force 14 August 1925) 2 LTNS 7.
34   As of 4 December 2014, 42 states are parties to the Treaty, see <http://emeritus.lovdata.no/
traktater/> accessed 20 November 2016.
35   D.H. Anderson, ‘The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around 
Svalbard’ (2009) 40(4) Ocean Development & International Law 373, 374.
36   See Torbjørn Pedersen and Tore Henriksen, ‘Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of Legal 
Uncertainty?’ (2009) 24(1) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 141; Robin 
Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones around Svalbard’ in Myron 
H Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Thomas H Heidar (eds), Changes in the Arctic 
Environment and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010); Erik J Molenaar, 
‘Fisheries Regulation in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard’ (2012) 27(1) The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 3; Andreas Raspotnik and Andreas Østhagen, ‘From 
Seal Ban to Svalbard—The European Parliament Engages in Arctic Matters’ (The Arctic 
Institute, 10 March 2014) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/from-seal-ban-to-svalbard-
european/> accessed 11 March 2014.
37   Molenaar, n. 36 above, 14–15.
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the EEA agreement does not apply to the archipelago of Svalbard pursuant 
to the EEA’s protocol 40.38
Norway’s engagement in Arctic affairs can be traced back to Jonas Gahr 
Støre’s decision to place emphasis on the High North (in a Norwegian con-
text) and the Arctic (in an international perspective), when he became Foreign 
Minister in 2005 as part of the ‘red-green’ government coalition.39 The eleva-
tion of the Arctic to the number one strategic foreign policy priority in 2005 
also coincided with the failed arrest of the Russian trawler Elektron, turning 
Norway’s attention towards maritime cooperation with Russia in the Barents 
Sea. With Russia’s planting of a flag at the North Pole’s seabed in 2007, world-
wide attention turned towards the region and Støre made use of the opportu-
nity to place emphasis on regional development domestically, and multilateral 
cooperation internationally, via arenas such as the Arctic Council (AC) and the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Since 2005, Norwegian Arctic policy has—as most 
national Arctic policies have—revolved around vague concepts of ‘sustainabil-
ity’, ‘multilateral cooperation’, surrounded by a distinct, at least implicit, sover-
eignty theme of ‘our Arctic’.40 Ultimately the ‘red-green’ coalition was criticised 
for failing to deliver on their grand Arctic policy statements.41 However, the 
new conservative government that took office in 2013 has arguably changed 
little, and at times even seemed uninterested in following up Arctic policies set 
out by their predecessor.
In Norway, Arctic policy is predominantly coined in Oslo, hence south of 
the Arctic Circle, and led by the Norwegian MFA in cooperation with a range 
of other ministries. Inherently, a divide exists, as in any other Arctic State, 
between its foreign and regional policy commitments. Promoting the AC, mul-
tilateral cooperation and search and rescue agreements do not achieve much 
on a regional level (at least immediately). In a Norwegian unitary state struc-
ture, demands have been brought forward from the Arctic counties for more 
regional autonomy, or at least increased participation in national decision-
38   Keil and Raspotnik, n. 2 above, 104.
39   Between the Labour party (Arbeiderpartiet), Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) 
and Centre Party (Senterpartiet).
40   Leif Christian Jensen, Øystein Jensen and Svein Vigeland Rottem, ‘Norwegian Foreign 
Policy in the High North: Energy, International Law and Security’ (2011) 35 Atlantisch per-
spectief 1; Jo Inge Bekkevold and Kristine Offerdal, ‘Norway’s High North Policy and New 
Asian Stakeholders’ (2014) 38(6) Strategic Analysis 825.
41   Asle Toje, ‘Arktisk Nachspiel’ Dagens Næringsliv (1 March 2015) <http://www.dn.no/
meninger/debatt/2015/03/01/2057/Globalt/arktisk-nachspiel> accessed 1 March 2016.
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making relating to the Norwegian Arctic.42 Appeasement from Oslo takes the 
form of additional regional funds, investment in Arctic-specific services such 
as emergency response equipment, and enhancing the two universities in 
Bodø and Tromsø. The interests of those inhabiting the Norwegian north will 
arguably not always coincide, or even be impacted by, the Arctic foreign policy 
initiatives by Norway as a State.
It is in this juncture of domestic, regional and international elements that 
the EU’s Arctic policy engages, with the likely outcome that some friction 
appears. We now turn to some of these frictions and key interests, which inter-
play with both the state and regional level in Norway.
3 The Norwegian Arctic & the European Union
In the context of more EU attention placed on Arctic affairs, the Norwegian 
Arctic holds a particularly prominent role. In contrast to the Finish and 
Swedish Arctic territories, North Norway has access to the Arctic Ocean: a geo-
graphical fact that to a certain extent hampers the Union’s Arctic endeavour. 
It is also more populous than its Nordic counterparts. While not a geographi-
cal part of EU territory, North Norway is more closely linked to the EU than 
any other non-EU Arctic areas, such as Alaska, the Canadian territories, the 
Russian Arctic regions and perhaps even Greenland. Moreover, North Norway 
is integrated in, and exports to, the EU common market, borders EU members 
Finland and Sweden, and is logistically connected to all major European cities.
In addition to the Norwegian Delegation to the EU, the three Arctic coun-
ties in Norway also have their own representation in Brussels.43 At one point 
the largest regional office amongst the Norwegian offices in spite of having the 
smallest population, their presence is legitimised through the very fact that 
the EU is actively engaging in the Arctic region. At the same time, the rep-
resentation argues that there is an inherent lack of information concerning 
the Norwegian Arctic in the EU decision-making system in Brussels: “We find 
42   Arne O Holm, ‘Kommentar: Ikke En «jævla Nordlending»’ High North News (25 May 2015) 
<http://www.highnorthnews.com/ikke-en-jaevla-nordlending/> accessed 1 March 2016; 
Miriam Stackpole Dahl, ‘Nord-Norge Med Innspill Til EUs Arktis-Politikk’ (Norwegian 
Government, 6 December 2012) <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nord-norge-
med-innspill-til-eus-arktis-p/id709356/> accessed 1 March 2016.
43   North Norway European Office <http://www.northnorway.org/> accessed 20 November 
2016.
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that most bureaucrats in Brussels have very little knowledge of, and interest in, 
North Norway as such.”44
Based on this conception of North Norway’s relationship with the EU and 
the EU’s Arctic policy engagement—as taking place on both a regional and a 
foreign policy level—there are some issues that help to explain Norway’s 
ambivalent relations to the EU in the Arctic.
3.1 Discussing Arctic Governance
Increasing Arctic/High North awareness within the hallways of EU power 
in Brussels has appeared on the Norwegian agenda ever since the Union’s 
development of an Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP),45 starting in 2005/2006.46 
Eventually, creating a distinct Arctic understanding took place on a whole 
spectrum of policy areas, from environmental research, indigenous people’s 
issues to defence and energy security.47 When the EU initially got engaged with 
Arctic issues, the mood quickly soured in Norway.
The European Parliament (EP) in 2008 suggested opening “international 
negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for 
the protection of the Arctic, inspired by the Antarctic Treaty” and aimed to 
cover, in particular, “the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the 
Arctic Ocean”.48 Subsequently, extensive deliberation in both the Commission 
(see its first Communication on The European Union and the Arctic Region)49 
and again the EP on a ‘lack of governance’ in the region initially caused outcry 
from Norwegian media and politicians.50 Although both the Commission and 
44   Trond Haukanes, Director North Norway European Office; Interview conducted by 
Andreas Østhagen on 2 February 2016.
45   Commission of the European Communities, ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy for the 
European Union’, COM (2007) 575.
46   Kristine Offerdal, ‘Arctic Energy in EU Policy: Arbitrary Interest in the Norwegian 
High North’ (2010) 63(1) Arctic 30; Kristine Offerdal, ‘The EU in the Arctic: In Pursuit of 
Legitimacy and Influence’ (2011) 66(4) International Journal 861; Wegge, ‘The EU and the 
Arctic: European Foreign Policy in the Making’, n. 27 above.
47   Kristine Offerdal, ‘Norge, Nordområdene Og EU’ (2011) Europautredningen Rapport #20.
48   European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance (P6_TA (2008) 
0474)’ 15.
49   Commission of the European Communities, n. 1 above.
50   Andreas Østhagen, ‘The European Union—An Arctic Actor?’ (2013) 15(2) Journal of 
Military and Strategic Studies 71; Raspotnik and Østhagen, ‘From Seal Ban to Svalbard—
The European Parliament Engages in Arctic Matters’, n. 36 above; Andreas Raspotnik and 
Andreas Østhagen, ‘To Svalbard and Beyond—The European Parliament Is Back on Its 
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the EP have since then moderated such views, questions related to governance 
have at times appeared in Arctic-related debates in Brussels.
For example, one study conducted on behalf of the then Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) Diana Wallis created some ‘EU-Arctic’ turmoil 
in Norway. The commissioned analysis examined the robustness of the legal 
framework concerning the Svalbard Treaty.51 Although the study only featured 
the opinion of one MEP out of 751, some Norwegian media reacted as if the 
EU had threatened Norway, prompting headlines such as: ‘The EU challenges 
Norwegian Svalbard policy’.52 The Norwegian Government quickly responded 
with the legal justifications needed for the Treaty and made clear that under 
no circumstances would a re-negotiation be considered.53 The EU’s interest 
in the Arctic was perceived as a threat to Norway when, in reality, the friction 
stemmed from a lack of knowledge about the very role and intentions of the EP 
and its representatives, respectively.
In general, a tendency seems to exist in Norway to portray the EU as one 
coherent actor, which often threatens Norwegian interests. The complex-
ity of the multiple interests among 28 Member States and numerous political 
factions and parties are rather neglected. Particularly when scrutinising the 
EU institutional policy output, it is necessary to distinguish between the dif-
ferent voices of the Commission, Council of the European Union, European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and EP, respectively, and their actual impact 
on the policy process.54 In this vein one also has to understand an EP debate 
in February 2014 with some MEPs discussing the legality of the Norwegian 
interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty, enquiring whether the EU accepts the FPZ 
surrounding the archipelago. Although the EU acknowledges Norway’s practice 
of the FPZ on the conditions that it is enforced in a non-discriminatory manner 
Arctic Track’ (The Arctic Institute, 17 March 2014) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/ 
to-svalbard-and-beyond-european/> accessed 18 March 2014.
51   Diana Wallis and Stewart Arnold, ‘The Spitsbergen Treaty: Multilateral Governance in the 
Arctic’ (2011) 1 <http://dianawallis.org.uk/en/document/spitsbergen-treaty-booklet.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2012.
52   ‘Norge I Skvis Om Svalbard’ Adresseavisen (1 November 2011) <http://www.adressa.no/
meninger/article1719680.ece> accessed 1 March 2016; ‘EU Utfordrer Norsk Svalbard-
Politikk’ Bladet Vesterålen (27 October 2011) <http://www.blv.no/ledere/eu-utfordrer-
norsk-svalbard-politikk/s/1-1175899-5784300> accessed 1 March 2016.
53   Andreas Østhagen, ‘Debating the EU’s Role in the Arctic: A Report from Brussels’ The 
Arctic Institute (19 October 2011) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/european-arctic- 
ambiguity/> accessed 28 October 2012.
54   Raspotnik and Østhagen, ‘To Svalbard and Beyond—The European Parliament Is Back on 
Its Arctic Track’, n. 50 above.
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and respected by all interested parties, some Norwegian media critically cov-
ered the MEPs’ endeavour.55 This particular lack of understanding of the EU 
policy-making system can be traced back to Norway’s ambiguous relationship 
to the Union at large. As both an outsider and an insider (see Section 2 above), 
the public’s interest in internal EU affairs is limited. Had Norway been a full EU 
Member State and had its own MEPs, some of these debates might have been cur-
tailed by more accurate descriptions from the media and national politicians.56
3.2 Regulating Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Development
The EU—due to the EEA—plays a varying but significant role in industrial 
development in the Norwegian Arctic,57 with several mechanisms and/or poli-
cies having both direct and indirect effects on regional oil and gas develop-
ments, mining and maritime transportation activities.58 An example of the 
Union’s role creating Norwegian Arctic turmoil is the contentious debate sur-
rounding the Commission’s proposal to introduce a regulation on the safe-
ty of offshore oil and gas exploration in 2012. Some MEPs also tried to push 
for a moratorium on Arctic drilling during the proposal phase.59 Although 
55   Terje Jensen, ‘Stiller Spørsmål Ved Norsk Suverenitet I Vernesonen’ Fiskeribladetfiskaren 
(3 March 2014); Eva Aalberg Undheim, ‘Såg Ikkje Grunn Til Kritikk Mot Noreg’ Nationen 
(1 March 2014) <http://www.nationen.no/eu/sag-ikkje-grunn-til-kritikk-mot-noreg/> 
accessed 5 March 2014; Raspotnik and Østhagen, ‘From Seal Ban to Svalbard—The 
European Parliament Engages in Arctic Matters’, n. 36 above; Molenaar, n. 36 above.
56   However, surveying EU-related debates in various member states over recent years, such 
a conclusion is by no means naturally guaranteed.
57   In this context we have chosen to disregard the debate on fisheries. Norway’s fisheries 
policy is excluded from the EEA agreement. Yet, much can be said about EU/Norway rela-
tions in this domain, where the EU serves as both the largest market and a regulator in 
terms of setting market requirements and standards. For the Norwegian Arctic, fisheries 
are especially crucial, from both a social and an economical perspective. However, this 
Chapter focuses on other, arguably more directly linked, policy domains only. For related 
analysis that covered to some extent Norway’s relationship with the EU in the domain of 
fisheries, see inter alia Bettina Rudloff, ‘The EU as Fishing Actor in the Arctic: Stocktaking 
of Institutional Involvement and Existing Conflicts’ (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
(SWP) 2010) SWP Working Paper FG 2, 2010/02 <http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Rff_WP_2010_02_ks.pdf> accessed 3 April 2012; Timo 
Koivurova and others, ‘The Present and Future Competence of the European Union in 
the Arctic’ (2012) 48(4) Polar Record 361.
58   However, mechanisms/policies related to energy exploration and exploitation do in prin-
ciple not extend to the EEA and hence do not per se affect Norway, see ibid., 366.
59   As observed by Andreas Raspotnik during attendances of meetings of the EP’s Commit-
tees on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (10 July 2012) and Industry, Research 
and Energy (11 July 2012), respectively.
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the Arctic was only mentioned twice in the 56-page draft document from the 
Commission’s Directorate-General Energy, MEPs from the EU’s environment 
committee proposed to re-write the related sections, adding a paragraph to 
request a halt in oil and gas drilling in the region.60 This demand was not added 
to the final directive based on the simple fact that the Union does not have 
(and for the foreseeable future will not have) legal jurisdiction over Norwegian 
Arctic waters.61 Nevertheless, with the directive having EEA relevance, the 
Commission’s initiative prompted debate in Norway and led again to a public 
outcry.62
Norway regarded these actions as a direct threat to its interests in Arctic 
offshore development. As with the rest of the Arctic, attention turned towards 
the potential of Arctic industries in the north of Norway at the beginning 
of the new millennium with the Barents Sea being perceived as a new global 
frontier for oil and gas development. Since 1979, seismic activity and explor-
atory drillings have been taking place in the Barents Sea, with over a hun-
dred wells drilled. Yet, in spite of substantial discoveries, only two producing 
fields—Statoil’s Snøhvit and ENI’s Goliat—exist with ENI just starting to pro-
duce oil from the Goliat field in March 2016.63 In general, low oil and gas prices 
and, equally important, a continuing lack of political commitment in Europe 
concerning Arctic hydrocarbon resources have halted further development.64
60   Andreas Østhagen, ‘The EU and The Arctic: A Never Ending Story’ (The Arctic Institute, 
13 September 2012) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/eu-and-arctic-never-ending-story/> 
accessed 14 September 2012.
61   Arthur Neslen, ‘Europe Rejects Ban on Arctic Oil Drilling’ The Guardian (10 October 2012) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/oct/10/europe-rejects-ban-arctic-oil-
drilling> accessed 31 May 2013.
62   Thomas Nilsen, ‘Norway: “EU Has No Jurisdiction in the Arctic” ’ BarentsObserver 
(3 October 2012) <http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/norway-eu-has-no-jurisdiction-
arctic-03-10> accessed 28 October 2012.
63   Ellen Kongsnes, ‘Goliat-Oppstart Utsatt Nok En Gang’ Stavanger Aftenblad (1 March 2016) 
<http://www.aftenbladet.no/energi/Goliat-oppstart-utsatt-nok-en-gang-3880857.html> 
accessed 1 March 2016; Thomas Nilsen, ‘First Barents Oil Production Starts Today’ The 
Independent Barents Observer (13 March 2016) <http://thebarentsobserver.com/industry/ 
2016/03/first-barents-oil-production-has-started> accessed 14 March 2016.
64   Andreas Raspotnik, ‘Is the European Union Missing Another Window of Opportunity for 
Arctic Energy Resources?’ (The Arctic Institute, 5 December 2011) <http://www.thearctic 
institute.org/european-union-missing-energy-window/> accessed 6 December 2011; 
Henrik Stolen, Gwladys Fouche and Joachim Dagenborg, ‘Norway’s Rising Oil Costs Hit 
Arctic Output Hopes’ Reuters US (16 January 2014) <http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
oil-norway-delays-idUSL3N0KP4BB20140116> accessed 1 March 2016; Keil and Raspotnik, 
n. 2 above.
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In order to raise public awareness of the Norwegian Arctic energy and its 
importance for the EU’s energy security, three Norwegian government ministers 
drafted a joint letter to Miguel Arias Cañete, the European Commissioner for 
Climate Action and Energy in January 2016. The ministers asked for a “clear 
message from the Commission that natural gas remains important for the EU’s 
energy mix”. A related European statement would be a “welcome signal” for 
Norwegian investment in exploiting the untapped gas resources in the Barents 
Sea.65 Adding to this, Norway’s Petroleum and Energy Minister Tord Lien 
emphasised that a clear signal from the Union could also boost the case for an 
extended pipeline system from and to the Barents Sea. It currently stops more 
or less at the Arctic Circle.66
Although the EU and its Member States, respectively, are highly dependent 
on energy imports, its approach to tackle energy shortcuts is incoherent. Some 
States favour coal and nuclear power, others pay more attention to natural gas. 
Additionally, strong environmental groups in Europe oppose Norway’s pro-
claimed ‘green’ gas and are in favour of renewable energy.67 In sum, despite 
the potential of the Barents Sea, the future of the Norway-EU energy outlook is 
anything but straightforward.
3.3 Regional Development and the Sámi
A third area of both influence and contention between Norway and the EU 
in the Arctic relates directly to regional development in North Norway. From 
a regional-financial perspective, the EU covers the Norwegian Arctic via its 
regional policy. The basic aim of the EU’s economic, social and territorial cohe-
sion policy is to reduce disparities between the varying levels of development 
in different European regions. Accordingly, and with regard to the European 
north in general, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
stipulates that “particular attention shall be paid to (…) regions which suffer 
from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the 
northernmost regions with very low population density (…)” (TFEU, Article 
65   Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norwegian Ministry of Climate and 
Environment and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Letter to EU Commissioner 
Miguel Arias Cañete’ <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/9ee937288b7c466ba0
62f6e023d8094b/letter_aspaker-helgesenlien-canete_29.1.2016.pdf> accessed 29 February 
2016.
66   Jonas Cho Walsgard and Mikael Holter, ‘Norway Says EU Gas Signals Strengthen Case for 
Arctic Pipeline’ Bloomberg (12 February 2016) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/eu-norway-
gas-idUKL8N15K1NU> accessed 1 March 2016.
67   Christian Oliver, ‘Norway Urges EU Assurances on Gas Output’ Financial Times 
(30 November 2015) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b74ad666-9526-11e5-8389-7c9ccf83dceb 
.html#axzz41wwrOhGU> accessed 1 March 2016.
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174).68 In particular, the focus has been on three related funds—the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund—and some programmes covered by these funds, e.g. Interreg 
Nord, Botnia-Atlantica and/or the Northern Periphery Programme. For the 
new financial period—2014–2020—the latter was even re-named the Northern 
Periphery and Arctic Programme, aiming to add a distinct Arctic-regional 
development level to the EU’s Arctic policy as well as to national Arctic poli-
cies of the Union’s Member States.69
Although there is relatively little difference between the Arctic and non-
Arctic communities in Norway, some traits have historically been more promi-
nent in the north. Given the region’s sparse population, vast distances, natural 
geographic barriers and dependency on traditional subsistence (fisheries, 
reindeer herding and agriculture), the northern counties have historically 
been poorer (as based on the gross domestic product per capita) than the rest 
of Norway. As the Norwegian welfare state grew after the Second World War, 
the north was targeted with regional development funds to help the region 
overcome barriers that did not exist in the south, such as sparse population, 
harsh climate and long distances to markets. Today, a system of differentiated 
employer’s social security tax is meant to improve the conditions of operating 
businesses in the north, as the region enjoys lower tax levels. Similarly, both 
Finnmark and parts of Troms county have—since 1990—had a lower income 
tax, return of student loans and a higher rate of child support.
In recent years, however, North Norway has been experiencing rela-
tively high economic development. In addition to the oil-boom, the region’s 
emphasis on seafood and fisheries, industrial products and tourism has helped 
spur this growth.70 Former Norwegian Foreign Minister Støre now depicts the 
future of the High North as one that turns away from a ‘black’—hydrocarbon 
resource—economy to a ‘blue’ economy, which is based on Norway’s leader-
ship in the fields of maritime/ocean knowledge and renewable energy, like 
hydropower and wind.71 It is assumed that renewable energy production in 
68   Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012. 
Official Journal C 326, 26 October 2012.
69   European Commission, ‘Northern Periphery and Arctic’ (10 January 2015) <http://ec.europa 
.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/UnitedKingdom/2014tc16rftn004> 
accessed 8 June 2015.
70   Elise Holdal, ‘Forventer Høyere Vekst I Nord-Norge Enn I Resten Av Landet’ NRK 
(5 May 2015) <http://www.nrk.no/troms/forventer-hoyere-vekst-i-nord-norge-enn-i-resten-
av-landet-1.12344711> accessed 1 March 2016.
71   Ingrid A Medby, ‘From Black Gold to a Blue Economy?’ (The Arctic Institute, 26 November 
2015) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/from-black-gold-to-a-blue-economy/> accessed 
1 March 2016.
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the Norwegian Arctic, with an already produced regional power surplus and 
high theoretical potentials, could have a positive impact on the Union’s shift 
towards ‘greener’ energy consumption.72
The economic development in the north, and specific measures to sup-
port the northern counties, has caused problems in Norway’s relationship with 
the EU. In particular, as the Commission revised their state aid regulation (as 
normal for every 7-year framework period) in 2013 for the 2014–2020 cycle, 
the whole scheme of differentiated employer’s tax came into question.73 The 
Commission had a desire to streamline and reduce various state aid regimes 
in regions and sectors where aid was deemed unnecessary, throughout the 
EEA.74 Although this streamlining was not targeted in the Norwegian Arctic 
at all, the fact that Norway adheres to the EEA-regime, while also stimulating 
its own Arctic areas, led to a clash with the new EU-regulatory regime. Again, 
Norwegian media and politicians blamed the EU for meddling in domestic tax 
regimes.75 For the north Norwegian counties, this entailed a loss of regional 
support mechanisms. In 2013, the amount of exempted fees totalled 13 billion 
NOK (approximately €1.4 billion), where a majority went to support North 
Norway specifically.76 Dialogue between north Norwegian actors and the EU 
is still continuing, as the Arctic environment and related challenges are being 
used to argue for special exemptions.77
72   Runa Haug Khoury and others, ‘Environmental Considerations in the Arctic: Sustainable 
Resource Exploitation’ (Bellona Foundation 2015) <http://network.bellona.org/content/
uploads/sites/2/2016/01/Arktisrapport-versjon-2.0_web.pdf> accessed 1 March 2016; 
Andreas Raspotnik, ‘Renewable Energy Production in the Norwegian Arctic: An Energy 
Boost for Europe?’ High North News (11 January 2016) <http://www.highnorthnews.com/
renewable-energy-production-in-the-norwegian-arctic-an-energy-boost-for-europe/> 
accessed 1 March 2016.
73   Torjus Kandal, ‘Kan Være Smutthull I Differensiert Arbeidsgiveravgift’ (Nordland Fylke-
skommune, 17 December 2014) <http://www.nfk.no/artikkel.aspx?Aid=43402&Back=1> 
accessed 1 March 2016.
74   Norwegian Government, ‘Spørsmål Og Svar—Differensiert Arbeidsgiveravgift’ (6 June 
2014) <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/okonomi-og-budsjett/skatter-og-avgifter/
Differensiert-arbeidsgiveravgift/Sporsmal-og-svar---differensiert-arbeidsgiveravgift/
id762193/> accessed 1 March 2016.
75   Lars Wiker, ‘Regjeringen Ber EU Snu Om Arbeidsgiveravgift’ Nationen (30 April 2014) 
<http://www.nationen.no/eu/regjeringen-ber-eu-snu-om-arbeidsgiveravgift/> accessed 
1 March 2016.
76   Norwegian Government.
77   Hege Eilertsen, ‘EU-Politikere Skal Turnere Nord-Norge’ High North News (13 February 
2015) <http://www.highnorthnews.com/eu-politikere-skal-turnere-nord-norge-til-uka/> 
accessed 1 March 2016.
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Another aspect of the EU’s Arctic engagement in Norway concerns the 
Union’s relationship with the indigenous Sami population. The traditional 
lands of the Sámi people in Norway—Sápmi—stretch from Hedmark county 
in the middle of Norway, to the Russian border in the north. Most Sámi live in 
North Norway. Reindeer herding and other traditional Sámi livelihoods, such 
as fishing, hunting and gathering, are some of the most important preservers 
of the Sámi cultural heritage. These lands are increasingly under pressure, as, 
for example, mining companies are investing in the north. The Union’s legal 
engagement with indigenous peoples issues in the Arctic covers a broad variety 
of policies, e.g. development, trade, animal welfare, environment, education 
and culture, regional policy or general human rights. However, only a few legal 
acts apply directly, as for instance Regulation 1007/2009 on trading of seal 
products.78 This Regulation,79 although it does not have a direct impact on Sami 
in North Norway, serves as prime example for the EU’s impact in the Arctic, 
despite the exclusion of the EU from the region’s main governance table. Both 
Canada and Norway challenged the regulation and brought the case before the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2009. The WTO upheld the ban in 2014, with 
two exceptions needing clarification. Accordingly, the regulation was brought 
into compliance with WTO regulations in October 2015.80
The Commission has been aware of the discrepancies between EU institu-
tions and Arctic indigenous peoples and hosted four events as part of an ‘Arctic 
EU-Indigenous Dialogue’ between 2010 and 2014. Stępień critically remarked 
that initially these meetings often lacked continuity and that they were only 
being used by EU officials to highlight the Union’s project with relevance for 
the Arctic indigenous community.81
78   Timo Koivurova and others, ‘EU Competencies Affecting the Arctic’ (Directorate-General 
for External Policies, European Parliament 2010) EP/EXPO/B/AFET/FWC/2009–01/LOT2/ 
04 37–39 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/433793/EXPO- 
AFET_ET(2010)433793_EN.pdf> accessed 28 November 2015.
79   Ibid.
80   Council of the European Union, ‘Seal Products Trade: The EU Ban Adapted to WTO Rules’ 
(Press Release (690/15), 1 October 2015) < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/10/01-seal-products/> accessed 2 October 2015; Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Goals 
of the EU Seal Products Trade Regulation: From Effectiveness to Consequence’ (2015) 
51(3) Polar Record 274; Nikolas Sellheim, ‘Policies and Influence: Tracing and Locating the 
EU Seal Products Trade Regulation’ (2015) 17(1) International Community Law Review 3.
81   Adam Stępień, ‘Internal Contradictions and External Anxieties: One “Coherent” Arctic 
Policy for the European Union?’ in Gudmundur Alfredsson, Timo Koivurova and Ju 
Jabour (eds), The Yearbook of Polar Law Volume 7 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2015) 260.
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4 Concluding Remarks: Arctic Rivals or Partners?
This Chapter has examined the Arctic relationship between Norway and 
the EU in the light of three examples, namely (1) the discussions embedded 
in the Arctic governance theme, (2) the EU’s impact on, and efforts to regulate, 
industrial policies of relevance to the Norwegian Arctic, and finally (3) regional 
development and indigenous peoples. We asked: what can help to explain the 
ambivalent stance taken by Norway towards the Union, concerning the EU’s 
Arctic engagement?
In general, the EEA agreement, which is the legal backbone of Norway’s 
close association with the Union, affects the relationship between the 
Scandinavian country and the EU in the (Norwegian) Arctic. This Chapter has 
demonstrated that the EU’s manifold Arctic endeavours hold a distinct region-
al element in Norway. With academic and public focus often centred around 
the debate about the EU’s AC observer status bid and the seal product issue 
between Canada and the EU, we argue that this limited conception hinders 
a greater understanding of the EU’s role in the north in general and its rela-
tionship with Norway in particular. Despite disagreements on matters such as 
the ban on seal products, Norway has continuously supported the Union’s bid 
for AC observer status.82 Moreover, Norway welcomes an increasing EU Arctic 
engagement. Despite Norway’s inability to directly impinge upon the Union’s 
Arctic policy, it holds many levers to influence and shape it.
Norway’s relationship with the EU in the Norwegian Arctic must be under-
stood as a continuation of its larger EU-policy, where the balance between sep-
aration and further integration is crucial. The Arctic has become yet another 
avenue for dialogue and cooperation with Brussels, in which both companies 
and the regional governments of North Norway can assert more influence. 
The region as an overall policy field has created venues to increase policy 
coordination in areas such as regional development, research and industrial 
endeavours, though in turn it depends on to what extent the EU-system and 
Norwegian actors choose to utilise such coordination. Norway is likely, in any 
case, to remain the EU’s staunchest ally in its Arctic engagement. Geography, 
82   Njord Wegge, ‘Politics between Science, Law and Sentiments: Explaining the European 
Union’s Ban on Trade in Seal Products’ (2013) 22(2) Environmental Politics 255; Adele 
Airoldi, ‘The European Union and the Arctic Region: Developments and Perspectives 
2010–2014’ (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014) TemaNord 2014:565 30 <http://norden 
.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:771155/FULLTEXT01.pdf> accessed 2 March 2015.
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historic ties, and economic and cultural integration are cornerstones of this 
relationship with the Scandinavian country holding many resource potentials 
that the EU needs, such as hydrocarbons and renewables.
At the same time, Norway is challenged by the way the EU’s various actions 
are perceived and described in the general debate. A lack of understanding 
with regards to the complex institutional system and tendencies to scapegoat 
Brussels for undesirable policy outcomes are fallacies across the EU Member 
States. This might pose an additional challenge for Norway’s relations with the 
EU in the Arctic, as various Norwegian governments continue to support 
the EU’s northern endeavour, while at the same time portraying EU policies 
and debate as a threat to Norwegian interests. Such a paradox is only likely to 
complicate matters for all parties.
For the EU, the Arctic as a region, both from the regional as well as circum-
polar perspective, has relatively low priority. While both the Eastern Neighbour-
hood (for example through the Ukraine crisis) and the Southern Neighbourhood 
(for example, as a result of the migration crisis) may lead to a step backwards 
in the Union’s supranational integration efforts, the Norwegian Arctic would 
not have the same impact on the EU’s neighbourhood policy.83 This is a some-
what insurmountable detail Norwegian policy-makers are fully aware of.84
Moreover, up to the present, the Union has not yet found its very own Arctic 
narrative—a broad concept or single organising idea similar to the Northern 
Dimension or the Barcelona Process that eventually offers a substantive and 
EU-unique approach to Arctic matters.85 Likewise, the EU’s Arctic policy en-
gagement has so far also lacked sharpness by not comprehensively taking 
into account the various Arctics of the circumpolar north and their different 
challenges. While the EU takes a back seat in circumpolar Arctic affairs, it is 
a key player in the European Arctic, with its regulatory competences, finan-
cial contributions and social impacts going beyond its Arctic Member States, 
83   Adam Stępień and Andreas Raspotnik, ‘Exploring Reasons & Remedies for the EU’s 
Incapability to Devise an “Arctic Policy”: The Quest for Coherence’ in Lassi Heininen, 
Heather Exner-Pirot and Joël Plouffe (eds), Arctic Yearbook 2015 (Northern Research 
Forum 2015) 434.
84   Interview conducted by Andreas Raspotnik with two representatives from the Norwegian 
MFA working on Arctic matters in Oslo on 24 April 2014.
85   The Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, formed the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership to manage the relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean neigh-
bours and eventually evolved in the Union for the Mediterranean, see <http://eeas 
.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm> accessed 20 November 2016.
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Finland and Sweden.86 Hence, the EU is not simply an ‘Arctic user’, attracted by 
the region’s various changes, challenges and/or opportunities, that can publi-
cally be equated with ‘non-Arctic’ States. However, neither Norway nor the EU 
have yet found a coherent way to turn these steps to positive action. 
86   Adam Stępień, ‘The EU Needs a Two-Tier Approach towards the Arctic: A General Policy 
for the Circumpolar Arctic and a Concrete Strategy for the European Arctic’ (The Arctic 
Institute, 10 December 2015) <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/eu-needs-two-tier-approach-
towards-the-arctic/> accessed 11 December 2015.
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CHAPTER 6
Searching for Common Ground in Evolving 
Canadian and EU Arctic Strategies
P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde
1 Introduction
In the beloved classic of English literature Pride and Prejudice, the heroine of 
the story, Miss Elizabeth Bennett, woefully misunderstands Mr. Darcy’s charac-
ter and motivations, wrongly believing him to be proud and disdainful follow-
ing a series of rather unfortunate encounters early on in their acquaintance. As 
a result, opportunities very much to Miss Bennett’s advantage are nearly lost.
The Canadian-EU Arctic relationship has also suffered from similar miscon-
ceptions; that is to say, from a lack of true understanding of “character, identity 
and motivations.” And as with Jane Austen’s tale, it may well be that Canada and 
the European Union have let early encounters skew their understanding 
and taint their vision of the other.
In Canada, the European Union’s efforts to constructively engage in the 
Arctic have been met with scepticism and distrust. The supranational body’s 
actions have been characterised in some quarters as irrelevant and, in others, 
as intrusive. A recent post on the “Eye on the Arctic” blog coordinated by Radio 
Canada International by Heather Exner-Pirot, a strategist for Outreach and 
Indigenous Engagement at the University of Saskatchewan, is representative. 
“The EU keeps telling us it cares about the Arctic,” she asserts. “I’m not sure the 
Arctic cares about it.”1
*   P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Professor, Department of History and co-director of the Centre 
on Foreign Policy and Federalism at St. Jerome’s University in the University of Waterloo, 
Canada.
**   Suzanne Lalonde, Professor of International Law and the Law of the Sea, Faculty of Law, 
University of Montreal, Canada.
***  The authors wish to thank Tahnee Prior, a Trudeau scholar and PhD candidate at the 
Balsillie School for International Affairs, for research assistance and the exchange of ideas 
on an earlier iteration of this work.
1    Graham Greenleaf, ‘The EU’s Arctic policy—A means, not an end’ (Eye on the Arctic, 
3 May 2016) <http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2016/05/03/blog-the-eus-arctic-policy 
-a-means-not-an-end/> accessed 22 September 2016.
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On the European side, commentators argue that the EU is a “misunder-
stood Arctic actor.”2 In turn, Canada’s Arctic policy is often cast in a harsh 
light. The assessment of Dr. Andrew Foxall, director of the Russian Studies 
Centre at the London-based Henry Jackson Society, published in The Guardian 
in December 2013, is telling. “It’s often said that the Russians act with their 
Arctic policy in an aggressive, nationalistic and unilateral way,” Foxall suggests. 
“The same thing can be said about the Canadians.”3 Kristine Offerdel of the 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies similarly refers to the “impression 
abroad of an aggressive Canadian Arctic policy” that continues to persist.4
These frames are increasingly relevant to the Canada-EU relationship as 
increasing global attention is directed towards the dramatic changes in the cir-
cumpolar Arctic. First and foremost, the Arctic has experienced some of the 
most rapid climate change impacts on Earth. For example, Canada has warmed 
twice as fast as the global average, and its North has warmed nearly three times 
as fast as the global average. This has generated accelerated thawing of perma-
frost, increased methane emissions, and major changes in ice and snow condi-
tions. The much-discussed melting of Arctic sea ice holds out the prospect of 
a longer shipping season and improved navigability of Arctic waters, thereby 
enabling potential new access to mineral and energy resources, shipping, tour-
ism, and commercial fishing.5 At the same time, members of the scientific and 
environmental communities raise concerns about a perceived rush to exploit 
natural resources of the Arctic Ocean. Such development, critics argue, is 
2   Damien Degeorges, ‘The Arctic: A region of the future for the European Union and the 
world economy’ (2013) 263 European Issues, available on the website of the Fondation 
Robert Schuman <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-263-en 
.pdf>, accessed 26 October 2016.
3   Luke Harding, ‘Russia to boost military presence in Arctic as Canada plots north pole claim’ 
(The Guardian, 10 December 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/russia-
military-arctic-canada-north-pole> accessed 22 September 2016.
4   Kristine Offerdel, ‘Interstate Relations: the complexities of Arctic politics’ in Rolf Tamnes and 
Kristine Offerdel (eds), Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic (Routledge, New York 2014) 73, 
at p. 75.
5   Various authors continue to emphasize the ongoing challenges to shipping in the Northwest 
Passage. For recent summaries, see Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, On 
Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage (Canadian Defence & 
Foreign Affairs Institute, Calgary 2014); Buixadé Farré and others ‘Commercial Arctic ship-
ping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infra-
structure’ (2014) 37 (4) Polar Geography 298, 324; and Frédéric Lasserre and Olga Alexeeva, 
‘Analysis of maritime transit trends in the Arctic passages’ in Suzanne Lalonde and Ted 
McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat 
Pharand (Brill, Leiden 2015).
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incommensurate with efforts to limit average global warming to 2°C.6 These 
new activities may also threaten the marine environment, negatively impact-
ing both ecosystems and the traditional livelihoods of Indigenous peoples and 
northern communities.
In the face of rapid environmental change and accelerating international 
interest in the Arctic, current approaches to regional governance aggregate 
multiple understandings and visions for the circumpolar North. A notion 
of multiple Arctics—North American, Northern European, and Russian—
points to both convergence and discordance in how different regional actors 
perceive the North. As Professor Carina Keskitalo of Umeå University observes, 
“Canada developed a specific understanding of its ‘Arctic’ quite early” that 
went beyond the Arctic Ocean and its immediate vicinity to encompass its 
entire Northern territories above 60° North latitude as “Arctic.” At the end 
of the Cold War, when Canada played a leading role in political negotiations 
to institutionalize circumpolar relations, its particular understanding of the 
Arctic in environmental and human terms (rooted in Indigenous subsistence-
based livelihoods) deeply influenced the region-building process. Accordingly, 
Canada’s “historically developed notions of ‘the Arctic’ have been trans-
planted to northern areas everywhere, with little reflection on whether it is 
applicable to the different regions or not.”7
As an Arctic coastal State with 40% of its landmass north of 60° latitude 
and 162,000 km of its coastline in the Arctic, Canada’s concern with effectively 
exercising its sovereignty is understandable. Its emphasis on the human dimen-
sions of the Arctic, and particularly those related to the northern Indigenous 
peoples, also reflects national realities. Its three northern territories (Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) are home to just over 110,000 people 
(more than half of whom are Indigenous or Aboriginal), spread out in remote 
communities. Social indicators in Canada’s North are abysmal, pointing to 
6   The Paris Agreement signed on 12 December 2015 seeks to limit global warming to “well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C.” For examples of scepticism that this can be met, see Cristophe McGlade and Paul 
Elkins, ‘The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming 
to 2°C’ [2013] 517 Nature 187, 90 and Climate Central, ‘Earth Flirts with a 1.5-Degree Celsius 
Global Warming Threshold’ (Scientific American, 20 April 2016) <http://www.scientific 
american.com/article/earth-flirts-with-a-1-5-degree-celsius-global-warming-threshold1/> 
accessed 22 September 2016.
7   Corinna Röver, Interview with Carina Keskitalo, ‘The notion of the ‘Arctic’ is based on 
Canadian ideas, according to discourse analysis study’ SciencePoles (2014). See also E.C.H. 
Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region (New York: 
Routledge 2004).
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the challenges of providing social services and infrastructure to small and re-
mote communities. Indigenous peoples, in particular, have experienced nu-
merous challenges associated with rapid changes to their homelands, including 
threats to language and culture, erosion of traditional support networks, poor-
er health than the rest of Canadians, and changes to traditional diet and com-
munal food practices.8 Rich in natural resources, but geographically distant 
from major markets, the North has long served as an economic “land of tomor-
row” in the Canadian political imagination.9 Buoyed by the prospect of height-
ened global demand and new access to resources, boosters have trumpeted the 
Arctic’s “coming of age” in the early twenty-first century. This has rejuvenated 
national interest in Northern affairs, as well as resurrecting longstanding anxi-
eties about sovereignty, security (in its many dimensions), and the well-being 
of Northern Canadians.10
Canada’s propensity to project its domestic northern strategy, which is 
deeply embedded in North American Arctic priorities, into the circumpolar 
sphere should come as no surprise owing to its success in deeply institutional-
izing its conception of the Arctic in current instruments of Arctic governance. 
Canadian politicians and commentators often trumpet how their country led 
efforts to establish the Arctic Council through the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, 
which reflected Canada’s preoccupations with the environment and Indigenous 
peoples,11 and served as the Council’s first Chair (1996–1998). Canada’s recent 
chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2013–15) also reflected a strong emphasis 
8    See, for example, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, ‘The Community Well-
Being (CWB) Index’ <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016579/1100100016580> 
accessed 25 September 2016, National Aboriginal Health Organization, ‘Overview of Inuit 
Health’ <http://www.naho.ca/inuit/overview-of-inuit-health/> accessed 25 September 
2016; and Nordic Council of Ministers, Arctic Social Indicators: ASI II: Implementation 
(TemaNord, Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen 2015).
9    See, for example, D.M. LeBourdais, ‘Land of Tomorrow: Arctic Is a Land of Promise Which 
We Must Hold’ (1938) 89 Canadian Magazine 18, 37, 38 and Sherrill Grace, Canada and the 
Idea of North (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston 2007).
10   On popular opinion and the Arctic, see the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, 
‘Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Public Opinion Survey’ reports: vol. 1: 2011 
<http://gordonfoundation.ca/publication/300> accessed 26 October 2016 and vol. 2: 2015 
<http://gordonfoundation.ca/publication/755> accessed 26 October 2016. On changing 
definitions of sovereignty and security, see Wilfrid Greaves and Whitney Lackenbauer, 
‘Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Updating our Ideas’ (OpenCanada 23 March 2016) 
<https://www.opencanada.org/features/re-thinking-sovereignty-and-security-arctic/> 
accessed 26 October 2016.
11   See, for example, Thomas Axworthy and Ryan Dean, ‘Changing the Arctic Paradigm from 
Cold War to Cooperation: How Canada’s Indigenous Leaders Shaped the Arctic Council’ 
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on Northern Indigenous peoples, prompting some commentators to lament its 
domestic (rather than global) orientation, its comparative lack of emphasis on 
science and research, and its suggestion that non-Northerners had a limited 
role to play in agenda-setting or circumpolar dialogue.12
Furthermore, as a result of geography and history, it is unsurprising that 
Canada considers the United States its “premier partner” in Arctic affairs.13 
Although academic and popular commentary often highlights disagreements 
between these North American neighbours over the status of the waters of 
the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the maritime boundary in the Beaufort 
Sea, the common interests of both countries have provided a firm founda-
tion for strong cooperation in the Arctic region. In March 2016, President 
Barack Obama and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau offered a U.S.-Canada Joint 
Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership that articulated a com-
mon North American commitment to “play a leadership role internationally in 
the low carbon global economy over the coming decades, including through 
science-based steps to protect the Arctic and its peoples.” This “new partner-
ship” seeks to “embrace the opportunities and to confront the challenges in the 
changing Arctic, with Indigenous and Northern partnerships, and responsible, 
science-based leadership.”14 While this statement affirms a bilateral “special 
relationship” between the two countries, it also suggests a leadership agenda 
that resonates with that of the European Union. Although the EU’s recent in-
tegrated strategy focuses on the European Arctic (as well as Greenland, given 
its relationship with Denmark),15 its fundamental priorities are consisted with 
those of the North American Arctic States.
This chapter begins with an overview of Canada’s historical engagement 
with the Arctic and the development of its Northern Strategy, explaining why 
[2013] 5 (1) The Yearbook of Polar Law Online, 7–43, and John English, Ice and Water: 
Politics Peoples and the Arctic Council (Penguin Canada, Toronto 2013).
12   For a sample of these views, see Heather Exner-Pirot, ‘Canada’s Arctic Council chairman-
ship (2013–2015): a post-mortem’ (2016) 22 (1) Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 87, 88.
13   On these theme, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebert, ‘Premier Partners: 
Canada, the United States and Arctic Security’ (2014) 20 (3) Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal, 320, 33.
14   Prime Minister of Canada ‘U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and 
Arctic Leadership’ (Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada) <http://www.pm.gc 
.ca/eng/news/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-climate-energy-and-arctic-leader 
ship#sthash.XjRoT2R7.dpuf> accessed 25 September 2016.
15   European Commission (EC), ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and 
the Council: An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (hereafter “Joint 
Communication”)’ JOIN (2016) 21.
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it places a high priority on sovereignty, economic development for the benefit 
of Northerners, environmental protection, and governance (particularly by 
Arctic States and Northern Indigenous peoples). Building on this foundation, 
we seek to bring the Arctic policies of Canada and the EU into dialogue, high-
lighting critical interests and issue areas such as the environment and climate 
change, transport, energy, mineral resources, fisheries, and research. While we 
argue that evolving policy positions point towards an increasingly convergent, 
cooperative agenda between Canada and the EU on Arctic issues, divergent 
interests and messaging associated with shipping and freedom of the seas/ 
navigation rights, the rights of Indigenous peoples and the trade in marine 
mammals, resource development and environmental stewardship could con-
tinue to complicate the relationship.
2 Canada’s Northern Interests: Historical Developments
Although the vast majority of Canadians live close to the country’s southern 
border (the 49th parallel) with the United States, the Arctic occupies a dis-
tinctive place in Canada’s national identity. Rich symbolism, imagery and 
mythology in Canada casts the Arctic as a resource-rich “frontier of destiny,” 
a homeland for Indigenous peoples, a fragile environment in need of protec-
tion, and a source of national inspiration. Accordingly, Canada’s historic and 
ongoing dilemma is how to balance sovereignty, security and stewardship in a 
manner that protects and projects national interests and values, promotes sus-
tainable development and healthy communities, and facilitates circumpolar 
stability and cooperation.16
Inuit and other Northern Indigenous groups have occupied what is now 
the Canadian North since “time immemorial.” As hunter-gatherer societies, 
their use and occupancy of the lands and waters form a core consideration of 
what is now widely accepted to constitute Canadian sovereignty. Accordingly, 
Canada has a recognized legal duty to consult and, where appropriate, accom-
modate Indigenous groups when their treaty and Aboriginal rights could be 
impacted. Their inter-connectedness with the land poses special obligations 
on the Canadian state to ensure that its practices are representative of their 
rights, interests, and wishes as recognized in both domestic and international 
law. Furthermore, these Indigenous peoples are transnational in that their 
16   For an introduction to these themes, see Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert, and P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer, Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship 
(Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo 2011).
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memberships include citizens of two or more countries. This is reflected in the 
Permanent Participant organizations representing them at the Arctic Council 
today. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), an NGO that formed in 1977 (nearly 
two decades before the Council), represents 155,000 Inuit of Chukotka (Russia), 
Alaska, Canada, and Greenland (Denmark), including just over 50,000 Inuit 
Canadians. The Gwich’in Council International (GCI) represents the Gwich’in 
peoples who live in the northernmost third of Yukon and adjacent areas 
in Alaska and the Northwest Territories. The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) 
represents 30,000 people of Athabaskan descent who live in Northern Canada 
and Alaska, with Canadian AAC members including the Dene Nation, the 
Council of Yukon First Nations, and the Metis Nation of the NWT. Cumulatively, 
the ongoing vitality of Northern Indigenous peoples makes them an influential 
force in Canadian domestic politics and in international norm-making in the 
Arctic more generally.17
Apart from short-lived Norse settlements around the turn of the first mille-
nium CE, the earliest European interest in what is now the Canadian North fix-
ated on trying to find a route through the region to reach the riches of Asia. The 
attempts to navigate through the icy labyrinth of islands north of the Canadian 
mainland from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries proved futile, 
however, and the much-sought after Northwest Passage did not materialize as 
a feasible commercial frontier. Instead, the fur trade drew both French and 
English interests further into the northern reaches of the continental main-
land. This economic activity played a pivotal role in forging relationships 
between Indigenous and Euro-Canadian peoples, eventually supplemented by 
the presence of missionaries, whalers, policemen, and the sporadic appearance 
of explorers. The British Royal Navy resumed its quest to establish a Northwest 
Passage in the nineteenth century, and while the search for Sir John Franklin’s 
ill-fated 1845 expedition proved the existence of an Arctic maritime route it also 
demonstrated its lack of utility. After Confederation in 1867, Euro-Canadians 
invested their resources and energies into establishing east-west linkages to 
17   See, for example, Natalia Loukacheva, The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy 
of Greenland and Nunavut (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2007); Sonia Lawrence 
and Patrick Macklem, ‘From consultation to reconciliation: Aboriginal rights and the 
Crown’s duty to consult’ [2000] 29 Can. B. Rev. 252; Canada, ‘Aboriginal Consultation and 
Accommodation—Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult’ 
(Canada, March 2011), <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014664/110010001467> 
accessed 29 October 2016; and Timo Koivurova and Leena Heinämäki, ‘The participation 
of indigenous peoples in international norm-making in the Arctic’ [2006] 42 (221) Polar 
Record 101–110.
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consolidate the Dominion of Canada. The northern limits of the young coun-
try, inherited from the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1870, remained ambiguous, 
and defining them seemed a remote, future consideration.18
Canada inherited whatever rights Great Britain had to the High Arctic in 
1880, but governed its northern territories in a “fit of absence of mind” until 
after the Second World War. The Alaska Boundary Dispute between Canada 
and the United States suggested, in the minds of Canadians, that not only 
did the United States cast covetous eyes at Canada’s Northern territories but 
that Britain would sell out our interests to court American goodwill.19 The 
Government of Canada would have to defend its own national interests in 
the North. The Klondike Gold Rush prompted the first official assertions of 
authority in the form of the Northwest Mounted Police and a small field force 
sent to the region around the turn of the twentieth century, but the expansion 
of official state activity into the region remained modest before the Second 
World War. Official expeditions into the Northwest Passage, matched by flag 
planting and asserting a Canadian “sector claim” up to the North Pole, were 
complemented by diplomatic activities to confirm Canadian sovereignty over 
the islands of Canada’s Arctic archipelago.20 The delivery of services to Inuit 
and other Northern Indigenous groups remained minimal, however, with 
the government preferring to leave responsibilities for welfare and educa-
tion to the Hudson’s Bay Company and missionaries, and only half-heartedly 
resourcing assimiliationist programs such as residential schools. Instead, the 
prevailing logic that Indigenous peoples were “best left as Indians” prevailed 
18   For a sweeping overview, see Shelagh Grant, Polar imperative: A History of Arctic 
Sovereignty in North America (Douglas & McIntyre Publishers, Vancouver 2011).
19   The Alaska Boundary dispute, which was resolved by arbitration in 1903, concerned 
the boundary between the Alaska panhandle and British Columbia. Britain still han-
dled Canada’s foreign affairs at the time, and one of three Canadian arbitrators—Lord 
Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England—sided with the Americans in drawing a line 
that was considerably closer to the American position than to the Canadian. This ignited 
a firestorm of criticism in Canada amongst nationalists who believed that Alverstone 
had supported the Americans because Britain, worried about the growing military power 
of Germany, had sacrificed Canadian interests to bolster Anglo-American relations. See 
John A. Munro, eds, The Alaska Boundary Dispute (Copp Clark Publishing Company, 
Toronto 1970).
20   On sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic before the Second World War, see Gordon W. Smith, 
A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North: Terrestrial Sovereignty, 
1870–1939, P.W. Lackenbauer (ed), (University of Calgary Press, Calgary 2014).
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until after the Second World War.21 Accordingly, the Northern Native economy 
remained rooted in subsistence hunting and the fur trade, while discover-
ies of oil, gold, and pitchblend (the mineral from which radium is extracted) 
prompted the emergence of a mining economy for non-Native Canadians in 
the Northwest Territories (NWT).
The Second World War ushered in the new idea that the Canadian North 
also represented a military frontier. The American imperative to build the 
Alaska Highway through the Canadian Northwest, as well as supporting air-
fields and an oil pipeline, brought a flurry of new activity into the region. 
Although undertaken in the name of continental security, these activities also 
resurrected fears about the United States’ encroachment on Canadian sover-
eignty in this sparsely-populated corner of North America.22 The Americans 
withdrew at the end of the war and confirmed Canadian ownership over the 
Yukon and the infrastructure built therein, but visions of a looming Cold War 
provided a primary impetus for another round of military-inspired develop-
ment beginning in the late 1940s. The dictates of geography placed the Arctic 
at the centre of Cold War superpower geopolitics, and in popular opinion and 
in the eyes of some Canadian officials, the American security agenda again 
seemed to pose a potential threat to Canada’s sovereignty. In the end, how-
ever, the North American neighbours found solutions that affirmed Canada’s 
terrestrial sovereignty.23 On the other hand, the American behemoth largely 
dictated the pace of military modernization in Canada’s North throughout the 
21   See, for example, Ken Coates, Best Left as Indians: Native-White Relations in the Yukon 
Territory, 1840–1973 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston & Montreal, 1991) and 
William R. Morrison, ‘Canadian sovereignty and the Inuit of the central and eastern 
Arctic’ (1986) 10 (1) Études/Inuit/Studies, 245–259.
22   See Kenneth Coates and William R. Morrison, The Alaska Highway in World War II: The US 
Army of Occupation in Canada’s Northwest (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1992) 
and Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 
1936–1950 (UBC Press, Vancouver 1988).
23   See, for example, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘Right and Honourable: Mackenzie King, 
Canadian-American Bilateral Relations, and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest, 
1943–1948’ in John English, Kenneth McLaughlin, and P.W. Lackenbauer (eds), Mackenzie 
King: Citizenship and Community (Robin Brass Studio, Toronto 2002) 151–68, and 
Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, ‘Sovereignty and Security: The Department of External 
Affairs, the United States, and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945–68’ in Greg Donaghy and Michael 
Carroll (eds), In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909–2009 (University of Calgary Press, Calgary 
2011) 101–20.
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1950s and the major socio-economic, cultural, and environmental impacts that 
flowed from it.
During this era, Canadian officials began to awaken to the federal govern-
ment’s obligations to Northern residents. The introduction of the Canadian 
social welfare system meant that Indigenous Canadians now had access to 
a wide array of programs, from family allowances to old-age pensions, and 
then housing, schooling, health care, and economic development grants. As 
a result, the federal government became increasingly involved in the lives of 
Northerners at a time of tremendous socio-political change. To seek wage 
employment at military installations or to receive government services, 
Northern Indigenous peoples (particularly Inuit) who had followed a sea-
sonal cycle, living off the land hunting and fishing since time immemorial, 
were drawn into small permanent communities sprinkled across the North. 
As a result, by the late 1960s the vast majority of Indigenous peoples no longer 
lived in tents or igloos (snow-houses) but in government housing.24 “In com-
munities, traditional methods of subsistence were difficult for Inuit to main-
tain because of the lengthy travel distances required to find animal resources, 
and the need to maintain a steady family income through wage employment,” 
historian Sarah Bonesteel explains.25 Although federal programs hoped to im-
prove living standards through a diversified economy that would offer wage 
labour opportunities in industries such as mining as well as the continuation 
of the subsistence economy, the result of the transition to sedentary, settle-
ment-based living was to produce cultural dislocation and wide-sweeping eco-
nomic dependency.
The role of the Northern frontier in Canada’s future economic prosperity 
grew in the twentieth century, as Canadians awakened to the idea of exploiting 
the region’s abundant natural resources. Geological Survey of Canada map-
ping operations in the early postwar period “discovered” gold, silver, nickel, 
zinc, lead, molybdenum and asbestos in the NWT districts of Keewatin and 
Mackenzie, leading to the opening of new mines. Exploration in the 1960s shifted 
to base metals around Great Bear Lake. By that time, Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker had articulated a new “northern vision” for Canada that promised 
“roads to resources” and would generate national prosperity. Only partially 
implemented, this plan did not extend to the High Arctic or realize the high 
24   On this process, see David Damas, Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers: The Transformation 
of Inuit Settlement in the Central Arctic (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & 
Kingston 2002).
25   Sarah Bonesteel, Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program 
Development (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Ottawa 2008).
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expectations for economic development in Canada’s northern territories. Over 
time, however, mining developments extended to Canada’s archipelago, with 
a lead-zinc mine at Nanisivik on Baffin Island opening in 1976 and the Polaris 
lead-zinc mine on Little Cornwallis Island that started production in 1982.26
Economic development became intertwined with issues of sovereignty, 
Indigenous rights, and environmentalism in the context of oil and gas explora-
tion. The discovery of the Prudhoe Bay field off the north slope of Alaska in 
1968 set off an Arctic exploration boom that persisted until oil prices declined 
precipitously in the mid-1980s.27 The viability of these northern projects 
depended upon the ability to transport resources to market. In 1969, American-
owned Humble Oil sent an icebreaker, the Manhattan, through the Northwest 
Passage to determine whether it was a viable commercial shipping route for 
oil and gas from the Beaufort Sea. In response, the Canadian media reported 
the voyage as a direct challenge to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. In response, the 
Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau announced its “functional” approach 
to Canadian sovereignty in 1970. It cast the Arctic as an ecologically delicate 
region: Canada needed to extend its jurisdiction northward to ensure that 
foreign vessels did not pollute Canadian waters. The Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA) allowed Canada to regulate and control future tanker 
traffic through the NWP by creating a pollution prevention zone one hundred 
nautical miles outside the archipelago as well as in the waters between the 
islands.28 Although initially opposed to this unilateral measure, the United 
States supported Canadian-sponsored Article 234 in the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which gives coastal States “the right to adopt 
26   W.W. Nassichuk, ‘Forty years of northern non-renewable natural resource develop-
ment’ (1987) 275 Arctic. On Diefenbaker’s Northern Vision, see P. Isard, ‘Northern Vision: 
Northern Development during the Diefenbaker Era’ (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of Waterloo, 2010).
27   The Norman Wells field had yielded petroleum since the 1920s, but exploration in the 
northern Yukon, Mackenzie Delta, and High Arctic islands began in the 1950s. On oil and 
gas activities in the 1970s and 80s, see Robert Page, Northern Development: The Canadian 
Dilemma (McClelland & Stewart, Toronto 1986).
28   The AWPPA (1970, R.S.C. 1985) and its regulations provides specific construction standards 
for vessels engaged in Arctic shipping, a system of shipping safety control zones, a ban on 
discharges of oil, hazardous chemicals, and garbage, and requirements for vessels to carry 
insurance to cover damages from any these discharges. On this period, see J. Alan Beesley, 
‘Rights and responsibilities of Arctic coastal states: the Canadian view’ (1971) 3 Journal 
of Maritime Law & Commerce 1, and Ted McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors: International 
Ocean Law Relations Between the United States and Canada (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2009).
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and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas 
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone.”29
Alongside environmental considerations encouraging Canadians to recon- 
ceptualize the Arctic as mere frontier space to a place in need of protection, 
the idea of the Arctic as homeland gained greater political salience in the 
Canadian dialogue on development in the 1970s. Indigenous groups had re-
emerged as a political force in Canada, and Northern Native leaders would no 
longer tolerate being left out of discussions related to resource development 
in their traditional territories. The Berger Inquiry, conducted to look into the 
socio-economic and environmental impact of a pipeline along the Mackenzie 
Valley through the Yukon and NWT, elicited unprecedented public engagement 
on a frontier development project before it began. Justice Thomas Berger’s 
final report, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, highlighted competing vi-
sions of Canada’s Northern history and the future. “We look upon the North as 
our last frontier,” he noted of the southern Canadian view. “It is natural for us 
to think of developing it, of subduing the land and extracting its resources to 
fuel Canada’s industry and heat our homes. But the native people say the North 
is their homeland. They have lived there for thousands of years. They claim 
it is their land, and they believe they have a right to say what its future ought 
to be.” Berger recommended a ten-year moratorium on any pipeline develop-
ment so that Aboriginal land claims could be settled and appropriate conser-
vation areas established beforehand.30 Thus, internal sovereignty claims by 
Canadian Indigenous groups changed the political dialogue, and Canada em-
barked upon a process of settling comprehensive land claims with Northern 
Indigenous peoples whose land rights had not been dealt with by treaty or 
other legal means—a process that has dramatically transformed Canada’s po-
litical landscape and remains ongoing today.31
29   See Don McRae, ‘The negotiation of Article 234’ in Franklyn Griffiths (eds), Politics of the 
Northwest Passage (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston 1987) 98–114, 
and Rob Huebert, ‘Article 234 and Marine Pollution Jurisdiction in the Arctic’ in Don 
Rothwell and Alex Oude Elferink (eds), The Law of the Sea in the Polar Oceans: Issues of 
Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001) 249–267.
30   Thomas R. Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline Inquiry vol. 1 (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa 1977) 1. See 
also Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) archives, ‘The Berger Pipeline Inquiry’ 
(CBC News) <http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-73-295/politics_economy/pipeline/> accessed 
26 October 2016, and Martin O’Malley, The Past and Future Land: An Account of the Berger 
Inquiry into the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline (P. Martin Associates Ltd., Toronto 1976).
31   See, for example, Kirk Cameron and Graham White, Northern governments in transi-
tion: Political and constitutional development in the Yukon, Nunavut and the Western 
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Domestic drivers dominated the Canadian political agenda for most of the 
1970s and early 1980s, but the external dimensions of sovereignty re-emerged 
with the August 1985 voyage of the US Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea 
through the Northwest Passage. Although launched for reasonable operational 
reasons relating to the resupply of the American base at Thule, Greenland, the 
Americans refused to seek official permission from Canada, recognizing that 
this would prejudice their own legal position on international straits globally. 
In response, the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney announced that 
Canada was officially drawing straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago 
effective 1 January 1986, thus confirming Canada’s sovereignty over the NWP 
as “historic, internal waters.” Concurrently, it outlined an aggressive plan to 
exercise control over its waters and assert its Arctic sovereignty.32 Canada also 
promised to negotiate with the United States—a prudent move that, owing 
to Prime Minister Mulroney’s close relationship with President Ronald Reagan, 
yielded the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement under which, in the interests of 
safe navigation, the “United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreak-
ers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with 
the consent of the Government of Canada.” By “agreeing to disagree” on the 
legal status of the passage, the two countries reached “a pragmatic solution 
based on our special bilateral relationship, our common interest in cooperat-
ing on Arctic matters, and the nature of the area”—one that did not prejudice 
either country’s legal position or set a precedent for other areas of the world.33 
With this understanding in place and the perceived “crisis” averted, Canadian 
political attention associated with Arctic sovereignty faded once again.
With the end of the Cold War, the official discourse in Canada on Arctic 
affairs shifted away from continental security and narrow sovereignty inter-
ests to emphasize circumpolar cooperation and broad definitions of security 
that prioritized human and environmental dimensions. Canada was an early 
champion of the Arctic Council and promoted the inclusion of Indigenous 
Northwest Territories (Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal 1995); Christopher 
Alcantara, ‘To treaty or not to treaty? Aboriginal peoples and comprehensive land claims 
negotiations in Canada’ [2008] 38 (2) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 343–369; and 
Greg Poelzer and Ken S. Coates, From Treaty Peoples to Treaty Nation: A Road Map for All 
Canadians (UBC Press, Vancouver 2015).
32   See Rob Huebert, ‘Polar vision or tunnel vision the making of Canadian Arctic waters 
policy: The making of Canadian Arctic waters policy’ [1995] 19 (4) Marine Policy 343–363, 
and Huebert, ‘A Northern Foreign Policy: The Politics of Ad Hocery’ in Kim Nossal and 
Nelson Michaud (eds), Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign 
Policy, 1984–1993 (UBC Press, Vancouver 2001) 84–99.
33   Christopher Kirkey, ‘Smoothing troubled waters: the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic 
co-operation agreement’ [1995] 50 (2) International Journal 401–426.
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Permanent Participants with a seat at the table. In 1997, a Canadian parlia-
mentary committee recommended that the country should focus on interna-
tional Arctic cooperation through multilateral governance to address pressing 
“human security” and environmental challenges in the region. Committee 
chairman Bill Graham reported that environmentally sustainable human 
development was “the long-term foundation for assuring circumpolar security, 
with priority being given to the well-being of Arctic peoples and to safeguard-
ing northern habitants from intrusions which have impinged aggressively on 
them.”34 The Liberal government under Jean Chrétien (1993–2003) embraced 
this emphasis on international cooperation, and The Northern Dimension of 
Canada’s Foreign Policy released in 2000 revealed how environmental and 
social challenges now predominated:
Both the tradition of transnational co-operation and the new empha-
sis on human security are particularly applicable to the shaping of the 
Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy. The circumpolar world 
that includes the northern territories and peoples of Canada, Russia, the 
United States, the Nordic countries plus the vast (and mostly ice-covered) 
waters in between was long a front line in the Cold War. Now it has be-
come a front line in a different way—facing the challenges and opportuni-
ties brought on by new trends and developments. The challenges mostly 
take the shape of transboundary environmental threats—persistent 
organic pollutants, climate change, nuclear waste—that are having dan-
gerously increasing impacts on the health and vitality of human beings, 
northern lands, waters and animal life. The opportunities are driven by 
increasingly confident northern societies who, drawing on their tradi-
tional values, stand poised to take up the challenges presented by glo-
balization. Whereas the politics of the Cold War dictated that the Arctic 
region be treated as part of a broader strategy of exclusion and confron-
tation, now the politics of globalization and power diffusion highlight 
the importance of the circumpolar world as an area for inclusion and 
co-operation.35
34   House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(HCSCFAIT), Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation 
into the Twenty-First Century (1997), ix, 100.
35   Canada, The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa 2000).
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Framed by principles of Canadian leadership, partnership, and ongoing dia-
logue with Northerners, this new northern foreign policy was rooted in four 
overarching objectives: to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, 
especially Northerners and Aboriginal peoples; to assert and ensure the 
preservation of Canada’s sovereignty in the North; to establish the Circumpolar 
region as a vibrant geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based interna-
tional system; and to promote the human security of Northerners and the sus-
tainable development of the Arctic.
By the start of the new millennium, developments in Aboriginal self- 
government and devolution required new economic opportunities that pro-
moted northern interests. Similarly, asserting and ensuring the preservation of 
Canadian sovereignty was deemed compatible with multilateral cooperation. 
The focus on diplomacy and circumpolar cooperation meant that traditional 
preoccupations with “defending” sovereignty slipped to the back burner. The 
2000 Canadian Forces’ Arctic Capabilities Study recognized that Northern 
security had evolved to include environmental, social, and economic aspects, 
but argued that the coming decades would make the region even more vulner-
able to “asymmetric” security and sovereignty threats. Accordingly, it argued 
that the Canadian Forces had to prepare to respond to challenges related to 
environmental protection, increased shipping as Arctic sea lanes opened due 
to climate change, heightened commercial airline activity, and “trans-national 
criminal activity” that would accompany resource development such as dia-
mond mining.36 These frames, accentuated by the rising tide of evidence about 
the pace and impacts of global warming in the Arctic, led Canadian journal-
ists and academic commentators to push in the early 2000s for a more proac-
tive Arctic strategy that anticipated emerging security challenges associated 
with climate change, boundary disputes like Hans Island, the contested sta-
tus of the waters of the Northwest Passage for international transit shipping, 
resource development, and heightened international activity in the region 
more generally.37
In December 2004, Paul Martin’s Liberal Government announced an inte-
grated Northern Strategy (devised in concert with the premiers of the Northern 
territories of Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut—a new, predomi-
nantly Inuit jurisdiction created in 1999) built around seven main goals. First, 
the strategy promised to strengthen Northern governance, partnerships and 
36   Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA), Arctic Capabilities Study (Yellowknife 2000).
37   Rob Huebert, ‘Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage’ [2001] 
Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2 (4); See, in particular, the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (2004).
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institutions to provide Northerners with greater control over decisions about 
their future. Second, it committed to establishing strong foundations for 
“strong, sustainable, diversified economies where northerners share in the 
benefits of northern development.” Third, it proposed “to engage all partners 
in the North in the protection and stewardship of the environment.” Fourth, 
it sought to promote “healthy, safe and sustainable northern communities” 
that would “promote self-reliance.” Fifth, the document committed to ensur-
ing that Canada would continue to play a “leading role” in promoting inter-
national cooperation, while taking Northerners’ concerns into “consideration 
in national efforts to reinforce sovereignty, security and circumpolar coop-
eration.” Sixth, the strategy promised to preserve, revitalize, and promote 
Indigenous cultures, recognizing and encouraging “the importance of lan-
guage, traditional knowledge and way-of-life.” Seventh, the government com-
mitted to ensuring that “Canada is a leader in northern science and technology, 
and to develop expertise in areas of particular importance and relevance to 
the North.” Although the Martin government conducted public consultations 
on the strategy in 2005, the results were not released before the federal election 
at the end of that year which saw a change in government.38
In 2005, the Liberal Government’s International Policy Statement (IPS) also 
identified the Arctic as a priority area in light of “increased security threats, 
a changed distribution of global power, challenges to existing international 
institutions, and transformation of the global economy.” It was anticipated 
that the next two decades would bring major challenges requiring creative 
diplomacy as well as investments in new defence capabilities. “In addition to 
growing economic activity in the Arctic region, the effects of climate change 
are expected to open up our Arctic waters to commercial traffic by as early 
as 2015,” the new policy stated. “These developments reinforce the need for 
Canada to monitor and control events in its sovereign territory, through new 
funding and new tools.”39 Although the Liberal government fell before it could 
implement its vision, it had intertwined sovereignty and security in political 
rhetoric and strategic documents.
38   See Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, ‘Renewing the Northern Strategy’ [2006] 30 
(1) Northern Perspectives 2.
39   The IPS focused on surveillance, such as infrared sensors for patrol aircraft, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and satellites. Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement, Overview 
(2005), excerpted in Ryan Dean, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Adam Lajeunesse, Canadian 
Arctic Defence and Security Policy: An Overview of Key Documents, 1970–2012 (Centre for 
Military and Strategic Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2014 Calgary and 
Waterloo) 39–40.
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It fell to the Conservatives, who came to office in January 2006, to imple-
ment this agenda and to make Arctic sovereignty and security a major politi-
cal priority. The Canadian North was a key component of the Conservatives’ 
2005 election platform, which played on the idea of an Arctic sovereignty 
“crisis” demanding decisive action. Stephen Harper promised that Canada 
would acquire the military capabilities necessary to defend its sovereignty 
against external threats. “The single most important duty of the federal gov-
ernment is to defend and protect our national sovereignty,” Harper asserted. 
“It’s time to act to defend Canadian sovereignty. A Conservative government 
will make the military investments needed to secure our borders. You don’t 
defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric, and advertis-
ing campaigns. You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea, and proper 
surveillance. And that will be the Conservative approach.”40 In short, the new 
prime minister’s political message emphasized the need for Canadian action 
with a particular attention to conventional military forces, differentiating his 
government from the Liberals whom he believed had swung the pendulum too 
far towards diplomacy and human development.
The government’s “use it or lose it” approach to Arctic policy dominated the 
agenda from 2006–09. A spate of commitments to invest in military capabili-
ties to defend Canada’s rights in the region, including new Arctic patrol vessels 
and more vigorous patrolling, reinforced the government’s emphasis on “hard 
security” rather than “human security” like its predecessors.41 This formulation 
offered little political incentive to downplay the probability of military conflict 
in the Arctic, given that the Conservative government was trying to project an 
image of strength and commitment to defend the country’s sovereignty. But 
this “use it or lose it” rhetoric frustrated and even offended Northerners, par-
ticularly Indigenous peoples who had lived in the region since “time immemo-
rial” (and thus resented any intimation that it was not sufficiently “used”) and 
continued to express concerns about their lack of substantive involvement in 
national and international decision-making. Inuit representatives, for exam-
ple, suggested that the government agenda prioritized military investments at 
the expense of environmental protection and improved social and economic 
conditions in the North. They insisted that “sovereignty begins at home” and 
that the primary challenges were domestic human security issues, requiring 
40   Stephen Harper, ‘Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty’ address in Ottawa, 22 December 
2005.
41   See, for example, Kathleen Harris, ‘Laying claim to Canada’s internal waters’ Toronto Sun 
(Toronto 23 February 2007). On Harper’s early vision, see Klaus Dodds, ‘We are a Northern 
Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic’ [2011] 47 (4) Polar Record 371–374.
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investments in infrastructure, education, and health care.42 Furthermore, 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s transnational Circumpolar Inuit Declaration 
on Sovereignty in the Arctic (2009) emphasized that “the inextricable linkages 
between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic and Inuit self-
determination and other rights require States to accept the presence and role 
of Inuit as partners in the conduct of international relations in the Arctic.” The 
declaration envisions the Inuit playing an active role in all deliberations on en-
vironmental security, sustainable development, militarization, shipping, and 
socio-economic development.43
3 Canada’s Integrated Northern Strategy
After the Ilulissat Declaration by the Arctic coastal States in May 2008, official 
Canadian statements began to adopt a more optimistic and less bellicose tone. 
In March 2009, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon acknowledged in 
a speech that geological research and international law (not military clout) 
would resolve continental shelf and boundary disputes, and he emphasized 
“strong Canadian leadership in the Arctic … to facilitate good international 
governance in the region.”44 These constructive messages were echoed in 
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, released the 
42   See, for example, Paul Kaludjak, ‘The Inuit are here, use us’ Ottawa Citizen (Ottawa 
18 July 2007); Mary Simon, ‘Does Ottawa’s northern focus look backwards?’ Nunatsiaq 
News (11 April 2008); and the perspectives in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Nilliajut: Inuit 
Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty (Inuit Qaujisarvingat, Ottawa 2013).
43   Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), ‘A Circumpolar Declaration on Sovereignty in the 
Arctic’ (Ottawa 2009), <https://www.itk.ca/publication/circumpolar-declaration-sovereignty 
-arctic> accessed 26 October 2016. Inuit representatives have opposed state actions that 
they feel violate their interests, such as Canada’s decision to host a meeting for the five 
Arctic coastal states in March 2010 without inviting Inuit and First Nations to the discus-
sions, and even critiqued a bilateral Canada-Denmark Arctic defence and security coop-
eration agreement because they were not involved in negotiating it. As such, indigenous 
voices add to the complexity (and richness) of the Canadian message projected to the 
rest of the world.
44   Speaking Notes for the Hon. Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Canada’s 
Arctic Foreign Policy: The International Dimension of Canada’s Northern Strategy,” 
Whitehorse, Yukon, 11 March 2009, reprinted in P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, 
Canada’s Northern Strategy under Prime Minister Stephen Harper: Speeches and Documents 
on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2006–15 (Centre for Military, Security and 
Strategic Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2016 Calgary and Waterloo), 
77–79.
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following July. It emphasized four main pillars: exercising Canada’s Arctic sov-
ereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting Canada’s 
environmental heritage, and improving and devolving Northern governance. 
The strategy reinforces a message of partnership: between the federal gov-
ernment and Northern Canadians, and between Canada and its circumpolar 
neighbours. Although it trumpeted the government’s commitment to “putting 
more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-
in-the-sky,” it also emphasized that Canada’s disagreements with its neigh-
bours were “well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defence challenges for 
Canada.” This signaled a rather abrupt change of tone from previous political 
messaging.45
Rather than a “use it or lose it” message, Canada’s Northern Strategy stressed 
opportunities for cooperation in the circumpolar world. The strategy cast the 
United States as an “exceptionally valuable partner in the Arctic” with which 
Canada has managed its differences responsibly since the Second World War. 
It also emphasized opportunities for cooperation with Russia and “common 
interests” with European Arctic states, as well as a shared commitment to 
international law. Implicitly, this confirmed that bilateral and multilateral en-
gagement is key to stability and security in the region. “We’re not going down a 
road toward confrontation,” Cannon emphasized. “Indeed, we’re going down 
a road toward co-operation and collaboration. That is the Canadian way. And 
that’s the way my other colleagues around the table have chosen to go as 
well.” The foreign minister insisted that his government saw the Arctic as an 
“absolute priority” and that the needs of Northerners would be at the heart of 
Arctic policy.
The Department of Foreign Affairs released its Statement on Canada’s Arctic 
Foreign Policy in August 2010.46 This document reiterated the importance 
of the Arctic in Canada’s national identity and Canada’s role as an “Arctic 
power.” The overall message mirrored the broader Northern Strategy, outlin-
ing a vision for the Arctic as “a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined 
boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern commu-
nities, and healthy and productive ecosystems.” These themes—which bear 
striking resemblance to The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy 
released in 2000—reinforce how recent strategic messaging from Ottawa 
45   Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa 2009).
46   Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy (Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, 2010, Ottawa). The following paragraphs are derived from this 
document.
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reflects an approach to circumpolar issues that began under the Liberals but 
was simply pushed more forcefully by the Conservatives.
The first and foremost pillar of Canada’s foreign policy is “the exercise of 
our sovereignty over the Far North.” The “hard security” message has been 
muted since 2009, and the tone of cooperation with circumpolar neighbours 
and Northerners has been amplified. Reaffirming that Canada’s Arctic sover-
eignty is longstanding, well-established and based on historic title (rooted, in 
part, on the presence of Inuit and other Canadians in the region since time 
immemorial), the statement projects a stable, secure circumpolar world—but 
one in which Canada will continue to uphold its rights as a sovereign, coastal 
state. Accordingly, Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy Statement commits Canada 
to “seek to resolve boundary issues in the Arctic region, in accordance with 
international law” and to secure its rights to the extended continental shelf. 
Longstanding disputes respecting the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea, and 
Hans Island are well-managed and pose no acute sovereignty or security con-
cerns to Canada.47 Leading Canadian academic experts seem to have reached 
a similar consensus, with previous proponents of the “sovereignty on thinning 
ice” school largely abandoning their earlier arguments that Canadian sover-
eignty will be a casualty of climate change and foreign challenges. Instead, 
academic narratives anticipating potential conflict now emphasize how other 
international events (such as Russian aggression in the Ukraine) could “spill 
over” into the Arctic or how new non-Arctic state and non-state actors might 
challenge or undermine Canadian sovereignty and security.48
47   On 28 November 2012, the Foreign Ministers of Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark 
announced that they had reached a tentative agreement on where to establish the bound-
ary in the Lincoln Sea. Negotiators are transforming the tentative agreement into a treaty 
text for ratification by their respective governments.
48   See, for example, Rob Huebert, ‘Why Canada, US must resolve their Arctic border dis-
putes,’ Globe and Mail (21 October 2014); Huebert, ‘How Russia’s move into Crimea 
upended Canada’s Arctic Strategy’ Globe and Mail (2 April 2014); Huebert, ‘Is Canada 
ready for Russia’s hardball approach to the North Pole’ Globe and Mail (30 January 2014); 
Derek Burney and Fen Osler Hampson, ‘Arctic alert: Russia is taking aim at the North’ 
Globe and Mail (9 March 2015); Michael Byers, ‘The Northwest Passage Dispute Invites 
Russian Mischief ’ National Post (28 April 2015); Chris Sorensen, ‘The World’s First Ice-
Busting Yachts Open the High Arctic’ Maclean’s (30 December 2015); Scott Borgerson and 
Michael Byers, ‘The Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia’ Wall Street Journal (New 
York 8 March 2016). For a less alarmist view of Russia, see Adam Lajeunesse and Whitney 
Lackenbauer, ‘Canadian Arctic Security: Russia’s Not Coming’ (ArcticDeeply, 14 April 2016) 
<https://www.opencanada.org/features/canadian-arctic-security-russias-not-coming> 
accessed 25 September 2016.
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Other dimensions of the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy 
reflect the interaction between domestic and international agendas in 
Canada’s Northern strategy. Canada’s North is home to numerous world-
class mineral deposits, and the country has a long-standing reputation for 
welcoming foreign investment in its resource sector. Trade and investment 
in resource development, a primary catalyst for the surge in international 
interest in the Arctic, are upheld as main priorities given that the mining 
and energy sectors are key drivers of northern economies and offer signifi-
cant opportunities for economic and social development. Accordingly, the 
second pillar, “Promoting Economic and Social Development,” promotes 
the idea that creating a dynamic, sustainable northern economy and improv-
ing the social well-being of Northerners is essential to unleashing the true 
potential of Canada’s Northern Territories. The statement emphasizes that 
Canada is actively promoting Northern economic and social development 
internationally on three key fronts: 1) taking steps to create the appropriate 
international conditions for sustainable development; 2) seeking trade and 
investment opportunities that benefit Northerners and all Canadians; 
and 3) encouraging a greater understanding of the human dimension of the 
Arctic.
The third pillar, “Protecting the Arctic Environment,” suggests that Canada 
is taking concrete action to protect and manage the unique and fragile ecosys-
tems and wildlife of the Arctic, which are being affected by global forces. Its 
“comprehensive approach” to environmental protection, built around the idea 
of sustainability, seeks to balance the frontier-homeland equation, “ensuring 
[that] conservation keeps pace with development and that development deci-
sions are based on sound science and careful assessment.”49 Recent domestic 
initiatives have included cumulative impact monitoring programs, scientific 
research to support regulatory decision-making related to Northern oil and gas 
management, remediation of contaminated military and mine sites, the cre-
ation of new terrestrial and marine protected areas, and the expanded applica-
tion of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to the full extent of Canada’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone.50 In the international sphere, Canada’s official 
49   Canada, ‘Protecting our Environmental Heritage’ (Government of Canada, updated 
13 April 2015), <http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/env/index-eng.asp> accessed 26 Octo-
ber 2016.
50   Kristin Bartenstein, ‘The ‘Arctic exception’ in the law of the sea convention: a contribu-
tion to safer navigation in the northwest passage?’ [2011] 42 (1–2) Ocean Development & 
International Law 22–52. Pursuant to article 234 of UNCLOS, on 1 July 2010 Canada also 
implemented mandatory ship reporting (NORDREG) for vessels destined for Canada’s 
Lackenbauer and Lalonde�40
environmental actions pursuant to its Northern Strategy are geared towards: 
1) promoting an ecosystem-based management approach together with Arctic 
neighbours and others; 2) contributing to and supporting international efforts 
to address climate change in the Arctic; 3) enhancing efforts on other press-
ing international issues, including pursuing and strengthening international 
standards for environmental protection; and 4) strengthening Arctic science, 
building on the legacy of the International Polar Year (IPY, 2007–08).
Science and technology is considered a cross-cutting theme that under-
pins all of Canada’s Northern Strategy priorities. As a world leader in Arctic 
science (second only to the United States in terms of scientific publications 
on the Arctic),51 its research extends beyond the academic sector to the pri-
vate, not-for-profit, and government sectors (including Indigenous research-
ers and organizations). Official statements tout that Aboriginal peoples and 
Northerners played a significant role in Canada’s planning, coordination, 
and implementation of its contributions to IPY, and that Canada’s investment 
of $156 million was one of the largest by a single country.52 The government 
has committed to significant new infrastructure in support of Northern sci-
ence, including a new polar icebreaker and remote sensing systems to support 
northern monitoring activities such as sea ice monitoring for navigation sup-
port, vessel detection in support of security and safety, and various environ-
mental monitoring activities including pollution detection and marine wind 
derivation. As a flagship initiative, Canada is investing $250–million in build-
ing the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS)—a world-class hub 
for science and technology, based in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut—that it hopes 
will attract international scientists to work with Canadians.53
The fourth pillar commits to “Improving and Devolving Governance and 
Empowering the Peoples of the North.” Domestically, this involves the ongoing 
Arctic waters, replacing the previous voluntary reporting system which had been in place 
since 1977.
51   Grégoire Côté and Michelle Picard-Aitken, Arctic Research in Canada: A Bibliometric 
Analysis (Science-Metrix for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Montreal 2009); 
Canadian Polar Commission, The State of Northern Knowledge in Canada (Canadian Polar 
Commission, Ottawa 2014).
52   Canada, Government of Canada Program for International Polar Year: Highlights and 
Achievements (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa 2011).
53   Polar Knowledge Canada, ‘Constructing the research station’ (Government of Canada, 
updated 2 June 2016) <https://www.canada.ca/en/polar-knowledge/constructingstation/
index.html> accessed 26 October 2016; Jane George, ‘Science, high-tech, guide Nunavut’s 
Canadian High Arctic Research Station’ (Nunatsiaq News, 29 October 2015) accessed 
26 October 2016.
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negotiation and implementation of land claim and self-government agree-
ments with Northern Indigenous peoples, as well as the negotiation of devolu-
tion agreements of federal responsibilities to the territorial governments. In 
its international dimension, improved governance includes continued sup-
port for the Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations of the Arctic 
Council, and ensuring that Northern governments and Indigenous organiza-
tions in Canada have opportunities to actively participate in shaping Canadian 
policy on Arctic issues. In Canada’s view, this high level of engagement with 
Permanent Participants (as rights-holders54) and other Northern stakeholders 
is vital to ensuring that the Arctic Council continues to respond to the regions 
challenges and opportunities.
4 The Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship (2013–15)
The Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy emphasizes the Arctic Council 
as the leading intergovernmental forum through which Canada advances its 
Arctic foreign policy. This reflects its strong contributions to the founding 
and activities of the Council since 1996, including significant government, 
Indigenous, and academic expertise, leadership, and resources (both human 
and financial) to the various working groups and task forces. Accordingly, 
Canada assumed its second tenure as Chair of the Arctic Council from 2013–15 
with great optimism. Canada’s vision for the Arctic was again reflected in its 
overarching theme, “Development for the People of the North,” and its three 
sub-themes: Responsible Arctic Resource Development, Safe Arctic Shipping, 
and Sustainable Circumpolar Communities. These themes, determined by a 
government-led public engagement process with northern Canadians, focused 
on enhancing the capacity of Indigenous Permanent Participants, creating 
conditions for dynamic and sustainable economic growth, and promoting 
vibrant communities and healthy ecosystems.55 The federal government’s 
appointment of Leona Aglukkaq (the first Inuk to serve as a Canadian Cabinet 
54   On the distinction between stakeholders and rightsholders, see Statement by Patricia A.L. 
Cochran Chair, Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat and Chair, Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, to the Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials of the Arctic Council, Kautokenio, 
Norway, (19–20 November 2008), <https://arcticcouncil.longsight.com/bitstream/handle/ 
11374/883/ACSAONO04_11_Statement_IPS_Chair.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 
24 November 2016.
55   Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship, 2013–2015 (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, Ottawa 2013).
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minister) as Canada’s Minister and Chair of the Arctic Council reaffirmed a 
national commitment to Indigenous leadership. Although her appointment 
elicited criticism from some commentators who questioned her mandate 
and competency because she was not Canada’s foreign minister, others were 
pleased to see an Arctic Indigenous person serve as chair of the Arctic Council 
for the first time.56
During the course of its chairmanship, Canada committed to eleven priority 
initiatives: strengthening the Arctic Council; creation of a Circumpolar Business 
Forum; Arctic marine oil pollution prevention;57 guidelines for arctic tourism 
and cruise ship operations in the Arctic; protecting Arctic traditional ways of 
life; promoting traditional and local knowledge; addressing short-lived climate 
pollutants; facilitating adaptation to climate change; promoting mental well-
ness in Northern circumpolar communities; migratory bird conservation; and 
enhancing scientific cooperation in the Arctic. All of the Arctic Council states 
and Permanent Participants supported these initiatives, the first ten of which 
Canada proposed and the eleventh (on scientific cooperation) coming from 
the U.S. and Russia.58 This agenda invited criticisms from stakeholders who 
worried that Canada’s agenda departed from the Council’s traditional empha-
sis on environmental protection and scientific assessments, instead imposing 
a parochial Canadian (rather than a circumpolar) vision. “Rather than viewing 
the Arctic as an increasingly global place, with a legitimate role for non-Arctic 
actors,” political scientist Heather Exner-Pirot suggests, “Aglukkaq prioritized 
56   On the debate over Aglukkaq’s appointment and the northern consultations, see Heather 
Exner-Pirot, ‘Canada’s Arctic Council chairmanship (2013–2015): a post-mortem’ (2016) 22 
(1) Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 86.
57   Arctic States signed an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response at Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in May 2013, but the Arctic Marine Oil 
Pollution Prevention initiative was revised in light of American and Norwegian con-
cerns, with the U.S. reticent to support language that implied the negotiation of a new 
international instrument and Norway reluctant to discuss standards. In the end, the 
Council developed a Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution 
from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic to promote 
regulatory cooperation in the petroleum and shipping industries to prevent marine oil 
pollution, protect the environment and local economies, and safeguard traditional live-
lihoods and ways of life. Canada, ‘Highlights of the Arctic Council Program (2013–15)’ 
updated 4 November 2015 <http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/chairman 
ship-presidence.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 26 October 2016.
58   The Kiruna Declaration (2013) referred to eight of these initiatives, with the two initia-
tives that were not mentioned (Guidelines for Arctic Tourism and Cruise Ship Operations, 
and Migratory Bird Conservation) captured in the relevant Working Group sections of the 
Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers.
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activities that supported Northerners, especially Canadian Northerners, and 
more specifically Nunavummiut, and in particular Inuit.”59
The first sub-theme, Responsible Arctic Resource Development, empha-
sized the sustainable development of natural resources. Canada’s “top prior-
ity” along these lines was the creation of a “Circumpolar Business Forum,” 
intended to bring circumpolar business perspectives and advice to the work 
of the Council. The Arctic Economic Council (AEC) held its first meeting in 
Iqaluit in September 2014. As an “independent organization that facilitates 
Arctic business-to-business activities and responsible economic development 
through the sharing of best practices, technological solutions, standards and 
other information,” the AEC’s membership represents a wide range of busi-
ness interests: “from mining and shipping companies to reindeer herding and 
Aboriginal Economic Development Corporations.”60 Although prematurely 
criticized for potentially undermining the Arctic Council and the unique status 
of Permanent Participants, as well as for providing “transnational corporations 
with preferential access to national governments,”61 the realities of the AEC 
remain much more modest and aspirational at this stage, offering the prospect 
of business support to bolster Canada’s desire that Arctic communities benefit 
from the economic boom that is unfolding in the region.
The Safe Arctic Shipping theme built upon previous Council recommenda-
tions, such as the landmark Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (2009),62 as 
well as the ongoing work of multilateral mechanisms like the International 
59   Exner-Pirot, ‘Canada’s Arctic Council chairmanship’ 87.
60   Arctic Economic Council, ‘Backgrounder’ <http://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/about-
us/backgrounder/> accessed 26 October 2016. AEC members decided to focus their 
efforts on five overarching themes: establishing strong market connections between the 
Arctic states; encouraging public-private partnerships for infrastructure investments; 
creating stable and predictable regulatory frameworks; facilitating knowledge and data 
exchange between industry and academia; and traditional indigenous knowledge, stew-
ardship and a focus on small businesses. Arctic Economic Council, ‘Messaging’ (Arctic 
Economic Council, 30 September 2014) <http://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/01/AEC-Backgrounder.pdf> accessed 26 October 2016.
61   See Lloyd Axworthy and Mary Simon, ‘Is Canada undermining the Arctic Council?’ Globe 
and Mail (4 March 2015). In actual practice, permanent participants have voting privileges 
within the AEC. See Chris Windeyer, ‘The Arctic Economic Council Makes an Entrance’ 
(Arctic Deeply, 4 May 2016) <https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/articles/2016/05/04/
the-arctic-economic-council-makes-an-entrance> accessed 24 October 2016. On contro-
versy over the AEC, see also Exner-Pirot, ‘Canada’s Arctic Council chairmanship’ 89–90, 93.
62   Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment Working Group, Oslo 2009).
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Maritime Organization (IMO). At the Arctic Council, the Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group developed best prac-
tice guidelines for sustainable marine-based tourism and safer cruise-ship 
operations in the Arctic, encouraging the benefits of tourism for Arctic com-
munities while seeking to mitigate the risks associated with increased activity.63 
This activity also complemented and encouraged the conclusion and adoption 
of the International Polar Code, negotiated through the IMO, which Canada 
had long championed and which is expected to enter into force on 1 January 
2017.64 These initiatives reflect Canada’s consistent advocacy for the protec-
tion of the Arctic environment, and reflect its interests as both a maritime 
nation and an Arctic coastal state that welcomes navigation in its waters, so 
long as maritime activities comply with domestic and international rules and 
regulations.
Work under the third theme, Sustainable Circumpolar Communities, also 
reinforced the human and environmental dimensions of a changing Arctic. 
Under Canada’s chairmanship, the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG) worked with Indigenous communities and health professionals to 
identify successful approaches to improve mental wellness and resiliency, de-
signed to help Arctic residents (particularly youth) adapt based on solutions 
that reflect Indigenous cultures and values.65 The SDWG also developed rec-
ommendations to integrate traditional and local knowledge into its work more 
consistently (a topic of ongoing debate since the founding of the Council) and 
facilitated PP-led efforts to enhance their capacity and participation in Council 
63   Canada, ‘Highlights of the Arctic Council Program’.
64   On the IMO Polar Code, see David VanderZwaag, ‘The IMO and Arctic Marine 
Environmental Protection: Tangled Currents, Sea of Challenges’ in Oran Young, Jong Deog 
Kim, and Yoon Hyung Kim (eds), The Arctic in World Affairs (Korea Maritime Institute 
and Honolulu: East West Center, Seoul 2012) 99–128; Jiayu Bai, ‘The IMO Polar Code: 
The Emerging Rules of Arctic Shipping Governance’ 2015] 30 (4) International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 674–699; and IMO, ‘Shipping in polar waters’ (International 
Marine Organization) <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/
default.aspx> accessed 25 September 2016. On Canada’s role, see Peter Kikkert, ‘Promoting 
national interests and fostering cooperation: Canada and the development of a polar 
code’ (2012) 43 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 319.
65   Results of this project were shared at the Circumpolar Mental Wellness Symposium held 
in Iqaluit in March 2015. See ‘Sharing Hope: Circumpolar Perspectives on Promising 
Practices for Promoting Mental Wellness and Resilience’ (2015), <https://arcticcouncil 
.longsight.com/bitstream/handle/11374/411/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_SDWG_Sharing_
Hope_Promoting_Mental_Wellness.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 26 October 
2016.
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activities.66 With respect to climate change, the Council launched a web-based 
adaptation portal to facilitate information sharing between Arctic residents, 
researchers and decision-makers67 and, building on the Council’s ongoing sci-
entific assessment work, developed an action plan to help reduce short-lived 
climate pollutants (such as black carbon and methane) that warm the Arctic 
and harm the air quality and the health of Arctic residents.68 Progress in other 
priority areas, such as the Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative (a longstanding bio-
diversity project), also acknowledged the importance of enhanced coopera-
tion between Arctic and non-Arctic countries to conserve vulnerable species 
66   See Arctic Council, Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, ‘Draft Recommendations’ (from the 
PP-led workshop on Traditional Knowledge and the Arctic Council held in Reykjavik 
in February 2014), <http://arcticpeoplestest.org/traditional-knowledge-workshop/draft- 
recommendations/> accessed 26 October 2016. The 2015 Iqaluit Declaration notes 
that the Ministers of the Arctic states “welcome the recommendations on traditional 
and local knowledge and recognize the importance of using this knowledge in the 
work of the Council, instruct the Arctic Council to take relevant actions to implement 
these recommendations, and note with appreciation the work done by the Permanent 
Participants to develop their own principles for the use of traditional knowledge.” 
Canada, ‘Iqaluit Declaration’ (Canada, 2015), <http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic- 
arctique/final-declaration-finale.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 24 November 2016. On PP 
capacity initiatives, see Jim Gam[b]le, ‘The Arctic Council Permanent Participants: 
Capacity & Support—Past, Present & Future’ in Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, 
and Joel Plouffe (eds), 2015 Arctic Yearbook: Arctic Governance and Governing, (Northern 
Research Forum, Akureyri 2015) 385–88.
67   The Arctic Adaptation Exchange project, led by the SDWG, developed an on-line portal 
that enhances adaptive capacity and fosters the exchange of information/knowledge 
and the development of best practices by: providing appropriate access to data, knowl-
edge and decision-support tools needed by governments, industry, Arctic indigenous 
peoples and other residents to manage climate change risks; enabling the sharing of exit-
ing tools and practical adaptation experiences including local and traditional knowledge 
across the Arctic; and facilitating the development of new practices and tools that support 
adaptation decision-making (e.g. arctic wide adaptive capacity indices). Canada, the United 
States, Aleut International Association and Gwich’in Council International collaborated 
to lead this project. Arctic Council, ‘Arctic Adaptation Exchange’ <http://arcticadaptation 
exchange.com/> accessed 29 October 2016.
68   See Arctic Council Secretariat, ‘Overview of National Submissions under the Arctic Council 
Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions’ 
(Arctic Council, 2015) <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1502> accessed 
26 October 2016. The Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (SLCPs) initiative was revised 
to reflect the concerns of Russia, which wanted the focus to focus solely on scientific 
research. In the end, the Arctic states and PPs reached consensus to proceed with work 
focusing on black carbon and methane, which included both supporting science and the 
development of appropriate national activities to reduce emissions of these pollutants.
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and protect traditional Indigenous ways of life. The meat, eggs, and down of 
migratory birds are important to many Indigenous communities in the Arctic, 
but most of these species travel to lower latitudes during the winter where 
they face habitat destruction and pollution. Accordingly, multi-jurisdictional 
conservation plans, based on rigorous monitoring plans, must reflect the 
Arctic’s connectedness to the rest of the world.69
In the end, Canada’s chairmanship achieved a mixed success. The offi-
cial summary report emphasized that it had “worked to support economic 
prosperity in the region, recognizing that business is essential to support resi-
dents and create sustainable communities,” and it had “also supported Arctic 
Indigenous peoples as they continue to adapt to changing social, economic, 
cultural and environmental conditions.”70 While these areas of emphasis 
served to reorient the Council’s work towards human development, Exner-
Pirot noted “many grumblings about Canada’s management and leadership of 
the chairmanship, with some [stakeholders] expressing that it lacked transpar-
ency, decisions were made without sufficient consultation, and emphasis was 
inevitably placed on issues of Canadian domestic concern.” Canada’s chair-
manship did not produce any landmark assessments, yield any binding trea-
ties, or convince other Arctic Council states that Canada’s domestic economic 
priorities were simply transferrable to the rest of the circumpolar world. While 
tensions with Russia over external developments in the Ukraine and Syria 
may have inhibited progress on some initiatives, Exner-Pirot concludes that 
Canada’s chairmanship also reflected the shortcomings of Canada’s leadership, 
particularly its propensity to conflate domestic and international agendas.71
5 The New Liberal Government: A New Way Forward?
On 19 October 2015, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal party won the Canadian federal 
election with a sweeping majority. Although this represented a clear repudia-
tion of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, it should not be miscon-
strued as an inherent rejection of the 2009 Northern Strategy which, while 
released under the Conservatives, reflects a longstanding Canadian Arctic 
agenda built around sovereignty, sustainable development, environmental 
69   Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Working Group, ‘Arctic Migratory Birds 
Initiative (AMBI)’ <http://www.caff.is/arctic-migratory-birds-initiative-ambi> accessed 
17 October 2016.
70   Canada, ‘Highlights of the Arctic Council Program’.
71   Exner-Pirot, “Canada’s Arctic Council chairmanship,” 90–94.
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protection, and governance. The change in government, however, is likely to 
bring a change in tone and emphasis to highlight a political departure—even 
if the main substantive elements of Canada’s Arctic policy are likely to remain 
intact. Similar to previous administrations, it is likely that Trudeau’s Arctic 
agenda will continue to focus on domestic issues—particularly those related 
to the health and resiliency of Indigenous communities. Internationally, this 
agenda is complemented by a renewed commitment to global climate change 
mitigation, a “return” to multilateralism and a foreign policy rooted in “respon-
sible conviction,” and a more constructive relationship with the United States.72
Respect for and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples lies at the heart of 
the Liberal agenda. “No relationship is more important to me and to Canada 
than the one with Indigenous Peoples,” Trudeau highlighted in his mandate 
letter to each of his Cabinet ministers. “It is time for a renewed, nation-to-
nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition of rights, 
respect, co-operation, and partnership.”73 Accordingly, Canada will place the 
highest priority on ensuring that its activities in the Arctic (both domestic and 
international) acknowledge, protect and promote Indigenous peoples’ rights—
and, by extension, will insist that other Arctic stakeholders do the same.74 In 
May 2016, Canada officially lifted the qualifications to its endorsement of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 
72   See, for example, Matthew Bondy, ‘Justin Trudeau is Putting the ‘Liberal’ Back in ‘Ca-
nadian Foreign Policy’’ (2015) Foreign Policy <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/21/justin 
-trudeau-liberal-canadian-foreign-policy-syria-climate-change/> accessed 17 October 
2016; Lee Berthiaume, ‘A return to multilateralism’ (2015) National Post; and Stéphane 
Dion, ‘On ‘responsible conviction’ and Liberal foreign policy’ (2016) Maclean’s <http://
www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/stephane-dion-how-ethics-inspires-liberal-foreign-
policy/> accessed 17 October 2016. On the new government’s main priorities and their 
relationship to the North, see Thomas Axworthy, ‘In the North, Justin Trudeau can 
accomplish great things’ Toronto Star (Toronto, 6 March 2016).
73   Prime Minister of Canada, ‘Ministerial Mandate Letters’ <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ministerial-
mandate-letter> (Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada) accessed 29 October 2016.
74   The Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy adopts the phrase Canadian “Aboriginal 
People,” thus emphasizing individuals living in the North, rather than the plural “peoples” 
connoting group rights. This reflects a longstanding debate in Canada about Indigenous 
rights to self-determination under international law. According to some strands of inter-
national law, and especially Article 1 of the Covenant, the word “peoples” opens up the 
prospect of unqualified acceptance of self-determination. See, for example, Andrew F. 
Cooper, Tests of Global Governance: Canadian diplomacy and United Nations world confer-
ences (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2004) 122–51. The Trudeau Government, 
however, seems fully prepared to acknowledge Aboriginal peoples as collective entities 
as well.
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which the Conservatives had registered over the requirement for “free, prior 
and informed consent” from Indigenous peoples on issues that affected them. 
While disavowing that this new position gives Indigenous groups a “veto” over 
development projects,75 Canada’s unqualified support of UNDRIP affirms a 
strong commitment to welcome “Indigenous peoples into the co-production 
of policy and joint priority-setting” within the Canadian political community.76
Prime Minister Trudeau has also declared that Canada “is back” when it 
comes to joining global efforts to mitigate climate change.77 While the Harper 
government emphasized climate change adaptation measures in its Arctic 
agenda, the Liberals chastised their predecessors’ alleged “refusal to take 
meaningful action on climate change,” their lack of funding for science and 
their “muzzling” of government scientists, and their prioritization of economic 
growth over environmental protection.78 In signing the Paris Agreement on 
climate change, Canada has signalled its commitment to shift course, reduce 
greenhouse-gas emissions in concert with the international community, and 
promote a clean-energy future.79 Along these lines, the U.S.-Canada Joint 
Statement of March 2016 articulated “a common vision of a prosperous and 
sustainable North American economy, and the opportunities afforded by ad-
vancing clean growth.” Both Trudeau and Obama cited the Paris Agreement as 
a pivotal moment and committed to reduce methane emissions from the oil 
and gas sector, as well as advancing climate change action globally. They also 
75   Gloria Galloway, ‘Canada drops opposition to UN indigenous rights declaration,’ Globe 
and Mail (9 May 2016);
76   Ken Coates and Bill Favel, ‘Embrace of UNDRIP Can Bring Aboriginal Canada and Ottawa 
Closer Together’ (iPolitics, 19 May 2016) <http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/embrace-of 
-undrip-can-bring-aboriginal-canada-and-ottawa-closer-together-ken-coates-and 
-blaine-favel-for-ipolitics/> accessed 29 October 2016.
77   Jason Fekete, ‘Justin Trudeau says Canada ‘is back at climate-change meeting’ National 
Post (30 November 2015).
78   Liberal Party of Canada, ‘A New Plan for Canada’s Environment and Economy’ 
(Liberal, August 2015) <https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/08/A-new-plan-for-Canadas-
environment-and-economy.pdf> accessed 29 October 2016. On the muzzling of gov-
ernment scientists, see for example Verlyn Klinkenborg, ‘Silencing Scientists’ New York 
Times (New York, 21 September 2013); Jonathon Gatehouse, ‘When Science Goes Silent’ 
Maclean’s (3 May 2013); Margaret Munro, ‘Unmuzzling government scientists is just the 
first step’ Globe and Mail, 26 October 2015; and Mark Hume, “Federal scientists eager to 
share their research now that muzzles are off,” Globe and Mail (Toronto, 8 November 
2015).
79   Alexa Panetta, ‘Trudeau on climate targets: ‘Canada’s efforts will not cease’ (2016) 
Maclean’s <http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/trudeau-on-climate-targets-canadas 
-efforts-will-not-cease/> accessed 17 October 2016.
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“reaffirm their commitment to working together to strengthen North American 
energy security, phase out fossil fuel subsidies, accelerate clean energy devel-
opment to address climate change and to foster sustainable energy develop-
ment and economic growth.” Both countries also promise to “continue to 
respect and promote the rights of Indigenous peoples in all climate change 
decision making.”80
Given Canada’s longstanding position that its sovereignty in the Arctic is 
well-established, there is unlikely to be any reversing of its basic stance on the 
rights and roles of Arctic states in regional governance. With Prime Minister 
Trudeau having criticized his predecessor for allegedly politicizing the sci-
entifically-informed legal process to delineate the outer limits of Canada’s 
continental shelf in the Arctic, Canada is likely to emphasize openness, trans-
parency, the rule of law, and science-based decision-making as it navigates 
the process established by article 76 of UNCLOS for claims to extended con-
tinental shelves.81 Similarly, the Liberal government is unlikely to succumb to 
alarmist narratives suggesting that military threats warrant a deviation from 
our established approach to managing outstanding sovereignty and status 
of water disputes.82 While the new government is more likely to emphasize 
constructive diplomacy rather than to adopt militant rhetoric on Arctic sov-
ereignty issues, it is unlikely to adopt the de-militarization or nuclear-weap-
ons free zone proposals promoted by a small number of left wing groups and 
80   Prime Minister of Canada, ‘U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic 
Leadership’ (Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, 10 March 2016) <http://pm.gc.ca/
eng/news/2016/03/10/us-canada-joint-statement-climate-energy-and-arctic-leadership> 
accessed 17 October 2016.
81   After PM Harper “ordered a rewrite of Canada’s international claim for Arctic seabed 
rights to include the North Pole” in December 2013, Trudeau (as Liberal leader) noted: 
“I am going to defer to scientists. There has been an awful lot of work done over the past 
years, and even decades, on mapping out the undersea floor of the North Pole to align 
with the United Nations regulations…. And I don’t know that it is a place where we need 
necessarily to have political interference. I trust our scientists and oceanographers in 
terms of how we’re mapping it.” Steven Chase, ‘Turf war with Russia looms over Ottawa’s 
claim to Arctic seabed’ Globe and Mail (Toronto: 5 December 2013).
82   See, for example, Scott Michael Byers, ‘Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia’ (2016) 
The Wall Street Journal <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-arctic-front-in-the-battle-to 
-contain-russia-1457478393> accessed 17 October 2016, and Levon Sevunts, ‘Canada’s 
defence review and the Arctic’ (Radio Canada International, 8 April 2016) <http://www 
.rcinet.ca/en/2016/04/08/canadas-defence-review-and-the-arctic/> accessed 17 October 
2016.
Lackenbauer and Lalonde�50
commentators.83 Instead, the Liberals have promised to maintain current 
National Defence spending levels, with “a renewed focus on surveillance and 
control of Canadian territory and approaches, particularly our Arctic regions, 
and will increase the size of the Canadian Rangers.”84 This continuity does not 
promote a “militarization” of the Arctic agenda, but simply represents a mod-
est investment in appropriate defensive capabilities that help to deter would-
be adversaries from attacking North America and, in a direct Arctic context, to 
support unconventional security and safety missions such as law enforcement 
and responding to natural or humanitarian disasters.85
The Trudeau government is emphasizing international cooperation in line 
with a more “nuanced” foreign policy. Building on Trudeau’s promise that 
Canada would have a more “compassionate and constructive voice in the 
world” under the Liberals after a decade of Conservative rule, in November 2015 
newly-appointed Minister of Global Affairs Stéphane Dion called for renewed 
“engagement” with Russia, despite Canada’s ongoing displeasure with Russian 
expansionism and aggression in the Ukraine. While the Harper Conservatives 
had suspended almost all bilateral contact with Russia after the latter invaded 
Crimea in March 2014, Dion stressed that this extreme stand deviated from 
the actions of the US and other G-7 partners. “We also need to think about our 
83   See, for example, Ernie Regehr, ‘A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and Cooperative Security 
in the Arctic’ (Simons Foundation, 14 October 2014) <http://www.thesimonsfoundation 
.ca/highlights/nuclear-weapon-free-zone-and-cooperative-security-arctic> accessed 17 Oc-
tober 2016; Thomas Axworthy, ‘A Proposal for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone’ (2012) 
Yearbook of Polar Law 4 (1) 87–139; and Michael D. Wallace and Steven Staples, Ridding the 
Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue (Rideau Institute, Ottawa 2010).
84   In highlighting the need for “an agile, responsive, and well-equipped military force that 
can effectively defend Canada and North America,” and by mentioning the Arctic in par-
ticular, there is no indication that Arctic defence, security, and safety will be downgraded 
in importance. Instead, the Liberal party promised to make investments in the Royal 
Canadian Navy a “top priority,” including completing the six Arctic and offshore patrol 
ships (AOPS) announced by the Conservatives and the construction of more icebreak-
ers (presumably for the Canadian Coast Guard). Liberal Party of Canada, ‘Defence Plat-
form’ (Liberal, 2015) <https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/royal-canadian-navy/> accessed 
24 October 2016.
85   P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, ‘The Canadian Armed Forces in the 
Arctic: Building Appropriate Capabilities’ (2016) 16 (4) Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies 7–66. Defence is defined as military actions taken to deter or defeat enemy state 
actors to protect Canada’s North. Security is defined as precautions taken to guard against 
crime, attack, sabotage or espionage by criminal or non-state actors. Safety is defined as 
the actions taken to protect life and limb or to mitigate damages to critical infrastruc-
ture and government assets from force majeure events. See Canadian Forces Northern 
Employment Support Plan, November 2012.
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national interests because Russia is our neighbour in the Arctic,” the minis-
ter explained.86 While this revised stance provoked debate amongst Canadian 
commentators, some of whom worried that this would send the wrong signals 
to an increasingly assertive Putin already “pivoting” towards the Arctic as a 
“strategic frontier,”87 the intention to continue cooperation on areas of com-
mon ground in Arctic affairs is an eminently sensible one.88
While it is premature to determine whether the Trudeau government’s 
policy priorities really “converge in Canada’s North,” thus investing the region 
with high political saliency in the country as a whole,89 the prominent place 
of the Arctic in the Trudeau-Obama joint statement of March 2016 points in 
this direction. Emphasizing Indigenous rights and knowledge, as well as “natu-
ral marine, land and air migrations that know no borders,” the statement con-
ceptualizes the Arctic as “the frontline of climate change” and articulates four 
main objectives:
86   Lee Berthiaume, ‘Canada ready to re-engage with Russia, Iran, despite differences, Dion 
says’ Ottawa Citizen (Ottawa, 11 November 2015). During the election campaign in October 
2015, Trudeau had told reporters that, if he became prime minister, he would “tell off” 
Putin “directly to his face” after accusing the Russian leader of “being dangerous” in east-
ern Europe, “irresponsible and harmful” in the Middle East, and “unduly provocative” in 
the Arctic. Canadian Press, “Justin Trudeau would tell off ‘bully’ Vladimir Putin ‘directly to 
his face’ if he becomes prime minister,” National Post, 13 October 2015.
87   In January 2016, Dion reiterated that Canada hoped to resume dialogue with Russia, 
despite that country’s military aggression in the Ukraine, and cited the Arctic as a region 
where Canada would benefit from re-engagement with its circumpolar neighbour. Scott 
Borgerson and Michael Byers, ‘The Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia’ Wall 
Street Journal (New York, 8 March 2016). See also Matthew Fisher, ‘Allies wait for great 
defence commitment from Canada while Russia militarizes the Arctic’ National Post 
(4 February 2016) <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/matthew-fisher-allies- 
wait-for-greater-defence-commitment-from-canada-while-russia-militarizes-arctic> 
accessed 24 October 2016; Eva Salinas & Hannah Hoag [in conversation with Rob Huebert 
and Heather Exner-Pirot], ‘Canada Wants to Reopen Dialogue with Russia’ (Arctic Deeply, 
17 February 2016) <https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/articles/2016/02/17/canada-
wants-to-reopen-dialogue-with-russia> accessed 24 October 2016.
88   Kari Roberts, ‘Why Russia will Play by the Rules in the Arctic’ (2015) Canadian Foreign 
Policy Journal 21 (2) 112–128; and Adam Lajeunesse and Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘Cana-
dian Arctic Security: Russia’s Not Coming’ (OpenCanada, 19 April 2016) <https://www 
.opencanada.org/features/canadian-arctic-security-russias-not-coming/> accessed 24 Octo-
ber 2016.
89   Thomas Axworthy, ‘In the North, Justin Trudeau can accomplish great things’ Toronto 
Star (Toronto, 6 March 2016).
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1) Conserving Arctic biodiversity through science-based decision making by 
achieving national goals for land and marine protected areas, and work-
ing “directly with Indigenous partners, state, territorial and provincial 
governments” to set “a new, ambitious conservation goal for the Arctic 
based on the best available climate science and knowledge, Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous alike.
2) Collaborating with “Indigenous and Arctic governments, leaders, and 
communities to more broadly and respectfully” incorporate Indigenous 
science and traditional knowledge into decision-making
3) Building a sustainable Arctic economy based on scientific evidence, 
with commercial activities occurring “only when the highest safety and 
environmental standards are met, including national and global climate 
and environmental goals, and Indigenous rights and agreements.” Sub-
priorities include:
a. establish low impact shipping corridors and consistent policies for 
ship operations, taking into account important ecological and cul-
tural areas, vessel traffic patterns, Indigenous and Northern Arctic 
input, and increased coast guard cooperation of our Coast Guards
b. seek a binding international agreement to prevent the opening of 
unregulated fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, building “on a pre-
cautionary, science-based principle to commercial fishing that both 
countries have put in place in their Arctic waters”
c. ensure that oil and gas development and exploration activities “align 
with science-based standards between the two nations that ensure 
appropriate preparation for operating in Arctic conditions, includ-
ing robust and effective well control and emergency response 
measures”
4) Supporting strong Arctic communities by “defining new approaches and 
exchanging best practices to strengthen the resilience of Arctic commu-
nities and continuing to support the well-being of Arctic residents, in 
particular respecting the rights and territory of Indigenous peoples.” This 
objective stresses that “all Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic are vital to 
strengthening and supporting U.S. and Canadian sovereignty claims,” and 
both countries “commit to working in partnership to implement land 
claims agreements to realize the social, cultural and economic potential 
of all Indigenous and Northern communities.” Priority areas include 
“innovative renewable energy and efficiency alternatives to diesel”; com-
munity climate change adaptation; “innovative options for housing and 
infrastructure”; and “greater action to address the serious challenges of 
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mental wellness, education, Indigenous language, and skill development, 
particularly among Indigenous youth.”90
Indigenous and environmental organizations in Canada applauded the state-
ment, with national Inuit leader Natan Obed stating that “the final language 
in this document really spoke to Inuit” and heralding it “a tremendous break-
through for Indigenous people who live in the Arctic.”91
6 Bringing the EU and Canadian Strategies into Dialogue
The evolution of the European Union’s Arctic policy has been the subject of 
numerous publications92 and is dealt with extensively in other chapters in this 
book. Accordingly, our intention is not to provide yet another summary but 
rather to use the most recent articulation of European Union policy for the 
Arctic, released on 27 April 2016 by the Commission and the High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as a “Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council,” as a way to juxtapose EU and Canadian 
90   ‘U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic Leadership’ (Office of the 
Prime Minister of Canada, 10 March 2016) <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/03/10/
us-canada-joint-statement-climate-energy-and-arctic-leadership#sthash.XjRoT2R7 
.dpuf> accessed 24 October 2016.
91   Sima Sahar Zerehi, ‘Trudeau-Obama shared Arctic leadership model a hit with Inuit and 
environmental groups’ (CBC News, 11 March 2016) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
north/trudeau-obama-washington-visit-arctic-promises-1.3486076> accessed 24 October 
2016.
92   Important overviews include Adele Airoldi, The European Union and the Arctic: policies 
and actions (Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen 2008); Adele Airoldi, European 
Union and the Arctic: Main Developments July 2008–July 2010 (Nordic Council of Ministers, 
Copenhagen 2010); Adele Airoldi, The European Union and the Arctic: Developments and 
Perspectives, 2010–2014 (Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen 2014); Steffen Weber 
and Iulian Romanyshyn, ‘Breaking the ice: the European Union and the Arctic’ (2011) 66 
(4) International Journal 849–860; Kristine Offerdal, ‘The EU in the Arctic: in pursuit of 
legitimacy and influence’ (2011) 66 (4) International Journal 861–877; Timo Koivurova, Kai 
Kokko, Sebastien Duyck, Nikolas Sellheim, and Adam Stepien, ‘The present and future 
competence of the European Union in the Arctic’ (2012) 48 (4) Polar Record 361–371; Njord 
Wegge, ‘The EU and the Arctic: European foreign policy in the making’ (2012) 3 (1) Arctic 
Review on Law and Politics 6–28; Andreas Østhagen, ‘The European Union—An Arctic 
Actor?’ (2013) 15 (2) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 71–92; and Adam Stępień, 
‘Internal Contradictions and External Anxieties: One ‘Coherent’ Arctic Policy for the 
European Union?’ (2015) 7 (1) Yearbook of Polar Law 249–289.
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policy priorities. Bearing the title “An integrated European Union policy for the 
Arctic,” the EU document proposes three priority areas:
1) Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment;
2) Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic; and
3) International Cooperation on Arctic Issues.
An admonition immediately follows this list of priority issues that the “EU 
should attach particular importance to research, science and innovation which 
will play a key role across the three priority areas.”93 At first glance, these areas 
resemble the main pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy and Arctic Foreign 
Policy (described above).
The introductions to both the Canadian and EU strategies acknowledge the 
significance and complexity of the changes occurring in the Arctic, with par-
ticular attention to climate change. Canada’s Northern Strategy stresses that 
the “North is undergoing rapid changes, from the impacts of climate change to 
the growth of Northern and Aboriginal governments and institutions,” and 
observes that “domestic and international interest in the Arctic region is ris-
ing.” The introductory paragraphs of the EU Policy also emphasize that the 
Arctic is acquiring “a higher profile in international relations”, concluding that 
“[w]hile the changes affecting the Arctic present opportunities for local com-
munities, they also have the potential to increase tensions in the region.”94 As 
discussed, these dynamics make sovereignty Canada’s “first and foremost” pri-
ority in Arctic policy. In the case of the EU, the primary policy driver is climate 
change.
In terms of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic Ocean, Canada 
maintains that an established international legal framework is in place and 
will govern the resolution of maritime boundary disputes and the extended 
continental shelf.95 Indeed, each of the five coastal States bordering the Arctic 
Ocean reiterated their commitment to the legal framework defined by the UN 
Law of the Sea Convention and to the peaceful settlement of any disputes in 
93   European Commission and The High Representative, ‘An integrated European Union 
policy for the Arctic’, Joint Communication, JOIN (2016) 21 final, 4.
94   JOIN (2016) 21, 4.
95   With regards to Hans Island, Canada’s only outstanding territorial dispute in the Arctic, 
the Joint Statement adopted by Canada and Denmark in September 2005 has proven 
extremely successful in managing the dispute. This statement provided that both parties, 
without prejudice to their respective legal claims, would inform each other of activities 
related to Hans Island. Furthermore, all contact by either side with Hans Island would be 
carried out in a low key and restrained manner.
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2008. Although a controversial resolution of the European Parliament in Octo-
ber 2008 called for a new Arctic legal governance regime based upon the Ant-
arctic Treaty (based on the misguided assumption that the region was devoid of 
governance), subsequent statements by the European Commission have been 
more sober in recognizing that “an extensive international legal framework is 
already in place that applies to the Arctic.”96 The 2016 EU Arctic policy similarly 
recognizes that the UNCLOS “provides a framework for managing the Arctic 
Ocean, including the peaceful settlement of disputes.”97 Thus, while the cur-
rent regime leaves some difficult questions unanswered—for instance, the 
resolution of overlapping ECS claims or the true nature of the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ’s recommendations regarding individ-
ual claims98—the existing legal framework ensures that Canada, as an Arctic 
coastal state, will be an equal party in any future negotiations and settlement.
The principal perceived “threat” to Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic stems 
from outside opposition to its legal position with respect to the Northwest 
Passage. Successive Canadian governments have declared that all of the waters 
within Canada’s Arctic archipelago constitute Canadian historic internal 
waters over which Canada exercises full sovereignty. This assertion of sover-
eignty necessarily includes the right to govern and control access to the various 
routes between Canada’s archipelagic islands. Washington, on the other hand, 
has consistently maintained that the Northwest Passage is an international 
strait through which the ships and aircraft of all nations enjoy a right of tran-
sit passage.99 Other States have also protested Canada’s governance measures 
96   See, for example, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, ‘The European Union and the Arctic Region’ COM (2008) 763 final, 9–10 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf> accessed 29 October 2016.
97   JOIN (2016) 21, 14.
98   On these themes, see Ted McDorman, ‘The Role of the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf: A Technical Boday in a Political World’ (2002) 17 (3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301–324; Annick de Marffy Mantuano, ‘La fixation des 
dernières limites maritimes: Le rôle de la Commission des Limites du Plateau Continental’ 
in Daniel-Heywood Anderson et al. (eds), La Mer et son Droit: Mélanges offerts à Laurent 
Lucchini et Jean Pierre Quénedec (Pedone, Paris 2003) 416; Alex G. Oude Elferink, ‘Causes, 
Consequences and Solutions Relating to the Absence of Final and Binding Outer Limits 
of the Continental Sheld’, Robert Volterra, ‘Problems Arising from Submissions by States 
to the CLCS in relation to Disputed Areas: A Selective Survey of State Practice to Date’ and 
Bjorn Kunoy, ‘Legal Problems Relating to Differences Arising between Recommendations 
of the CLCS and the Submission of Particular States’—all three in Clive R. Symmons (ed), 
Selected Contemporary Issues in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
2011) at 253, 273 and 305 respectively.
99   See The White House, Section III “Policy”, sub-section B ‘National Security and Homeland 
Security Interests in the Arctic’ at paragraph 5, January 9, 2009: “The Northwest Passage is 
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in the past,100 and a 2008 Communication of the European Community and 
a 2014 European Parliament Resolution emphasized freedom of navigation 
in the newly-opened Arctic routes.101 Furthermore, Germany’s Arctic policy 
guidelines released in September 2013 announced that the country was “cam-
paigning for freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean (Northeast, Northwest 
and Transpolar Passages) in accordance with high safety and environmental 
standards.”102 Given Canada’s understandable sensitivities with respect to its 
sovereignty, these challenges to its legal position are bound to elicit concern 
and generate political friction.
The 2016 EU Arctic policy for the Arctic does not wade into the Northwest 
Passage controversy, which bodes well for bilateral relations with Canada. 
Instead, it emphasizes the need for safe and secure maritime activities—a 
shared priority with Canada. “In view of increasing vessel traffic in the Arctic, 
including some carrying flags from EU Member States,” it asserts, “the EU 
should contribute to enhance the safety of navigation in the Arctic through 
a strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route include straits used 
for international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through 
those straits.” See also President Obama’s ‘National Strategy for the Arctic Region’ of May 
2013: “Accession to the Convention would protect U.S. rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea 
and airspace throughout the Arctic region, and strengthen our arguments for freedom of 
navigation and overflight through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route.”
100   For example, in 1978, a Canadian official acknowledged that a “drawer full of protests” had 
been received following the adoption of Canada’s 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act. See Ted McDorman, ‘The New Definition of ‘Canada Lands’ and the Determination of 
the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf ’ (1983) 14 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 
215.
101   Reference can be made to the 2008 Communication of the European Communities to the 
European Parliament and the Council, “The European Union and the Arctic Region” in 
which Member States and the Community were exhorted to “defend the freedom of navi-
gation and the right of innocent passage in the newly opened routes and areas.” This call 
was repeated in paragraph 48 of the recent “European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 
2014 on the EU Strategy of the Arctic”, which also calls on “the states in the [Arctic] region 
to ensure that any current transport routes—and those that may emerge in the future—
are open to international shipping and to refrain from introducing any arbitrary unilater-
al obstacles, be they financial or administrative, that could hinder shipping in the Arctic, 
other than internationally agreed measures aimed at increasing security or protection of 
the environment.
102   Auswärtiges Amt, ‘Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy—Assume Responsibility, Seize 
Opportunities’ (Auswärtiges Amt, September 2013) <http://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/EN/International/Leitlinien-Arktispolitik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile> accessed 
24 October 2016.
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innovative technologies and the development of tools for the monitoring of 
spatial and temporal developments of the increasing maritime activities in the 
Arctic.”103 The EU policy only references the “North East Passage” (more com-
monly referred to as the Northern Sea Route)104 and, even then, only does so 
with regards to the stated objective of creating a “network for the Arctic and 
the Atlantic” to cope with any maritime security threats that might result from 
increasing activity within the Passage. Emphasis is placed on ensuring the 
effective implementation of the Polar Code and enhancing search and rescue 
capabilities—all critical issues for Canada. Accordingly, as long as Canada’s 
position on the status of the waters of the NWP is left uncontested,105 the 
European emphasis on enhancing stewardship of the Arctic waters falls into 
perfect alignment with Canadian priorities under its sovereignty, environmen-
tal, and development pillars.
While the 2016 EU Arctic policy is respectful of the sovereignty and primary 
role of the Arctic States in tackling the issues affecting the Arctic region,106 it 
stresses that climate change, the preservation of biodiversity, and the viabil-
ity of ecosystems in the Arctic are global challenges best addressed through 
regional or multilateral cooperation. Acknowledging the particularly acute 
impacts of climate change in the region, the EU Joint Communication also 
emphasizes the critical role that the Arctic plays as a regulator for global cli-
mate and as a sink for long-range pollution. In light of this critical link between 
the Arctic and global efforts to combat climate change, the EU policy state-
ment declares that the “EU has a duty to protect the Arctic environment and 
103   JOIN (2016) 21, 12, under the heading “Safe and secure maritime activities.” Emphasis in 
the original.
104   As regards shipping activities in Russian Arctic waters, the Northern Sea Route [NSR] 
is the national maritime transportation route. As Willy Østreng explains, according to 
“legal regulations in Russia, the NSR stretches from Novaya Zemlya in the west … to the 
Bering Strait in the east … The establishment of the NSR as separate part of the Northeast 
Passage was decided by the Council of Peoples Commissars of the USSR on 17 December 
1932, which was the beginning of the NSR as an administered, legal entity under full 
Soviet jurisdiction and control.” Footnotes omitted, emphasis added. Willy Østreng, ‘The 
Northeast Passage and Northern Sea Route’ (ARCTIS, 2010) <http://www.arctis-search 
.com/The+Northeast+Passage+and+Northern+Sea+Route+2> accessed 24 October 2016.
105   A willingness to “agree to disagree” on intractable issues related to the legal status of the 
Northwest Passage, as Canada has successfully implemented in its bilateral relationship 
with the United States, may offer the EU a path to avoid alienating Canadian stakeholders 
and rights-holders.
106   This important acknowledgment appears in the second paragraph of the seventeen-page 
document.
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strengthen ecosystem resilience.”107 Given the Trudeau government’s strong 
support for multilateral efforts to mitigate climate change and its recognition 
that the Arctic environment cannot be protected simply through domestic or 
regional action, both the EU and Canada should consider the Arctic as a propi-
tious opportunity for joint leadership.
At the heart of both the Canadian and EU Arctic strategies is a commit-
ment to protect the environment and promote the economic development 
of the region. It remains to be seen, however, whether the interpretation or rela-
tive weight given to these dimensions complicates Canada-EU Arctic relations. 
These issues intersect most clearly in the case of energy. Canada is a major 
producer of oil and gas (although derided in some European circles as a gen-
erator of “dirty oil” from its oil sands), and its Arctic region—although the site 
of minimal exploration and development activity at present—could become a 
significant contributor to global energy supply in the long term as technology, 
equipment, and expertise advance and melting sea ice improves accessibility. 
While resource development can generate economic growth and opportunities 
for Northern peoples, Canada also recognizes that it increased risks of oil spills 
from offshore oil and gas operations and from ships and applies amongst the 
highest safety and environmental regulatory standards to oil and gas produc-
tion in the world.108 For its part, the European Commission also acknowledges 
that “Arctic resources could contribute to enhancing the EU’s security of sup-
ply concerning energy and raw materials in general,”109 and seeks to promote 
the “highest standards of major accident prevention and environmental con-
trol” over oil and gas activities in the region.” The recent policy statement also 
encourages the EU “to share regulatory and technological best practice with in-
ternational partners to support the safety and preservation of the environment 
in the region.”110 Unless the EU decides to adopt an anti-development stance 
on Arctic oil and gas on environmentalist grounds, their stance on strong regu-
lation of shipping, exploration, and extraction activities is likely to resonate 
107   JOIN (2016) 21, 12. Emphasis in original but added for the word “duty.”
108   Estimates indicate that over one-third of Canada’s remaining total of recoverable con-
ventional sources of oil and natural gas is found in its on- and offshore Arctic region, 
including 35% of remaining conventional light crude oil (almost 11.9 billion barrels) and 
38% of conventional natural gas (146.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)). Canada, Northern Oil and 
Gas Annual Report 2015 (Ottawa: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2015). There is 
currently no drilling in Canada’s Arctic offshore, although there are an estimated 200 mil-
lion barrels of oil in the Amauligak field in the shallow waters of the Beaufort Sea and an 
estimated 240 million barrels of potentially recoverable oil in the Paktoa discovery well.
109   COM (2008) 763.
110   JOIN (2016) 21, 8.
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with Canadian interests at the Arctic Council and other multilateral bodies. 
So too is the shared recognition of the importance of laying the groundwork 
for future energy security through investments in innovative technologies to 
support greater energy efficiencies and renewable energy solutions suited 
to extreme Arctic conditions.111
The JOIN (2016) 21 highlights that “close links between research, science and 
technology, while taking account of traditional knowledge, will … ensure that 
development is taken forward in a sustainable way.”112 Both Canada and the 
EU strategies place tremendous weight on the importance of science-based 
decision making, reaffirming that Arctic research represents a key area of col-
laboration and cooperation. Science “can be used as a catalyst to support a 
common understanding,” the EU policy suggests, “enabling jointly agreed solu-
tions to be reached and foster peaceful cooperation.”113 Accordingly, as “a major 
contributor to Arctic research,” the EU’s fundamental response to addressing 
climate change impacts in the Arctic is to maintain and even intensify its re-
search efforts.114 This fits with Canada’s Northern Strategy priorities, and exist-
ing mechanisms already make Canada and Europe longstanding partners in 
science and technology. For example, the Canada-EU Science and Technology 
Cooperation Agreement (1996, amended in 1998) facilitates scientific coop-
eration by enabling reciprocal access to programs,115 and the EU, Canada and 
the US signed the Galway Statement on research cooperation that led to the 
establishment of the Transatlantic Ocean (and Arctic) Research Alliance in 
May 2013.116 Given Canada’s aspirations to make the Canadian High Arctic 
111   JOIN (2016) 21, 9–10; “U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Climate, Energy, and Arctic 
Leadership.”
112   JOIN (2016) 21, 10.
113   JOIN (2016) 21, 13.
114   JOIN (2016) 21, 5. Emphasis in original. The Joint Communication contains a wealth of 
information on EU funding of Arctic research and ongoing Polar/Arctic programmes and 
initiatives. Reference is made to the EUR 40 million already committed under the 2016–
2017 work programme for Arctic related research and a further commitment is made to 
maintain current funding levels (around EUR 200 million in the past decade) under the 
Horizon 2020 programme (2014–2020). Funding for research and innovation activities is 
also to be provided by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), a central 
plank of the EU’s Arctic research efforts.
115   A Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee (JSTCC) established under the 
Agreement meets regularly to identify collaborative activities, tools and initiatives that 
facilitate international collaboration and to set strategic directions.
116   Under this Alliance, the ERA-CanII project (funded by the European Commission, the 
Government of Canada and coordinated by the Canadian Foundation for Innovation) 
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Research Station a world-class hub for scientific research by experts from 
around the world, it is highly likely that partnerships between Canadian and 
European scientists seeking “transnational access to research infrastructure 
and open data resources”117 will be enhanced.
As a prime example of convergence, both Canada and the EU favour simi-
lar approaches for the effective protection of the Arctic’s marine biodiversity 
and ecosystems.118 The 2016 EU policy endorses the Arctic coastal states’ July 
2015 “Declaration concerning the prevention of unregulated high seas fish-
ing in the Central Arctic Ocean” and recognizes the need for better scientific 
knowledge of the Arctic Ocean before commercial fisheries can begin. The 
Joint Communication does, however, specifically refer to the international 
status of the waters and encourages the consideration of appropriate inter-
national measures, such as the creation of a Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (RFMO) for the Arctic and/or the adoption of a Regional Sea 
Convention. Negotiations are currently underway to transform the 2015 
Arctic fishing moratorium into a binding agreement and those negotiations 
have been broadened so as to involve other major fishing nations, includ-
ing the EU.119 Furthermore, the Arctic Council Task Force on Arctic Marine 
facilitates the sharing of information and fosters interaction between the European and 
Canadian research communities. For example, the ERA-Can II project hosted a Can-US-
EU Symposium in September 2013 with the Canadian Embassy in Rome on “fostering 
transatlantic collaboration for the development and use of Arctic and marine research 
infrastructure.” See the final report at <https://ec.europa.eu/research/infrastructures/
pdf/Rome%20Symposium%20Final%20Report.pdf>. The Alliance launched their second 
project to map the ocean seabed between Halifax, Nova Scotia and Tromsø, Norway, in 
2015. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, ‘Canada, U.S. and European Union 
Partners Complete Second Project under the Galway Statement’ (Government of Canada, 
25 August 2015) <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/infocus-alaune/2015/galway/index-
eng.htm> accessed 24 October 2016.
117   JOIN (2016) 21, 6.
118   For background, see David VanderZwaag, Timo Koivurova, and Erik J. Molenaar, ‘Canada, 
the EU and Arctic Ocean Governance: A Tangled and Shifting Seascape and Future 
Directions’ (2009) 18 (2) Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 247–87.
119   Canada, China, Denmark, the EU, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Russia and the 
US met in Washington in April 2016 to discuss plans to prohibit commercial fishing in 
the Central Arctic Ocean until scientists can learn more about the fish stocks and how 
they are changing. Hannah Hoag reports that “policy talks are discussing three different 
possible approaches: modifying the signed declaration to include other nations in a non-
binding agreement; drafting a new binding international agreement; and negotiating 
the creation of a regional fisheries management organization.” According to the news 
report, “[b]oth the U.S. and Canada support a binding agreement on Arctic fisheries.” 
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Cooperation is currently assessing the need for a regional seas programme or 
other mechanism, as appropriate, for increased cooperation in Arctic marine 
areas.120 The EC Joint Communication also promotes the establishment of 
marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Arctic as essential tools for the preserva-
tion of Arctic biodiversity, which dovetails with PAME’s strategic priority to 
develop a “pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas to strengthen marine 
ecosystem resilience and contribute to human well-being, including tradition-
al ways of life.”121
A significant aspect of PAME’s approach to marine protected areas in the 
Arctic is its emphasis on areas of cultural significance and the explicit refer-
ence to the goal of enhancing the wellbeing of the Arctic’s inhabitants and 
fostering traditional ways of life. The idea that environmental protection must 
not be considered in a vacuum, distinct and separate from the lives of the peo-
ples of the Arctic, also lies at the heart of Canada’s policy for its northernmost 
regions. Under the “Protecting our Environmental Heritage” pillar, Canada’s 
two key priorities for the International Polar Year are identified: climate 
change impacts and adaptation; and, significantly, the health and wellbeing 
of Northerners and Northern communities. The Northern Strategy emphasizes 
that “Aboriginal people and Northerners played a significant role in the plan-
ning, coordination and implementation of the IPY and were actively engaged 
in science and research activities.” Government programmes, funding bodies 
and researchers continue to tap into the traditional knowledge and expertise 
of the Arctic’s Indigenous inhabitants.
The idea that Northerners must have a meaningful role in shaping the 
future of the Arctic region transcends each of the individual pillars of Canada’s 
Northern Strategy and is highlighted in recent EU policy statements as well. 
Under the “Sovereignty” pillar, for instance, Canada’s strategy acknowledges 
Hannah Hoag, “Nations Negotiate Fishing in Arctic High Seas,” News Deeply, 28 April 2016, 
<https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/articles/2016/04/28/nations-negotiate-fishing-in 
-arctic-high-seas> accessed 24 November 2016. A second round of negotiations will be 
held in Iqaluit, Nunavut in July 2016.
120   Arctic Council, ‘Interviews with co-chairs of the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation’ 
(Arctic Deeply, 29 October 2015) <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/ 
8-news-and-events/369-tfamc-co-chairs-interviews> accessed 24 October 2016.
121   PAME, Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) 2015–25, Strategic Action 7.2.10 <http://www 
.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSP/AMSP_2015-2025.pdf> accessed 24 November 2016. 
Annex 4 to the AMSP provides detailed information on existing and planned MPAs in 
the Arctic EEZs of Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States and attests to the progress that has been achieved. The table “Existing MPAs” 
reveals that Canada has five MPAs covering 29,892 km2 of its Arctic EEZ.
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that “Northerners have an important role to play in shaping regional priori-
ties and actions.” Under the “Promoting Social and Economic Development” 
pillar, the Canadian policy insists that “Northerners participate in and benefit 
from development” in the North.122 The Northern Strategy also recognizes 
the rights and political influence of Indigenous peoples within the Canadian 
political and legal system, pledging to continue to pursue the most innovative 
and consultative approaches for Northern governance. For its part, the EU’s 
recent policy devotes two paragraphs to the need for meaningful consultation 
and participation under the heading “Dialogue with Arctic indigenous peo-
ples.” The opening sentence is perhaps the most critical, committing the EU to 
“continue to engage” with Arctic Indigenous peoples and local communities 
to ensure that “their views and rights are respected and promoted in the ongo-
ing development of EU policies affecting the Arctic.”123 This emphasis hopes 
to dispel lingering distrust stemming from the EU ban on the trade in seal 
products—the most obvious and politically contentious example of divergent 
Canada-EU interests.
Sealing is a way of life and an important source of food and income for 
Canadian Inuit and for thousands of Canadian families in remote coastal com-
munities.124 Although Canada insists that its seal harvest is lawful, sustainable, 
humane and strictly regulated,125 the EU adopted a general ban on the impor-
tation and sale of seal products in 2009 in response to popular concerns about 
the methods used to kill seals. Under this EU regulation, seal products can be 
122   Canada’s Northern Strategy, 7–8.
123   JOIN (2016) 21, 15.
124   See, for example, Seals & Nunavut: Our Tradition, Our Future (Nunavut Tunngavik, Ottawa 
1999). See also comments by Jon Burgwald on behalf of Greenpeace Nordic via a blog-
post on 21 January 2016: ‘Indigenous communities have shown time and again that they 
understand how to protect the Arctic ecosystem they call home, and their hunting prac-
tices have never been a threat to seal or whale populations … They hunt because it is a 
crucial way to sustain themselves and their families in the harsh Arctic environment’. 
Available at <http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/blog/Blogentry/where-does-green-
peace-stand-on-seal-hunting/blog/55360/> accessed 24 October 2016.
125   The methods used by Canadian sealers and prescribed in Canada’s Marine Mammal 
Regulations are based in part on the recommendations of the Independent Veterinarians 
Working Group (2005) and are consistent with the conclusions of the EU’s European 
Food Safety Authority report released in 2007. Canada maintains that its enforcement 
of the regulations is thorough, comprehensive, and ensures adherence to catch require-
ments, licence conditions, and humane harvesting practices. Canada, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ‘Questions & Answers: Canada’s World Trade 
Organization Dispute on the European Union Seal Ban—Public Release of Final Report’ 
25 November 2013.
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placed on the EU market only if a “recognized body” attests that the products 
result from hunts conducted traditionally by Inuit and other Indigenous com-
munities or from hunts conducted for the sole purpose of sustainable man-
agement of marine resources on a non-systematic, not-for-profit basis.126 This 
appears to accommodate Indigenous rights, but the actual requirements for 
Canadian seal products to qualify under the Inuit exemption were unclear 
and Canadian Inuit groups forcefully argued that the European Economic 
Community’s 1983 ban on harp seal pup skins (which allowed Inuit-derived 
products while banning all others) proved how a general ban effectively 
destroys the market for all seal products.127
Subsequent legal processes, which pitted public morality against the human 
rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples, widened the divide between the two sides. 
By provoking strong Inuit statements against the EU’s alleged disregard for the 
rights and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, the dispute forced 
Canada to not only challenge the myths and misinformation that underlay 
the European position but also to mount legal challenges against what it con-
sidered to be an unfair law.128 When attempts to resolve the issue bilaterally 
126   The import of seal products for personal use by travellers and in small quantities is 
also permitted. Notably, seal products from Canada’s east coast commercial seal fish-
ery would not qualify under either of the exemptions. European Parliament, Regulation 
(EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
on trade in seal products, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/november/ 
tradoc_145264.pdf> accessed 24 November 2016. It should be noted that amendments to 
the 2009 EU seal Regulation which came into effect on 18 October 2015 have eliminated 
the marine resource management exemption.
127   Government of Canada, ‘Seals: Canada’s Seal Hunt’ (Government of Canada, last modi-
fied 25 March 2013) <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/
seals-phoques.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 26 October 2016; and Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee, ‘The Anti-sealing Campaign’ (1986) 14 (2) Northern Perspectives <http://www 
.carc.org/pubs/v14no2/2.htm> accessed 26 October 2016. Implementing the necessary 
certification structures and procedures to meet the requirements of the Inuit exemption 
under the 2009 EU ban were expected to cost more than the possible export revenues 
generated in the long term.
128   For background on the case, see Peter Fitzgerald, ‘Morality’ May Not Be Enough to Justify 
the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law’ (2011) 14 (1) 
Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 85–136; Nicolas Sellheim, ‘The goals of the 
EU seal products trade regulation: From effectiveness to consequence’ (2015) 51 (3) Polar 
Record 274–289; Kamrul Hossain, ‘The EU ban on the import of seal products and the 
WTO regulations: neglected human rights of the Arctic indigenous peoples?’ (2013) 49 
(2) Polar Record 154–166; Tamara Perišin, ‘Is the EU seal products regulation a sealed 
deal? EU and WTO challenges’ (2013) 62 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
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failed, Canada and Norway challenged the EU seal ban through World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute mechanisms129 and Inuit groups also ques-
tioned the legality of the ban under European Union laws.130 Although the EU 
defended its position, the legal battle with Canada elicited divergent perspec-
tives within the Union about whether to insist that Canada withdraw its chal-
lenge before concluding a Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA).131
373–405; Xinjie Luan and Julien Chaisse, ‘Preliminary Comments on the WTO Seals 
Products Dispute: Traditional Hunting, Public Morals and Technical Barriers to Trade’ 
(2011) 22 Colorado Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 79–121; and Sellheim, ‘The ne-
glected tradition?–The genesis of the EU seal products trade ban and commercial sealing’ 
(2013) 5 (1) Yearbook of Polar Law 417–450.
129   Following consultations between Canada, Iceland, Norway, the European Communities 
and European Union, Canada requested the establishment of a panel under the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in February 2011. Its final report was circulated to 
WTO Members on 25 November 2013 and found that the European Union’s ban on im-
ports of Canadian seal products indeed violates its international trade obligations and 
confirmed that the EU ban is discriminatory and treats Canadian seal products unfairly, 
but the panel also decided that such a ban can be justified due to some of the public’s con-
cerns regarding seal harvesting. Canada and Norway appealed the report on 24 January 
2014 and the Appellate Body issued its final ruling on 22 May 2014.
130   Separately, Inuit and affiliated groups (including the Inuit Circumpolar Council and Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami) filed applications at the European General Court for the annulment of 
the EU seal ban. The Court dismissed the first application as inadmissible in September 
2011. In April 2013, the Court dismissed the second application on the basis that the “basic 
regulation is intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market by laying down harmonising rules for the placing on the market 
of seal products.” On 3 September 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union dis-
missed an appeal of the earlier decisions. See Court of Justice of the European Union, 
Press Release No. 93/15, ‘The Court of Justice confirms the validity of the regulation on 
trade in seal products’, (3 September 2015), <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2015-09/cp150093en.pdf> accessed 29 October 2016. The CJEU identified 
three technical legal grounds as justifying its dismissal and also ruled that “Article 19 of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which encourages 
members of the United Nations to obtain prior consent of those peoples before adopt-
ing or implementing measures that affect them, does not, in itself, have binding legal 
force.” For a succinct summary of Inuit concerns, see Mary Simon, ‘Speech: The European 
Union, Canada, and the Arctic: Challenges of International Governance’ (23 September 
2011) <https://www.itk.ca/media/speech/european-union-canada-and-arctic-challenges-
international-governance> accessed 29 October 2016.
131   In June 2011, the European Parliament approved a resolution that expressed its strong 
hope that Canada would withdraw its challenge against the seal ban before a Canada–EU 
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The seal dispute had a direct bearing on Canadian and Permanent 
Participant support for the EU’s application for accredited observer status at 
the Arctic Council. While the EU had been an ad hoc observer since 1998 (origi-
nally as the European Community),132 the European Commission formally 
applied to become a “permanent observer” in 2008 and its policy released that 
year identified this as an immediate priority.133 The prolonged Arctic Council 
deliberations on observer applications have been documented elsewhere, 
with recent scholarship confirming that Canada and Russia harboured deep 
reservations about the EU’s application. In Canada’s case, Inuit groups strongly 
urged the government to oppose it.134 “As long as [the] European Union doesn’t 
have the required sensitivity to the needs of northerners,” Canadian Foreign 
Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon asserted in 2009, “I see no reason why they 
should be […] a permanent observer on the Arctic Council.”135 Accordingly, 
when the Arctic Member States and Permanent Participants considered four-
teen applications for observer status at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in 
May 2013, the Arctic Council “received the application of the EU for observer 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was ratified. Ashey Fitzpatrick, 
‘Seal hunt under fire again at European parliament’ The Telegram (St. John’s, 8 June 2011). 
That October, about 100 of the 735 members of the European Parliament signed an open 
letter condemning the Canadian seal hunt and advocating against supporting a CETA until 
Canada withdrew its WTO seal challenge <http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/hsi_canada_ 
meps_101711.pdf> accessed 24 November 2016. By contrast, the European Commission 
appeared to agree with Canada that the CETA negotiations and the WTO challenge were 
two separate issues. This distinction was clarified in discussions following Lackenbauer’s 
presentation to Members of European Parliament on “Canada’s Northern Strategy: 
Convergence or Divergence with EU Interests?” in Brussels, Belgium, on 23 March 2015.
132   J. Wouters et al., ‘The EU and International Organizations’ in Michael Smith, Stephan 
Keukeleire, and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds), The Diplomatic System of the European 
Union: Evolution, Change and Challenges (Routledge, London 2016) 103.
133   COM (2008) 763, 9.
134   See, for example, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., ‘NTI Urges Canada to Deny the European 
Union’s Application’ (Nunavut Tunngavik, 25 April 2013) <https://www.tunngavik 
.com/blog/news/nti-urges-canada-to-deny-the-european-unions-application/> accessed 
October 26 2016. “The EU has demonstrated repeatedly that it does not support Canada’s 
sustainable use of renewable resources,” NTI President Cathy Towtongie stated. “The EU 
demonstrated this through its actions on Canada’s seal hunt and its recent lack of support 
at CITES on the polar bear harvest.”
135   Cannon quoted in CBC News, ‘Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of 
seal trade ban’ (CBC News, 29 April 2009) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/ 
canada-against-eu-entry-to-arctic-council-because-of-seal-trade-ban-1.806188> accessed 
26 October 2016.
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status affirmatively” but deferred a final decision on implementation until 
the Council ministers agreed by consensus that all of the concerns of Council 
members regarding the EU application were resolved.136 For Canada and vari-
ous Indigenous groups, this equated to finding specific ways to address well-
established concerns about the EU seal product import ban.
Since that time, the EU has repeatedly affirmed its clear intent to respect 
Indigenous interests and rights, and has sought regular dialogue with 
Permanent Participants to improve mutual understanding—without conced-
ing on the seal issue. Prior to the final ruling of the WTO Appellate court in 
May 2014 (which upheld the previous ruling that the EU seal ban was “neces-
sary to protect public morals”),137 the European Parliament passed a resolution 
acknowledging “the wish of the inhabitants and governments of the Arctic 
region with sovereign rights and responsibilities to continue to pursue sustain-
able economic development while at the same time protecting the traditional 
sources of the Indigenous peoples’ livelihood and the very sensitive nature 
of the Arctic ecosystems.”138 The EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on 
“Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region,” adopted 
on 12 May 2014, called on the EU to explore “appropriate ways of ensuring that 
the representatives of Arctic Indigenous peoples are informed and consulted 
on EU policies that may affect them.” It also urged Canada to use the current 
136   In the meantime, the decision noted that the EU could continue to observe Council 
proceedings.
137   The WTO Panel and Appellate Body both rejected the claims of Canada and Norway 
against the ban itself. They accepted that the ban pursued a legitimate objective (pub-
lic moral concerns on seal welfare) and was not more trade restrictive than necessary. 
However, as noted by the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, “the 
Appellate Body found that there was a de facto violation of the most-favoured nation 
treatment obligation (Article 1 GATT) because seal products derived from Greenland 
were treated more favourably than seal products from Canada through the exception 
for products derived from Inuit hunts. It found that this difference in treatment could 
in principle be justified under the exception of GATT (Article XX) for public morals but 
found that the EU had failed to design the legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimina-
tion and should have made more efforts to encourage Canadian Inuit to use the excep-
tion.” European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, ‘WT/DS400—European 
Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products’ 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=475&code=2> accessed 29 October 
2016. For a summary of the key legal findings in the case, see EC-Seal Products (DS400, 
401), available at <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/
ds400sum_e.pdf>, accessed 29 October 2016.
138   European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic’ 
(12 March 2014) 2013/2595(RSP) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=
TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0236> accessed 29 October 2016.
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positive momentum in EU-Canada relations to help resolve the remaining 
issue so as to allow for the full implementation of the Kiruna decision regard-
ing the EU’s observer status as soon as possible before the next EU/Canada 
summit.”139 The remaining issue, not mentioned by name, was the seal ban.
The WTO ruling, coupled with the necessity for consensus support in the 
Arctic Council for the EU to gain full observer status, encouraged both sides 
to broker an agreement to overcome the political imbroglio. For the EU, 
this meant ensuring Canadian Indigenous peoples were treated the same 
as any other Indigenous communities seeking access for their seal products 
in markets within the EU. Along these lines, the “Joint Statement by Canada 
and the European Union on Access to the European Union of Seal Products 
from Indigenous Communities of Canada,” released in August 2014, set out 
“the framework for cooperation to enable access to the European Union of 
seal products that result from hunts traditionally conducted by Canadian 
Indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence.” Under 
this agreement, both sides reinforced “the importance of preserving the tradi-
tional way of life of indigenous communities” and pledged to:
 • pursue discussions on possible participation by Canadian partners in the 
new European Union Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme;
 • explore possibilities for supporting indigenous communities and traditional 
ways of life through capacity building and exchange of best practices;
 • explore how indigenous communities can benefit from the new opportu-
nities to be opened up by the Canada-European Union Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement, to develop their economic, social, and 
environmental potential;
 • explore how bilateral European Union-Canada research cooperation, 
including the incorporation of traditional knowledge, can bring benefits 
relevant to indigenous communities;
 • identify other areas of mutual interest where exchange of expertise and 
dialogue could benefit indigenous communities, including the marketing of 
traditional products; and,
139   Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, ‘Council conclusions 
on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region’ (12 May 2014) <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142554.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2016. Paragraph 14 further invites the European Commission to 
ensure that EU programs relevant to the Arctic under the EU’s 2014–2020 multi-annual 
financial framework “meet the development needs of local populations and offer bet-
ter opportunities for circumpolar cooperation and research as well as Arctic economic 
development.”
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 • continue to engage in regular dialogue with representatives of indigenous 
communities, with a view to increasing mutual understanding.140
In its decision on the Joint Statement, the European Commission noted that, in 
return, Canada had agreed to “lift its reservations concerning the EU’s observer 
status in the Arctic Council.”141
Since 2014, progress has been made on implementing this agreement142 and 
the EU continues to emphasize the importance of substantive dialogue with 
Arctic Indigenous peoples. Its 2016 policy expresses a clear commitment to 
“engage with Arctic indigenous peoples and local communities to ensure that 
their views and rights are respected and promoted in the ongoing develop-
ment of EU policies affecting the Arctic.”143 The annual EU Arctic Indigenous 
Peoples Dialogue meetings between the European Commission and represen-
tatives of Arctic Indigenous peoples, held since 2013 to exchange views and 
agree on areas for further cooperation, have been helpful in building trust 
and mutual understanding. The Joint Communication also urges the EU to 
continue to work “on advancing consistency between the EU’s internal and 
external policy towards indigenous peoples.”144 For Inuit, who depend on the 
harvest of sea mammals to provide a livelihood for their families and to main-
tain their culture and quality of life, this commitment may be tested if a long-
standing debate reignites over the commercial trade in polar bears.
Canadian Inuit do not support the US proposal to transfer the polar bear 
from Appendix II to Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade 
140   See Annex 1: ‘Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union on Access to the Euro-
pean Union of Seal Products from Indigenous Communities of Canada’ to the European 
Commission Decision, (2014), C(2014) 5881 final <http://eeas.europa.eu/canada/docs/
joint_statement_c_2014_5881_f1_annex_en.pdf> accessed 29 October 2016.
141   European Commission Decision on the Joint Statement by Canada and the European 
Union on Access to the European Union of Seal Products from Indigenous Communities 
of Canada, 18 August 2014, C(2014) 5881, <http://www.embassynews.ca/sites/embassy 
news.ca/files/Commission-Decision-Joint-Statement.pdf> This page is no longer avail-
able, copy on file with the authors.
142   In July 2015, the EU formally approved the Government of Nunavut as a Recognized Body 
under the Indigenous Communities Exemption of the EU Seal Regime, meaning that the 
latter would be able to certify sealskins as having been harvested according to the rules 
of the exemption. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, ‘Government of Canada Congratulates 
the Government of Nunavut on Important Step to Securing Access to European Markets 
for Seal Products’ (Government of Canada, 31 July 2015) <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en 
.do?nid=1014449> accessed 26 October 2016.
143   JOIN (2016) 21,15. Emphasis in the original.
144   Ibid.
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in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES]145, which would 
ban all commercial trade. Canada’s national Inuit organization, Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami (ITK), maintains that the species does not meet the criteria for an 
Appendix I listing: the polar bear is well-managed, and the hunt remains within 
sustainable levels and does not pose an existential threat to the species.146 The 
EU, which votes as a block registering 28 votes, helped defeat the US proposal 
in March 2010. The US resubmitted its proposal at the 16th CITES Conference 
of the Parties [CoP16] in March 2013, and without EU support it once again 
failed to garner the required two-thirds majority. The EU’s action on this oc-
casion, however, simply reflected a lack of consensus among the European 
Member States, with the EU tabling an alternative proposal at the same meet-
ing to keep the polar bear in Appendix II but with export limits for each man-
agement unit in Canada and providing for a review of trade impacts by CITES 
to identify further actions. The EU alternative proposal also failed to achieve 
a two-third majority and was rejected; the polar bear thus remains listed under 
Appendix II and the controlled trade of polar bear parts has been maintained. 
Although no proposal to uplist polar bears was submitted to the CITES CoP17 
in South Africa in October 2016,147 the issue may resurface in the future.
Future trends are inherently speculative, but it is appropriate to conclude 
that EU policies have moved into closer alignment with those of Canada, and 
vice versa (particularly on issues of climate change mitigation and sustainable 
energy development). While the European Parliament’s past messaging raised 
145   Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243.
146   According to the ITK fact sheet, not only have polar bear numbers not significantly 
declined but rather there has been a significant increase over the past forty years with 
the population currently estimated at 20,000–25,000 individuals. Canada is home to 
65% of the world polar bear population and only 2% of that population, roughly 300 
animals, enter the market each year. And within the Canadian Arctic, polar bear hunt-
ing quotas and tags are allocated exclusively to Inuit communities. See ITK, ‘Polar Bears, 
Harvesting and Inuit’ (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) <https://www.itk.ca/about-itk/dept-envi 
ronment-and-wildlife/polar-bears/polar-bears-harvesting-and-inuit> accessed 29 October 
2016. On Canada’s conservation measures regarding polar bears, see Environment and 
Climate Change Canada, ‘Conservation of Polar Bears in Canada’ (Environment Canada, 
2012) <https://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/14C22559–9427–4476–9D85E783E03106B8/Con 
servationOfPolarBearInCanada.pdf> accessed 26 October 2016.
147   See Makivik Corp., ‘Makivik Congratulates Fellow Canadian Inuit on Continued Polar 
Bear Trade’ (Makivik Corporation, 2 May 2016) <http://www.makivik.org/inuit-continued-
polar-bear-trade/> accessed 26 October 2016; Sima Sahar Zerehi,’ Inuit applaud U.S. deci-
sion not to push polar bear trade restrictions’ (CBC News, 3 May 2016) <http://www.cbc 
.ca/news/canada/north/inuit-applaud-us-decision-polar-bear-trade-1.3562940> accessed 
26 October 2016;
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legitimate concerns in Canada about the EU’s grasp of circumpolar governance, 
sovereign rights, and Indigneous peoples, the recent Joint Statement reveals 
a nuanced and mature appreciation of circumpolar affairs. In response, Timo 
Koivurova recently noted, “the time has come for Arctic states to understand 
the European Union and acknowledge its investments in research, develop-
ment, and education in the region, and its contribution to Arctic governance. 
It should be formally accepted as an observer to the Arctic Council.”148 Canada 
agrees, with outgoing Arctic Council chair Leona Aglukkaq unambiguously 
stating in April 2015 that “Canada supports the EU application for full observer-
ship [sic].”149 Although the Arctic Council again deferred its final  decision on 
the EU’s application at the Iqaluit Ministerial that month, this was a  reflection 
of the frosty relations with Russia since the EU imposed sanctions on that 
country in September 2014 over the Ukraine crisis. In short, Canada is no lon-
ger a primary roadblock to EU Arctic aspirations and, in areas of common in-
terest, is likely to become a more enthusiastic partner.
7 Conclusions
The popular media and academic literature typically depicts the Canadian-EU 
Arctic relationship as confrontational. This narrative is largely unjustified or, 
at the very least, reflects insufficiently nuanced understandings of both par-
ties’ motives and aspirations. It is our hope that such unflattering and harsh 
assessments have now been laid to rest. Indeed, the Joint Declaration signed 
on 26 September 2014 by Prime Minister Harper, European Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso and European Council President Herman 
Van Rompuy to celebrate the end of negotiations of the Canada-European 
Union Trade Agreement seems to portend a new era of cooperation and mu-
tual understanding:
We, the leaders of Canada and the European Union … are committed to 
strengthening and deepening our strategic partnership that builds on our 
shared history and values. We reaffirmed our commitment to contribut-
ing to our mutual prosperity through our continued cooperation.
148   Timo Koivurova, ‘The EU in the Arctic: Correcting Misconceptions’ (Arctic Deeply, 
29 February 2016), <https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/op-eds/2016/02/29/the-eu-in 
-the-arctic-correcting-misconceptions> accessed 26 October 2016.
149   Quoted in Lily Haines, ‘EU bid to become Arctic Council observer deferred again’ (Barents 
Observer, 4 May 2015) <http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/eu-bid-become 
-arctic-council-observer-deferred-again-04-05> accessed 26 October 2016.
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We welcome the deepening ties in Arctic cooperation, including through 
the Arctic Council. The EU and Canada are strategic partners in the field 
of research and innovation … This Ottawa Summit has given renewed 
voice and vision to our partnership, and has positioned us to work more 
closely and effectively together across a range of priority areas, for the 
prosperity and security of our peoples, and the global community.150
Although Canada and the EU have displayed strong differences on several 
Arctic issues and policy areas over the last decade, we suggest that recent 
political and policy trajectories point to increasing policy convergence related 
to the region. Our overview of the main tenets of Canada’s integrated Northern 
Strategy suggests a fairly consistent approach to Arctic affairs that reflects par-
ticular views about sovereignty, security, indigenous rights, economic develop-
ment, environmental protection, and governance borne of its historical and 
contemporary experiences. Bringing Canada’s interests into dialogue with EU 
Arctic policy, particularly the integrated policy released in April 2016, helps to 
counter the pervasive perception of conflicting agendas writ large.
The EU’s 2016 Arctic policy notes that “sustainable development faces spe-
cific challenges in the Arctic region.” Although this statement applies across the 
circumpolar Arctic, on this particular theme the EU seems reticent to project a 
vision for the region as a whole. Instead, it refers repeatedly to “the European 
part of the Arctic,” with little to no reference to the North American Arctic 
(apart from Greenland).151 While this avoids criticism from Canadians that the 
EU is seeking to impose a European view of development on the circumpo-
lar world as a whole, it also entrenches the idea that the ideal of “One Arctic” 
(enunciated by both the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the U.S. Arctic Council 
chairmanship for 2015–17) must be supplemented by regional variations that 
reflect multiple Arctics. In Canada’s case, criticisms that its Arctic agenda is 
relentlessly domestic or North American in its assumptions and priorities also 
suggest the need to articulate and promote a more holistic, comprehensive 
view to address truly circumpolar challenges. Although some diverging inter-
ests, as well as competing interpretations of relevant rules, may be inevitable, 
we contend that these legitimate points of policy friction need not hinder 
Canadian-EU collaboration in the Arctic, particularly around the priority areas 
of climate change and environmental safeguards, science and technology, sus-
tainable development, and international cooperation more broadly. 
150   Available on the website of the Government of Canada, available at <http://news.gc.ca/
web/article-en.do?nid=888399>. Emphasis added.
151   JOIN (2016) 21, 8–13.
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CHAPTER 7
Russian Arctic Policy, Petroleum Resources 
Development and the EU: Cooperation or 
Coming Confrontation?
Tina Hunter
1 Introduction
The Arctic is a place of immense natural resource wealth, both onshore and 
offshore.1 Yet it is also an environment with extreme conditions, therefore pre-
senting particular challenges to the development of the resources, especially 
offshore oil and gas resources.2 Whilst the melting of the Arctic sea ice poses a 
significant opportunity for the development of these resources (and the focus at 
present is the offshore oil and gas resources), the technical and environmental 
aspects of an operation, combined with the high costs, make such exploitation 
of resources difficult. However, as sea ice recedes, and technologies improve, 
there has never been a more opportune time to develop such resources. Such 
a coalescence of conditions has meant that some of the Arctic States,3 as well 
as other States with an interest in these vast resources,4 are seeking to de-
velop them and advance national interests. In particular, the exploration of 
* Tina Hunter, Professor, School of Law, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom.
1   The USEIA estimates that the Arctic holds 22% of the World’s undiscovered oil and gas 
wealth. Peter Stauffer, ‘US Geological Survey (USGS) Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: 
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle’ <http://library.arcticportal 
.org/1554/> accessed 5 October 2015.
2   Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic, ‘Developing Oil and Gas Resources in 
Arctic Waters: The Final Frontier? (factsheet)’ (2014) <http://www.arcticinfo.eu/images/
Facksheet/Factsheets_Final/oil_and_gas_factsheet.pdf> accessed 10 August 2016.
3   The Arctic States include the Arctic coastal States, (Russia, Norway, Greenland (and there-
fore Denmark), the United States and Canada), Iceland (whose EEZ extends into the Arctic 
Ocean), as well as the non-coastal Arctic States of Iceland, Sweden, and Finland.
4   In particular a number of major Asian States, including China, Japan and South Korea) have 
exhibited a huge interest in arctic (and Antarctic) resources. In addition, China has become 
an observer to the Arctic Council. For Asian nation’s interest in the Arctic see Sanna Kopra, 
‘China’s Arctic Interests’ (2013) Arctic Yearbook 107–124; Fujio Ohnishi, ‘Does the sun also rise 
in the Arctic? Three pillars of Japan’s Arctic Economy (2015) Arctic Yearbook, 410–412.
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abundant Arctic petroleum resources (oil and gas) has been on the agenda of 
Arctic States,5 giving rise to a perception of intense competition for petroleum 
resources of the Arctic.
To date there has already been some development of the mineral and petro-
leum resources. Regarding petroleum development, which is the focus of this 
chapter, the Snøhvit gas field and Goliat oil field in the Norwegian sector of the 
Barents Sea are operational. In the Russian Arctic the Yamal gas field, where  its 
LNG terminal is under development, while the Prirazlomnoye oil field in the 
Pechora Sea is operational. There are also vast known, but as yet undeveloped 
petroleum resources in the western Russian Arctic, led by the mega Shtokman 
gas field in the Kara Sea. Russia sees its economic future tied to the Arctic, In 
an interview in September 2016, First Deputy foreign Minister Vladimir Titov 
noted that the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation accounts for over 15% of 
Russia’s GDP, and 20% of its exports, with this expected to rise.6
As part of this rush to harness the Arctic petroleum resources, there is a 
perception that there has been an overt drive by the Russian Federation to 
remilitarize their Arctic areas in order to drive the resource exploitation in 
the Arctic.7 Such militarization has been met with varied reception in the 
media, with headlines ranging from “Russia is Wrapping the Arctic in a Loving, 
Militarized Embrace”,8 and “Russia Prepares Militarization of Arctic Ocean 
after Huge Oil and Natural Gas Strike”,9 to the fearful headline of Defensetech 
which proclaims “Russia’s Arctic Militarization ‘Disturbing’, US lawmakers 
5   For example, on 21 September 2016 Greenland released a second round of licenses, located 
onshore at Disko and Nuussuaq, See Greenland opens second onshore licensing round (2016) 
Arctic Journal, October 4, 2016, <http://arcticjournal.com/oil-minerals/2583/greenland 
-opens-second-onshore-licensing-round> accessed 29 November 2016.
6   First Deputy foreign Minister Vladimir titov’s interview with the ITAR-TASS news agency, 
September 19, 2016 http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonk 
JE02Bw/content/id/2450934.
7   A. Scherbinin, E. Danilova, A. Sentsov, L. Bolsunovskaya and Y. Bolsunovskaya, The Russian 
Arctic: innovative possibilities at the turn of the past and the future (2015) 27 IOP Science 
Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science.
8   John Dyer, ‘Russia Is Wrapping the Arctic in a Loving, Militarized Embrace’ (Vice News, 
22 October 2015) <https://news.vice.com/article/russia-is-wrapping-the-arctic-in-a-loving 
-militarized-embrace> accessed 16 August 2016.
9   Geoffrey Grider, ‘Russia Prepares militarization of Arctic Ocean after huge oil and natural 
gas strike’ (2014) Now The End Begins <http://www.nowtheendbegins.com/russia-prepares 
-militarization-arctic-ocean-huge-oil-natural-gas-strike/> accessed 29 February 2016.
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say”.10 These headlines, just a minute sample of the multitude of headlines that 
have occurred in the last few years, demonstrate the wildly varied responses to 
Russian sovereign military actions the Russian Arctic territory. These headlines 
have a partial ring of truth, insofar as they describe the return of a large mili-
tary presence along the breadth of the Russian Arctic. However, given that the 
focus of this chapter is on the EU and its relationship with Russia in the Arctic 
region, a consideration of Russian militarisation and the impacts of such mili-
tarisation will be confined to the European Arctic, defined in the EU Strategic 
Assessment of Development in the Arctic as ‘a region extending from Greenland 
to northwest Russia’ and incorporating the Greenland Sea, the Norwegian Sea 
and the Barents Sea.11
Military activities in the Russian Arctic have been largely confined to the 
establishment or reinvigoration of the Arctic naval bases and power,12 as out-
lined in the 2015 Russian Marine Doctrine.13 In this Doctrine,14 Russia seeks to 
regain its status as a blue water force15 through a large-scale development of 
its Navy. The declaration of such expansion and reinvigoration of the Russian 
navy has been analysed by think tanks in Russia and the US, with the US think 
tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies concluding that such actions 
mean that the Russia is undertaking a period of aggression and conflict in 
the Arctic region. Further, the CSIS concludes that Russian military buildup 
and exercises in the region “are obviously not just about economics or safety 
but indicate a potentially dangerous attempt to return to cold War parity in the 
10   Kris Osborn, ‘Russia’s Arctic Militarization “Disturbing,” US Lawmakers Say’ (Defenstech, 
12 March 2015) <http://www.defensetech.org/2015/03/12/russias-arctic-militarization 
-disturbing-us-lawmakers-say/> accessed 16 August 2016.
11   Adam Stepien, Timo Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää, ‘Strategic Assessment of Devel-
opment of the Arctic: Assessment Conducted for the EU’ (2014) 3 <http://www.arctic 
info.eu/images/pdf/SADA_report.pdf> accessed 10 August 2016.
12   Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin and Gleb Yarovoy, ‘Russian Strategies in the 
Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War’ (Valdai Club 2015) 36–40 <http://www.uarctic.org/
media/857300/arctic_eng.pdf> accessed 10 August 2016.
13   Russian Federation Marine Doctrine (2015) 26 July 2015. Meeting to discuss the new 
Russian Marine Strategy on board the frigate Admiral Gorshkov <http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/50060> accessed 12 December 2015; Russia Marine Doctrine to 
2020 <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/uAFi5nvux2twaqjftS5yrIZUVTJan77L 
.pdf> accessed 29 November 2016.
14   Amendments incorporated into the Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020 
<http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Russian_Maritime_Policy_2020.pdf> accessed 
16 August 2016.
15   Blue water force denotes a country with the naval capability to engage in deep-water mili-
tary operations.
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Arctic.”16 Other assessments of Russian military activity is perceived in a neu-
tral manner, with military presence logical given the large concentration of 
nuclear facilities in the region and the direct access it provides to both the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.17 Russian Arctic strategy is perceived as less ambi-
tious and aggressive, and more cooperative and realistic.18 Further, the Valdai 
Club sees that historical cooperative relationships between Russia and Norway 
(including the signing of the Barents Sea Agreement in 2010 and the agreement 
between Rosneft and Statoil for the joint development in the Barents Sea) are 
a good foundation for a strategic partnership between the two countries, based 
on cooperation rather than conflict.19
Whilst few authors reject the notion that Russia’s geo-economic and geo-
strategic ambitions in the Arctic are considerable, particularly in relation 
to petroleum resource development, there are two vastly opposing views of 
Russian military activity in the region. Is Russia an aggressive villain seeking 
to exploit its Arctic resources in an aggressive manner, or is it maintaining 
a collaborative and cooperative approach that has been previously demon-
strated, particularly in negotiations and agreements relating to Norway and 
the Barents Sea?
Whichever strategy Russia is undertaking in its resource development, the 
European Union (EU), as a neighbour and consumer of Arctic resources, has 
a vested interest in the Russian Arctic Region. This interest is demonstrated 
by the development of an EU policy towards the European Arctic.20 This raises 
the question which is the subject of this chapter: does EU Arctic policy and the 
Russian Arctic marine policy seek to implement the same broad objectives in 
relation to natural resources, and are these policies likely to encourage contin-
ued cooperation, or, as the US media would have you believe,21 the 2015 Russian 
16   Heather A Conley and Caroline Rohloff, ‘The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Research 
to the Arctic’ (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2015) 19.
17   Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy, n. 12 above, 15–6.
18   Ibid., 88.
19   Ibid., 36–40.
20   This refers to the area of the policy relating to resources and development of the European 
Arctic as a whole.
21   Especially in the US media. See for example John Dyer, ‘Russia is wrapping the Arctic 
in a loving, militarized embrace (2015) Vice News October 22, 2015 <https://news 
.vice.com/article/russia-is-wrapping-the-arctic-in-a-loving-militarized-embrace> accessed 
29 February 2016; Geoffrey Grider, ‘Russia Prepares militarization of Arctic Ocean after 
huge oil and natural gas strike’ (2014) Now The End Begins <http://www.nowtheendbegins 
.com/russia-prepares-militarization-arctic-ocean-huge-oil-natural-gas-strike/> accessed 
29 February 2016; Kris Osborn, ‘Russia’s Arctic Militarization ‘Disturbing’, US lawmakers 
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Arctic Marine Policy setting Russia on a course of conflict with other Arctic 
States? This chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of the EU and Russian 
policies in relation to petroleum resources in the Arctic. The purpose of this 
comparative analysis is to determine whether the policies have diverging in-
terests, thereby possibly driving Russia and the EU to conflict over the use and 
development of the Arctic, or whether the EU and Russia have common Arctic 
interests that may lead to cooperation in the Arctic region.
In order to undertake this comparative analysis, this chapter first considers 
EU Arctic policy in relation to resource development in the Arctic, focusing on 
petroleum resource development. It then undertakes an analysis of Russian 
Arctic strategy, examining general Russian marine policy as well as Arctic spe-
cific policy. Finally, through an analysis of the two policies and current Russian 
activity in the Arctic, this chapter will determine whether the policies are 
broadly similar, seeking to implement the same broad objectives, albeit for dif-
ferent motives: Russia as an Arctic State wishing to secure its natural resources, 
and the EU to access the natural resource bounty the Arctic has to offer the 
EU and its Member States.
2 The EU and the Arctic
2.1 EU Petroleum Interest in the Arctic
The EU has a special interest in the Arctic for a number of reasons. First, 
and perhaps foremost, the EU maintains an interest in the Arctic since three 
Member States (Sweden, Denmark and Finland), and two European Economic 
Areas (EEA) (Norway and Iceland) states lie within or have interests associated 
with the Arctic.
As noted in the introduction above, it is estimated that vast petroleum 
resources exist in the Arctic.22 These resources are of particular interest for the 
EU,23 given their proximity to European markets. Indeed, the EU is currently a 
major destination for goods and resources from the Arctic, with 24% of Arctic 
oil and gas output going to the EU countries. The development of Arctic oil and 
gas presents a number of challenges and opportunities for the EU economy.24 
Such opportunities include investment opportunities in the Arctic, coupled 
say’ (2015) Defensetech 12 March 2015 <http://www.defensetech.org/2015/03/12/russias 
-arctic-militarization-disturbing-us-lawmakers-say/> accessed 29 February 2016.
22   Stauffer, n. 1 above.
23   Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic, n. 2 above, 9.
24   Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic, n. 2 above.
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with the opportunity to undertake research and development in the techno-
logical and scientific sectors.25
2.2 EU Arctic Policy
Given that the Arctic region already plays an important role in the EU, and is 
likely to become increasingly important in the future, the EU has developed a 
policy towards, and strategic assessment of, the Arctic region. A discussion of 
both the policy and assessment, whilst addressing the global Arctic region, will 
be confined to the European Arctic26 within the confines of this chapter.
Given the emerging strategic and economic importance of the Arctic, an EU 
Arctic policy was first developed in 2008,27 calling for a united EU policy on 
the Arctic.28 The EU Arctic policy is built around three main policy objectives:
1) the promotion of the sustainable use of the resources;
2) the protection and preservation of the Arctic in unison with its popula-
tion; and
3) international cooperation.
2.2.1  Promotion of Sustainable Use of Resources
In the European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU Strategy for 
the Arctic, the EU acknowledged ‘the wish of the inhabitants and governments 
of the Arctic region with sovereign rights and responsibilities to pursue sus-
tainable economic development…’.29 Hence, the EU understands the reality of 
attempting to balance the inalienable sovereign right of a State to develop its 
resources with environmental protection. The recognition of a State’s sover-
eignty lies at the heart of the EU, and developing EU Arctic policy respects the 
right of any state to develop its resources.
25   Ibid., 9.
26   As defined in the EU Strategic Assessment of Development in the Arctic as ‘a region 
extending from Greenland to northwest Russia’ and incorporating the Greenland Sea, the 
Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. See n. 10 above.
27   European Commission Communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union 
and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763.
28   European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU Strategy for the Arctic 
(2013/2595RSP), para. 2.
29   European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU Strategy for the Arctic 
(2013/2595RSP), para. 42.
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Russia is home to the majority of the Arctic petroleum resources, holding 43 
of the 61 large hydrocarbon fields.30 These substantial resources clearly dem-
onstrate Russian primacy over the area, with these large deposits critical for 
the EU in the future. Norway holds one large Arctic oil field to date, that of 
Goliat. In addition, the European Arctic is rich in gas resources, including the 
giant Shtokman field in Russia, and the Snøhvit field on the Norwegian side of 
the Barents Sea.
The EU strategic assessment of development of the Arctic by Stepien, 
Koivurova and Kankaapää identified four main areas that need to be con-
sidered in the development of Arctic petroleum resources.31 These consider-
ations are environmental, social, economic, and political/governance issues, 
all of which are closely interlinked and cannot be considered in isolation from 
each other.32 The assessment also recognizes and reiterates that any devel-
opment of these resources will have impacts and consequences that will 
be unevenly distributed in the Arctic.33 However, the EU being a major en-
ergy market (importing more than EUR400 billion in oil and gas in 2012)34 
means that EU policy development is firmly focused on how the oil and gas 
resources of the Arctic region can be developed in a sustainable manner that 
minimises impact.35 As a frontrunner of global climate change mitigation ef-
forts, the EU also emphasizes the necessity of implementation of innovative 
solutions for the development of renewable energy in the Arctic.36
The Council of the EU notes the need for long-term resource policy 
developments in the Arctic States, including the Barents region, and seeks to 
pursue long-term partnerships and policy dialogues in order to secure access 
to raw materials and renewable natural resources.37 To that end, EU policy 
30   Philip Budzik, ‘Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential’ (US Energy Information Administra-
tion 2009) 4.
31   Stepien, Koivurova and Kankaanpää, n. 10 above, 78.
32   Ibid., 78–9.
33   Ibid.
34   Ibid., 81.
35   It is important to note that although the EU Arctic policy is focused on oil and gas 
resources in the Arctic, the EU has also developed policy towards use of more renew-
able energy and less dependence on oil and gas, cf. reduction of CO2 emissions in order 
to meet its energy needs. However, this chapter will retain a focus on Arctic oil and gas 
resources as part of the energy security mix.
36   European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU Strategy for the Arctic 
(2013/2595RSP), A37, A46.
37   Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Developing a European Union 
Policy Towards the Arctic Region’ (12 May 2014), para. 11.
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development is focused on innovative research and education in technology 
and the Arctic environment, and enhanced funding/investment frameworks 
for environmentally and socially responsible Arctic petroleum projects.38
The latest EU Arctic Policy development occurred in April 2016.39 In this 
2016 EU policy, the need for the sustainable development of the Arctic, 
including its valuable natural resources, was further enunciated, noting that 
the European Arctic has significant potential to support growth in the rest of 
Europe, although it will present some challenges.40 In the press release 
of the 2016 EU Policy, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European 
Commission noted that
a safe, sustainable and prosperous Arctic not only serves the 4 million 
people living there, our European Union and the rest of the world. It is a 
region of immense environmental, social, and economic importance to 
us all … the Arctic is also crucial in terms of regional and global security 
and a strategic component of our foreign policy.41
The EU also recognises that sustainable economic development of the natu-
ral resources of the Arctic creates specific challenges, primarily due to sparse 
populations and a lack of transport infrastructure.42 Such challenges are 
enhanced by an incomplete north-south traffic connection, and the need to 
strengthening Arctic transport links through trans-European networks. It is 
recognised that the strengthening of transport links for sustainable develop-
ment of Arctic natural resources will also require cooperation between EU and 
EEA member-states.43
It is likely that the Arctic will be one of the areas of the earth most affected 
by climate change,44 most dramatically demonstrated by the projection that 
the Arctic Ocean will become largely ice-free in summer within the next thirty 
38   Stepien, Koivurova and Kankaanpää n. 10 above, 85.
39   European Commission and The High Representative, ‘An integrated European Union 
policy for the Arctic’, Joint Communication, JOIN (2016) 21 final.
40   Ibid, 8–9.
41   European Commission, ‘A New Integrated EU Policy for the Arctic Adopted [press re-
lease]’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1539_en.htm> accessed 16 August 
2016.
42   JOIN (2016) 21, 8.
43   Ibid.
44   Ibid., 5.
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years.45 A dramatic change in the quantity and quality of ice has already estab-
lished a commercial shipping route through the Arctic, known as the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR).46 An analysis of the NSR transits identifies that although 
transit numbers are low, there has been a 1000% increase in the number of 
transits since 2009,47 signaling the future use of the area and the need for the 
development of a policy and strategy prior to the mainstream use of the NSR 
as a sea route.48
In view of such increasing shipping in the Arctic, including vessels carrying 
flags from EU Member States, the 2016 EU Policy recognizes that the EU should 
contribute to increased safety of navigation in the Arctic, particularly through 
innovative technologies, and the development of spatial and temporal moni-
toring tools to increase knowledge for the assessment of risks and the mitiga-
tion of identified risks.49
The governance of the NSR and the use of oceans within the Arctic are within 
the remit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS).50 
Article 234 of the UNCLOS, or so-called ‘Arctic clause’, allows States whose 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is ice-covered to ‘to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control 
of marine pollution from vessels.’51 Russia has made use of this clause by de-
veloping ‘most comprehensive’ regulations for the prevention, reduction and 
control of marine pollution.52 As the NSR lies mostly in the Russian internal 
waters and EEZ, it is these regulations that control the shipping on the route.53
2.2.2 International Cooperation
Given the EU reliance on and interest in the resources of the Arctic, EU policy 
recognizes the strategic importance of the Arctic, and identifies it as an area 
of successful international cooperation contributing to peace and security in 
45   Ibid., 2.
46   By the end of the 2014–15 season, transits across the northern sea route included bother 
internal transits (wholly within Russian Federation) as well as transits from the Barents 
Sea to the Bering Strait.
47   Transit numbers rose from 4 in 2009 to 40 in 2013 season.
48   Stepien, Koivurova and Kankaanpää, n. 10 above, 39.
49   JOIN (2016) 21,12.
50   United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (signed 10 December 1982, entered into 
force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).
51   Article 234, UNCLOS.
52   Stepien, Koivurova and Kankaanpää, n. 10 above, 46.
53   Brubaker R Douglas, ‘Straits in the Russian Arctic’ (2001) 32 (3) Ocean Development and 
International Law 263.
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the region.54 Thus, there has been an ongoing development and commitment 
to an EU Arctic policy.
The EU seeks to engage more with Arctic partners in order to address com-
mon challenges in a collaborative manner.55 It also sees the conclusion of the 
maritime delimitation between Russia and Norway, and ongoing cooperation 
in the Barents Sea, as positive examples of cooperation.56 It regards the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Cooperation (BEAC) as an important hub for cooperation between 
EU countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), as well as Norway, Russia and 
the European Commission.57
In developing its Arctic policy, the EU has taken note of recent exploration 
activities in European Arctic and Barents Sea, and especially the bilateral co-
operation between Norway and Russia, particularly in relation to environmen-
tal protection in the prospecting for oil and gas in the region.58
As part of the developing Arctic policy, the Council of the EU has identified 
the need for the EU to enhance its contribution to Arctic cooperation by con-
forming to international instruments, especially UNCLOS.59 It also reiterates 
the importance of respecting international law principles with regard to trans-
Arctic ocean routes, including the NSR.60 Alongside this engagement, the EU 
seeks to increase dialogue with Arctic States.61 To date, such engagement has 
occurred through the development of EU policy, engagement with the BEAC, 
and seeking admission to Arctic Council (which to date has not yet come to 
fruition).
The 2016 EU Arctic Policy recognizes that the Arctic region has acquired 
a higher profile in international relations due to the increasing environmen-
tal, social, economic and strategic importance of the Arctic.62 Furthermore, 
the 2016 EU Policy notes that changes affecting the Arctic, although present-
ing opportunities, also have the potential to increase tensions in the area, 
54   JOIN (2016) 21, 3; European Commission and The High Representative Joint Communica-
tion ‘Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 
and next Steps’ JOIN(2012) 19 final.
55   JOIN (2012) 19, 3.
56   Ibid.
57   European Parliament Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic (12 March 2014) 
2013/2595RSP, para. 7.
58   Ibid, para. 54.
59   Council Conclusions on Developing a European Union Policy Towards the Arctic Region’ 
(12 May 2014), para. 3.
60   Ibid, para. 10.
61   JOIN (2012) 19, 4.
62   JOIN (2016) 21, 3.
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rendering constructive international cooperation more important than ever.63 
The 2016 EU Arctic policy recognizes that there is a need for a network for the 
Arctic and Atlantic to address maritime security threats associated with 
the opening of the NSR,64 as well as supporting the soon to be introduced IMO 
Polar Code.
2.2.3 A Developing EU Arctic Policy
An analysis of EU Arctic policy demonstrates that the foundation of EU Arctic 
policy—the sustainable development of natural resources—remains impor-
tant in the region and sits alongside the development, utilization and safety 
of the marine shipping capacity of the region. The EU seeks to undertake such 
development and utilization within a framework of international cooperation. 
Such cooperation between the EU and/EU actors and Russia in the Arctic is 
long standing, spanning the previous twenty years. As the EU seeks to clarify 
and develop its policy toward the Arctic, the question remains whether the 
Russian Arctic policy remains cooperative, or whether it is entering a more 
‘bullish’ phase with a shifting focus to one of a more aggressive nature, with 
the cooperative nature of previous relationships in the Arctic shifting with it.
3 Russian Arctic Policy—A New Strategy or More of the Same?
Russian Arctic policy is inextricably tied up with Russian marine policy, given 
that the region includes a huge expanse of ocean. In the 21st century Russia 
has identified the Arctic as playing a vital dual role: strategic priority and a 
resource base for future development.65
3.1 Post Soviet Interest in the Arctic—The Development of Maritime 
Policy
Almost immediately after coming to power, Russian president Vladimir Putin 
set forth on a path of rebuilding Russia, particularly through the develop-
ment of Russian industry. A key strategy in this redevelopment of the Russian 
Federation was the 2001 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020 
63   Ibid., 4.
64   Ibid., 13.
65   Ekaterina Klimenko, ‘Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy: Drivers, Challenges and New 
Opportunities’ (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2014) Policy Paper 42, 1.
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(the 2001 Doctrine).66 The legal basis of 2001 Doctrine is the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, the federal laws of the Russian Federation, UNCLOS, 
international maritime treaties and the use of the ocean.67 The 2001 Doctrine 
sets out Russia’s national maritime interests, and continues to remain the fun-
damental Doctrine for the Russian Maritime area. The 2001 Doctrine sets out 
the inviolability of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in its internal wa-
ters, as well as its sovereign rights over the EEZ and continental shelf.68 It rec-
ognises the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the 
exploitation, development and conservation of living and non-living marine 
natural resources.69 This declaration of interests in the maritime zones under 
the 2001 Doctrine is similar to the declaration of the UK over its continental 
shelf in section 1 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 and the Norwegian govern-
ment declaration over natural resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
in 1963.70 Other Russian interests specifically articulated in the 2001 Doctrine 
include freedom of high seas, protection of human life at sea, the prevention 
of marine pollution the control of marine communications and the creation of 
conditions conducive to benefit marine economic activity.71
In articulating Russian marine interests, the 2001 Doctrine sets out a num-
ber of objectives of national marine policy (NMP) related to the development 
of petroleum resources. These include:
 • The preservation of sovereignty of inland waters, the Territorial Sea and the 
airspace and subsoil of these areas;
66   Article 1: General Provisions, Vladimir Putin, ‘Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 
2020’ (2001) 1 <http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Russian_Maritime_Policy_2020 
.pdf> accessed 16 August 2016.
67   Ibid.
68   In accordance with the United Nation Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the Federal Act on the internal maritime waters, territorial sea and contigu-
ous zone of the Russian Federation, 17 July 1998 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1998_Act_TS.pdf> accessed 1 December 
2016; and the Federal Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation, 
2 December 1998 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDF 
FILES/RUS_1998_Act_EZ.pdf> accessed 1 December 2016.
69   Putin, n. 66 above.
70   Act of 21 June 1963 no 12 relating to scientific research and exploration for and exploita-
tion of subsea natural resources other than petroleum resources, as amended 6 June 2008 
(Norway), Section 2 < http://www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Acts/Scientific-research-act> 
accessed 29 November 2016.
71   Putin, n. 66 above, 2.
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 • Protection of sovereign rights on EEZ and CS for the development of natu-
ral resources, including the construction and operation of artificial islands, 
installations and other structures, and.
 • Protection of the Russian Federation with the marine areas, protection of 
national borders, including sea and air space.72
In addition, the 2001 doctrine outlines the principles of the NMP:
 • Compliance with generally accepted norms of international law and inter-
national treaties of the Russian federation in the implementation of mari-
time activities;
 • The priority of political (diplomatic, economic, information and other 
non-military means) means in resolving conflict in the oceans and remove 
threats to national security;
 • The possession of naval capabilities, and its effective use to support marine 
activities;
 • Maintaining maritime capabilities consistent with national interests includ-
ing the presence of a Russian fleet in remote areas of the oceans; and
 • Construction and infrastructure development for the Russian fleet within 
RF maintenance of fleet to meet existing and emerging challenges; and
 • The readiness of specialized fleets, including commercial, research, and fish-
ery vessels.73
In developing the 2001 Doctrine, Russia outlines its interests in its seas. These 
interests in the Arctic can be divided into two main areas—shipping and the 
NSR, and resource development.
3.2 Shipping and the Northern Sea Route
Russian interest in the Arctic is not confined to this century, rather going back 
many centuries, with particular focus since the beginning of the last century. 
The defeat of Russia at the hands of the Japanese in 1905 illustrated the need 
for rapid movement of soldiers and goods from the populous west to the east 
where an increasingly militarized Japan posed a serious threat to the Russian 
empire. After this defeat, money was made available for the development of 
the NSR, to enable faster mobilization of troops and resources to the area.74
72   Ibid., 3.
73   Ibid. 3–4.
74   Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (Vintage 2011) 48.
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A notable navigation of the NSR occurred in 1932, when a one-year naviga-
tion test of the NSR was undertaken by Otto Schmidt.75 At this time the Soviet 
government also set up the administrative body Glavsevmorput, with the aim of 
developing Soviet Arctic domains, especially the NSR.76 Engagement with the 
NSR and the Soviet Arctic region continued with the deployment of a drifting 
Arctic research station in the 1937–8 winter.77 The Russian Arctic zone contin-
ued to be developed both on land and sea, with the rapid development of the 
city of Murmansk from 1938 as a Northern Sea Port (given its largely ice-free 
status and location), as well as the Kola Peninsula (including Murmansk) and 
Archangelsk for resource development. During the Soviet era the role of the 
NSR was the transport of cargo, people and raw materials east and west along 
the Arctic route rather than as a transit route for cargo from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific.78 However, the breakup of the Soviet Union saw the decline of the 
USSR military might, with the Murmansk Northern Sea Base in particular en-
tering a stage of rapid decay. Such decay was highlighted in August 2000 with 
the Kursk tragedy, when the Russian Navy lacked the capability to launch a 
rescue of the crew of the Kursk.79
Ongoing use of domestic maritime transport in Russia is crucial, particu-
larly in the Far North where shipping is the only mode of transport, and is 
essential for sustenance. To achieve the development of the north and ship-
ping in the region the Russian government set out a long-term objective in 
the 2001 Doctrine for the formation of a regulatory framework for marine 
activities in compliance with international law, taking into account Russian 
national interests.80 The importance of development of national interests of 
the Russian Federation in the Arctic was reiterated under Part II of the Basics 
of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 
2020 and for a Further Perspective (2008 Russian Arctic Policy).81 In particu-
lar, Article 7 (d) of the 2008 Arctic Russian Policy prioritizes, as a matter of 
75   Ibid., 64.
76   Ibid., 53.
77   Ibid., 64.
78   Claes L. Ragner, ‘Den Norra Sjövägen’ in Torsten Hallberg (ed), Barents—ett Gräsland 
I Norden (Arena Norden 2008) 116, English translation at <http://www.fni.no/pdf/clr- 
norden-nsr-en.PDF> accessed 16 August 2016.
79   Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breaksown and the decline of the Russian Military (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) 19–43.
80   Putin, n. 66 above, 3.
81   Dimitry Medvedev, ‘Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for 
the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective’ (2008) <http://www.arctis-search.com/
Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020> accessed 16 August 2016.
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strategic interest for the Russian Federation in the Arctic, assistance in the 
organization and effective utilization of the NSR for international navigation 
under Russian jurisdiction, in accordance with international treaties. Article 8 
(b) of the 2008 Arctic Russian Policy identifies that such development of the 
NSR will necessarily require the security, defense and protection of the Russian 
border along the NSR.
The recently announced draft 2015 Russian Marine Doctrine (the 2015 
Doctrine) set out additional strategies to promote the development of ship-
ping, particularly in the Arctic. At the launch of the Doctrine, Deputy Prime 
Minister Rogozin outlined a plan for the resurgence of shipbuilding, with an 
emphasis on icebreakers.82 The 2015 Doctrine attributes the resurgence of 
shipbuilding and icebreakers, the largest development in the post-Soviet era, 
to the growing importance of the Northern Sea Route.83 To meet the grow-
ing importance, Rogozin identified the development of three new atomic ice-
breakers, which would be ready to accompany ships in the NSR in 2017, 2019, 
and 2020 respectively.84 Such commitment to the NSR was further strength-
ened in 2016 with the release of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation.85 Under this Concept, Russia clearly reiterates the importance of 
the NSR, stating that the use of the NSR as Russia’s national transport route 
in the arctic, as well as for transit shipments between Europe and Asia is sig-
nificant for the development of the region.86
3.3 Development and Conservation of Natural Resources
The value of natural resources in the High North has long been identified. As 
Nansen travelled down the Yenisei River in 1913, he expressed the possibility 
that Siberia would become a European resource base for the future.87
82   ‘Russian Maritime Doctrine’ President of Russia Website (26 July 2015) <http://en.kremlin 
.ru/events/president/news/50060> accessed 16 August 2016.
83   Ibid.
84   Ibid.
85   Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Rus-
sian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30 2016) <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_ 
policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248> accessed 
4 Feburary 2017.
86   Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30 2016) Arcticle 76 <http://www.mid.ru/en/ 
foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248> 
accessed 4 Feburary 2017.
87   Emmerson, n. 74 above, 40.
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Since the early 20th century Russia has been a natural resources leader in 
the Arctic—in the early 1930s the value of Arctic minerals for Soviet Russia was 
identified by Stalin, who stated …’ the Arctic and our northern regions contain 
colossal wealth. We must create a soviet organisation, which can, in the short-
est period possible, include this wealth in the general resources of our socialist 
economic structure.’88
This expansionist policy of Russia in relation to Arctic mineral wealth is also 
demonstrated by the acquisition of the Barentsburg coal mining operation on 
Svalbard from Sweden in 1927, with operation continuing until 1998, beyond the 
end of the soviet era.89 However, although there is an abundance of resources 
in the Russian north, there is also an acceptance that the economic exploita-
tion of the Russian High North needs to overcome some major obstacles—the 
cold, the dark and the ice.90 Russia was able to largely overcome these obsta-
cles to the development of resources in the region through a massive expan-
sion in the capitals on high north, assisted greatly by the Gulag system, which 
provided labour to develop necessary infrastructure.91 The other great tool in 
the development of Arctic mineral wealth was the pioneering development of 
icebreakers. Russia developed the first atomic icebreakers, including the Lenin 
in 1959, followed by the Arctic class atomic icebreakers with the Arktika in 1975, 
Sibit (1977), Rossiya 1985, and Sovietskiy Soyuz in 1989.
The development of ocean resources, and in particular the development of 
mineral and petroleum resources was highlighted in the 2001 Doctrine, out-
lining the need for advanced geological studies of the Russian Arctic,92 and 
the need for state control in the development of these resources.93 The 2001 
Doctrine recognizes international law, and the requirement to adhere to 
international law, especially UNCLOS and the International Seabed Authority, 
in the development of these resources. The 2001 Doctrine sees the imple-
mentation of increased naval activity as critical to the exploitation of these 
Arctic resources and the navy as essential for the protection and promotion 
of national interests and the security of the Russian Federation in the oceans.
88   Ibid., 35.
89   Rachel Nuwer, ‘A Soviet Ghost Town in the Arctic Circle, Pyramiden Stands Alone’ 
(Smithsonian, 19 May 2014) <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/soviet-ghost-town 
-arctic-circle-pyramiden-stands-alone-180951429/?no-ist> accessed 19 August 2016.
90   Emmerson, n. 74 above, 50.
91   For example the Gulag system at the Solovetsky Islands and Monastery. See Anne 
Applebaum, Gulag: A history (Doubleday, 1994).
92   Putin, n. 66 above, 7.
93   Ibid., 9.
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In line with the 2001 Doctrine, Russia has increased military exercises in 
the region, as well as reinstating the Northern fleet and undertaken regional 
deployment of military forces. Such militarisation has not gone unnoticed by 
the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), which notes that
Russia has taken a number of steps to flag and secure its interests in the 
Arctic. On 1 December 2014, the country formally established a joint mili-
tary Arctic command, and the Russians have also reopened old bases and 
established a permanent presence in new locations across the Arctic. An 
infantry brigade has been re-established on the border with Finland.94
The 2013 Russian Strategy of the Development of the Arctic (2013 Arctic Strategy)95 
further enforces this development of the Arctic resources. Article 11 of the 2013 
Arctic Strategy outlines the use and development of the Arctic resources. In 
particular, the strategy outlines the implementation of large infrastructure 
projects in Russia’s Arctic zone, particularly the hydrocarbon deposits on the 
continental shelf of the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas, and the Yamal and 
Gydan Peninsulas.96
The importance of Arctic natural resources was also identified in the 2015 
Russina Maritime Doctrine. Aside from the importance of the NSR, Deputy 
Prime Minister Rogozin emphasized that ‘there are the riches of continental 
shelf, the development of which calls for an attentive approach’,97 thereby 
reinforcing the need for the development of atomic icebreakers and the devel-
opment of the north.
3.4 Longstanding Northern Policy
There is a clear and longstanding Russian strategy for the development of 
European Arctic, especially in relation to shipping (the Arctic as both a des-
tination and a transit route) and natural resource development. Such a policy 
was commenced in former soviet times, and after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was resurrected and articulated in the 2001 Doctrine, clarified in the 
94   Norwegian Intelligence Service, ‘Focus’ (2015) Annual assessment 20 <https://forsvaret 
.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/Focus2015-ENG_hele_lav_19.05.pdf> accessed 16 August 
2016.
95   Russian Strategy of the Development of the Arctic Zone and the Provision of National 
Security until 2020 (adopted by the President of the Russian Federation on February 8 
2013, No. Pr-232.
96   Russian Strategy of the Development of the Arctic Zone and the Provision of National 
Security until 2020 (adopted by the President of the Russian Federation on February 8 
2013, No. Pr-232, Article 11(d) and (e).
97   ‘Russian Maritime Doctrine’, n. 82 above.
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2008 Russian Arctic Policy, and reinforced in the 2013 Arctic Strategy and 
the 2015 Doctrine. Such strategies create two fundamental questions. Firstly, 
is the Russian policy position regarding the Arctic fundamentally different to 
the policy position of the EU? Secondly, does current Russian Arctic strategy 
and policy demonstrate a cooperative approach to Arctic development?98
4 Russia—EU Interests in the Arctic—Convergence or Divergence?
4.1 Is Russian Arctic Policy Fundamentally Different to EU Arctic Policy?
The Russian Arctic policy is clearly articulated in the 2001 Doctrine, which out-
lines a focus on two main areas in the Arctic: the development of the NSR for 
both internal and transit shipping, and the exploitation of natural resources 
in the Russian Arctic, especially the petroleum. The development of these two 
main areas is seen as long-term strategies, essential for the future of the Russian 
Federation. This policy approach has been implemented since the beginning 
of the 21st century, and reiterated in the recent 2015 Doctrine. There is rec-
ognition that the development of resources in the Russian Arctic will require 
infrastructure, and that the European High North lacks sufficient infrastruc-
ture at present. Commitment to environmental protection in the Arctic is also 
recognized by Russia’s participation in the petroleum standards developed as 
part of the Barents 2020 project, providing a great advance in environmental 
protection for the Arctic.99
An analysis of EU Arctic policy in Section 2 reveals that the EU focused on 
two similar issues to that of Russia. The first issue is that of resource devel-
opment in the Arctic, arising since the EU is a major petroleum consumer, 
importing more than EUR400 billion in oil and gas in 2012.100 This need for 
access to petroleum resources by the EU, and Russian desire to develop its 
petroleum resources indicates a symbiotic policy relationship between the EU 
and Russia, reminiscent of the 1990s when the Energy Charter Treaty 1994 was 
forged: Russian Arctic policy highlights a commodity it seeks to develop, and 
the EU policy indicates the EU seeks to acquire Arctic petroleum resources. 
Regarding the NSR, a symbiosis between Russian and EU Arctic policy also 
98   Sean MacCormac, ‘The New Russian Naval Doctrine’ Center for International Maritime 
Security (24 November 2015) <http://cimsec.org/new-russian-naval-doctrine/18444> 
accessed 16 August 2016.
99   European Parliament Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic (12 March 2014) 
2013/2595RSP, para. 54.
100   Stepien, Koivurova and Kankaanpää, n. 10 above, 81.
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exists.101 The EU seeks to protect the Arctic and gain access to shipping routes, 
and the Russian Federation seeks to develop and control the NSR in order to 
protect and preserve the Arctic environment for future generations.102
4.2 Does Current Russian Arctic Policy Mark a Shift From Cooperative 
Arctic Development?
The EU has clearly and specifically articulated the need for any development 
of the Arctic to occur through cooperation. In the past, Russia’s conduct has 
been viewed as cooperative in nature, and its Arctic Policy has been overtly 
cooperative: Article 6(f) of the Basics of the State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic for the Period til 2020 and for a Further Perspective 
explicitly states that in the sphere of international cooperation, there is a basic 
objective to maintain a mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral coop-
eration between the Russian Federation and the sub-Arctic States on the basis 
of international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a 
party.103
However, military activity in the Arctic, especially the remilitarization of the 
Murmansk naval base, combined with the recent announcement of the 2015 
Doctrine, has prompted some authors to question whether this marks a shift 
in Russian Arctic policy from one of cooperation to one of conflict. Such con-
cern is articulated by Sean McCormac from the Center for Maritime Security 
(CIMSEC), who notes that ‘what is of greatest concern to America’s strategic 
planners is Russia’s interest in control of the Arctic and the natural resources 
in the waters there—Russia’s control of the Arctic is a possibility that should 
not be lightly dismissed’.104 Given the low oil price at present, the motives 
of Russia in developing Arctic petroleum resources, which are expensive to 
extract,105 are being questioned. Although much of the discussion regarding 
the development of Arctic resources during 2015 focused on the economic cli-
mate and low oil prices, and hence the peril of developing Arctic petroleum 
101   This symbiosis is based on a recognition of current Russian maritime boundaries, and 
does not incorporate the areas subject to a submission to the Law of the Sea Commission 
regarding the extension of the limits of the Russian continental shelf.
102   As articulated by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in ‘Russian Maritime 
Doctrine’, n. 82 above.
103   Medvedev, n. 81 above.
104   CIMSEC sees this remilitarization as a move to Russian aggression. See MacCormac, n. 95 
above.
105   ‘Opportunities and Challenges for Arctic Oil and Gas Development’ (Wilson Center 
2014) <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Arctic%20Report_F2.pdf> accessed 
30 November 2016.
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resources, Russian Arctic policy, as demonstrated by the 2001 doctrine and the 
2015 Doctrine, is a long-term strategy, designed to fuel a long-term resurgence 
of economic growth and development.106
In order to develop the resources of the region, there is a need for the de-
velopment of critical infrastructure resources, including the NSR, which is 
necessary for the transport of resources that are exploited in the region. Russian 
strategy to date, which has also been demonstrated in the Soviet era, is to develop 
critical infrastructure in the region. Such critical infrastructure development has 
been based largely (although not exclusively) on the use of prison labour under 
the gulag system,107 and militarization for the development of infrastructure.108
Western media has reported, often with appropriate scaremongering, that 
Russia plans to reopen military bases it abandoned after the Soviet Union 
collapsed.109 Journalists have raised fear about such a move, citing such mili-
tarization comes at a time heightened tensions with the West over Ukraine 
that ‘saw Russia increase its air patrols probing NATO’s borders, including 
in the Arctic.’110 The Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) ques-
tions whether recent Russian military exercises and the opening of previously 
closed soviet-era military bases in the arctic are proportional to the use of the 
NSR or to deploy in search and rescue and oil spill response Agreements that 
Russia has signed.111 In its analysis, CSIS interprets Russian activity as a form of 
aggression, and ‘Russia’s military buildup and demonstrations of capability are 
obviously not just about economics or safety but indicate a potentially danger-
ous attempt to return to Cold War Parity in the Arctic.’112 Such a view is at odds 
with Norway, Russia’s neighbour, which has concluded that the relationship 
between Russia and the West is not at its coldest since the Cold War.113 Russia itself 
106   International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Russia in the Arctic: Economic interests 
override military operations’ (2012) 19 (9) Strategic Comments vi–viii.
107   See for instance Magadan-Yakutsk road (‘the road of a million bones’) and Smolensky 
Islands.
108   See for example the establishment of the port of Murmansk from the first world was 
period, and in particular the development of Murmansk during and after World War 2.
109   L. van Geuns and S de Jong, ‘West Should Respond to Russian Militarization of the Arctic’ 
Atlantic Community (7 September 2015) <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/west 
-should-respond-to-russian-militarization-of-the-arctic> accessed 16 August 2016.
110   Ibid.
111   Conley and Rohloff, n. 16 above, IX, 15.
112   Ibid., 19.
113   Trude Pettersen, ‘Norwegian Intelligence Service: Russia Is More Confident and 
Unpredictable’ (The Independent Barents Observer, 24 February 2016) <http://www 
.thebarentsobserver.com/2016/02/norwegian-intelligence-service-russia-more-confident 
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has also iterated its position regarding militarisation in the Arctic, with first 
Deputy foreign Minister Titov dispelling any perception of militarization in 
the arctic:
… Russia does not see any challenges in that area [the Arctic] that would 
have a military dimension. Russia will continue to oppose any attempts to 
portray the region as an area of future conflict, and intends, for its part, 
to promote the idea of the arctic as a territory of peace and cooperation.114
It is critical to note that one motive articulated by Russia for increased militari-
zation in the Arctic is its leadership and commitment to the binding (hard law) 
components of the Arctic Council, Search and Rescue in the Arctic Agreement 
(SAR),115 and Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic (MOPPR).116 Russia has argued that the remilitarization of the 
region is required in order to meet the SAR and MOPPR obligations. Such 
claims are rejected by western (dominantly the US) authors, who instead cite 
aggression and conflict associated with Ukraine as reasons for military action.117 
Although doubted by some academics, the role of the military in civilian 
maritime activities is evidenced in several Arctic States, including the US and 
Norway. The Norwegian Coast Guard is a part of the Norwegian Navy, to ensure 
that it receives the necessary training personnel and maintenance to under-
take operations from their northern base in Sortland.118 Similarly, the US Coast 
Guard (USCG) is one of the five branches of the US military, and the only mili-
tary organisation within the Department of Homeland Security.119 The role of 
the USCG is to safeguard US maritime interests around the world.120 This is not 
-and-unpredictable> accessed 19 August 2016. Note that the Norwegian intelligence 
service report for 2016 is only available in Norwegian at present, and therefore there is a 
reliance on reports in the media regarding the content of the report.
114   First Deputy foreign Minister Vladimir titov’s interview with the ITAR-TASS news agency, 
September 19, 2016 <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2450934> accessed 4 Feburary 2017.
115   Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic (signed 12 May 2011, entered into force 19 January 2013).
116   Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic (signed 15 May 2013, entered into force 25 March 2016).
117   See van Geuns and de Jong, n. 113 above; Conley and Rohloff, n. 16 above.
118   Forsvaret (the Norwegian Armed Forces) website, The Navy <https://forsvaret.no/en/ 
organisation/navy> accessed 16 August 2016.
119   US Coast Guard, ‘Doctrine for the US Coast Guard’ (2014) 59 <http://www.uscg.mil/ 
doctrine/CGPub/Pub_1.pdf> accessed 16 August 2016.
120   Ibid.
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dissimilar to the Russian Coast Guard that has been taken under the auspices of 
the Federal Secruity services of the Russian Federation (the FSB) in order to se-
cure and protect national interests. Such Russian militarisation of the Arctic can 
be viewed within the lens of infrastructure development, given that establish-
ment of military bases provides essential infrastructure that can be built on and 
extended for civilian purposes, such as for petroleum resource development.121 
In the 2016 EU Policy, the European Commission specifically identified the 
challenges of sustainably developing Arctic natural resources due to the lack 
of transport links and infrastructure.122 The need for infrastructure in the high 
North was also identified by the Norwegian government in the Barents 2020 re-
port in 2006, which concluded that Norway has ‘well developed infrastructure 
in northern parts of the country. In Russia, much of this experience is lacking, 
and supply systems are of an inferior standard compared with those on the 
Norwegian side of the border.’123 The role of the military in establishing infra-
structure in a region that lacks sufficient infrastructure is recognised by the 
US military, which notes that ‘the infrastructure required to support military 
operations is similar in nature to that which is required by a nation’s popula-
tion as a whole’.124 In addition, there is also recognition that often the military is 
the only organisation with the capacity, skills and materials to establish critical 
infrastructure in areas where infrastructure is lacking or destroyed.125 The lack of 
threat that the Russian militarisation poses in the Arctic has been the subject 
of a study by the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS).126 Whilst the NIS acknowl-
edges that ‘Russia has demonstrated increased military capacity, as shown in 
Ukraine annexation and the Syrian campaign,’127 it has established that Russia 
presently poses no immediate military threat to Norway, although Russia’s 
increased presence in the North and upgraded military power has increased the 
121   The essential use of military in the Arctic region for operations (such as search and res-
cue) has also been recognized by the US military. See Col. John L. Conway III, ‘Search and 
Rescue in the High North: An Air force Mission?’ (2013) 27 (6) Air and Space Power Journal 
4–24.
122   JOIN (2016) 21, 8.
123   Norwegian government, Barents 2020: A Tool for a forward-looking High North Policy 
(2006), <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/barents2020e.pdf> 
accessed 12 February 2016, p 15.
124   Alan L. Webster, ‘The Role of the Army in Infrastructure and Capacity Building’ (2010) p. 15 
<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA522051> accessed 16 August 2016.
125   Ibid., 15.
126   Norwegian Intelligence Service, ‘Focus’ (2015) Annual assessment 20 <https://forsvaret 
.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/Focus2015-ENG_hele_lav_19.05.pdf> accessed 16 August 
2016.
127   Pettersen, n. 113 above.
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ability of Russia to influence Norway’s freedom to act in the region.128 Indeed, 
the NIS has concluded that:
despite significant military and security policy shifts in 2014, NIS main-
tains that Russia does not, in the current situation, pose a military threat 
to Norway. Threats arise from a combination of capability and intention, 
and although Russia’s capability is increasing it is currently difficult to 
envision any rational basis for Russian military action against Norway in 
the short to medium term.129
Thus, it would appear that Norway has concluded that Russia poses no military 
threat to Norwegian sovereignty. Such a conclusion is also supported by the 
EU, which recognizes that there is a lack of facilities and services in the region, 
and that the Russian government seeks to upgrade facilities and services in the 
region.130 The EU also recognizes that there are severe shortcomings to Arctic 
marine infrastructure, particularly hydrographic surveys for extensive knowl-
edge of the bathymetry.131 Russia is naturally a State, along with Norway, that 
is likely to play a role in the region. It is likely that the role Russia plays will be 
particularly related to maritime affairs, and include port reception facilities 
for ship waste, a place of refuge in bad weather, oil spill contingency planning 
equipment depots, provision of hydrographic surveys, and provide refueling 
stations for the NSR. However, what remains questionable, is how well these 
critical roles will sit with other international actors.
A commonality that exists between Russian and EU Arctic policy is that of 
cooperation. Whereas legal instruments dominate international cooperation 
and use of Antarctica, the Arctic has been dominated by international coop-
eration, particularly in the form of ‘soft law’. The development of soft law in 
the Arctic, based on cooperation has been led by the Arctic Council, of which 
Russia has played a leading and cooperative role to date. As well as develop-
ing a body of soft law, the Arctic Council has developed a number of legally 
binding instruments in relation to resource development and increased mari-
time activity in the Arctic: an agreement on search and rescue in the Arctic 
(SAR), and cooperation on marine oil spill preparedness and response in the 
Arctic (MOPPR). In doing so, the Arctic Council has morphed from soft law 
to hard law, from non-binding to binding instruments. In undertaking this 
128   Ibid.
129   Norwegian Intelligence Service, n. 94 above.
130   Stepien, Koivurova and Kankaanpää, n. 10 above, 42.
131   Ibid., 39.
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 transformation to hard law, Russia has continued to play an integral role in, 
and is an integral part of, the Arctic Council, demonstrated by Russia recently 
assuming the Chair of the Arctic Council.
A similar demonstration of Russian commitment to cooperation rather 
than conflict within the region is its active participation for over 20 years in the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC),132 a forum for intergovernmental coopera-
tion on issues concerning the Barents Region, comprising Russia (Arkhangelsk, 
Karelia, Komi, Murmansk and Nenets), Norway, Sweden and Finland, Iceland, 
and the European Commission. To date, Russia has not indicated that it seeks 
any changes to the cooperative nature of BEAC Russia has not indicated any 
change to BEAC, nor has it withdrawn support for the forum. Russia remains 
committed to the focus of BEAC on economic development and transport.133 
Within BEAC, Russia has identified the future potential of the NSR that would 
benefit the Barents Region and all members of BEAC, providing economic and 
business opportunities to all,134 including Arctic members and the EU. Support 
of BEAC was demonstrated by the Russian foreign Minister Lavrov at the XV 
meeting,135 where Russia affirmed its commitment to BEAC:
the principle of continuity, taking into account the interests of all partici-
pants in Barents cooperation, including the indigenous population. We 
prioritise the promotion of the region’s sustainable social and economic 
development, putting in place modern infrastructure and making the re-
gion more competitive and attractive to investors through the effective 
utilisation of its industrial, scientific, innovative, and resource potential, 
as well as in compliance with environmental requirements.136
The establishment of several regional bodies has contributed to cooperation 
and stability in the region. Previously a region of weak governance, the creation 
132   See Chapter 3 as well.
133   Joint Communiqué, XV Session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (15 October 2015) 
<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=335913&contentlan=2& 
culture=e> accessed 12 August 2016.
134   Ibid., art 9.
135   <http://www.mid.ru/en/sovet-gosudarstv-barenceva/evroarkticeskogo-regiona-sber-/-/
asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/1846132> accessed 18 August 2016.
136   Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Information and Press Department 
on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Participation in the 15th ministerial meeting of the 
Barents/Euro-Arctic Council (2015) <http://www.mid.ru/en/sovet-gosudarstv-barenceva/
evroarkticeskogo-regiona-sber-/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/1846132> 
accessed 16 August 2016.
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of the Arctic Council in 1996 along with the Barents Regional Council have been 
an innovative arrangement, leading the former Norwegian Foreign Minister to 
recently declare that in the Arctic there is less risk of conflicts arising from the 
region, but greater risk that tensions may spillover from elsewhere.”137 Russian 
support for such a regional cooperative approach is reiterated in Article 7 (c) 
of the 2008 Russian Arctic Policy, enunciating that strategic Arctic priorities 
for the Russian Federation include strengthening cooperation with the Arctic 
Council and BEAC.138 This support has again been reiterated in the 2016 Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,139 with Russia recognizing the special 
responsibility that Arctic states bear for the sustainable development of the arc-
tic region.140 Recognizing such responsibility, Russia also advocates enhanced 
cooperation in the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.141
Another strong indicator of the cooperative nature of Russian Arctic policy 
is its respect for the international law framework governing the Arctic Region. 
In 2008 the five Arctic states declared at Ilulissat that UNCLOS would be the 
‘governing international law’ regarding the development of the Arctic.142 In 
particular, Russian recognition of and deference to UNCLOS includes the reso-
lution of conflicting continental shelf claims;143 a State’s right over mineral re-
sources in the territorial sea and continental shelf,144 a State’s duty to protect 
marine ecosystems,145 and special provisions regarding ice-covered waters of 
the EEZ that authorizes Arctic coastal States to enforce shipping environmen-
tal protection.146
137   Johan Store Støre, ‘Is This a New Era for the Arctic?’ (World Economic Forum, 5 January 2016) 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-this-a-new-era-for-the-arctic/> accessed 19 
August 2016.
138   2008 Russian Arctic Policy, n. 80, above.
139   Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Rus-
sian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30 2016) <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_ 
policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248> accessed 
4 Feburary 2017.
140   Ibid, Article 76.
141   Ibid.
142   Illulisat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference (Illulisat, Greenland 27–29 May 2008) 
<http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf> accessed 12 February 
2016.
143   Article 76, UNCLOS.
144   Article 9, UNCLOS.
145   Article 192, UNCLOS.
146   Article 234, UNCLOS.
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Russia’s commitment to UNCLOS147 was demonstrated in April 2010 in 
the delimitation of the maritime border between Russia and Norway in the 
Barents Sea. After being contested by both States for almost 40 years, a cooper-
ative approach was utilized to delimit the border in order to enable both states 
to pursue economic activities. The maritime delimitation, whilst a surprise to 
the international community, including Norway, has been interpreted as the 
commencement of a Russian cooperative phase regarding the Barents region 
and the High North. To date, there have been no actions by Russia that indicate 
aggression and conflict. There has been a peaceful establishment of Russian 
military in the Arctic Region, which has been viewed by the NIS as not posing a 
threat to Norway. Furthermore, in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation,148 the Russian government reiterated its peaceful approach to the 
Arctic, stating that ‘The Russian Federation believes that the existing interna-
tional legal framework is sufficient to successfully settle any regional issues 
through negotiation’, including the issue of defining the outer limits of the con-
tinental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.149
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined and analyzed EU and Russian Arctic policies in order 
to determine whether EU and Russian Arctic policies, which since 2015 has 
focused on the remilitarization of the Arctic, are divergent, thereby creating 
conflict within the region. Russia has demonstrated a respect of the interna-
tional interests that govern the seas, and has engaged with the development 
of soft law in the region. To date, Russia has complied with all international 
legal instruments, and initiated the peaceful maritime delimitation of its bor-
der with Norway. It has demonstrated leadership within the Arctic Council, 
especially in the establishment of SAR and MOPPR, and played a leading role 
in BEAC. Furthermore, it has demonstrated the use of the NSR from as early as 
147   Russia undertook this delimitation in accordance with Article 74 and Article 83 of the 
United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, regarding the delimitation of the EEZ 
and the Continental Shelf with opposite or adjacent coasts.
148   Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Rus-
sian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30 2016) <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_ 
policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248> accessed 
4 Feburary 2017.
149   Ibid, Article 76.
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the 1930s, which correlates to Russia’s exploitation of natural resources in the 
Arctic. Such strength in the Arctic was diminished in the period after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, where naval bases were deactivated, military bases 
closed, and the region largely abandoned. However, since coming to power in 
2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin has reviewed and revised the value 
of the Arctic. Since 2001, the Arctic has been reestablished as a priority for 
the Russian Federation, particularly the development of its resources and the 
development of the NSR. This commitment was reiterated in 2008 with 
the Arctic Policy, and again in July 2015 when Russia released its draft Maritime 
Doctrine, which reiterated the importance of the Arctic.
In reiterating the importance and value of the Arctic, areas that were 
previously of strong military importance, particularly Murmansk and the 
Kola Peninsula, are again being activated to assist in the development of 
the resources that EU wants to access. In particular, Murmansk is of vital 
importance, due to the ice-free port. Russia sees increased naval presence 
there vital to achieving economic growth and development. The utilization of 
the military on the Arctic is logical given it is the most prepared and trained 
for the area, demonstrated by the incorporation of the Coast Guard as a 
branch of the military in Norway and the US, since only the navy can provide 
the essential personnel, equipment and training to conduct Arctic operations. 
Other commercial areas, such as around Norilsk, have always remained mili-
tarized for development, demonstrating that military capacity and infrastruc-
ture is best able to deal with this in this hostile environment.
The argument that Russian militarization of the Arctic is due to Russian 
aggression is fanciful, rejected by Russia’s closest neighbour, Norway. Rather 
the evidence demonstrates that Russia is reengaging in the region, reopening 
and remilitarizing regions in the areas that were decommissioned at the end 
of the cold war, when there was little use for the regions in the post conflict 
era. Evidence indicates that there are no alarming trends of aggression and 
conflict in the Arctic, or that Russia is seeking to reverse its trend of coopera-
tion in the region. In 2001 Russia set in motion a policy of focus on the Arctic 
and resourcing the Arctic, one that has been strengthened and enhanced by 
the 2015 Doctrine, and the maritime delineation with Norway under a 76 of the 
UNCLOS.
Certainly there is a focus on military activity and increased personnel in the 
Arctic, in part tied to agreements on SAR and OSPR. Rather, increased military 
activity is also tied to the use of the military to develop regional infrastructure 
that is needed. Such militarization clearly has made the EU and the US ner-
vous. However, this action has not indicated a rise in conflict in the region, 
or a move away from cooperation. Rather, it indicates that although there is 
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conflict and tension between the EU and Russia in other regions of the world, 
particularly the Ukraine, there is a commonality in Russian and EU Arctic 
policy, which is fundamentally based upon a mutual respect for the UNCLOS. 
This commonality is two fold. Firstly, the EU and Russia have a commercial 
interest in the NSR for shipping and navigation, with an emphasis on freedom 
of navigation and the right of innocent passage. Secondly, natural resources 
are of interest to both the EU and Russia. Russia wants to secure and delineate 
them, and the EU wants to form long-term partnerships to secure access to 
them. Thus there is a commonality of Arctic policy interests between Russia 
and the EU, which appear to be ushering in an era of cooperation, not conflict 
and the threat of war. 
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CHAPTER 8
Gauging US and EU Seal Regimes in the Arctic 
against Inuit Sovereignty
Michael Fakhri
1 Introduction
It is worth comparing US and EU Arctic power because both have had an 
ambivalent policy position on the Arctic; and both have recently started to 
devote significant political and financial resources towards a coherent Arctic 
strategy.
The US intensified its Arctic policy on 12 January 2009, when the George W. 
Bush administration released a presidential directive establishing a new pol-
icy for the Arctic region.1 On 10 May 2013, Barack Obama’s administration 
released a document entitled National Strategy for the Arctic Region supple-
menting the 2009 directive.2 With the directive and strategy in tow, the Obama 
administration was very politically active in the Arctic as highlighted by sev-
eral events: In May 2011, as part of the US chairmanship of the Arctic Council, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the Arctic Council ministerial 
meeting, held in Nuuk, Greenland accompanied by US Interior Secretary Ken 
Salazar. They were the first US Cabinet members to attend an Arctic Council 
meeting. In February 2014, the Obama administration appointed retired 
Coast Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. as the first Special Representative 
*  Michael Fakhri, Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, United States of 
America.
1   National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (2009). 
The first federal policy addressing the Arctic was by Richard Nixon in his two-page National 
Security Memorandum 144 (1972); this was followed by Ronald Regan with National Security 
Directive 90 (1993). In 1994, Bill Clinton issued Presidential Directive 26—but this was not pub-
lically circulated and received little attention. See Chanda L. Meek and Emily Russell, ‘The 
Challenges of American Federalism in a Rapidly Changing Arctic’ in Dawn Alexandrea Berry, 
Nigel Bowles and Halbert Jones (eds), Governing the North American Arctic (Palgrave Macmillan 
UK 2016); Michael T. Corgan, ‘The USA in the Arctic: Superpower or Spectator?’ in Lassi 
Heininen (ed), Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2014).
2   National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf> accessed 19 July 2017.
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for the Arctic Region. And in September 2015, during Obama’s trip to Alaska 
was the first time a US president travelled north of the Arctic Circle. It was also 
the longest and most engaged visit a sitting president made to Alaska since 
1923.3 All of these events were to some degree the US exercising its political 
muscle in international Arctic politics. This was also the Obama administra-
tion’s attempt to try to bring Arctic policy home and direct domestic attention 
due north. As Special Representative Papp recently stated, ‘[Americans] are 
detached from our Arctic. Alaskans understand it, but the rest of the country 
really doesn’t think about the United States being an Arctic nation.’4
Finland was the first to push the EU towards developing an Arctic policy 
when in 1997, as part of its first EU presidency, it put forward the Northern 
Dimension policy. This was then approved by the European Council in 2000.5 
The Northern Dimension policy raised more questions than answers and com-
mentators continued to wonder what the EU’s role in the Arctic was and should 
be.6 The European Commission then produced two official Communications 
3   Dermot Cole, ‘Since Harding in 1923, Presidential Stops in Alaska Have Brought the 
Unexpected and Memorable’ Alaska Dispatch News (Anchorage, 28 August 2015) <https://
www.adn.com/we-alaskans/article/presidential-journeys-alaska-and-lesser-momemts 
-history/2015/08/29/> accessed 19 July 2017; Klaus J Dodds, ‘Northward Ho! Obama, 
Diefenbaker and the North American Arctic’ (2016) 52(2) Polar Record 252; Ronald O’Rourke, 
Congressional Research Service, ‘Changes in the Arctic: Background Issues for Congress’ 
(R41153, 31 May 2016) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf> accessed 19 July 2017.
4   Erica Martinson, ‘Now Trending in DC: Arctic Issues’ Alaska Dispatch News (Washington, DC, 
10 June 2016) <https://www.adn.com/arctic/2016/06/10/now-trending-in-dc-arctic-issues/> 
accessed 19 July 2017. See also Philip E. Steinberg, ‘US Arctic Policy: Reproducing Hegemony 
in a Maritime Region’ in Robert W Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall (eds), International 
Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance (Cambria Press 2014); Donald 
R Rothwell, ‘The United States and Arctic Straits: The Northwest Passage and the Bering 
Strait’ in Suzanne Lalonde and Ted L. McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the 
Arctic Ocean (Brill 2015).
5   European Council, Action Plan for Northern Dimension with External and Cross-border Policies 
of the European Union 2000–2003 (14 June 2000) Doc. No. 9401/00 NIS 78.
6   Hanna Ojanen, ‘The EU and Its’ Northern Dimension’: An Actor in Search of a Policy, or a 
Policy in Search of an Actor?’ (2000) 5(3) European Foreign Affairs Review 359; Moritz Pieper 
and others, ‘The European Union as an Actor in Arctic Governance’ (2011) 16(2) European 
Foreign Affairs Review 227; Andreas Østhagen, ‘The European Union–An Arctic Actor?’ (2013) 
15(2) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 71; Kamrul Hossain, ‘EU Engagement in the 
Arctic: Do the Policy Responses from the Arctic States Recognise the EU as a Legitimate 
Stakeholder?’ (2015) 6(2) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 89.
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in 2008 and 2012.7 Despite these two Communications, most EU politicians and 
policymakers remained ambivalent to the Arctic. In response, some commen-
tators argued that it was in the EU’s interest to devise a rigorous Arctic policy 
that was more coherent than the piecemeal initiatives to date.8 On 27 April 
2016 the EU released its most articulate position to date with its Integrated 
Policy for the Arctic.9
While both the US and EU have published new policy documents, their 
relationship to the Arctic is still unclear. They have framed their Arctic political 
activity in terms of matters of environment, sustainable development energy 
and security and it remains to be seen how each authority will pursue an 
agenda that navigates these multiple—and at times competing—demands.10 
7    European Commission, The European Union and the Arctic Region (11 November 2008) 
<eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016; 
European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Developing a European Union Policy Towards the Arctic 
Region: Progress Since 2008 (26 June 2012) <https://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/
join_2012_19.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016.
8    Kristine Offerdal, ‘The EU in the Arctic: In Pursuit of Legitimacy and Influence’ (2011) 66(4) 
International Journal 861; Steffen Weber and Iulian Romanyshyn, ‘Breaking the Ice: The 
European Union and the Arctic’ (2011) 66(4) International Journal 849; Timo Koivurova 
and others, ‘The Present and Future Competence of the European Union in the Arctic’ 
(2012) 48(4) Polar Record 361; Antje Neumann, ‘European Interests as Regards Resource 
Exploitation in the Arctic: How Sustainable Are European Efforts in This Regard?’ (2012) 4 
Yearbook of Polar Law 619; Mar Campins Eritja, ‘European Union and the North: Towards 
the Development of an EU Arctic Policy, The Polar Oceans Governance’ (2013) 27 Ocean 
Yearbook 459; Kathrin Keil and Andreas Raspotnik, ‘The European Union’s Gateways 
to the Arctic’ (2014) 19(1) European Foreign Affairs Review 101; Cécile Pelaudeix, ‘China’s 
Interests in the Arctic and the EU’s Arctic Policy: Towards a Proactive EU Foreign Policy?’ 
(2015) 7 Yearbook of Polar Law 128; Vicente Lopez-Ibor Mayor, ‘The EU Needs a New Arctic 
Strategy’ (2016) 7(1) Global Policy 119.
9    Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 27 April 2016 on An Integrated 
European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN (2016) 21 <https://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_ 
region/docs/160427_joint-communication-an-integrated-european-union-policy-for-the-
arctic_en.pdf > accessed 17 October 2016.
10   Stéphane Roussel and John Erik Fossum, ‘The Arctic Is Hot Again in America and 
Europe: Introduction to Part I’ (2010) 65(4) International Journal 799; Patrizia Vigni, ‘The 
Governance of the Arctic Environment: The EU and US Contribution’ in Christine Bakker 
and Francesco Francioni (eds), The EU, the US and Global Climate Governance (Ashgate 
2014); Adam Stępień, ‘Internal Contradictions and External Anxieties: One “Coherent” 
Arctic Policy for the European Union?’ (2015) 7 Yearbook of Polar Law 249; Adam Stępień 
and Andreas Raspotnik, ‘The EU’s New Arctic Communication: Not-So-Integrated, Not-
So-Disappointing?’ (Arctic Institute, 2015) <http://www.arcticcentre.org/blogs/The-EU% 
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Moreover, within the US and EU, the degree of political interest in the Arctic 
remains uneven.11
Political uncertainty has not meant inaction and both the US and EU have 
enacted laws that have effected Arctic inhabitants. Some of the most contro-
versial legislation has been seal hunting moratoriums that have provided an 
exception for indigenous hunters. In this chapter, I compare the respective seal 
regimes—the US marine mammal conservation laws and the EU trade import 
ban—because seal hunting is a practice that not only provides sustenance and 
income to Inuit and other indigenous peoples, it is also defines self-hood in 
the Arctic. I therefore consider the US and EU’s respective seal regimes as a 
principal way each authority negotiates its relationship with Arctic indigenous 
communities and expresses power in the Arctic.
I will first explain my analytical approach. I then argue that even though 
the US and EU have new policies, their relationship to the Arctic remains 
uncertain partly because geographic concepts about the Arctic itself are com-
plex. After, I study the US seal regime and how it relates to indigenous hunting 
rights—I show that what is at stake in the governing of seals is sovereign power 
in the Arctic. From the experiences in Alaska, I treat sovereignty as a method of 
analysis to examine the EU seal regime.
2  Sovereignty as an Analytical Concept
Before commencing the legal study, I should explain how I use sovereignty as 
an analytical concept since the term is inherently contentious. One way to un-
derstand sovereignty is as an exclusive exercise of power over a determined 
territory by a single authority. But this concept does not capture the multiple 
ways that sovereignty is expressed and defined in practice.12 Sovereignty is 
E2%80%99s-new-Arctic-Communication-not-so-integrated,-not-so-disappointing/
ne2t4glg/65469626-3128-4ae2-96e3-c38b75cf387d> accessed 19 July 2017.
11   Philip E. Steinberg, ‘Maintaining Hegemony at a Distance: Ambivalence in US Arctic 
Policy’ in Richard C. Powell and Klaus Dodds (eds), Polar Geopolitics?: Knowledges, 
Resources and Legal Regimes (Edward Elgar 2014); see also Østhagen, n. 6 above.
12   Jean L. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law’ (2004) 18(3) Ethics 
& International Affairs 1; Antony Anghie, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law’ 
(2009) 5(1) Annual Review of Law and Social Science 291; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What Use 
for Sovereignty Today?’ (2011) 1(1) Asian Journal of International Law 61; Betsy Baker, 
‘International Law and the Arctic: How Territoriality, Human Rights, and Sovereignty 
Can Shape Sovereignty’ in Robert W Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall (eds), International 
Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance (Cambria Press 2014); Guy-
Serge Côté and Matthew Paterson, ‘Ecological Sovereignty and Arctic Politics’ in Robert W. 
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pluralist and relational, involves the regular negotiation of authority and juris-
diction, and constitutes a complex relationship to land.
While sovereignty is about the authority to rule over people and things with-
in a particular territorial jurisdiction, it is not necessarily established through 
military exercises, flag planting, or regular scientific expeditions. Instead, I take 
sovereignty as a historically contingent concept, which in the Arctic can be un-
derstood within the context of Inuit and other indigenous peoples’ ‘long history 
of struggle to gain recognition and respect.’13 I do not assume that sovereignty 
over land and territory in the Arctic (or anywhere for that matter) is something 
that is ever determinatively settled.14 Instead, it is a concept that people deploy 
in different ways when they argue over who gets to create the rules and insti-
tutions that govern territory. Thus, examining international legal and political 
disputes as disagreements amongst sovereigns may not completely capture po-
litical dynamics in a case; it may be more illuminating to understand what is at 
stake by examining how sovereign power is defined through those disputes.
In order to better understand the stakes it also helps to make a distinction 
between the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty, even though their 
meanings significantly overlap and people often use the terms interchange-
ably. I understand self-determination as a group’s ability to obtain their needs 
and express their desires within an existing system—to play the game in a way 
that serves their own interest. Sovereign power is a group’s ability to define the 
rules of the game and determine the space in which those rules apply.
I will show how due to a particular colonial and legal context, debates about 
seal hunting (and other hunting rights)—not claims in terms of land title or 
maritime boundaries—are one significant way that contemporary sovereignty 
is understood, contested, and negotiated in Alaska. By using sovereignty as way 
to organize legal concepts, the fight over seal hunting laws becomes a story 
about the broader jockeying for control and authority in the Arctic. The EU 
is not making direct claims to any land or seaways in the Arctic, but as two 
residents of the North Slope Borough in Alaska explain, ‘Regulation of animals 
Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall (eds), International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding 
Policy and Governance (Cambria Press 2014); Jessica M. Shadian, The Politics of Arctic 
Sovereignty: Oil, Ice, and Inuit Governance (Routledge 2014).
13   A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic (April 2009) para. 2.1 <http:// 
iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-Sovereignty-Declaration-
11x17.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016.
14   Contra Michael Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
10–16, 235; David L. VanderZwaag and Jonathan R. Edge, ‘Canada–Russia Relations in 
the Arctic: Conflictual Rhetoric, Cooperative Realities’ in Suzanne Lalonde and Ted L. 
McDorman (eds), International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean (Brill 2015) 242.
 �05Gauging US and EU Seal Regimes
extends to regulating the land and water on and in which the animals live, 
which then leads to “regulating” people by restricting their activities.’15 
The meaning of seal hunting and the implications of the law become even 
more complicated when considering how seal hunting connects to a global 
economy.16 Sovereignty, therefore, serves as a useful concept to examine how 
the EU’s new seal regime changes how different bodies exercise authority and 
jurisdiction over Inuit seal hunting practice and commerce.
Also, I take claims to sovereign power to be only as legitimate and as good 
as one’s relation to Arctic indigenous communities. Or as Mary Simons, former 
President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, famously put it in the context of Canada, 
‘Sovereignty begins at home.’17 The international corollary is that ‘Arctic sover-
eignty begins with Inuit [and indigenous peoples].’18 This is true for all Arctic 
states, but especially true for the US and EU since they have such a historically 
and geographically equivocal Arctic presence. Thus, the EU seal regime should 
be measured against contemporary Arctic legal and political developments in 
which indigenous peoples are granted at least autonomous legal and proce-
dural standing as a right.19
In sum—since indigenous peoples such as the Inuit have a clear claim to 
their presence in the Arctic, only by gauging and comparing the US and EU’s 
relationship to indigenous communities can one truly understand how US and 
EU power operates in the Arctic.20
15   Glenn W. Sheehan and Anne M. Jensen, ‘Emergent Cooperation, Or, Checkmate by 
Overwhelming Collaboration: Linear Feet of Reports, Endless Meetings’ in Rebecca 
Pincus and Saleem H. Ali (eds), Diplomacy on Ice (Yale University Press 2015) 215.
16   Gary Kofinas, ‘Subsistence Hunting in a Global Economy: Contributions of Northern 
Wildlife Co-Management to Community Economic Development’ (1993) 4 Making Waves: 
A Newsletter for Community Economic Development Practioners in Canada <http://arctic 
circle.uconn.edu/NatResources/subsistglobal.html> accessed 20 September 2016.
17   Mary Simon, ‘Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home’ (2009) 43(2) 
Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d’études canadiennes 250.
18   ICC Canada Staff, ‘Arctic Sovereignty Begins with Inuit’ (2008) 1(4) DRUM 1 <http:// 
iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/December-2008-Drum.pdf> accessed 
17 October 2016.
19   Timo Koivurova, ‘The Status and Role of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic International 
Governance’ (2011) 3 Yearbook of Polar Law 169; Leena Heinämäki, ‘Towards an Equal 
Partnership between Indigenous Peoples and States: Learning from Arctic Experiences?’ 
(2011) 3 Yearbook of Polar Law 193; Antje Neumann, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participation 
in the Context of Area Protection and Management: International Approaches versus 
Regional Approaches in the Arctic’ (2011) 3 Yearbook of Polar Law 247.
20   Inuit, like all people, are always defining and redefining the nature and meaning of 
that claim, see for example A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic 
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3 Multiple Understanding of the Arctic
Even though both the US and EU have new revitalized Arctic policy agendas, 
their geopolitical relationship to the Arctic remains a matter of debate. This 
stems in part by the fact the ‘Arctic’ is a multifaceted concept. The Arctic may 
be understood in various geographic terms: the area north of Arctic Circle 
(latitude 66 degrees, 32 minutes north), north of the tree line (which roughly 
follows the 10°C summer isotherm), or the territory surrounding the Arctic 
Ocean. Instead of thinking of the Arctic as having a particular boundary you 
get a better understanding of Arctic geopolitics if you think of it as ‘structur-
ally more of a multifold extension of the northerly regions of the eight Arctic 
states’.21 If you think in these terms, the Arctic is then defined by how those 
States and their citizens deploy a complex mix of domestic and international 
laws to govern the North.
By any geographic definition, the US Federal Government may claim to 
be an Arctic power because of the fact that part of Alaska is situated in the 
Arctic Circle. Nonetheless, many residents in Alaska will use the phrase ‘Alaska 
and the United States’ designating an indefinite relationship between what is 
now the State of Alaska and the 48 states that comprise the contiguous con-
tinental United States (the ‘Lower 48’).22 The European Commission makes 
geographic claims to the Arctic based on the fact that three of its members, 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have territory in the Arctic Circle. But that 
claim is fraught with political uncertainties: Denmark’s claim to Arctic geog-
raphy is based on the fact that Greenland and the Faroe Islands are countries 
within the Kingdom of Denmark. But Greenland’s autonomy and sovereignty 
increases every year, and the Faroese are divided over the future of their 
(April 2009) <http://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-
Sovereignty-Declaration-11x17.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016; Inuit Circumpolar Council 
Nuuk Declaration 2010 (1 July 2010) <http://inuit.org/icc-greenland/icc-declarations/
nuuk-declaration-2010/> accessed 17 October 2016. See also Fiammetta Borgia and Paolo 
Vargiu, ‘The Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic: Between the Right to Self-
Determination and a New Concept of Sovereignty?’ (2012) 4 Yearbook of Polar Law 189. Of 
course, the Inuit Circumpolar Council like all alliances includes its own internal disagree-
ments and tensions, see Gary N. Wilson and Heather A. Smith, ‘The Inuit Circumpolar 
Council in an Era of Global and Local Change’ (2011) 66(4) International Journal 909.
21   Timo Koivurova, ‘The Arctic Council: A Testing Ground for New International 
Environmental Governance’ (2012) 19(1) Brown Journal of World Affairs 131, 141.
22   See the following for a history of the complexities of Alaska statehood, Gregory W. Kimura 
(ed), Alaska at 50: The Past, Present, and Future of Alaska Statehood (University of Alaska 
Press 2010).
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constitutional relationship with Denmark thereby complicating Denmark’s 
Arctic geography.23 Moreover, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, though part 
of the Kingdom of Denmark, are not members of the EU. Finland and Sweden 
are relative newcomers to the EU, joining in 1995 and have showed some lead-
ership within the EU to develop an Arctic policy.24 Nonetheless, Sweden only 
recently began presenting itself as an ‘Arctic’ nation in foreign relations and 
developed its first significant Arctic strategy only in 2011;25 Finland articulated 
its Arctic policy only in 2010.26
The Arctic may also be understood as the space comprised by the multi-
ple institutions that focus on Arctic life, politics, and geography.27 The Arctic 
Council, since its inception in 1996, has become a principal intergovernmental 
forum that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments and indigenous 
23   R. Adler-Nissen, ‘The Faroe Islands: Independence Dreams, Globalist Separatism and 
the Europeanization of Postcolonial Home Rule’ (2014) 49(1) Cooperation and Conflict 
55; U.P. Gad, ‘Greenland: A Post-Danish Sovereign Nation State in the Making’ (2014) 
49(1) Cooperation and Conflict 98; Jeppe Strandsbjerg, ‘Making Sense of Contemporary 
Greenland: Indigeneity, Resources and Sovereignty’ in Richard C. Powell and Klaus 
Dodds (eds), Polar Geopolitics?: Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes (Edward Elgar 
2014).
24   See Ojanen, n. 6 above; Ida Holdhus, ‘Developing An EU Arctic Policy: Towards a 
Coherent Approach?’ (Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies, University of 
Oslo 2010) <https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/12984> accessed 19 July 2017.
25   Sverker Sörlin, ‘The Reluctant Arctic Citizen: Sweden and the North’ in Richard C Powell 
and Klaus Dodds (eds), Polar Geopolitics?: Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes 
(Edward Elgar Pub 2014). On understanding the EU’s involvement in the Arctic as a mix 
between external and internal factors see Clive Archer, ‘The Arctic and the European 
Union’ in Robert W. Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall (eds), International Relations and the 
Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance (Cambria Press 2014).
26   Lassi Heininen, ‘Finland as an Arctic and European State’ in Robert W. Murray and 
Anita Dey Nuttall (eds), International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and 
Governance (Cambria Press 2014).
27   The Arctic Ocean is primarily governed under the auspices of the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. A series of relevant ‘sub-regional’ entities include the Nordic 
Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, West Nordic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 
Northern Dimension, and Council of Baltic Sea States, see Alyson J.K. Bailes and 
Kristmundur Th. Ólafsson, ‘Northern Europe and the Arctic Agenda: Roles of Nordic and 
Other Sub-Regional Organizations’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 45. On the EU’s role in 
some of these organizations see, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Kristmundur Th. Ólafsson, ‘The 
EU Crossing Arctic Frontiers: the Barents Euro—Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, 
and EU-West Nordic Relations’ Chapter 3.
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peoples.28 It is constituted by eight Member Countries and six indigenous 
Permanent Participants, all of which occupy territory in the Arctic by any geo-
graphic definition.29 The Arctic Council allows States and organizations to seek 
official observer status: to date this includes 13 non-Arctic States,30 13 intergov-
ernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations,31 and 13 non-governmental 
organizations.32 The fact that the number of official observer applicants is 
increasing every year is indicative of the fact that the Arctic Council has 
quickly become a site of global focus and politics. In fact, some Arctic Council 
members worry that their power will be diluted if the Arctic Council member-
ship is opened up too widely.33
The European Commission has been able to send observers to Arctic 
Council meetings on an ad-hoc basis, which means it is treated like other 
28   Timo Koivurova and Pitor Graczyk, ‘The Future of the Arctic Council: Navigating Between 
Sovereignty and Security’ in Robert W. Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall (eds), International 
Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance (Cambria Press 2014); 
Kristin Bartenstein, ‘The Arctic Region Council Revisited: Inspiring Future Development 
of the Arctic Council’ in Suzanne Lalonde and Ted L. McDorman (eds), International Law 
and Politics of the Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat Pharand (Brill Nijhoff 2015). On 
the tension between regional and Arctic Council governance see Valur Ingimundarson, 
‘Managing a Contested Region: The Arctic Council and the Politics of Arctic Governance’ 
(2014) 4(1) The Polar Journal 183.
29   Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.
30   France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, People’s 
Republic of China, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India.
31   International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, International Federation of Red Cross 
& Red Crescent Societies, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission, OSPAR Commission, Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians 
of the Arctic Region, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations 
Development Program, United Nations Environment Program, World Meteorological 
Organization, and West Nordic Council.
32   Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Institute of North America, Associ-
ation of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation Union, International Arctic 
Science Committee, International Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union 
for Circumpolar Health, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, National Geo-
graphic Society, Northern Forum, Oceana University of the Arctic, and World Wide Fund 
for Nature-Global Arctic Program.
33   Yareth Rosen, ‘How Many Observers Can Arctic Council Handle?’ The Independent Barents 
Observer (Fairbanks, AK, 16 March 2016) <http://thebarentsobserver.com/arctic/2016/03/
how-many-observers-can-arctic-council-handle> accessed 29 July 2016.
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observers in practice but has to apply every time it wants to attend. Since 2008, 
it has set its sights on trying to receive accreditation as a more permanent 
Observer to the Arctic Council and put its bid forward at the Kiruna Ministerial 
meeting in 2013.34 This can be understood as the EU’s attempt to increase its 
prominence in Arctic geopolitics.35 But Arctic Council members have pointed 
to the EU seal regime and its insensitivity to indigenous hunters as a princi-
pal reason to block EU’s membership bid. Until recently, the EU’s Observer 
status has been vetoed by Canada as an explicit response to the seal hunt 
dispute (described below).36 In 2014, Canada dropped its opposition to the 
EU’s application to the Arctic Council after striking a deal on implementing 
exemptions for indigenous peoples from the EU seal regime37 and as part of its 
bilateral trade negotiation (Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement).38 
Nonetheless, some Greenland representatives in Danish Parliament called for 
their government to veto the EU’s bid for the Arctic Council if the EU did not 
do away with its seal regime banning the importation of sealskin, even with an 
indigenous exception.39 The EU’s membership was left off the agenda (along 
with other observer applications) at the 2015 Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council in Iqaluit, and only Switzeralnd was the only national government to 
win observer status at the 2019 Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, the EU will now 
have to wait at least until the next Ministerial meeting in 2017 in Finland.
34   European Commission, The European Union and the Arctic Region (11 November 2008) 
COM(2008) 763 final <eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf> accessed 
17 October 2016.
35   Andreas Østhagen, ‘In or Out? The Symbolism of the EU’s Arctic Council Bid’ [2013] 
Arctic Institute <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/in-or-out-symbolism-of-eus-arctic/> 
accessed 3 August 2016.
36   ‘Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban’, Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation News (29 April 2009) http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/
canada-against-eu-entry-to-arctic-council-because-of-seal-trade-ban-1.806188> accessed 
29 July 2016.
37   Duncan Depledge, ‘The European Union in the Arctic’ <http://www.worldpolicy.org/
blog/2015/06/24/european-union-arctic> accessed 19 September 2016.
38   European Commission Press Release, ‘Canada-EU Summit—A new era in Canada-EU 
relations: Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the Presidents of the 
European Council and the European Commission’ (26 September 2014) <http://europa 
.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-288_en.htm> accessed 24 October 2016.
39   Kevin McGwin, ‘EU Seal Ban: A Seal of Disapproval’ The Arctic Journal (Nuuk, 18 February 
2015). Russia is blocking the EU on more geopolitical terms, see Duncan Depledge, 
‘The EU and the Arctic Council’ (European Council on Foreign Affairs, 20 April 2015) 
<http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eu_and_the_arctic_council3005> accessed 
18 September 2016.
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The EU has some pan-Arctic institutional presence through its parlia-
mentarians who are members of the Conference of Parliamentarians of the 
Arctic Region. The Conference views the Arctic Council as the primary forum 
for Arctic cooperation. The Standing Committee (which includes one EU par-
liamentarian amongst a total of 11 members) works to promote the work of 
the Arctic Council and participates in the meetings of the Arctic Council as an 
Observer.
The US, because of its possession of Alaska, was invited to be a founding 
member of the Arctic Council. While the US was skeptical of the need for the 
Arctic Council it nonetheless joined at the Council’s inception in 1996. But like 
the EU, it now has significantly increased the political resources it puts towards 
participating in the Arctic Council, especially since it held the chairmanship 
from 2015 to 2017.40
4  The US and Alaska
4.1 Hunting Rights and Sovereignty
In order to understand US Arctic presence and policy, one must understand 
the historical legal relationship between the US and Alaska. In Alaska, the 
meaning and delineation of sovereign power remains a live debate. In the past, 
like today, hunting rights have played a central role in territorial debates over 
Alaska.41 I provide brief historical context as to how sovereignty in Alaska is 
the product of constant negotiation and is in practice dispersed across an array 
of authorities. From within this context, I then discuss the legal regime gov-
erning marine mammal hunting and provisions made for indigenous hunting 
rights as it relates to seals.
In Alaska, sovereignty has been the means through which indigenous peo-
ples and settler colonists have defined their relationship between each other, 
and negotiated authority and jurisdiction over land. Indigenous claims to 
sovereignty in Alaska today arise from assertions of the inherent powers of 
self-governing communities that have lived with particular lands from time 
immemorial. Indigenous communities first engaged with sovereignty as a 
40   Diddy R.M. Hitchins, ‘An Alaskan Perspective: The Relationship between the US and 
Canada in the Arctic’ (2011) 66(4) International Journal 971.
41   Hiroo Nakajima, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and Russia: American Views of Czar Alexander I and 
Their Influence upon Early Russian-American Relations’ (2007) 31(3) Diplomatic History 
439; ‘The North Pacific Sealing Convention’ (1911) 5(4) American Journal of International 
Law 1025; Garrett Boyle, ‘Mutiny against the MMPA: A Look at Alaska SB 60’ (2013) 30(2) 
Alaska Law Review 207.
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legal and political concept tied to notions of nationhood and the state in their 
encounter with European migrants. The US lays legal claim to Alaska, and by 
extension to the Arctic, through the colonial doctrine of discovery.42 It began 
when the US purchased what is now the State of Alaska from Russia in 1867 
through the Treaty of Cession.43 Article 3 of the treaty deemed the tribes to 
be uncivilized and granted the US Federal government the power to subject 
almost all aboriginal peoples in the area to US federal law.44 Thus, the treaty 
followed the logic that Russia was the initial discovering nation, and the US 
became its successor to legal title of the land used and occupied by indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous tribes were enraged that no one sought their consent 
or even consulted with them. The US Federal Government’s legal claim was 
that indigenous tribes only retained the right to the use and occupancy of the 
land as if they were tenants; this conflicted with native understanding of their 
relationship to the land.45 As it stands today in US law, indigenous communities 
retain the sovereign power of self-government which cannot be extinguished; 
but Congress in effect passes laws that alters indigenous authority and jurisdic-
tion. Herein lies the space where Alaska Natives negotiate with or resist against 
US Federal law to define their sovereign power. If we understand authority as 
the power over someone or something, and jurisdiction as the scope of said 
power, Congress and the US Federal Government significantly control the 
levers of indigenous sovereignty.46 While indigenous peoples as US citizens 
have some leverage with the executive and legislative branch of US govern-
ment, like for any citizen, this is power is determined by how well people can 
organize themselves and exert collective will within the national system.
The US federal government has recognized 229 Alaska Native govern-
ments, but without specifically identified territory. The result is that questions 
over sovereign powers of authority and jurisdiction most often arise through 
conflicts over subsistence hunting. In fact, subsistence and self-government 
remains to be the most legally complex and politically heated issue in Alaska 
42   Robert T. Anderson, ‘Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished Business’ (2007) 
43(1) Tulsa Law Review 17.
43   Treaty Concerning the Cession of Russian Possessions in North America (30 March 1867) 
15 Stat. 539, TS No. 301.
44   The US considered Unangans to be ‘civilized’ Russian subjects, and ostensibly could 
choose Russian or American citizenship through the Treaty. In practice, the United States 
did not recognize the civil rights of Unangans until 1966, see Barbara Boyle Torrey and 
Agafon Krukoff, Slaves of the Harvest: The Story of the Pribilof Aleuts (Tanadgusix Corp 
1978).
45   See Anderson, n. 42 above.
46   Benjamin W. Thompson, ‘The De Facto Termination of Alaska Native Sovereignty: An 
Anomaly in an Era of Self-Determination’ (1999) 24(2) American Indian Law Review 421.
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today. But this is not a new issue. Ever since 1867, tribes in Alaska have been 
fighting for hunting, gathering, and land rights.47 The struggle was made more 
acute after the Second World War when Alaska native peoples, demanding 
more land rights from the US federal government, came up against non-native 
desires to take of advantage of the postwar economic boom.48 When Alaska 
became a state in 1959, the federal government deliberately avoided the issue. 
Instead, it authorized the newly created state to select 103.35 million acres of 
‘vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved’ land as its own from federal public 
land (representing about 28% of Alaska’s total land base); while at the same 
time it recognized but did not define native rights.49 The clash between Native 
tribes and the new State government was then over which lands were ‘vacant, 
unappropriated, and unreserved’ and which were lands necessary and part of 
Native subsistence use.50
Today, this conflict continues between Native governments and the 
State government over different understandings of hunting rights. Alaska’s 
Constitution does not recognize indigenous rights as such or grant any prefer-
ence for subsistence hunting. Moreover, the State of Alaska’s Department of 
Fish and Game has had a bias in favor of sport fishing and hunting by urban 
non-natives.51 The US government did not address Native hunting rights until 
the passing of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which 
forms the basis of the modern relationship between tribes in Alaska and the 
US Federal government.52 The act fundamentally transformed indigenous rela-
tions with the US Federal government and significantly curtailed Native sover-
eign power.53 First, the ANCSA extinguished Aboriginal title claims based on 
prior conveyances, use and occupancy, right, or foreign law.54 This, however, 
was not an effort to permanently abolish Native rights; instead the ANCSA then 
redefined indigenous powers of self-determination. In lieu of title claims, all 
Alaska Natives alive on 18 December 1971 received the right to obtain stock 
47   David S. Case and David A. Voluck, Alaska Natives and American Laws (3rd ed, University 
of Alaska Press 2012) 24–33.
48   Sophie Theriault and others, ‘The Legal Protection of Subsistence: A Prerequisite of Food 
Security for the Inuit of Alaska’ (2005) 22(1) Alaska Law Review 35.
49   Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. 85–508, 72 Stat. 339 (7 July 1958) sections 4, 6.
50   See Theriault and others, n. 48 above; Anderson, n. 42 above.
51   See Case and Voluck, n. 47 above, 293–294.
52   Pub. L. No. 92–203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h 
(2000)).
53   Dalee Sambo Dorough, ‘Inuit of Alaska: Current Issues’ in Natalia Loukacheva (ed), Polar 
Law Textbook (Nordic Council of Ministers 2010).
54   43 USC § 1603.
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in one of the newly created thirteen regional corporations and in more than 
two hundred village corporations. The ANCSA conveyed approximately forty-
five million acres of land to the Alaska Native Corporations through fee title, 
along with a cash payment of almost $1 billion.55 Thus, land in Alaska was and 
remains governed in part through Alaska Native corporations created by the 
ANCSA and in turn through Alaska state corporate law.
The ANCSA also extinguished ‘any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that 
may exist.’56 Then, US Congress requested that the Secretary of Interior and 
State of Alaska take positive measures to protect native hunting rights. This 
did not happen and the question of subsistence hunting was left unaddressed 
(along with other key issues such as federal services and Native government). 
While Native tribes retained their sovereign hunting rights, the meaning and 
definition of those rights remained a matter to be decided by tribes in their 
debates with the Federal government through Congress and disagreements 
with the Federal government through the courts.
The 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)57 was 
an attempt to further settle Alaska Native hunting and fishing rights. It did this 
by granting exclusive access to hunting, gathering, and fishing to all rural resi-
dents. Thus, it did not create rights to Native peoples in law and left the issue 
to the fact that most rural residents are Native. In 1989, the Alaska Supreme 
Court found this provision to be unconstitutional since it made a distinction 
between rural and non-rural Alaskans.58 To date, distinct Native subsistence 
hunting rights are not granted in positive law as a rule and are only provided 
through exceptions to wildlife management statutes such as the 2000 Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act, the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and the 1973 
Endangered Species Act.59
4.2  The Economy of Seal Hunting Rights and Indigenous Sovereignty
In Alaska, seal hunting is at the intersection of three aspects of village econ-
omies: subsistence, government transfer, and the market economy.60 It also 
has a broader existential meaning in which seal hunting is how indigenous 
55   Case and Voluck, n. 47 above, 35, 75, 79.
56   43 USC § 1603(b).
57   Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96–487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233. (2000)).
58   McDowell v State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
59   Theriault and others, n. 48 above.
60   Lee Huskey, ‘Alaska’s Village Economies’ (2004) 24(3) Journal of Land Resources & 
Environmental Law 435.
Fakhri��4
groups in the Arctic socially and culturally define themselves. In other words, 
seal hunting in the Arctic is a practice that is embedded within several 
economies—and those economies are conjoined through indigenous under-
standings and expressions of sovereign power and rights of self-determination. 
Indigenous groups make choices through this matrix to determine what seal 
hunting means and how it should be valued, and often those choices are con-
ditioned by law.
US law grants Indigenous peoples in Alaska seal hunting rights as an 
exception to the MMPA. US Congress first enacted this on 21 October 1972.61 
It prohibited US citizens on the high seas from harassing, hunting, capturing, 
or killing (‘taking’) protected species or anyone doing the same in US waters. 
It also prohibited importation of marine mammals and marine mammal 
products into the US.62 To some degree, US Congress passed the MMPA as a 
response to a public animal cruelty campaign against the hunting of harp seal 
pups in Canada, and general concerns about other marine mammals.63 Like 
the current EU seal regime, it was not specifically a response to species that 
were endangered. Native groups, in order to exercise their hunting rights, had 
to seek permission from the appropriate Federal Secretary.64
In 1994, the MMPA was significantly amended marking a shift in conserva-
tion policy from hunting moratorium to wildlife management. It also provided 
Native peoples more opportunities to define their hunting rights and be part 
of that management.65 As usual in the case when rights are granted, this did 
not resolve anything and instead signaled the beginning of a long, costly, and 
complex negotiation and contest between different federal and state agencies, 
sovereign tribes, and non-native hunters.66 What follows is an examination of 
how the law configured the political, social, economic, and social attributes 
of hunting (and the concomitant debates) in a particular way.
The MMPA operates within a convoluted system of government manage-
ment. After the 1989 Alaska Supreme Court ruling, ‘the federal government 
took over the management of fish and wildlife for subsistence purposes on 
61   16 USC §§ 1361–1423h (2000).
62   16 USC § 1371(a).
63   H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 USCCAN 4144.
64   Other exceptions include taking for the purpose of scientific, commercial, and ecological 
activities.
65   Susan C. Alker, ‘The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to 
Conservation’ (1996) 44(2) UCLA Law Review 527.
66   Kate Wynne, ‘The Marine Mammal Protection Act: An Overview of Recent Changes’ 
Alaska’s Marine Resources (Fairbanks, September 1995) <http://nsgd.gso.uri.edu/aku/
akug95003.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016. For the initial implementation process, 
$2.5 million were authorized to set up the new system but were not released immediately.
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Alaska public lands in 1990 (approximately 60% of Alaska lands), leaving the 
state to manage the remaining 40% of Alaska lands, including Native lands.’67 
The result is that hunting rights are governed by multiple legal regimes through 
a federal and state management system that is ‘complicated and sometimes 
conflicting.’68
In sum, hunting rights to date are entangled in three, uneasy bundles of 
sovereign power: Native-US Federal relations, Native-State of Alaska relations, 
and the constitutional division of power between the Federal and State gov-
ernment. Since tribes in Alaska are within the fold of US imperial adventures, 
US executive power and local tribes negotiate and contest the meaning, limits, 
and extent of sovereign power through US administrative law and not inter-
national law.69 It is helpful to understand the administrative structure before 
turning to the actual legislation.
The amended MMPA provides a structure to implement the Alaska Native 
hunting right exception, authorizing (but not requiring) the US Federal govern-
ment to develop a co-management system with Alaska Native organizations.70 
In 1997, the Indigenous People’s Council for Marine Mammals (a coalition 
of Tribal marine mammal commissions/councils and other Native organiza-
tions in Alaska), U.S. Geological Survey Biological Resource Division (which 
falls under the auspices of the Department of Interior), Fish and Wildlife 
Service (Department of Interior), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA Fisheries is under the auspices of the Department of 
Commerce) developed a Memorandum of Agreement to provide the founda-
tion and direction for the use of co-management funds provided under the 
MMPA.71 The result has been a number of place-specific or animal-specific 
67   Alaska Federation of Natives, 2016 State Priorities <www.nativefederation.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2016/02/2016statepriorities-2.5.2016.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016.
68   Ibid.; Case and Voluck, n. 47 above, 265; Jordan Diamond, Greta Swanson and Kathryn 
Mengerink, ‘Rights and Roles: Alaska Natives and Ocean and Coastal Subsistence 
Resources’ (2012) 8(2) Florida A&M University Law Review 219.
69   There is, however, a strong argument made in the US that international law is increasingly 
becoming the platform from which Alaska Natives, and all indigenous groups in the US, 
to assert their rights in relation to the US government, see Dorough, n. 53 above; Case and 
Voluck, n. 47 above, 1–20.
70   16 USC § 1388.
71   Memorandum of Agreement for Negotiation of Marine Mammal Protect Act Section 
119 Agreements (August 1997) <https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/
umbrellaagr97.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016; this was updated with Memorandum 
of Agreement for Negotiation of Marine Mammal Protect Act Section 119 Agreements 
(October 2006) <https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/umbrellaagr06.pdf> 
accessed 17 October 2016.
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cooperative agreements and concomitant agencies.72 The result is a com-
plex system of shared responsibility in which each commission or committee 
is a place of back-and-forth discussion between the US Federal government 
and Native tribal councils—the theory being that these are ‘government-to- 
government’ negotiations and neither has principal control over decision-
making. The meaning and effect of co-management is not only a matter of 
administrative design but also arises through implementation. For example, 
State troopers will sometimes not cite someone for a violation and leave 
the matter to the appropriate tribal council. In sum, co-management can be 
understood as the complex, pluralist legal regime through which questions of 
authority and jurisdiction over hunting are decided both through agreement, 
implementation, and interpretation.73
The US government in many respects defines Native rights, but Alaska 
Natives assert those rights as a matter sovereign power because of pre-colonial 
contact history. The MMPA defines Alaska Native organization to mean a 
group designated by or formed through US law, which represents or consists 
of Indians, Aleuts, or Eskimos residing in Alaska. Thus, tribes retain inherent 
sovereignty but derive their standing in government-to-government negotia-
tions from the US itself; they may, for example, obtain official designation as 
an Alaska Native Tribe, authorization through a co-management bodies, or 
legal personality through incorporation. An Alaska Native, as a US citizen, may 
also assert her Native rights by suing the appropriate federal or state agency in 
court, thus granting the final word on hunting rights to the US judiciary.74
The US government expresses its sovereignty through two agencies which 
have different jurisdiction, each of which negotiates with Alaska Native orga-
nizations. The Secretary of Commerce (through NOAA Fisheries) has jurisdic-
tion over mammals that are members of the order of Cetacea and members 
of the order Pinnipedia (other than walruses). The Secretary of the Interior 
(through the US Fish and Wildlife Service) has jurisdiction over all other 
marine mammals.75 Because each agency operates out of its own Federal 
72   Alaska Beluga Whale Committee, Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Aleut Marine 
Mammal Commission, Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission, Cook Inlet Marine Mam-
mal Council (disbanded in 2012), Ice Seal Committee, Traditional Council of St. George 
Island, and Tribal Government of St. Paul.
73   Eric Smith, ‘Some Thoughts on Comanagement’ (1996) 4(1) Hastings West-Northwest 
Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 1.
74   See for e.g. John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001).
75   16 USC § 1362(12)(A). In fact, the legislation grants NOAA the jurisdiction and grants the 
power to whatever Secretary of the department in which NOAA is operating.
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department, they each operate within a distinct institutional history, has a dif-
ferent Secretary with her or his own particular agenda, and must respond to 
different political pressures. As a result, each agency enforces the law in its 
own way.
The US seal regime’s laws are just as complex as its administrative structure. 
Through the MMPA, Congress first delimits indigenous hunting rights in Alaska 
in terms of ethno-cultural membership and geography. It does this by desig-
nating and defining the category of ‘Alaska Native’ and only granting hunting 
rights to ‘any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo who resides in Alaska and who dwells 
on the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean’. Then, Congress 
grants anyone who meets these defined identities the right to take any marine 
mammal if the taking meets the following criteria:
(1)  is for subsistence purposes; or
(2)  is done for purposes of creating and selling authentic native articles of 
handicrafts and clothing …; and
(3)  in each case, is not accomplished in a wasteful manner.76
Last, the US Federal government retains final authority to restrict or revoke 
this hunting right if the appropriate Secretary determines ‘any species or stock 
of marine mammal subject to taking by Indians, Aleuts, or Eskimos to be 
depleted.’77 In other words, the Secretary retains a conservation trump card 
against Alaska Natives.
Each one these points have been legally contentious. First, on the ques-
tion of who is allowed to hunt and the category of ‘Alaska Native’: unlike the 
Alaskan Constitution, the MMPA singles out Alaska Natives and in doing so 
recognizes indigenous sovereignty to some degree. What makes the issue more 
antagonistic amongst people in Alaska is the fact that hunting rights are now 
embroiled in a constitutional debate that was triggered when the Alaska 
Supreme Court ruled in 1989 that ANILCA’s provision privileging rural—and 
mostly Native—residents was unconstitutional because it contravened the 
‘equal access’ clause of the Alaska Constitution.78 Native and pro-Native 
groups argue that the Alaska Constitution should be amended to bring it 
into compliance with ANILCA; while non-native groups argue that ANILCA 
76   16 USC § 1371(b).
77   Ibid.
78   McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989).
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should be amended to bring it into compliance with the Alaska Constitution.79 
Additionally, some conservationists oppose the government granting Native 
tribes subsistence rights because they worry that such rights will ‘open the 
door’ to commercial hunting.80 From another perspective, if an Alaska Native 
no longer ‘dwells on the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean’, 
moving for example to an urban center like Fairbanks in the interior of the 
State, this suggests that she or he will likely lose their hunting rights.
Next, hunting practice criteria are also a matter of significant disagree-
ment: hunting must be for the purpose of subsistence or making authentic 
handicrafts/clothing, and is not wasteful. To start with the overarching require-
ment of non-wastefulness, the criticism has been that ‘interpretation has been 
ambiguous, and enforcement arbitrary’, and such debates have eroded the 
relationship between indigenous hunters and government managers.81
ANILCA identifies the elements to subsistence, requiring Alaska Natives 
to show the hunt is a matter of economic and physical reliance, cultural or 
social value, and custom and tradition.82 Not only are there legal debates over 
the meaning of subsistence, but there are also socio-economic questions as to 
whether subsistence hunting should be treated more like a commercial com-
modity or as a communal right for Alaska villages.83 The more acute problem, 
79   Alaska Federation of Natives, 2016 State Priorities <www.nativefederation.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2016/02/2016statepriorities-2.5.2016.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016; Jack 
B. McGee, ‘Subsistence Hunting and Fishing in Alaska: Does ANILCA’s Rural Subsistence 
Priority Really Conflict with the Alaska Constitution?’ (2010) 27(2) Alaska Law Review 221.
80   Alma Soongi Beck, ‘The Makah’s Decision to Reinstate Whaling: When Conservationists 
Clash with Native Americans over and Ancient Hunting Tradition’ (1996) 11(2) Journal of 
Environmental Law & Litigation 359, 362.
81   Martin Robards and Julie Lurman Joly, ‘Interpretation of Wasteful Manner within the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act and Its Role in Management of the Pacific Walrus’ (2007) 
13(2) Ocean & Coastal Law Journal 171.
82   16 USC § 3113. See also Jennifer L. Tomsen, ‘Traditional Resource Uses and Activities: 
Articulating Values and Examining Conflicts in Alaska’ (2002) 19(1) Alaska Law Review 167; 
Case and Voluck, n. 47 above, 266–267. The Katie Johns litigation remains one the most 
politically contentious, legally complicated, and popularly (in)famous series of cases 
on federal, tribal and state interests over jurisdiction of Alaska Native subsistence 
rights, John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). See Heather R. Kendall-Miller 
‘Katie John—Her Life and Legacy’ (Native American Rights Fund) <www.narf.org/cases/
katie-john-v-norton/> 17 October 2016.
83   Jeremy David Sacks, ‘Culture, Cash or Calories: Interpreting Alaska Native Subsistence 
Rights’ (1995) 12(2) Alaska Law Review 247; William M. Bryner, ‘Toward a Group Rights 
Theory for Remedying Harm to the Subsistence Culture of Alaska Natives’ (1995) 12(2) 
Alaska Law Review 293.
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however, is the sovereign power question of who gets to decide what is sub-
sistence hunting. In the division of power in Alaska, the State authority and 
legal regime is often rigid and backward looking, while the Federal system of 
co-management with tribes tends to be more accommodating and responsive 
to indigenous claims.84 Nonetheless, Federal conservationist legislation that 
carves out indigenous exception such as the MMPA do not grant tribes a man-
datory role in the federal government’s decision-making on whether and how 
much to limit subsistence hunting. Moreover, the Federal government makes 
these decisions through executive orders, which does not provide tribes with 
clarity since these orders are more easily made and unmade than legislation 
(the corollary is that they are more negotiable). More problematic is the fact 
that each federal agency has their own concept of when or how they engage in 
co-management consultations.85
The requirement that hunting be for the purpose of making ‘authentic’ 
handicraft or clothes, the other criteria for allowable indigenous hunting, is 
vexing. One Federal agency (Fish and Wildlife Service) decided to only look to 
the past and limit ‘authentic’ articles to those ‘commonly produced’ before the 
enactment of the MMPA (in this case it was products made from sea otter skin). 
The Federal Court of Appeal struck down their legislation and held that legis-
lation sufficiently defined authentic native handicrafts as being ‘made at least 
in part of “natural materials”, and … [produced] … in traditional native ways, 
such as weaving, carving, and stitching.’ Thus, the court held that the agency 
had no discretion to impose what it deemed to be as additional requirements.86
The final way that Congress delineates its authority over hunting rights is 
through wildlife protection powers. While seals are not currently endangered, 
this may change as the climate rapidly changes raising the issue of seal protec-
tion in the future. Alaska Natives’ rights are respected, however, by the fact that 
the Federal Government are accountable to them (and the courts) a very spe-
cific burden of proof showing ‘substantial evidence on the basis of the record 
as a whole’ that a species or stock of marine mammal is depleted.87 The US 
Federal government rarely exercises this authority, but when it does the politi-
cal stakes are high. This is exemplified in the case when the Federal government 
banned all gray whale hunting on conservation grounds contra their treaty 
with the Makah tribe in the Northern Pacific (in the State of Washington); the 
84   See Theriault and others, n. 48 above; Diamond, Swanson and Mengerink, n. 68 above.
85   Elizaveta Barrett Ristroph, ‘Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence Rights’ (2010) 1(1) Arizona 
Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 47, 71–72.
86   Didrickson v United States Department of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992).
87   16 USC § 1371(b)(3).
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Tribe forcefully responded through a long legal battle and extra-administrative 
measures.88
The reality of everyday life is that communities’ cultural, economic, and 
social practices and ensuing meanings are always responding to changing 
conditions.89 Subsistence hunting, like all community practices, is embed-
ded in the past but also alive in the present. Thus, as indigenous communi-
ties change so does their sense of subsistence hunting’s meaning and purpose. 
What is consistent is that subsistence hunting remains central to indigenous 
self-understanding in Alaska.
The legal complexity of the seal regime in Alaska is the result of that fact 
ever since statehood in 1959 sovereignty remains—in the words of a doyen of 
indigenous law in the US—a matter of ‘unfinished business’ in Alaska.90 And 
as long as it remains a matter of ‘unfinished business’ the US’s claims to sover-
eignty in the Arctic will be politically tenuous.
5 EU Seal Regime
In 2009, the EU enacted regulations whose aim was to ban the importation of 
seal products into its market.91 It made exceptions for indigenous communi-
ties, marine resource management, and personal use by travelers. The indig-
enous community exception only allowed seal products that result from Inuit 
or other indigenous communities if they met the following criteria:
(a)  seal hunts conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities which 
have a tradition of seal hunting in the community and in the geographi-
cal region;
88   See Beck, n. 80 above; Paul Gottleib, ‘U.S. Halts Makah Whaling Study After Seven Years 
Over “New Scientific Information” ’ (Peninsula Daily News, 23 May 2012) <www.peninsu-
ladailynews.com/article/20120523/NEWS/305239987> accessed 13 July 2016.
89   Chanda L. Meek, ‘Comparing Marine Mammal Co-Management Regimes in Alaska: Three 
Aspects of Institutional Performance’ (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Alaska 2009) 
<http://www.uaf.edu/files/rap/Meek%20dissertation%2009.pdf> accessed 2 August 2016; 
Ristroph, n. 85 above.
90   See Anderson, n. 42 above.
91   Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 on trade in seal products, [2009] OJ 
L286/36 (Basic Regulation). The exceptions are contained in Commission Regulation 
(EU) No. 737/2010 laying down detailed rules for implementation of Regulation (EC) 
No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products, 
[2010] OJ L216/1 [Implementing Regulation].
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(b)  seal hunts the products of which are at least partly used, consumed or 
processed within the communities according to their traditions;
(c)  seal hunts which contribute to the subsistence of the community.92
This seal ban created an international maelstrom including a series of cases 
before the EU courts and WTO. I first provide a summary of these cases as part 
of the larger political context surrounding the 2009 EU seal regime since the 
current 2015 seal regime was drafted in response to these cases. Using the sov-
ereignty analytic developed in the previous section on Alaska, I then examine 
the process that led to the current seal regime and the text of the regime itself.
5.1 Seal Ban Cases
Inuit groups in Canada were frustrated that they had no practical way to 
take advantage of the indigenous community exception because the EU 
did not create any administrative structure to clarify and enforce the mea-
sure in a way that applied to them. As exemplified in Alaska, the terms of the 
measure were not self-explanatory and also required significant administra-
tive structure in order to be effective. The EU did put into place a mecha-
nism that allowed (the mostly Inuit) Greenlandic hunters to benefit from the 
exception.93 Nonetheless, Inuit groups in Canada and Greenland came 
together in their broader concern that even with an indigenous exception, 
such legislation would cause the entire seal market to collapse. In alliance with 
all seal hunters they called for an end to the whole seal regime.
This position was partly based on experience: international animal welfare 
activists had successfully led anti-seal hunt campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s 
that caused the US to ban the importation of all seal products in 1972 and the 
EU to ban the importation of the white pelts of the youngest pups in 1983.94 
This in effect reduced the price of seal pelts and significantly diminished all 
seal hunting. The Inuit position was also based on contemporary economic 
conditions: by the European Commission’s estimate, 30% of global trade in 
seals is within the EU market.95 The EU’s ban would likely cause surplus seal 
products to flood other markets thereby depressing the global price. Moreover, 
92   Implementation Regulation, article 3.
93   See Chapter 4.
94   Peter L. Fitzgerald, ‘“Morality” May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: 
Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law’ (2011) 14(2) Journal of International 
Wildlife Law & Policy 85.
95   European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning Trade in Seal Products’, COM (2008) 469 final.
 AQ: verify as instruction in correction.
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Inuit hunters and their communities’ livelihood would be affected since not 
all seal products they produced would satisfy the specific, exceptional condi-
tions laid out in the EU regulation. Even if the products did meet the regulatory 
exception, Inuit traders would have to bear the administrative and financial 
burden proving the hunt and product meet EU criteria, thereby raising the cost 
of production. Moreover, Inuit access to the international seal product markets 
depends upon the marketing channels created and maintained by the much 
larger Atlantic seal hunt. The ban would do away with these channels, which 
would in effect deny Inuit hunters market access.96
Inuit were also angry that animal welfare activists, celebrities, and the 
regime itself characterized seal hunting as a cruel and barbaric practice. They 
were frustrated that animal welfare activists and EU officials did not under-
stand the reality of the seal hunts, conditions in the Arctic, or the centrality 
of seal hunting in almost all aspects of Inuit life. This had economic impli-
cations for even if Inuit seal products made it to the European market, they 
would be tainted by demonizing moralistic language. Moreover, Inuit heard 
this complaint as patronizing especially since their identity was at stake. For 
example, at the 2014 Oscars, comedian Ellen DeGeneres raised funds by post-
ing a selfie photo and sent about $1.5 million to the Humane Society, which 
strongly opposes the seal hunt. In response, Killaq Enuaraq-Strauss, a 17-year-
old Inuk woman from Iqualuit and Degeneres fan, posted a video, where she 
told Degeneres in the most considered and considerate way, ‘We do not hunt 
seals … for fashion. We hunt to survive.’97 This triggered an online campaign 
and Inuit flooded Twitter with selfies posing with seal fur and affirming the 
importance of hunting seal for food, clothing, and traditional reasons 
(#sealfies).
Like the Inuit, some commentators questioned the exception’s legitimacy 
or effectiveness and predicted that the seal regime would shut down all seal 
trade and hunts, commercial or otherwise. Some found that the EU seal 
regime contravened indigenous human rights since it potentially threatened 
Inuit livelihood and way of life.98 Others focused on the incoherence of the 
96   Tamara Perišin, ‘Is the EU Seal Products Regulation a Sealed Deal? EU and WTO 
Challenges’ (2013) 62(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 373; Elizabeth 
Whitsitt and Nigel Bankes, ‘The WTO Panel Decision on the EU’s Rules on the Marketing 
of Seal Products: Who Won and Who Lost?’ (ABlawg, 10 January 2014) <http://ablawg 
.ca/2014/01/10/the-wto-panel-decision-on-the-eus-rules-on-the-marketing-of-seal-products-
who-won-and-who-lost/> accessed 29 September 2016.
97   Killaq Enuaraq-Strauss, ‘Dear Ellen’ (YouTube, 23 March 2014) <https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=eRPEz57_l_M> accessed 24 October 2016.
98   Dorothée Cambou, ‘The Impact of the Ban on Seal Products on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: A European Issue’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 389; Kamrul Hossain, ‘The EU 
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legislation pointing out that it served multiple conflicting purposes namely the 
protection of animal welfare concerns, the need to harmonize a fragmented 
internal market, and an attempt to protect indigenous rights.99 The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) upheld the Regulations on the basis 
of Article 95 of the EC Treaty and determined that the principal objective of 
the EU’s Sealing Regulations ‘… is not to safeguard the welfare of animals but 
to improve the functioning of the internal market.’100 The WTO Panel found 
that that hunting methods used by indigenous hunters ‘… can cause the very 
pain and suffering for seals that the EU public is concerned about’ and as such 
the indigenous community exception bore no rational connection to the EU’s 
alleged concern for animal welfare.101 One Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) agreed that the legislation did not clearly serve animal welfare purposes 
and stated,
[t]here is something not strictly rational about singling out seals for spe-
cial treatment. They are not an endangered species—even the WWF says 
so. We do not get anything like the clamour about hunting seals on behalf 
of wasps or woodlice or wolverines or worms. Then again, democracy is 
not strictly rational.102
Others have pointed out that not only did the European and WTO courts have 
ample evidence that seals did not necessarily suffer in the hunts, but that the 
EU legislation was disconnected from scientific and social reality of seal hunt-
ing communities.103 The EU’s position that the legislation’s purpose was to 
Ban on the Import of Seal Products and the WTO Regulations: Neglected Human Rights 
of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples?’ (2013) 49(2) Polar Record 154.
99   See Fitzgerald, n. 94 above; Whitsitt and Bankes, n. 96 above; Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Goals 
of the EU Seal Products Trade Regulation: From Effectiveness to Consequence’ (2015) 
51(3) Polar Record 274.
100   Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission (General Court, 25 April 
2013), paras 35, 83.
101   WTO, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products—Reports of the Panel (25 November 2013) WT/DS400/R and WT/DS401/R, 
para. 7.275.
102   Quoted in Fitzgerald, n. 94 above, 129.
103   Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Right Not to Be Indigenous: Seal Utilization in Newfoundland’ 
(2014) Arctic Yearbook 546; Nikolas Sellheim, ‘“Direct and Individual Concern” for 
Newfoundland’s Sealing Industry?—When a Legal Concept and Empirical Data Collide’ 
(2015) 6 Yearbook of Polar Law 466; Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Narrated “Other”—Challenging 
Inuit Sustainability Through the European Discourse on the Seal Hunt’ in Kamrul Hossain 
and Anna Petrétei (eds), Understanding the Many Faces of Human Security (Brill 2016).
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protect animal welfare was not strengthened since it defended the seal regime 
at the WTO as a measure necessary to protect public morals104 and not in terms 
of exceptional provisions in the GATT that allowed states to restrict trade if it 
was necessary to protect animal life and health.105
One reason that the issue bubbled up onto international politics was 
because the price of seal pelts doubled from 2001 to 2004 due to a thriving 
seal population and new markets in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and China. Inuit 
hunters and struggling communities in Newfoundland were excited about the 
prospect of revived market.106 With the new booming market, animal activ-
ists reinvigorated their international campaign against seal hunting. Moreover, 
animal activists were empowered by 2009 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union which placed a legal obligation on the EU and Member States 
to ‘pay full regard to welfare requirements of animals’ when enacting and 
enforcing EU policies.107
Inuit groups quickly mobilized against the 2009 EU seal regime. In April 
2009, the Nunavut Premier Eva Aariak asked the Federal Government of 
Canada to oppose the EU’s bid to seek Observer Status at the Arctic Council. 
The Federal Government accommodated this request, which was a politi-
cal blow to the EU trying to position itself as an Arctic power—the EU seal 
regime was now one of the major issues in Arctic politics. Meanwhile, both the 
Governments of Nunavut and Canada mounted a campaign to convince EU 
parliamentarians to vote against the legislation.108
When that failed, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (representing Inuit interests in 
Canada) lead advocacy groups from Canada and Greenland, associations of 
hunters from Canada and Greenland, individual Inuit hunters, and other repre-
sentatives from the seal hunting industry from Canada, Greece, and Norway in 
a series of suits in EU courts. The General Court found the challenge inadmis-
sible primarily on the grounds that the measure in question was a legislative 
104   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (14 April 1994) (GATT) 1867 UNTS 187, 33 ILM 1153 
(1994), article XX(a).
105   GATT, article XX (b).
106   Clifford Kraus, ‘New Demand Drives Canada’s Baby Seal Hunt’ New York Times (New York 
City, 5 April 2004), <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/05/world/new-demand-drives-
canada-s-baby-seal-hunt.html?_r=0> accessed 24 October 2016.
107   Article 13, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] OJ C326/47.
108   ‘Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban’ (CBC News, 29 April 
2009) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-against-eu-entry-to-arctic-council-
because-of-seal-trade-ban-1.806188> accessed 24 October 2016.
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and not regulatory measure.109 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) upheld this finding on appeal.110
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami then lead the group to challenge the implement-
ing measure before the European courts. This time the courts did not address 
the admissibility question and instead focused on the substance of the legal 
claims. The General Court of the CJEU dismissed the applicants claims that: 
1) the Commission did not have the appropriate legal basis to enact the regula-
tion and; 2) that regulation breached proportionality and subsidiary rights, and 
fundamental rights.111 The applicants lost their appeal before the CJEU.112 Part 
of the applicants’ argument was that General Court erred in finding not apply-
ing Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, especially since the Declaration was mentioned in the Recital of the 
measure. Article 19 provides that ‘States shall consult and cooperate in good 
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may 
affect them.’ The CJEU held that the Declaration was not binding and the ref-
erence to it in the Recital only provided reasoning for the indigenous excep-
tion and did not acknowledge a legal obligation—which in effect denied Inuit 
rights to self-determination within the EU.
While the EU court cases proceeded, Canada and Norway challenged the 
EU seal regime before the WTO.113 Their claims were that the regime was dis-
criminatory and contravened ‘Most Favored Nation’ and ‘National Treatment’ 
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
109   Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission (General Court, 6 September 
2011) ECR 11-5599; Article 263, TFEU: ‘[a]ny natural or legal person may … institute pro-
ceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual 
concern to them, and against a regulatory of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures.’
110   Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission (Grand Chamber, 
3 October 2013).
111   Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission (CJEU, 25 April 2013).
112   Case C-398/13 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission (CJEU, 3 September 
2015).
113   WTO, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products—Reports of the Panel (25 November 2013) WT/DS400/R and WT/DS401/R; 
WTO, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products—Reports of the Appellate Body (22 May 2014) (WTO AB Seals) AB-2014-1 and 
AB-2014-2.
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Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT). They also claimed that regime 
violated the TBT because it was not ‘necessary to achieve a legitimate objec-
tive’ and constituted an ‘unnecessary obstacle to trade’. Much like the CJEU, 
the WTO Appellate Body (AB) held that the EU Seal regime was not a ‘technical 
regulation’ and therefore the TBT did not apply.
The AB did hold that EU seal regime contravened GATT Article I:1 (Most-
Favored Nation) because it unjustifiably discriminated against all seal products 
from Canada and Norway in favor of seal products from Greenland. It followed, 
however, with the conclusion that the EU could provisionally justify its ban as a 
general exception under GATT Article XX(a) as a measure necessary to protect 
public morals. The AB’s conclusion was provisional because the AB also found 
that the EU seal regime favored Greenlandic Inuit hunters over Canadian Inuit 
hunters because the EU did not pursue ‘cooperative arrangements to facilitate 
the access of Canadian Inuit to the [indigenous community] exception’; the AB 
held that as a result the EU had not shown that their ban was not arbitrary or 
unjustifiable suggesting that if the EU treated all indigenous hunters equally it 
would be WTO compliant.114
5.2  The Process Leading to the New Seal Regime
Inuit leaders throughout the whole fight against the EU through the courts 
did not assert their hunting rights in explicit terms of sovereignty and instead 
framed the issue as a matter of human rights, WTO law, and EU law. Nonetheless, 
after the series of cases were decided, one can see how sovereignty—under-
stood as the authority to decide what rules applied to seal hunting—was in 
practice negotiated and contested amongst national and transnational Inuit 
advocacy groups, the Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut, the 
WTO courts, the EU courts, the EU Parliament, EU Council, and EU Commission 
in the process of developing the new seal regime.
Several months after the WTO AB report was released, all the relevant 
authorities and groups adjusted to the new legal landscape, politically 
regrouped, and mobilized. Canada and the EU ironed out their economic 
differences and negotiated a framework to ensure the indigenous exception 
would allow actual access for Inuit seal products into the product, while also 
finalizing the text of the Canada-EU bilateral trade agreement.115 In return, 
114   WTO AB Seals para. 5.337.
115   European Commission, ‘On the Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union 
on Access to the European Union of Seal Products From Indigenous Communities of 
Canada’ C(2014) 5881 final; ‘Canada, EU strike deal on indigenous-hunted seal products: 
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Canada agreed to support the EU bid for Observer Status at the Arctic Council. 
Thus, the EU was able to preserve its ability to enact its seal regime and in 
effect govern seal hunts in the Arctic while also garnering more support for its 
position in the Arctic Council.
Indigenous groups were cautiously favorable with the prospect of an effec-
tive indigenous exception. But since details were still not worked out it was 
unclear whether the Inuit would have meaningful input in the process or 
whether the new seal regime would actually benefit indigenous people. Duane 
Smith, president at the time of ICC Canada statement captures the concern of 
how much power the EU may retain when he stated, ‘Hopefully, [Canada and 
the EU] resolve this issue so that we don’t have to deal with this every time the 
EU has elections.’116
The European Commission released its proposal for a new seal regime 
on 6 February 2015.117 Inuit hunting advocacy groups, such as Inuit Sila from 
Greenland took a two-pronged approach. They continued to outright oppose 
the seal import ban. But seeing that the process was continuing, in the alter-
native they also argued that the EU had to make an active effort undoing the 
stigma against seal products and inform consumers that sealskin is sustainable 
and legal, and invest in businesses that help increase the sale of seal products.118 
The EU Parliament took up some of those points and successfully fought the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission to include a 
provision in the regime that requires the European Commission to inform the 
public as such.119 Parliamentarians also successfully added more language in 
Joint statement gives Inuit seal products access to EU market; non-aboriginal sealers left 
on the floe edge’ NunatsiaqOnline (Iqaluit, 13 October 2014) <http://www.nunatsiaqonline 
.ca/stories/article/65674canada_eu_strike_deal_on_indigenous-hunted_seal_products/> 
accessed 24 October 2016; Jim Bell, ‘EU Trade Deal Good for Nunavut Fish Harvesters, 
Tootoo says’, NunatsiaqOnline (Iqaluit, 29 April 2016) <http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/
stories/article/65674eu_trade_deal_good_for_nunavut_fish_harvesters_tootoo_says/> 
accessed 24 October 2016.
116   Chris Plecash, ‘Seal Deal Clears Way for EU Observer Status at Arctic Council’ Embassy 
(Ottawa, 22 October 2014) 1 <http://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2014/10/22/seal-deal 
-clears-way-for-eu-observer-status-at-arctic-council/#.WXEjRYqQxE4> accessed 20 July 
2017.
117   European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products’ (Proposal for 
New Seal Regime) COM(2015) 45 final.
118   Kevin McGewin, ‘Let Them Eat Brussel Sprouts’ The Arctic Journal (Nuuk, 10 February 
2015).
119   Article 5a, European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1775 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 737/2010 (Basic Regulation 2015) [2015] OJ L 262/1.
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an explicit effort to emphasize that hunting is a matter of self-determination. 
The Commissions proposal framed hunting rights in the following way:
seal hunting is an integral part of the socio-economy, nutrition, culture 
and identity of the Inuit and other indigenous communities, making a 
major contribution to their subsistence.120
Parliamentarians managed to add the statement that ‘seal hunting was a major 
contribution to indigenous subsistence and development, providing food and 
income to support the life and sustainable livelihood of the community, pre-
serving and continuing the traditional existence of the community.’121 Also, 
references to hunting as ‘cruel’ were removed and references to indigenous 
rights were placed more centrally as an effort to reduce the assumption in 
many people’s mind that all seal hunting was inhumane.
After the release of the proposed new seal regime, the Governments of 
Greenland and Nunavut came together and released a joint statement empha-
sizing the role that seal hunting played in their way of life, sense of self, and 
human rights.122 They concluded by encouraging ‘the EU to work with us in a 
manner that respects for our way of life and the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to ensure all Indigenous peoples have 
equal access to, and benefits from, the implementation of the Indigenous 
Communities Exemption.’123 This communicated that the respective Inuit gov-
ernments’ tactic was to accept that the new EU seal regime was going forward 
and work to ensure that that Inuit rights of self-determination were as pro-
tected as much as possible within this new law.
120   Proposal for New Seal Regime, COM(2015) 45.
121   Basic Regulation 2015, recital para. 2. Cristian-Silviu Bușoi, ‘EU Seal Products Trade Rules 
Must Respect Inuit Culture’ The Parliament Magazine (Brussels, 13 July 2015) <http://
www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/eu-seal-products-trade-rules-must-
respect-inuit-culture> accessed 24 October 2016.
122   The Government of Nunavut is a semi-autonomous body governing a mostly Inuit com-
munity. Because Nunavut is a Canadian territory, it is created through federal law (unlike 
provinces which are created by the Canadian Constitution). This means it theoretically 
has a more direct relationship with the Federal government than the provinces.
123   Government of Greenland, ‘Joint Statement of the Governments of Greenland and 
Nunavut regarding the Revision of the EU Seal Ban Regulation’ (24 April 2015) <http://
naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Udenrigsdirektoratet/Joint% 
20statement%202015/240415_Joint%20Statement%20ENG.pdf> accessed 24 October 2016.
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While the EU Parliament was able to find some compromise with the Coun-
cil and Commission on meeting Inuit demands for enhancing references to 
indigenous self-determination, the regime by the very act of its existence is in 
effect a co-management system in which the EU shares sovereign power with 
the Governments of Nunavut, Greenland, and Canada. The EU seal regime 
forces Arctic authorities to engage in ‘government-to-government’ negotia-
tions over seal hunting with the EU.
Under the new regime, the EU sets the rules and approves recognized bod-
ies which implement the rules. The new criteria only focus on the hunting 
methods and do not scrutinize the seal products themselves. But, in order to 
comply with WTO law, due regard for animal welfare was now included as a 
determining factor. Now seal products from indigenous hunts will only be 
allowed into the EU market if they meet the following criteria:
(a)  the hunt has traditionally been conducted by the community;
(b)  the hunt is conducted for and contributes to the subsistence of the com-
munity, including in order to provide food and income to support life and 
sustainable livelihood, and is not conducted primarily for commercial 
reasons;
(c)  the hunt is conducted in a manner which has due regard to animal wel-
fare, taking into consideration the way of life of the community and the 
subsistence purpose of the hunt.124
To date, the EU has authorized the Governments of Greenland125 and 
Nunavut126 to implement the indigenous exception. Thus, Inuit govern-
ments retain some power in how the system is managed since they assess the 
124   Article 1, Basic Regulation 2015.
125   European Commission, ‘Decision Recognising the Greenland Department of Fisheries, 
Hunting and Agriculture (APNN) in accordance with Article 3 of Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2015/1850 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) 
No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products’ 
C (2015) 7274 final, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/ 
pdf/C_2015_7274_en.pdf> accessed 24 October 2016.
126   European Commission, ‘Decision recognising the Department of Environment, 
Government of Nunavut in accordance with Article 3 of Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2015/1850 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) 
No1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products’ 
C (2015) 7273 <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/pdf/ 
C_2015_7273_en.pdf> accessed 24 October 2016.
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conditions of the hunt that generated the seal products according to the EU 
indigenous exception. Then (if appropriate), the respective authorized gov-
ernment agency issues the attesting document, which accompanies the seal 
product into the EU market. This document is what confirms the legality of the 
seal product and all subsequent invoices related to the product must contain 
a reference to the number of the attesting document.127 As we saw in Alaska, 
terms such as ‘subsistence’ and ‘tradition’ are complex, dynamic ideas best 
determined by the communities themselves.
Much like the US Secretary of the Interior or Commerce in Alaska, EU 
authorities, however, retain the final word. Disputes over the authenticity 
or correctness of the attesting document are to be determined by each EU 
Member States.128 It is unclear what this means, and one can imagine Inuit 
hunters having to navigate an inconsistent, fragmented dispute resolution sys-
tem. Moreover, in order to respond to the WTO ruling and the AB concerns 
about the seal regime being arbitrary and unjustified in its ability to distin-
guish between commercial and subsistence hunting, the new seal regime 
accords the Commission heightened powers to scrutinize indigenous hunters: 
if the Commission has evidence that indigenous hunts are ‘commercial’ it may 
prohibit the placing on the market or limit the quantity that may be placed 
on the market of seal products resulting from the hunt concerned. Thus, the 
Commission is the final arbiter of interpreting what is meant by ‘subsistence’ 
and what is ‘commercial’, what is ‘traditional’, and what constitutes appropri-
ate consideration for animal welfare. From Alaska, we learned that this inter-
pretive authority is a key power in governing seal hunts.
The language empowering the Commission to conduct ‘appropriate con-
sultations’ is not clear as to whether this is mandatory or only permitted. 
Nor does it explain whether the Commission has to consider the input from 
experts and stakeholders when making its final decision.129 As a result, the 
standard of proof is unclear. Much like how each US Federal agency interprets 
its duty to consult Alaska Natives, Inuit seal hunters will have to see how the 
EU Commission will interpret its duty.
127   Basic Regulation 2015.
128   Article 4, Basic Regulation 2015.
129   Basic Regulation 2015, recital para. 5: ‘It is of particular importance that the Commission 
carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. 
It is also important that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations with the 
countries of origin concerned and with relevant stakeholders. The Commission, when 
preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and 
appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the 
Council.’
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The new seal regime forces the Governments of Canada, Nunavut, and 
Greenland to expend resources on implementing the new regime and respond-
ing to market conditions that they could have otherwise spent on other ser- 
vices for Inuit communities. For example, the Government of Canada allocated 
CAD 5.7 million over five years to build the Inuit seal industry and create the 
certification system for the EU market.130 The Government of Greenland spent 
large sums of money to counter negative public perception and promote and 
document the sustainability of the seal hunt.131
Even with all these provisions that distribute decision-making power across 
different authorities, the EU still retains significant power in affecting the seal 
product market. The seal products market has still not recovered from 2009 
mainly due to public perception in the EU that all seal products are illegal or 
immoral. The market is at the mercy of how quickly the EU works with the 
respective authorities to get the new seal regime up and running. For exam-
ple, Danish and Greenlandic MEPs have been frustrated with how slow the 
Commission has been in launching an awareness-raising campaign. In fact, 
the Commission has interpreted their duty to raise public awareness to be 
about ‘informing the public and competent authorities in order to facilitate 
the implementation of the regulation and of its exceptions’ and explicitly not 
as a strategy to ‘restore consumer confidence’.132 This approach will undoubt-
edly limit the ability of seal product prices to rise.
While Inuit governments work hard to ensure that Inuit rights of self-
determination are protected within the new system, Inuit hunter advocates 
are consolidating their efforts on a parallel tract and continue to challenge the 
legitimacy of the new seal regime itself.133
130   Jim Bell, ‘Nunavut MP says $5.7M Sealing Fund is “Huge for Inuit” ’ NunatsiaqOnline 
(Iqaluit, 23 April 2015) <http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavut_
mp_says_5.7m_sealing_ fund_is_huge_for_inuit/> accessed 24 October 2016; ‘Federal 
Money Flowing to Nunavut to Certify, Promote Sealskin’ NunatsiaqOnline (Iqaluit, 
29 January 2016) <http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674federal_money_
flowing_to_nunavut_to_certify_promote_sealskin/> accessed 24 October 2016.
131   Bill Justinussen and Randi V. Evaldsen, ‘Seal Ban Undermines EU Credibility in Arctic’ The 
Arctic Journal (Nuuk, 15 April 2015).
132   Parliamentary Questions, ‘Answer given by Mr Vella on behalf of the Commission’ 
E-000747/2016 (17 March 2016), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers 
.do?reference=E-2016-000747&language=EN> accessed 24 October 2016.
133   ‘Greenland Group in Iqaluit to Partner Against EU Seal Product Ban’ CBC News (16 January 
2015); ‘Despite Exemption, NTI [Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.] still opposed EU Seal Skin Ban’ 
NunatsiaqOnline (Iqaluit, 6 August 2015); Inuit Sila Press Release, ‘Inuit Seal Hunters 
Unite in Struggle for International Justice’ Arctic Journal (Nuuk, 28 September 2015).
Fakhri�3�
6 Conclusion
Since indigenous peoples constitute the core of the Arctic, one can consider 
the US as occupying the semi-periphery. While the US government has terri-
tory in the Arctic, its history as a colonizing power has been at the forefront 
of its complicated relationship with sovereign indigenous communities 
in Alaska. This is one reason that the US’s claims as an Arctic State are not 
straightforward. Alaska Natives have struggled over a number of decades to 
assert and define their sovereign power; the US Federal Government and 
Alaska State Government have each responded accordingly to those claims 
while still asserting their own authority and addressing their own political 
needs. As such, US sovereignty in the Arctic is the product of a colonial rela-
tionship enacted through a complex domestic legal regime based on adminis-
trative, constitutional, corporate, and Alaska Native laws.
The EU can be understood as lying on the periphery of the Arctic because 
it has an even more limited relationship to territory in the Arctic (through 
northern Finland and Sweden) and is not a member of the Arctic Council. 
There are of course limits to comparing the EU to the US since it does not 
make any colonial claims over Inuit and other Arctic indigenous peoples. 
Nonetheless, the EU’s new seal regime, like its US counterpart, governs Inuit 
seal hunts directly effecting how Inuit relate to the land. This strikes at the 
heart of the Arctic and has threatened international acceptance of the EU as 
an Arctic player.
If EU politicians and civil servants examine their relationship to the Arctic 
in terms of sovereign power they are presented with several choices: EU 
officials may continue down the path of trying to balance animal welfare 
activist desires, market harmonization regulations, EU Arctic policies, and 
Inuit livelihood. Thus, they would try to signal to Arctic peoples that they are 
indeed responsible Arctic actors by taking the time to investigate domestic 
co-management systems more deeply and systemically, with an acute 
awareness of Inuit self-determination rights. They would have to invest signifi-
cant amounts of political and financial resources in order to ensure that the 
new EU seal regime is implemented in a way that aligns with contemporary 
Arctic law and politics.134
What the study of the US seal regime highlights, confirmed by political 
reality thus far, is that putting such a scheme into effect is no easy task— 
and that even if done with the best intentions the process will be fraught with 
134   Cf. Shadian, n. 12 above.
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missteps and challenged by popular protest. Even though law is a common way 
to express power in a way that includes multiple agendas and interests, it does 
not necessarily resolve ambiguities. Instead it pushes and reshapes political 
agendas in a particular direction. What the EU may learn from the US and Alaska 
is that while the new seal regime is the product of resolved court disputes, 
it is very likely only the beginning of a long, legally complex negotiation with 
Inuit leaders in Canada and Greenland and will remain a matter of ‘unfinished 
business’ for a while.135 The EU seal regime, if fully operationalized, will likely 
be even more complicated than the US seal regime in Alaska since it will be 
enmeshed in the web of Federal Canadian laws, Nunavut laws, Inuit indige-
nous laws, the increasingly autonomous legal system of Greenland,136 Danish 
law, WTO law, international human rights law, EU law, and the respetive 
domestic laws of EU Member States.
If EU officials choose that path they must also live with a particular irony. 
Under the new law and with the new administrative structures, the EU will 
be able to claim that they are to some degree addressing Inuit self-determina-
tion rights. Take away the irony and all that is left is the EU projecting sover-
eign power beyond its existing territorial boundaries, and reconfiguring Inuit 
relationships to seals, land, and water. One key aspect of sovereign power is 
to determine what is the norm and what, or as in this case who, is the excep-
tion. Sovereign power is most often constituted through defining difference 
and then implimenting law to reconcile with this purported difference. In 
fact, this was the classic way in which imperial power operated over the past 
several centuries. Colonizing powers first would legally define indigenous 
as different or exceptional, then enacted laws that tried to bridge, redefine, 
or contain that difference. Such a ‘dynamic of difference’ would justify the 
enactment of postitive laws and the prescence of the colonizing power.137 In 
Alaska, it was as recent as the early 1970s when the US Federal Government 
abolished Native claims to land title, only to start anew by redefining the mean-
ing of Native soveriegn hunting rights as an exception to conservation laws.
135   See Anderson, n. 42 above.
136   Natalia Loukacheva, The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and 
Nunavut (University of Toronto Press 2007).
137   Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005); Karin Mickelson, ‘The Maps of International Law: Perceptions 
of Nature in the Classification of Territory’ (2014) 27(3) Leiden Journal of International 
Law 621.
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The EU seal regime also enacts this dynamic of difference since it character-
izes seal hunting as immoral, bans the importation of seal products thereby 
killing the market, and then categorizes indigenous hunters as an exception 
to the ban. The regime attempts to reconcile that indigenous difference and 
reconstruct the market by creating conditions for Inuit and indigenous hunt-
ers ‘to place [seal products] on the market’.138 This in effect increases the EU’s 
influence in the Arctic since it is now dictaing the rules of the seal market. The 
new legislation defines indigenous communities as people sharing a history 
of conquest or colonisation.139 But one could also read it as a definition that 
brings with it the echoes of conquest and colonialism into the present since 
the EU is also implicitly laying claim that it has the authority to define who is 
or is not indigenous.
EU officials could also take another path and measure their new seal regime 
against Inuit sovereign power and presence. In doing so, they would have to 
account for the fact that their seal regime raises questions of the EU’s legiti-
macy in Arctic politics and international law writ large. With that they would 
have a series of options. EU officials may do away with distinctions between 
subsistence and commercial as well as indigenous and non-indigenous, and 
focus on only allowing seal products that result from hunts that consider the 
seals’ welfare into the European market. These EU measures would still have to 
comply with WTO law, but this would be feasible in partnership with exporting 
countries. This approach would focus on the method of the hunt and not the 
identity of the hunter. Or EU officials may trust domestic and international legal 
regimes regulating seal hunts and enforcing standards of humane treatment.140 
This would mean that the EU would treat Inuit hunting rights, and really all 
hunting, as the rule leaving it to domestic and international laws to determine 
138   New Basic Regulation article 2. See also Elizabeth Whitsitt, ‘A Comment on the Public 
Morals Exception in International Trade and the EC—Seal Products Case: Moral 
Imperialism’ (2014) 3(4) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 1376; 
Sellheim, ‘The Narrated “Other”—Challenging Inuit Sustainability Through the European 
Discourse on the Seal Hunt’ n. 103 above.
139   New Basic Regulation article 1: ‘“other indigenous communities” means communities in 
independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from 
the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the coun-
try belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions.’
140   Nikolas Sellheim, ‘Seal Hunting in the Arctic States. An Analysis of Legislative Frameworks, 
Incentives and Histories’ (2015) 7 Yearbook of Polar Law 188.
 �35Gauging US and EU Seal Regimes
when such rights offended legal standards of ethical treatment. With that, EU 
officials may want to abandon their seal regime all together and focus their 
Arctic efforts on other issues. This would enhance Inuit communities’ ability to 
confront other challenges of everyday life and determine for themselves how 
they want to build a livelihood from seal hunting. 

Part 3
The EU and Regulating Human Activities in the 
Arctic
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CHAPTER 9
The European Union and Arctic Shipping
Henrik Ringbom
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) has no specific policy on Arctic shipping. Even 
though the Union has significant policy and economic interests in the projected 
increased use of Arctic sea routes, existing EU documents on Arctic policy tend 
to deal with maritime transport issues quite superficially and highlight the need 
for international rules and global solutions—thus de-emphasizing the role of 
regional actors like itself. The most recent EU policy document describes the 
Union’s role as that of a mere monitor.1
There may be good policy reasons for the EU to avoid an ambitious and 
potentially controversial policy that specifically targets shipping in the Arctic. 
Such reasons could include, for example, a general preference for global solu-
tions in shipping policy; policy considerations for the EU with respect to the 
Arctic more generally; or policy considerations with respect to the EU’s bilat-
eral relationships with some of the key Arctic states. The present chapter, how-
ever, does not evaluate the EU’s policy in political terms. Rather, the scope of 
the chapter is limited to exploring the extent to which alternative approaches 
are even conceivable from a legal point of view. Is the EU’s cautious policy on 
Arctic shipping, in other words, dictated by legal necessity or could there be 
ways to take a more assertive stance, if the political situation permitted? The 
availability of legal options to the EU is key to any political assessment of its 
Arctic shipping policy.
* Henrik Ringbom, Professor II, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Oslo, Norway; Adjunct Professor (Docent) Department of Law, Åbo Akademi 
University, Turku/Åbo, Finland.
1   The Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ‘An Integrated European Union Policy for 
the Arctic’ ( JOIN (2016) 21 final) of 27 April 2016, at pp. 12, 13 provides that the EU should “sup-
port international efforts to implement the International Polar Code” and “should contribute 
to enhance the safety of navigation in the Arctic through innovative technologies and the 
development of tools for the monitoring of…. the increasing maritime traffic in the Arctic”.
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The chapter begins by outlining the general setting for a potential EU ship-
ping policy for the Arctic. First it introduces briefly the general EU policy with 
respect to the Arctic (section 2.1), followed by a review of Arctic navigation 
more generally (section 2.2). EU’s own statements related to Arctic shipping 
are discussed in section 2.3. Section 3 assesses the legal options and restraints 
for EU measures in this area. Since the scope of the analysis is limited to legal 
matters, a number of non-regulatory ways in which the EU could play a role 
in Arctic shipping are mentioned only very cursorily in section 3.2. Finally, 
section 4 provides some concluding observations on the EU’s Arctic shipping 
policy to date.
2 The Setting
2.1 The EU and the Arctic
The EU has significant interests in the resources of the Arctic area. The EU 
is the principal destination for goods and natural resources from the region. 
One third of the fish caught in the Arctic is sold in the EU market, and 88 per 
cent of the EU’s iron ore output is produced in the Barents Region.2 EU activi-
ties and decisions affect developments in the Arctic, in terms of investment, 
projects and funding, but long-distance air and sea transport to Europe is also 
a major source of pollutants that contaminate the Arctic.3 Shorter transit ship-
ping routes, which could reduce the distance between Northern Europe and 
Asia by as much as half, could obviously be of significant economic interest in 
terms of savings in fuel and other operational costs.4
2   Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘Developing a European Union Policy 
towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps’ ( JOIN (2012) 19 final), p. 5.
3   Arctic environment: European perspectives—Why should Europe care? European 
Environment Agency, Environmental issue report No 38/2004. See also Adam Stępień and 
Timo Koivurova, ‘The Making of a Coherent Arctic Policy for the European Union: Anxieties, 
Contradictions and Possible Future Pathways’, in Adam Stępień, Timo Koivurova and Paula 
Kankaanpää (eds.) The Changing Arctic and the European Union—A Book Based on the 
Report “Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic: Assessment Conducted for 
the European Union” (Brill 2015), 23–24.
4   An oft-cited example is the route between Rotterdam and Yokohama, which measures 11,200 
nm via the Suez Canal, but only 6,500 nm via the Northern Sea Route. Generally on the EU’s 
economic interests in Arctic shipping, see Andreas Raspotnik and Bettina Rudloff, ‘The EU 
as a Shipping Actor in the Arctic’, Working Paper FG 2, 2012/Nr. 4, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Berlin, 2012.
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While such examples of closely intertwined interests between the EU and 
the Arctic would appear to justify a close relationship between the two regions, 
that relationship is in reality quite complicated. So far at least the EU has not 
managed to exercise a strong influence over Arctic policies and there are few 
signs that this will change in the near future.
The most obvious obstacle to the EU assuming a dominant role in the Arctic, 
not least with respect to shipping, is geography. None of the EU’s Member 
States has a coastline in the Arctic. This not only effectively limits EU jurisdic-
tion to take legislative or enforcement measures in the region under the law 
of the sea, but also raises questions about its interests in doing so. An outsider 
might be forgiven for questioning why, in these circumstances, the EU needs 
an Arctic policy at all and why its policies could not be implemented through 
the adoption of national Arctic policies by the individual Member States that 
do have clearer links to the Arctic.
Seen from the EU’s point of view, however, the question is more complex. 
First of all, the Union’s formal relationships with the various Arctic States5 vary 
from state to state. Two of the Arctic states are EU Member States (Finland and 
Sweden), albeit neither has a coastline facing the Arctic Ocean. Two coastal 
States in the Arctic region (Norway and Iceland) are very closely associated 
with Union through the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA).6 
Greenland belongs to EU Member State Denmark, but has exited from the EU 
and is hence not subject to EU laws; rather, it is associated with the Union as 
one of the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) with a specific Partnership 
Agreement governing the mutual relationships.7 The remaining Arctic States 
(the USA, Canada and the Russian Federation) are all strategic partners in the 
EU’s external relations, governed by continuously developing bilateral treaty 
relationships in trade and other areas of cooperation,8 though the relationship 
5   This term refers to the eight states that are members of the Arctic Council (AC), i.e. Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA.
6   Iceland was also a candidate country for EU membership following an application made in 
2009, but the application was withdrawn in 2013. In March 2015, Iceland’s government finally 
requested that “Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership”. See 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/iceland/index_ 
en.htm> accessed 20 August 2016.
7   The current Partnership Agreement covers the period 2014–2020 and focuses on education 
and training. See Council Decision 2014/137/EU on relations between the European Union on 
the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other [2014] OJ L76/1. See 
also Chapter 4.
8   The EU and the USA have the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the 
world, covering roughly half of the world GDP, and a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
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with Russia, which is the EU’s biggest neighbour and its third biggest trading 
partner, has seriously deteriorated following the Ukraine conflict.9
The EU’s close and strategic relationships with all key players in the Arctic 
region, combined with its significant economic and other interests in the 
Arctic and its emerging ‘Integrated Maritime Policy’, which includes an inter-
national dimension,10 suggest that the EU needs an Arctic policy, not only to 
protect its interests in the region itself, but also for the sake of credibility and 
consistency in its foreign policy generally. The lack of a coherent EU policy 
with respect to a large region in its immediate vicinity, which is also consid-
ered to be among the strategically most interesting parts of the world at the 
moment, would not fit well with the EU’s more general foreign policy objec-
tives, e.g. in relation to climate change, and its “ambition for a stronger Union, 
willing and able to make a positive difference in the world.”11
The second consideration for EU Arctic policy relates to the division of roles 
and responsibilities between the EU and its individual Member States, i.e. 
why policies should be adopted at the EU level rather than by the individual 
  Partnership (TTIP) is currently being discussed <www.euintheus.org/transatlantic-trade-
and-investment-partnership-ttip/> 20 August 2016. Current negotiations with Canada 
similarly aim at enhancing an already intense cooperation between the EU and Canada. 
The EU and Canada expect to finalize a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) and a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) by the end of 2016 <http://eeas 
.europa.eu/canada/index_en.htm> accessed 20 August 2016.
9    <http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/about/index_en.htm> accessed 28 November 2016. Despite 
the EU’s halting of most cooperation programmes with Russia and its imposition of tar-
geted sanctions, its cooperation with Russia has continued in fora such as the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). See e.g. G. Stang EU Arctic Policy in a Regional Context, 
Study for the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies/Policy 
Department, (EP/EXPO/B/FWC/AFET/2015–01/03) 2016 at 16–17.
10   See the European Commission Communications ‘Towards a Future Maritime Policy for 
the Union: A European Vision for the Oceans and Sea’ (COM (2006) 275 final) and ‘An 
Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’ (COM (2007) 575 final). In pream-
bular para 42 of Directive 2008/56 establishing a framework for community action in 
the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) [2008] 
L164/19 it is held that “[t]he serious environmental concerns … relating to the Arctic 
waters, a neighbouring marine environment of particular importance for the Community, 
need to be assessed by the Community institutions and may require action to ensure the 
environmental protection of the Arctic.”
11   ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016, Executive Summary at 11.
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Member States, some of which already have seats at the Arctic Council.12 This 
consideration touches on a key legal aspect of the EU’s foreign relations, i.e. 
the division of formal external competence between the EU and its Member 
States. From an EU-law point of view, the Union clearly possesses formal com-
petence to engage in matters relating to the Arctic and in some areas, nota-
bly on “the conservation of marine biological resources under the common 
fisheries policy”, that competence is exclusive.13 As to shipping, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Article 4(2) provides for a shared 
competence between the EU and its Member States in matters such as environ-
ment, transport and energy. In addition, several Arctic issues of potential EU 
regulatory interest deal with matters that are already subject to existing 
EU legislation; on the basis of the so-called ERTA principle, these matters are 
subject to the exclusive competence of the Union.14 Current EU rules on mari-
time safety, environmental protection or oceans management might clearly be 
“affected” or have their scope altered by policies adopted for the Arctic. It is 
hence perfectly arguable not only that the EU has competence to regulate 
Arctic shipping and involve itself in international negotiations on this topic, 
but that its competence to do so at least to some extent excludes a parallel 
competence by its Member States. On this view, the EU as such, rather than its 
Member States, should engage in international negotiations on these matters.
12   In addition to the Nordic EU member states that are full members of the AC, seven EU 
member states (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK) are 
observers at the Arctic Council.
13   Article 3(1)(d), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] OJ 
C326/47. Other a priori exclusive Union competences under the same article that may 
be of particular relevance for Arctic cooperation are the customs union and the common 
commercial policy of the EU. Even outside fields of exclusive EU competences member 
states have a duty of loyal cooperation with the Union in matters relating to external 
policy. See e.g. Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude the WTO agree-
ments, [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 108.
14   The principle was originally laid down in case law, first in Case 22/70 AETR [1971] ECR 
263, but has subsequently been codified in the founding Treaty. TFEU Article 3(2) pro-
vides: “The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an inter-
national agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union 
or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its 
conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” See also TFEU Article 216(1) 
and the 1998 Declaration concerning the competence of the EU with regard to matters 
governed by UNCLOS, which lists a series of EU shipping law instruments that are deemed 
to be relevant for transferring competence exclusively to the EU. <www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm> accessed 28 November 2016.
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As a starting point, therefore, it is clear that the EU has important economic 
and policy reasons, as well as legal backing in the form of competences that 
are at least in part exclusive, to be closely involved in matters relating to Arctic 
governance.15 Yet the Union has not been successful in translating its interests 
and internal authority into a leading role in the Arctic policy scene.
The Arctic region has no international regulatory body of its own. The main 
intergovernmental forum for the region is the Arctic Council (AC), which was 
established in 1996 by a political declaration as a consensus-based forum for 
political cooperation among the eight participating states, rather than as an 
international organization.16 Following considerable efforts by the EU to 
enhance its formal liaison with the AC, its request for formal observer status was 
turned down, or at least postponed, at the Ministerial meeting in Kiruna in May 
2013.17 The AC attached conditions to granting the EU observer status; these con-
ditions have yet to be met to the satisfaction of AC members.18 In addition to 
the principal original concern relating to seal hunting,19 other issues, such as the 
Ukrainian crisis, now appear to have delayed acceptance of the EU’s request, 
15   See also Claudia Cinelli, ‘Law of the Sea, The European Union Arctic Policy and Corporate 
Social Responsibility’, 30 Ocean Yearbook (Brill 2016) 245–254.
16   The AC accordingly lacks a mandate to negotiate new treaties and its decisions are not 
binding. See the 1996 Ottawa Declaration and other background documents available 
at www.arctic-council.org/. Later, however, the Arctic Council has played an important 
role in developing two international treaties, both of which have relevance to shipping in 
the region. See section 2.2.2 below. The term ‘Arctic Council System’ has been introduced 
to accommodate such developments. See Erik Jaap Molenaar ‘Current and prospective 
roles of the Arctic Council System within the context of the law of the sea’, (2012) 27 (3) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 553.
17   The decision of the Council was written in somewhat cryptic terms: “The Arctic Council 
receives the application of the EU affirmatively, but defers a final decision on implemen-
tation until the Council ministers are agreed by consensus that the concerns of Council 
members, addressed by the President of the European Commission in his letter of 8 May 
are resolved, with the understanding that the EU may observe Council proceedings until 
such time as the Council acts on the letter’s proposal.” The reluctance of the Council is 
all the more notable as at the same meeting India, China, Japan, Italy, South Korea and 
Singapore were granted observer status.
18   See also the rulings of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body in European Communities—
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400 and 
WT/DS401 and the Joint Statement by Canada and the European Union on access to the 
European Union of seal products from indigenous communities of Canada, Commission 
decision C (2014) 5881 final, Annex.
19   The original seal trade Regulation from 2009 has since been amended by Regulation 
2015/1775 amending Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing 
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which requires unanimity by the AC’s current members.20 More generally, too, 
there appears to be no strong enthusiasm for an increased EU role among the 
current AC members. This lack of enthusiasm may stem from uncertainties 
about the EU’s policy ambitions and visions for the Arctic region. It has, for 
example, been pointed out that the EU lacks clarity about the core purpose or 
goal of its Arctic policy21 and that its influence is sometimes weakened by its 
complex administrative structure, with a multitude of institutions having differ-
ent roles and motives and an unclear internal division of responsibilities.22
In the absence of regulatory EU measures governing the Arctic, the Union’s 
Arctic policy is set forth in certain non-binding policy documents issued by var-
ious EU institutions since 2008. The European Commission (the Commission) 
adopted its first communication on an Arctic policy in 2008.23 Compared 
to subsequent communications, this first Arctic policy document included 
certain quite specific policy objectives and action proposals for the future 
development of the Arctic and visions for the role of the EU in that develop-
ment. The document was not well-received by the Arctic counterparties, how-
ever, who criticized the Commission for being ignorant about the Arctic and 
unclear about its own role and level of commitment.24 Subsequent Commission 
documents issued in 2012, which were by and large endorsed by the Council,25 
generally emphasized matters that were not particularly controversial politi-
cally, such as the Union’s ability to contribute to research, investment and 
cooperation in the region.26 These documents highlighted the benefits of the 
EU’s permanent presence around the table in the AC. The European Parliament 
has adopted a somewhat sharper stance and has repeatedly called for a 
Commission Regulation 737/2010 [2015] OJ L 262/1. The aim of the amendment is to 
reflect the outcome of WTO rulings referred to in the previous footnote.
20   See also Stępień and Koivurova n. 3 above, 36.
21   Andreas Østhagen, ‘The European Union—An Arctic Actor?’ (2013) 15 (2) Journal of 
Military and Strategic Studies 84; Raspotnik & Rudloff n. 3 above, 14 characterizes the EU’s 
Arctic policy-making as a “step-by-step-learning-by-doing process”.
22   Stępień and Koivurova n. 3 above 25–29. For example, within the Commission, Arctic 
shipping involves four different General-Directorates (DGs MARE, MOVE, ENTR and 
ENV) and a lack of coordination between them could easily create uncertainties as to the 
Commission’s policy objectives.
23   European Commission Communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union 
and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763.
24   See e.g. Stępień and Koivurova n. 3 above, 52.
25   Council conclusions of 12 May 2014 on developing a European Union Policy towards the 
Arctic Region.
26   JOIN (2012) 19.
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“coherent strategy and a concretised action plan on the EU’s engagement on 
the Arctic”, including on some shipping-related questions,27 but it, too, has 
accepted that a focus on socio-economic and environmental issues represents 
a “strategic choice … integral in ensuring legitimacy and local support for the 
EU’s Arctic engagement.”28
The most recent EU document, issued by the Commission in April 2016, is 
even less specific about purpose and strategy. This document identifies three 
generic priority areas—climate change and the environment, sustainable 
development and international cooperation—for a future integrated EU 
Arctic policy, but offers very little information as to what the Commission’s 
ambitions, visions and strategies are more concretely. Policy responses to vari-
ous identified issues are limited to action in the fields of research, science and 
innovation.29 Apart from that, the core purpose and goals of an EU policy for 
the Arctic remain unclear.
2.2  Shipping in the Arctic
2.2.1 The Environmental Context
The reduction of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean creates new opportunities for 
maritime activities in the region. Fishing, petroleum activities, marine scientif-
ic research, naval activities and commercial shipping are expected to increase 
as the sea ice cover becomes thinner and eventually recedes for part of the 
year. For commercial shipping this increase is already noticeable, in terms of 
carriage of passengers as well as cargo. Cruise vessel traffic in the Arctic has 
increased significantly in the past decades,30 while cargo transport is stimu-
lated by the greater accessibility and exploitation of Arctic resources and by 
the prospect of sea routes between Europe and Asia that are almost down to 
half the length of current routes.31
27   See section 2.2.3.
28   European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic 
(2013/2595 (RSP), hereinafter the ‘2014 European Parliament resolution’) para. 2.
29   JOIN (2016) 21. The Council Conclusions on the Arctic of 20 June 2016 endorsed the poli-
cies outlined in the Joint Communication.
30   The Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators estimates that some 70,000–80,000 
passengers per year have taken cruises in the Arctic during the years 2005–2013, Svalbard 
and Greenland being the main destinations. See also the PAME Report on Arctic Marine 
Tourism Project, 2014, pp. 18–24 <www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/Arctic_Marine_
Shipping/Arctic_Marine_Tourism_Project/AMTP_Workshop_Report_March_2014.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2016.
31   See Raspotnik and Rudloff, n. 4 above; and Tore Henriksen, ‘Protecting Polar Environments: 
Coherency in Regulating Arctic Shipping’, in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.) Research Handbook 
on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 363–384.
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Currently two routes have relevance for trans-Arctic passages. First, the 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) covers all routes across the Russian Arctic coastal 
seas from Kara Gates (Novaya Zemlya) to the Bering Strait.32 The second route 
is the Northwest Passage (NWP). This route is not defined in Canadian law, 
but is commonly understood as referring to the maritime routes that span the 
straits and sounds of the Canadian Arctic archipelago along the Northern coast 
of North America between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.33 In the future, if 
and when ice coverage continues to decrease, an alternative route could be the 
“trans-polar route” that runs straight across the Arctic Ocean,34 without involv-
ing passage in either Canadian or Russian territorial waters (though entry and 
exit to the Arctic Ocean would still be through the exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) of the US/Russia in the Bering Strait or Canada/Greenland/Norway on 
the Atlantic side).
An increase in shipping activities in the Arctic presents not only opportu-
nities, but also significant risks. Maritime activities in this particular region 
are likely to score badly in any environmental risk assessment, considering the 
nature of the risks and circumstances involved.
The Arctic environment is unique in terms of its biological and geographic 
features. Features such as low temperatures, extreme seasonal variations and 
light conditions which, in turn, bring about extensive seasonal migrations of 
birds and mammals and a short but intense feeding period, make the Arctic 
ecosystem particularly vulnerable to change. The risks associated with climate 
change already place Arctic marine biodiversity under significant pressure, 
and human activities in the area will further increase such pressures.35 As 
32   Article 5(1) of the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation. According to 
statistics from the Northern Sea Route Information office, 207 transits have been made 
in the years 2011–2015, with the peak of 71 crossings in 2013. See <www.arctic-lio.com/
nsr_transits> and <www.pame.is/index.php/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/northern-
sea-route-shipping-statistics> accessed 20 August 2016. See also Erik Franckx ‘The “New” 
Arctic Passages and the “Old” Law of the Sea’, in Henrik Ringbom (ed.) Jurisdiction over 
Ships—Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law of the Sea (Brill 2015) 194–216.
33   The number of transits has increased from only a few per year in the 1980s to 20–30 
per year in 2009–2013. Most transits are completed by icebreakers on coastguard and 
research duties, small vessels or adventurers, passenger ships offering Arctic tourism 
opportunities, and tug and supply vessels, sometimes with barges. See <www.enr.gov.nt 
.ca/state-environment/73-trends-shipping-northwest-passage-and-beaufort-sea> accessed 
20 August 2016.
34   See Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik ‘The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the 
Transpolar Sea Route’, (2012) 26 Ocean Yearbook 281.
35   According to the biodiversity working group of the Arctic Council Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), climate change “is by far the most serious threat to Arctic 
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far as shipping is concerned, the most obvious risks relate to (accidental and 
deliberate) releases of oil and other harmful substances into the sea, physical 
disturbance by noise, collisions with marine mammals and the introduction of 
invasive species to the region through ships’ hulls or ballast water. In addition, 
ships give rise to air pollution, of which the emission of soot particles, or ‘black 
carbon’, is particularly relevant for the Arctic region, as it contributes to the 
acceleration of the ice melt by reducing the reflectivity of snow and ice.
The likelihood of maritime incidents in Arctic waters is increased by the 
unusually difficult operating conditions in the area. Sea ice can be very pow-
erful and its movements difficult to predict. In addition, few seafarers have 
practical experience of dealing with the challenges presented by such condi-
tions. Furthermore, icing of the ship itself can lead to serious stability prob-
lems, weather conditions can and do change rapidly in the region and even 
basic infrastructure like charts, navigation aids, various types of forecasts and 
communication equipment are considerably less developed in the Arctic than 
in other navigating areas. Finally, Arctic conditions present a variety of chal-
lenges related to low temperatures, such as the outdoor working environment 
and the increased likelihood that equipment and systems will malfunction. 
All of this means that maritime incidents are more likely in Arctic waters than 
elsewhere.
Moreover, the consequences of accidents in the Arctic are likely to be 
more serious than in warmer waters. Oil and other hazardous materials 
are more difficult to remove in icy conditions and the natural cleaning process 
through the dissolving, decomposition or evaporation of the substances is sig-
nificantly impeded by low water and air temperatures.
Finally, capacity to take responsive measures should an accident occur is 
limited by the fact that ships navigating in the Arctic are usually far away from 
land-based support infrastructure for search-and-rescue or pollution response. 
Even if an incident were to occur close to a shore-based station, rescue opera-
tions in icy conditions will pose special challenges and there will be very little 
shore-based infrastructure, including hospitals or other medical support for 
injured crews and passengers, to support a large-scale response.
In order to identify and deal with these challenges, in view of the changing 
circumstances and increasing pressures for economic use of the Arctic, the 
Arctic Council in 2004 asked its working group on Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
biodiversity and exacerbates all other threats”. Arctic Biodiversity Assessment 2013, 
Report for Policymakers, available at <www.arcticbiodiversity.is/index.php/the-report/
report-for-policy-makers/key-findings> accessed 20 August 2016.
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Arctic shipping. The outcome was the 2009 ‘Arctic Marine Safety Assessment 
(AMSA) Report’, which includes an extensive analysis of the status, prospects, 
risks and challenges of Arctic shipping. The AMSA Report concluded with 17 
recommendations, which were approved by the Arctic Council ministerial 
meeting in 2009.36 Progress with the implementation of these recommenda-
tions is continuously monitored, with the latest update being from April 2015.37
2.2.2  The Legal Context
2.2.2.1  General
Shipping in the Arctic is predominantly regulated by global international rules. 
Most of these rules have global application in that they apply worldwide, irre-
spective of the location of the operation, but some include more specific rules 
for the particular characteristics of the region.
Two types of rules must be distinguished. First, there are jurisdictional 
rules that govern what measures states may, must or must not take with re-
spect to ships. These rules are currently laid down authoritatively in the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),38 which currently has 169 
contracting parties, including the EU39 and all Arctic coastal States other than 
the USA.40 While the general regime for jurisdiction over ships laid down in 
UNCLOS applies to the Arctic, certain additional subtleties apply to the region 
in terms of the law of the sea. These are discussed in section 2.2.2.2 below.
The second type of rules are technical rules that apply to each ship. These 
include rules on ship construction, discharge standards, manning conditions 
36   <www.pame.is/index.php/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/amsa> accessed 28 November 
2016.
37   Status on Implementation of the AMSA 2009 Report Recommendations, April 2015. 
<www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSA/AMSA_Documents/Progress_Reports/
AMSArecommendations2015_Web.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016.
38   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).
39   See <www.un.org/depts/los/> 20 August 2016. It should be noted that the European Union, 
as a party to UNCLOS under its Annex IX on participation by international organizations, 
has no jurisdictional advantage over individual states. The jurisdictional opportunities 
to regulate shipping are hence the same for the EU as for individual states. Whether the 
measures in question should be introduced by the EU as a whole or individually by its 
member states is essentially an internal consideration to be sorted out by the EU itself. 
See e.g. UNCLOS Annex IX, Article 4.
40   UNCLOS’ provisions on shipping are widely considered, including by the USA, to be 
indicative of international customary law and hence binding on all states irrespective of 
formal ratification.
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etc. These technical rules are usually adopted by the IMO, the most important 
rules being set forth in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL) and the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).41 All three conventions 
have recently been modified through the inclusion of particular requirements 
for navigation in polar regions as discussed in section 2.2.2.3.
2.2.2.2  Jurisdictional Rules
 The General Scheme
The rights and obligations of States to take measures in the Arctic are gov-
erned by the UNCLOS. The five Arctic coastal States have specifically empha-
sized that the UNCLOS framework “provides a solid foundation for responsible 
management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through 
national implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore 
see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to gov-
ern the Arctic Ocean.”42
Under the UNCLOS, the roles and obligations of a State depend on the 
capacity in which the State acts and the maritime zone concerned. The main 
responsibility for ensuring the safety and environmental performance of ships, 
irrespective of the area concerned, lies with the ship’s flag State. Apart from 
every State’s obligation to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag,”43 The 
UNCLOS imposes a number of minimum criteria on flag States’ legislation, by 
reference to the “generally accepted” international rules and standards.44 For 
example, the UNCLOS requires flag States to adopt such measures regarding 
the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships as are necessary to 
41   These three conventions were adopted in the 1970s and have been repeatedly updated 
through new protocols and amendments. By now all three conventions have been rat-
ified by more than 150 States, including the flag states representing more than 95 per 
cent of the world’s merchant tonnage. See <www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/
StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 20 August 2016.
42   The 2008 “Ilulissat Declaration”, <www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_
Declaration.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016. The Arctic coastal states’ emphasis on the 
adequacy of UNCLOS for Arctic governance had its background in the growing interest in 
Arctic resources worldwide, uncertainty over the precise maritime borders that apply 
in the Arctic and growing calls for a special treaty regime for the Arctic Ocean, similar to 
the one governing Antarctica.
43   Article 94(1), UNCLOS.
44   Articles 94(5) and 211(2), UNCLOS.
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ensure safety at sea.45 States are free to exceed these international rules and 
standards by imposing additional obligations on their own ships, and these 
obligations will normally apply irrespective of where a ship navigates.
Alongside flag States’ jurisdiction, the UNCLOS offers certain prescriptive 
and enforcement powers to coastal States, in the form of rights (rather than 
obligations) over foreign ships that transit their waters. The jurisdictional bal-
ance between the coastal and maritime interests differs in respect of each mar-
itime zone, depending on the geographical proximity of the zone in question 
to the coastal state.
On the high seas, a flag State’s jurisdiction over its ships is in principle exclu-
sive “save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties 
and [UNCLOS]”,46 thereby largely ruling out coastal state jurisdiction by the 
Arctic coastal states beyond their exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’).47 Within 
its EEZ, however, a coastal state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules for foreign 
ships for the purpose of protecting and preserving the marine environment, 
but only rules giving effect to ‘generally accepted international rules and 
standards established through the competent international organization’.48 
A corresponding limitation in the territorial sea (up to 12 nm from the 
45   Article 94(3), UNCLOS.
46   Article 92(1), UNCLOS. One such exception that is of relevance for present purposes is art 
221, which offers a coastal state, in the case of ‘major casualties involving major environ-
mental damage’, the possibility to take proportionate action to protect its coastline and 
related interests.
47   All Arctic states implement a 200 nm EEZ, but this type of zone has not been established 
around the Svalbard Archipelago. The 1920 Treaty of Spitsbergen grants Norway territo-
rial sovereignty subject to certain access requirements for other treaty partners and also 
recognises Norway’s right to non-discriminatory conservation measures in its ‘territorial 
waters’. A fishery protection zone established in the archipelago in 1977 remains contro-
versial. See e.g. Geir Ulfstein and Robin Churchill ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones around 
Svalbard’, in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Tomas H. Heidar (eds) Changes 
in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Nijhoff 2010) 551–593, Torbjørn Pedersen 
and Tore Henriksen, ‘Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of Legal Uncertainty?’ (2009) 
24 (1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 142 and Erik Jaap Molenaar, ‘New 
Maritime Zones and the Law of the Sea’ in Henrik Ringbom (ed.) Jurisdiction over Ships—
Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law of the Sea (Brill 2015) 256–258.
48   Articles 56(1) and 211(5), UNCLOS. The reference to internationally accepted rules as a 
maximum level applies largely even to defined areas of the EEZ “where the adoption of 
special mandatory measures … is required for recognized technical reasons in relation to 
its oceanographical and ecological conditions, as well as its utilization or the protection 
of its resources and the particular character of its traffic” under article 211(6).
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baseline)49 applies to coastal-State rules that relate to the design, construc-
tion, manning or equipment of foreign ships.50 Apart from these limitations, 
a coastal State’s sovereignty extends to its territorial sea, which means that 
the coastal state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its own laws in this 
zone, subject only to the general right of ships to exercise the right of innocent 
passage.51 In “straits used for international navigation” specific rules apply to 
limit the coastal states’ jurisdiction further.52 Inside the baseline, i.e. in inter-
nal waters, the coastal state enjoys territorial sovereignty and its prescriptive 
and enforcement jurisdiction is not limited under the law of the sea.53
In other words, the legal possibility for an Arctic coastal State to impose its 
own national rules on foreign ships navigating in its coastal waters is mainly 
limited to ships within its own internal waters.54 Beyond that, national rules 
are permissible only to the extent that they do not relate to the design, con-
struction, equipment and manning of ships within the territorial sea, and even 
such rules must not have the practical effect of denying or impairing foreign 
ships’ right of innocent passage.55 Beyond the territorial sea, unilateral coast-
al State legislation is essentially ruled out.56 In addition to these limitations 
on the national rules, a range of other UNCLOS provisions limit the ability of 
states to take enforcement measures against ships that fail to comply with the 
rules while in transit through their coastal waters.57
UNCLOS does not deal in detail with the jurisdiction of port States to 
impose requirements on foreign ships that visit their ports. While it is widely 
acknowledged that ships have no general right of access to ports and that the 
49   Article 3, UNCLOS. Apart from Greenland, which implements a 3nm territorial sea, all 
Arctic States have declared a 12 nm territorial sea.
50   Article 21(2), UNCLOS.
51   Articles 17–26, UNCLOS.
52   UNCLOS Part III, see in particular arts 41–44.
53   The exception to this is UNCLOS art 8(2), which provides that the right of innocent pas-
sage shall apply in “new” internal waters, that is, areas that were not previously internal 
waters but enclosed by straight baselines under UNCLOS art 7. The applicability of this 
exception has not been raised with respect to the Arctic internal waters. See e.g. Erik 
Jaap Molenaar, ‘Options for Regional Regulation of Merchant Shipping Outside IMO, 
with Particular Reference to the Arctic Region’, (2014) 45 (3) Ocean Development and 
International Law 275. On UNCLOS art 8(2), see also Robin R. Churchill ‘Coastal Waters’ in 
The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, Volume I (OUP 2014) 14–16.
54   Article 2(1), UNCLOS.
55   Article 24(1)(a), UNCLOS.
56   Art 211(5), (6), UNCLOS.
57   See e.g. Articles 220 and 24(1), UNCLOS.
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port state accordingly may impose conditions on access,58 the more precise 
limitations as to how port States may exercise their jurisdiction are not clear. 
The question is particularly unsettled with respect to a port state’s jurisdiction 
over matters that take place beyond its maritime zones.59 Section 3.3 below 
addresses this question.
 Arctic Peculiarities
Two peculiarities relating to the jurisdictional scheme in the Arctic should 
be highlighted. First, there is some political uncertainty as to which mari-
time zones are involved, when it comes to the areas within NSR and the NWP. 
Both Canada and Russia claim sovereignty over parts of their Arctic waters 
based on historical title. The Canadian system of straight baselines around the 
Arctic islands was established in 198560 and effectively causes large parts of 
the Northwest Passage to lie within Canadian internal waters, where Canada 
has full sovereignty. However, the Canadian claim is contested by many par-
ties, including the US61 and several EU member states who lodged diplomatic 
protests when Canada established the baselines, regarding them as inconsis-
tent with international law and rejecting Canada’s claim that historical title 
could provide an adequate justification for them.62 Similarly, Russia has also 
established straight baselines to enclose some of the Russian Arctic straits that 
form part of the NSR and that would otherwise form part of the territorial sea.63
The second peculiarity regarding coastal States’ jurisdiction over foreign 
ships in the Arctic follows directly from UNCLOS. Article 234 accepts a broader 
environmental prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction for coastal States.
58   See e.g. articles 25(2) and 211(3), UNCLOS.
59   See e.g. Henrik Ringbom ‘Global Problem—Regional Solution? International Law 
Reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for Ships’ (2011) 26 (4) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 613, Robin Churchill, ‘Port State Jurisdiction Relating 
to the Safety of Shipping and Pollution from Ships—What Degree of Extraterritoriality?’ 
(2016) 31 (3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 442.
60   Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12 (AWPPA).
61   See e.g. Ted L. McDorman, Salt Water Neighbors, International Ocean Law Relations 
Between the United States and Canada (OUP 2009) 236–244.
62   Molenaar, n. 53 above 275. See also J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States 
Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (Nijhoff, 2012, 3rd ed.) 112, which includes an 
excerpt from a communication by several European Community Member States to 
Canada dated 9 July 1986, in which the EC member states conclude that they “cannot … in 
general acknowledge the legality of these baselines”.
63   See e.g. R. Douglas Brubaker, ‘Straits in the Russian Arctic’, (2001) 32 (3) Ocean Development 
& International Law 263–287.
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to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in 
ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional haz-
ards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause 
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such 
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protec-
tion and preservation of the marine environment based on the best avail-
able scientific evidence.64
By including no references to international rules, the article clearly goes beyond 
the ordinary jurisdiction of coastal States, both in the EEZ and in the territorial 
sea. While strictly speaking the language limits its applicability to the former, it 
is reasonable to construe the article as extending jurisdiction to the territorial 
sea as well, as otherwise the jurisdiction in the EEZ would be more extensive 
than that in the territorial sea.65 Other parts of the article nonetheless impose 
important qualifications on the extent of this jurisdiction.
First, the area must be subject to “particularly severe climatic conditions” 
and it must be covered by ice for “most of the year”, creating obstructions 
or exceptional hazards to navigation. There is some uncertainty as to what 
exactly is meant by ‘presence of ice covering the area’ and how to calculate 
the ‘most of the year’ requirement,66 but regardless of how these requirements 
may be interpreted, the result is that the area covered by the article will shrink 
over time due to warming temperatures in the Arctic. A second condition to 
the applicability of the article is that pollution of the marine environment 
in the area could cause “major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the eco-
logical balance”. This condition may not impose a significant limitation, as it 
is well known that a single incident may cause significant and long-lasting 
64   See e.g. Kristin Bartenstein: ‘The “Arctic Exception” in the Law of the Sea Convention: 
A contribution to safer Navigation in the Northwest Passage’ (2011) 42 (1–2) Ocean 
Development & International Law 24 and Aldo Chircop: ‘The Growth of International 
Shipping in the Arctic: Is a regulatory Review Timely?’ (2009) 24 (2) International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 372.
65   See e.g. Donat Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’, 
(2007) 38 (1–2) Ocean Development and International Law 47 and Henriksen n. 31 above, 
374. But see Chircop n. 64 above, 371.
66   Chircop n. 64 above 370; Molenaar n. 53 above, 276; Henriksen n. 31 above, 380–381.
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ecological damage.67 Thirdly, any laws adopted on this basis “shall have due 
regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment based on the best available scientific evidence”, which calls for par-
ticular justification of measures that go beyond IMO standards. Finally, any 
laws and regulations adopted under this article must be non-discriminatory 
and adopted “for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution”. 
Presumably measures aimed at enhancing maritime safety (and through that 
environmental protection) in the area, such as ship construction require-
ments, collision avoidance rules, routeing and reporting systems etc., would 
satisfy this requirement, but purely safety-related rules, such as rules regarding 
evacuation of passengers and crews, lifeboat requirements etc. might not be 
covered by the article.68
Even under this article, in other words, Arctic coastal States cannot promote 
purely national interests. The measures they adopt must aim at preventing, 
reducing and controlling marine pollution from ships and must be necessary 
and reasonable for that purpose. So far only Canada and Russia have made use 
of this jurisdiction, by adopting special legislation for Arctic shipping,69 but 
Denmark has indicated its preparedness to use the jurisdiction provided under 
Article 234 for Greenland’s coastal waters.70
The only recent international discussion on the reach of Article 234 in rela-
tion to Arctic Shipping was a debate at the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee 
in 2010 on the legality of Canada’s mandatory ‘Northern Canada Vessel Traffic 
Services Zone Regulations’ (NORDREG). The debate centred on whether or not 
Canada was obliged to seek IMO approval before making NORDEG mandatory.71 
Before this debate, which in the end was inconclusive, certain EU Member 
States had issued Notes Verbales to Canada. The European Commission, 
67   The grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska in 1989 is the main oil spill in Arctic waters 
to date and a number of injured natural resources have still not recovered. In November 
2014 the report from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, <www.evostc.state.ak.us/
index.cfm?FA=status.injured> accessed 20 August 2016, concluded that “[r]ecovery for 
most injured resources has taken much longer than was originally projected. However, 
this Update contains a large number of resources moving to recovered status. This shift 
marks an important stage in recovery from the Spill. While this is a positive step forward, 
there remain thirteen resources and four services that are still recovering from the Spill.”
68   See also Chircop n. 64 above, 371.
69   See ns. 60–63 above.
70   Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/
media/Nanoq/Images/Udenrigsdirektoratet/100295_Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_
Web.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016, 18.
71   For a summary see IMO Doc. MSC 88/26 paras. 11.28–11.39 and Annex 28).
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however, declined to do so, reportedly due to a lack of certainty about 
whether Canada’s action warranted a diplomatic protest and because of 
potential broader implications for the EU’s Arctic policy.72
If the Canadian and Russian straight baseline claims were held to be 
invalid, the critical sea passages in the areas concerned would form part of the 
territorial sea of the two States. Moreover, depending on the interpretation of 
straits “used for international navigation”, it may be that the passages would 
be subject to the regime of transit passage, which would provide even more 
extensive navigational rights for ships. This situation has given rise to a discus-
sion on the relationship between the regime for transit passage under UNCLOS 
Part III section 2 and the special Arctic jurisdiction under Part XII, section 8 
(Article 234). While it seems plausible to argue that the regime for ice-covered 
waters constitutes lex specialis over the straits regime,73 states with large navi-
gational interests in the areas have sometimes taken an opposite approach.74 
In the absence of any authoritative ruling on this question, there is no cer-
tainty on this matter. Since the issue presupposes that the straight baseline 
delimitations made by Canada and Russia are deemed to be unlawful, Canada 
and Russia have understandably not expressed strong views on this matter, but 
their views are likely to differ from those defending strong navigational rights 
in the areas. The EU has made no explicit pronouncements on this matter.
2.2.2.3  Technical Rules
IMO rules generally set a minimum standard to be upheld by flag States in 
any sea area in the world, including the Arctic Ocean. The main obligation to 
implement and enforce these obligations rests on the flag State, but most IMO 
conventions include references to a supplementary layer of monitoring and 
control of ships’ compliance with the rules. Port State control (PSC) applies to 
any ship present in a port, irrespective of its flag or its flag State’s formal ad-
herence to the IMO convention in question. In spite of the global approach of 
the IMO conventions in general, some of the key conventions include stricter 
72   See Molenaar n. 53 above, 78.
73   Ibid., 275.
74   See Roach and Smith n. 62 above, 318–320, 478–479 and 494. See also the position paper 
on Arctic shipping issued by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) in 2014: “ICS 
believes that the UNCLOS regime of transit passage for straits used for international nav-
igation (as codified in Part III of UNCLOS) takes precedence over the rights of coastal 
States under Article 234.” <www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/policy-
tools/ics-position-paper-on-arctic-shipping.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016. The paper pro-
vides no further justification for this belief, however.
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regimes for certain sea areas, which are deemed to be in need of specific pro-
tection. This is notably the case with the “special areas” of MARPOL Annexes I 
(oil), II (other hazardous and noxious substances), IV (sewage), V (garbage) 
and the “Emission Control Areas” (ECAs) of MARPOL Annex VI on air emis-
sions. So far, however, the Arctic (as opposed to Antarctica)75 has not received 
such special area status.
The special safety and environmental implications of navigation in 
polar waters were recently recognised through the IMO’s adoption of the 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the Polar Code) in 
2014 and 2015. The Code will be implemented as amendments to MARPOL, 
SOLAS and the STCW Conventions, and enters into force on 1 January 2017. 
The Code applies to all ships above 500gt, but does not extend to state ships, 
pleasure craft or fishing vessels.
The Polar Code contains comprehensive detailed requirements on CDEM 
standards for ship safety as well as operational standards for discharge of dif-
ferent substances into the sea by vessels navigating in Arctic and Antarctic 
waters. The mandatory part76 of Part I of the Code addresses issues such as 
ship structure; stability and subdivision; watertight and weather tight integ-
rity; machinery installations; fire safety/protection; life-saving appliances; 
communications; manning and training. The Code seeks to minimize the risks 
involved in operating ships in polar areas by offering overarching goals and 
functional requirements for flag states to implement, hence allowing them a 
certain discretion in the implementation.
By contrast, Part II of the Code on environmental protection is more pre-
scriptive in its approach. The Code prohibits discharge of oil or oily mix-
tures from any ship into Arctic waters, effectively making the Arctic Oceans 
a de facto special area under MARPOL, without, however, including the ban 
of heavy fuel oil, which has been implemented for Antarctica.77 Similarly, the 
75   The Antarctic area is a special area under MARPOL Annexes I (oil), II (noxious liquid 
substances) and V (garbage). See Regulations I/10 and II/1 and V/5.
76   The Polar Code includes two main parts, Part I on maritime safety and Part II on pollu-
tion prevention. Both parts include a mandatory section A and recommended guidance 
in section B.
77   MARPOL Annex I Reg. 43. But see also the Polar Code, Part II-B, section 1.1 recommend-
ing that ships apply its rules when operating in Arctic waters. See also Nengye Liu ‘The 
European Union’s Potential Contribution to Enhanced Governance of Arctic Shipping’ 
(2013) 73 (4) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 714–15 and the 
2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), n. 36 above, 60, considering the pros-
pect of banning the carriage of heavy grades of oil and of discharging other hazardous 
substances as potential future IMO measures to the protection the Arctic environment. 
Ringbom�58
Code also prohibits the discharge of noxious liquid substances or any mixture 
containing such substances into Arctic waters, while the discharge of sewage 
and garbage within polar waters is prohibited unless performed in accordance 
with MARPOL Annexes IV and V, respectively, and with certain additional 
requirements specified in the Code.78
2.2.2.4  Regional Rules
As noted above, the Arctic, unlike many other maritime regions, has no 
regional regulatory body of its own. Due to its constitutional structure, the 
Arctic Council has no authority to issue regional rules for Arctic shipping, or 
even binding decisions for its own members. Despite such constraints, how-
ever, the Council’s activities have played a very important role in developing 
a maritime and shipping policy for the region. Based on a comprehensive 
assessment of the challenges and opportunities linked to increased shipping 
activities in the region,79 the Arctic Council in 2009 adopted a set of recom-
mendations to guide future action by the Council itself, its constituent states 
and others. Under the broad headings of “Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety”, 
“Protecting Arctic People and the Environment”, and “Building Arctic Marine 
Infrastructure”, the Council adopted 17 concrete recommendations. Some of 
these related to action at IMO and other international organizations, while 
others were to be implemented by the Arctic states through national measures.
Two of AMSA’s recommendations have already resulted in binding region-
al treaties. The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic SAR) was adopted in 2011. Secondly, 
an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (Arctic MOPPR) was adopted in 2013. Both agreements 
focus on response action in case of accidents in the Arctic area and both 
implement related IMO conventions.80
As to prescriptive standards for ships, however, the work within the AC, 
including the AMSA recommendations, has been cautious and has repeatedly 
The 2009 AMSA and related follow-up work undertaken by the Arctic Council’s working 
group Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) are available at <www.pame 
.is/index.php/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/amsa> accessed 20 August 2016.
78   Polar Code, Part II-A, sections 2.1.1, 4.2 and 5.2.
79   See n. 36 above.
80   The Arctic SAR implements the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR), while the 2013 Arctic MOPPR implements the 1990 International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) and parts 
of the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties. Both Arctic agreements are binding on the eight Arctic States.
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emphasized the desirability of harmonized rules and global solutions for the 
region and the need for consistency with UNCLOS and international law.81 This 
holds true for the 2015 Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, which covers the period 
2015–2025.82 In October 2015 a new international forum, the “Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum” was formed, which may play an important role in coordinating 
the implementation of the shipping regulations in the future.83
2.2.2.5  Conclusion
The desirability of global rules to protect the Arctic from the threats associated 
with shipping appears to be universally accepted. From a legal point of view, 
too, global rules are clearly the least problematic and most embracing solution, 
as they offer the greatest possibility to legislate and take enforcement action 
with respect to the broadest range of ships. The legal framework beyond that, 
however, includes a number of uncertainties, notably relating to the possibili-
ties for individual States to introduce legislation that exceeds the global rules. 
Apart from the more general uncertainty related to the reach of port States’ 
prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign ships, the legal status of the waters of the 
key Arctic shipping routes (NSR and NWP) is not clear, and UNCLOS Article 234 
includes a number of unclear provisions for which there is neither uniformity 
of views among States nor authoritative interpretations by courts or tribunals.
Recent developments have illustrated that these questions have not gone 
away and the looming boom in Arctic shipping calls for a clarification of the 
matter. For example, does the adoption of the Polar Code, which represents a 
significant advance in substantive standards, impose limitations as to how far 
Arctic coastal states can adopt new standards beyond that, based on UNCLOS 
Article 234? Presumably the Polar Code does not directly impose such a limita-
tion, in view of various caveats to exclude such effects.84 Nonetheless, it may 
81   Apart from the recommendations themselves (see notably recommendations I(a), I(b) 
and I(c), II(c), II(d), II(e) and II(g)), this policy is also obvious in subsequent policy 
discussions within the Council. See e.g. the regular reviews of progress with the rec-
ommendations, the latest one being from 2015, <http://pame.is/images/03_Projects/
AMSA/AMSA_Documents/Progress_Reports/AMSArecommendations2015_Web.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2016.
82   <www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSP/AMSP_2015-2025.pdf> accessed 20 August 
2016.
83   The Forum includes coastguards or similar agencies from the eight Arctic states and is 
designed to be an operational entity that can control collective resources and coordinate 
communications, operational plans, and at-sea activity in the area.
84   The new SOLAS Ch XIV, Reg 2(5) provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall prejudice the 
rights or obligations of States under international law.” See also MARPOL Article 9(2).
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well have more indirect consequences in the form of altering the conditions 
for unilateral action listed in the Article.85 The IMO debates on NORDREG 
illustrate the divergence of views on the Arctic coastal states’ legal latitude to 
regulate international shipping.
2.3 The EU Policy for Arctic Shipping
Like the EU’s more general Arctic policy, its positions on shipping and law of 
the sea issues in the region have not been very precise or well explained. The 
development of these positions during the brief history of EU Arctic policy 
documents appears to be towards ever-weaker policy statements and towards 
a focus on uncontroversial aspects of the EU’s participation. While the ear-
lier policy documents included some indications of a future EU Arctic policy, 
the more recent policy statements by EU institutions have been remarkably 
cautious.
First, regarding the law of the sea and passage rights in the Arctic, the EU has 
been careful not to take an explicit position in sensitive Arctic issues involving 
maritime delimitation and zones in the region.86 More indirectly, however, its 
policy has tended to side with the navigational interests in the Arctic. All three 
EU institutions (Commission, Council and the Parliament) have chosen to 
highlight “the importance of respecting international law principles, including 
the freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage”.87 This contrasts 
with the EU’s own maritime safety and environmental policy for its member 
states, which has been distinctively port and coastal state-oriented.
Second, regarding substantive requirements for ships sailing in the 
Arctic, the EU’s emphasis has been on the desirability of international—
that is, global—rules, with a particular emphasis on the Polar Code and its 
85   See Henriksen n. 31 above, 379–383, concluding that the Code may “provide a frame of 
reference for the exercise of the extended jurisdiction, with any deviations requiring par-
ticular justification.”
86   See also at ns. 61 and 71 above.
87   2014 Council conclusions n. 25, para 10. Similar statements were made in the Council con-
clusions of 8 December 2009 on Arctic issues, para. 16; 2012 Joint Communication n. 2 17; 
and 2014 European Parliament Resolution n. 28, para. 48. The European Parliament came 
closest to criticising the Arctic coastal states, when calling on “the states in the region to 
ensure that any current transport route—and those that may emerge in the future—are 
open to international shipping and to refrain from introducing any arbitrary unilateral 
obstacles, be they financial or administrative, that could hinder shipping in the Arctic, 
other than internationally agreed measures aimed at increasing security or protection of 
the environment”. (Ibid., para. 50).
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implementation.88 The EU institutions have also endorsed the regional regula-
tory initiatives for the Arctic, notably in the form of support for the implemen-
tation of the Arctic SAR and MOPPR Conventions, but also by endorsing the 
entire range of recommendations adopted in the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment.89
Third, when it comes to the EU’s own contribution to Arctic shipping, focus 
has been on matters where the participation of the Union could support and 
provide benefits to the region as a whole. A particular emphasis has been 
placed on the monitoring capabilities developed by the EU and their poten-
tial usefulness for inducing compliance with existing (international) rules in 
the region. The role of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has been 
specifically highlighted in this respect.90 The only exception to this cautious 
stance has been the European Parliament, which in its 2011 resolution specifi-
cally called for the EU to adopt supplementary port-State measures in case the 
international negotiations at the IMO did not produce the desired results for 
the Arctic.91 This element no longer featured in the Parliament’s next resolu-
tion of 2014, however.
As noted above, the most recent joint communication by the Commission 
and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, issued in 
April 2016, is remarkably free from topics that could generate controversy, both 
generally and in respect of the Union’s maritime policy. Under the priority area 
of climate change and the environment, the joint communication states that 
the EU “should encourage full respect for the provisions of UNCLOS … includ-
ing the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment” (p. 7) and 
encourages states to ratify the IMO’s 2004 International Convention for the 
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (p. 8). Under 
88   See e.g. the 2014 European Parliament Resolution n. 28 para. 48 and most recently the 2016 
Council Conclusions on the Arctic n. 29, para. 9.
89   2014 Council Conclusions n. 25 above, para. 9. This aspect no longer features in the 2016 
conclusions n. 29 above.
90   Ibid., para 9 and the 2014 European Parliament Resolution n. 28 above, para. 49.
91   The European Parliament specifically called upon its fellow EU institutions to act if the 
IMO negotiations on the Polar Code failed to produce results on soot emissions and heavy 
fuel oil: “in the event that such negotiations in IMO do not bear fruits, (the European 
Parliament) requests the Commission to put forward proposals on rules for vessels call-
ing at EU ports subsequent to, or prior to, journeys through Arctic waters, with a view to 
imposing a strict regime limiting soot emissions and the use and carriage of heavy fuel 
oil”. European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for 
the High North (2009/2214 (INI)) (hereinafter the ‘2011 European Parliament Resolution’), 
para. 67.
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the heading of sustainable development, the joint communication refers only 
to research and development tasks. The EU should, for example, “contribute to 
enhance the safety of navigation in the Arctic through innovative technolo-
gies and the development of tools for the monitoring of … the increasing mari-
time activities in the Arctic” (p. 12).92 The joint communication calls for close 
cooperation between the newly created Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the 
European Coast Guard Functions Forum (p. 13). The only proposal for EU 
action set forth in the joint communication is a proposal that the Council and 
European Parliament establish working parties/delegations on Arctic matters 
“to meet the challenges ahead” (p. 17).
Accordingly, very little in these policy documents indicates a desire by the 
EU or any of its institutions to take an active role in steering Arctic shipping 
policy. Rather, the EU appears to view itself as a facilitator with a set of useful 
tools that could benefit the Arctic states should they wish to make use of them.
3 The EU’s Regulatory Options
This section explores what options, if any, the EU has within the existing 
international legal framework to take action to improve safety or environmen-
tal protection standards for ships operating in the Arctic. Regulatory action 
at the global level (section 3.2) is distinguished from regional (EU) measures 
(3.3). The section concludes with a brief mention of some existing practical 
tools by which the EU could make a concrete contribution to Arctic shipping.
3.1 Global Rules
While the EU on its own is obviously not in a position to draft global rules for 
the Arctic, or even “generally accepted” ones that flag states were bound to fol-
low under UNCLOS,93 it may nonetheless play a significant role in the making 
92   2016 Joint Communication n. 29. Interestingly, the joint communication in this context 
refers to research programmes designed to cope “with maritime security threats resulting 
from the opening of the North East passage”.
93   The obligation to apply “generally accepted” international rules, e.g. in UNCLOS arts 94(5) 
and 211(2) applies irrespective of whether the flag state has formally signed up to the 
rules and standards in question. The level of acceptance required for a rule to qualify 
as “generally accepted” is not certain, but it is widely considered that “generally accep-
tance” requires that the rule or standard in question is of global origin and application. 
See e.g. the Final Report of the International Law Association’s Committee on Coastal 
State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution over Vessel-Source Pollution, 2000 (‘ILA 
Report’) <www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/12> accessed 20 August 2016.
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of such rules elsewhere. Coordinated approaches by 28 EU Member States (and 
three EEA States), many of which are key maritime States, have a significant 
potential to shape regulatory outcome at the global level, including at the IMO. 
The EU as such is not a member of the IMO, but this does not prevent it from 
coordinating the position among its Member States at the IMO negotiations. 
To some extent this way of proceeding has already been used successfully in 
the Arctic context,94 and there are many additional regulatory issues where 
such a coordinated approach could be used to strengthen the existing IMO 
rules for Arctic navigation. Potential examples include the introduction of a 
ban on carriage and use of heavy grades of oils in the Arctic,95 the adoption of 
Arctic ship reporting and routeing systems, creating MARPOL special areas for 
the Arctic, introducing tighter emission standards or training requirements 
for ships operating in Arctic waters. It has even been proposed that Arctic 
waters might justify a new loadlines standard.96 The IMO could also decide to 
identify the Arctic Ocean or parts thereof as a “particularly sensitive sea area” 
under its Resolution A.982 (24).97
94   E.g. in the context of negotiating the Polar Code, where EU member states’ positions were 
subject to advance coordination at the EU level. In the absence of identified exclusive 
competences, however, the coordination was ‘light’ with an option for states to opt out 
if their interests diverged from the common position. Personal communication with the 
EU/EMSA representative at IMO at the time, Mr Marten Koopmans, 17 November 2015.
95   See Liu n. 77 above. The European Parliament in its 2011 resolution n. 91 above, para. 28 
took a different, or at least more explicit, approach than the other EU institutions by 
stressing that “a similar ban might be appropriate in Arctic waters to reduce risks to the 
environment in case of accidents”.
96   See A. Chircop et al., CMI Working Paper (2014) ‘Polar Load Lines for Maritime Safety: A 
Neglected Issue in the International Regulation of Navigation and Shipping in Arctic Waters?’, 
<www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Arctic%20and%20Antarctic/CMI%20Polar% 
20Load%20Lines%20Paper%20(Final)(14%20October%202014).pdf> accessed 20 August 
2016.
97   The full name of the resolution is “Revised Guidelines for the Identification and 
Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas”. While designation of an area in the Arctic 
as a PSSA would not in itself alter the jurisdictional rights and obligations of states in the 
area, it would serve to highlight the special nature of the area and provide a framework 
for further protection measures. See e.g. Henrik Ringbom, The EU Maritime Safety Policy 
and International Law (Brill 2008) section 6.4.1, Markus J Kachel, Particularly Sensitive Sea 
Areas—IMO’s Role in Protecting Vulnerable Sea Areas (Springer 2008). In an Arctic con-
text Liu, n. 77 above, 730 has proposed the creation of a 200nm PSSA around the Svalbard 
archipelago. See also Laura Boone ‘International Regulation of Polar Shipping’, Molenaar 
et al. (eds.) The Law of the Sea and Polar Regions, Interactions between Global and Regional 
Regimes (Brill, 2012) 212.
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Contributing to the global regulatory scheme clearly represents the least 
controversial policy approach for the EU. Global rules are most effective; they 
are authoritative and unproblematic from a jurisdictional point of view; and 
they involve little political tension as a matter of principle. Yet this approach is 
probably unsatisfactory as the sole means for the EU to develop Arctic policy, 
as a commitment to global rules includes no guarantee of result. In fact sev-
eral of the measures mentioned above presuppose acceptance by the coastal 
States concerned or by States whose interests are most directly affected by 
the measure.98 They are hence unlikely to be adopted without the endorse-
ment of the Arctic coastal States. Moreover, even if the measures in question 
were successfully adopted, the enforcement of such global rules would not lie 
in the hands of EU Member States, but would mainly rely on the flag States 
of the ships operating in the Arctic. An additional consideration which is spe-
cific to the Arctic is that even if global rules were to be agreed for the area, the 
extent to which those rules would actually stop the coastal States (Canada and 
Russia) from implementing separate unilateral rules under UNCLOS Article 234 
remains unclear.99
3.2  EU Rules
The possibilities for the EU to introduce its own supplementary rules to regu-
late Arctic shipping are governed by the law of the sea. The differentiation in 
UNCLOS between rights and obligations of States acting in different capacities 
calls for a distinction between the scenarios where the EU acts in the capacity 
of a flag State, coastal State or port State.
3.2.1  Flag State
From a jurisdictional point of view, the easiest way to complement or even 
exceed the international requirements would be to act in the capacity of a 
flag state, i.e. by imposing requirements that apply to ships flying the flag of 
EU/EEA Member States. Both under UNCLOS and the IMO conventions, the 
international standards represent minimum standards for flag States, who are 
thus free to complement them as they see fit. By tonnage, roughly a fifth of the 
98   See e.g. Regulation 13.2 of the revised MARPOL Annex IV, in force on 1 January 2013, under 
which a special area for sewage will take effect only upon receipt of sufficient notifica-
tions on the existence of adequate reception facilities from party states whose coastlines 
border the relevant special area.
99   See at ns. 84 and 85.
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world’s fleet fly the flag of an EU/EEA Member State,100 though a somewhat 
smaller proportion appears to apply to ships operating in the Arctic.101
However, as a matter of policy the EU has not normally favoured regulating 
international shipping by means of flag State rules.102 The reasons for this are 
easily understood. Requirements that only apply to ships flagged in Member 
States involve obvious risks of subjecting these ships to a competitive disad-
vantage in relation to other ships of non-member flag States. In view of the 
ease by which ship operators may change the flag of their ships, such an 
approach involves a risk of outflagging, which in turn would reduce both the 
effect of the requirement and the size of the EU’s fleet. With respect to ships 
operating in the Arctic, the prospect of outflagging seems particularly real, as 
this type of trade supposedly involves a relatively low number of ships, which 
are specifically constructed and equipped for the trade.
3.2.2 Coastal State
As the EU has no Member State with coastal waters in the Arctic neither 
‘ordinary’ coastal State jurisdiction under UNCLOS nor the specific jurisdic-
tion under Article 234 is available to the EU or its member states. It seems 
legally possible that the EU could adopt requirements for coastal states bor-
dering the Arctic oceans that would bind (only) Norway and Iceland under 
the EEA Agreement,103 but not even that would provide access to jurisdiction 
under Article 234 in view of the limited presence of ice in the coastal waters of 
100   See e.g. <www.ecsa.eu/images/files/STAT_ECSA_2013_4.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016.
101   29 out of the 207 transits of the Northern Sea Route in 2011–2015 were made by ships 
flagged in an EU/EEA Member State. See <www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits> 20 August 
2016.
102   Only a handful of the more than 40 EU maritime safety legal instruments are directed 
exclusively at ships flying the flag of a member state. See Ringbom n. 97 above, chapter 4. 
A relatively recent example is Directive 2009/21 on compliance with flag state require-
ments [2009] OJ L131/132.
103   The Agreement on the European Economic Area, ([1994] OJ L 1/1, as amended) 
guarantees the main elements of the internal market throughout the area. For an EU act 
to apply in the EEA, the act needs to be EEA relevant (i.e. belong to the substantive and 
geographical scope of the EEA Agreement). These elements were recently challenged 
by EEA states in connection with Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations [2013] OJ L 178/66. See Cinelli n. 15 above, 247 et seq. The author knows of no 
precedent of EU acts that exclusively target EEA member states. An instrument targeting 
both port and coastal state responsibilities in the EU/EEA with respect to Arctic shipping 
would not fall within that category, however.
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Iceland and (mainland) Norway.104 Consequently, the extent of such jurisdic-
tion would in any case be quite limited.
3.2.3 Port State
In light of the above, the principal option available to the EU to regulate 
shipping in the Arctic would be in the port state capacity, which is also the 
jurisdictional mechanism preferred by the EU to regulate maritime safety 
more generally.105 Roughly one third of the ships making use of the transpo-
lar routes have their point of departure or arrival in the EU.106 It can thus be 
expected that if trans-Arctic traffic were to boom, one of the end ports would 
be located in the EU.
There are many ways to influence shipping through measures taken in 
ports. The least controversial ones focus on implementation only, typically 
in the form of port state control. The Arctic has no PSC regime of its own, 
but all coastal States in the area participate in the Paris MOU,107 which is also 
closely calibrated with the EU’s own PSC legislation.108 PSC serves only to 
implement international (IMO and ILO) rules, but represents a very powerful 
tool for ensuring that the rules, including the Polar Code once it enters into 
force, are implemented in practice. The enforcement measures taken in cases 
of non-compliance have been strengthened over time and by now include 
quite drastic consequences, such as the “banning” of a ship from an entire 
104   The exercise of jurisdiction based on UNCLOS artilce 234 by Norway in the Svalbard 
Archipelago would be justified from a climate point of view, but would have to be subject 
to the 1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen.
105   The main parts of EU maritime safety and environmental legislation target ships of 
any nationality that (voluntarily) enter a port within the Union. Ringbom n. 97 above, 
chapter 5.
106   According to statistics provided by the NSR Information Office (<www.arctic-lio.com/
nsr_transits> accessed 20 August 2016), 36 per cent of the transits that were not heading 
for Russia in 2011–2015 were destined for a European port.
107   Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, 1982, latest amendment 
from 27 May 2016. <www.parismou.org> accessed 29 November 2016. The text of the MOU 
does not include a geographical scope of coverage, but operates with the (undefined) 
terms ‘region of the memorandum’ or ‘Paris MOU region’. Under section 9.2, the MOU is 
open to participation for maritime authorities of “a European coastal State and a coastal 
State of the North Atlantic basin from North America to Europe”. Maritime authorities 
of all Arctic States except the US are already signatories to the Paris MOU, and there is 
close cooperation with the US Coast Guard. There are thus no immediate legal hurdles for 
extending the application of the regime to the Arctic region.
108   Directive 2009/16 on port State control [2009] OJ L 31/57, as amended by Directive 2013/38 
[2013] OJ L 218/1.
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region’s ports.109 Even without a change of legislation or MOU, it is feasible 
to target Arctic shipping by means of special attention and “concentrated 
inspection campaigns” for ships coming from or heading towards Arctic 
waters. More permanent target arrangements, such as an inherent inspection 
priority of ships arriving from Arctic waters, would probably necessitate a 
change of the Directive and/or the MOU, but would be unproblematic in terms 
of international law.
Apart from PSC, which represents an administrative tool to enhance mari-
time safety and environmental protection, judicial penalties may also be 
invoked for violation of international rules. As far as pollution is concerned, 
this could also be done without further regulatory change, even for violations 
that occur outside the maritime waters of EU Member States. UNCLOS Article 
218 permits port states to institute proceedings against violations of interna-
tional (MARPOL) pollution standards, even if there is no link between the spill 
and the state in question. The principle is already incorporated in EU law, as far 
as oil and noxious liquid substances are concerned, through Directive 2005/35, 
but has not been widely applied in practice.110
Port States could also influence shipping by unilaterally implementing 
international rules that have been adopted but that have not yet entered into 
force, for ships operating in the Arctic that visit EU ports.111 For example, the 
2004 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ 
Ballast Water and Sediments, which has not yet entered into force, set forth 
rules relating to ballast water management.112 Requiring ships that operate 
in the Arctic and enter EU ports to have the necessary equipment on board 
to prevent the introduction of non-indigenous species through their ballast 
waters might very well be a justifiable measure in view of the sensitive Arctic 
marine environment.
109   Ibid., art 16, Paris MOU. section 4.
110   Directive 2005/35 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for 
infringements [2005] OJ L 255/11. The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) stud-
ied the practical implementation of the rules in 2011 and concluded that few states had 
applied the rules on pollutions beyond their coastal waters. (Unpublished study, on file 
with author).
111   Precedents of EU requirements advancing the application of international rules ahead 
of their international entry into force include Council Regulation No 3051/95 on the 
safety management of roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries (ro-ro ferries) [1995] OJ L 320/14 
and Regulation 782/2003 on the prohibition of organotin compounds on ships [2003] 
OJ L 115/1.
112   See also Liu n. 77 above, 727.
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A more far-reaching alternative would be to implement rules that have been 
adopted only in the form of recommendations at the international level. The 
Polar Code’s Part B includes several examples, including a ban on the carriage 
and use of heavy grades of oil in the Arctic.113
3.2.4 Legal Considerations
The extent to which the EU could legally require ships entering its ports to 
comply with requirements aimed at improving maritime safety and environ-
mental protection in the Arctic depends on a series of considerations.
First, whether the substantive nature of the rule in question is relevant. In 
particular, whether a State may legally assert jurisdiction depends on whether 
the rules in question relate to ‘static’ features of the ship or to questions of 
operation or behaviour.114 In the former case, e.g. specific ice-class require-
ments or equipment requirements for ballast water treatment, it is easier to 
find a jurisdictional basis for the requirement, given that any violation of the 
requirement will ‘follow’ the ship and hence also occur within the port where 
the state’s jurisdiction is undisputed. By contrast, it would be more difficult 
for a port State to assert jurisdiction in respect of (non-static) operations or 
behaviour that occur outside its coastal waters, where it has no prescrip-
tive jurisdiction. Potential examples including a zero discharge policy of oil 
discharges115 or rules on ‘grey water’ discharges from ships in the Arctic.116 
Discharge rules without an international foundation will not be covered by the 
broad jurisdiction provided to port states under Article 218(1) of the UNCLOS. 
Potentially, but much less certain, alternative bases for jurisdiction could be 
one of the accepted bases for extra-territorial jurisdiction under international 
law or merely the requirement of a sufficient ‘substantive connection’ between 
the matter under regulation and the port State.117
Second, the choice of measures taken to enforce the requirement in ques-
tion plays a role. For example, it has been convincingly argued that refusing 
a ship the right of access to a port (or other losses of entitlement to which 
the ship or its flag State has no specific right) requires a less solid prescriptive 
113   See above at notes 77 and 91 and Liu n. 77, 728.
114   See e.g. Churchill n. 59, above 450 et seq.
115   See e.g. Canadian Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR) CRC c. 353, 
s. 29.
116   This matter is not regulated in MARPOL, but the ASPPR n. 115 above, s. 28 prohibits the 
discharge of any waste, with the exception of untreated sewage, in the Arctic waters.
117   See in particular Bevan Marten, ‘Port State Jurisdiction, International Conventions and 
Extraterritoriality: An Expansive Interpretation’ in Henrik Ringbom (ed.) Jurisdiction over 
Ships—Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law of the Sea (Brill 2015) 105.
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basis than punitive enforcement measures, such as fines and other types 
of sanctions.118 Accordingly, the legal basis for a measure may be easier to 
establish where the consequence of non-compliance is denial of (subsequent) 
access to the port State. Measures of this type are particularly effective in a 
regional context, such as in the EU, where the refusal could be implemented 
jointly by all EU/EEA States, hence extending the ban to all ports in the region. 
Moreover, coordinated implementation of port State jurisdiction among a 
larger group serves to avoid the risk of ‘ports of convenience’ whereby ship 
operators could evade the requirements by simply choosing another port of 
destination.
Third, other types of legal obligations may limit a State’s options to exer-
cise port state jurisdiction against foreign ships. As one example, specific 
treaty obligations may impose such limitations. While this is not a common 
feature in the IMO conventions, other areas of international law, notably 
international trade law, may impose important limitations in this respect.119 As 
another example, more general international law principles impose certain 
general reasonableness criteria, which may also serve as limitations. Port entry 
requirements may, for example, not be discriminatory or constitute an abuse 
of right by the port state.120 They must be adopted in good faith and must be 
proportional to the objective they seek to achieve. In this respect it has been 
suggested that the objective of a measure in itself should play a role in its legal 
justifiability and that a measure that aims at protecting common values or 
resources should enjoy a stronger claim to legality.121 Measures aimed at pro-
tecting the Arctic against the risks involved with shipping are likely to score 
high on such an assessment. Also, measures that serve to implement standards 
with an international basis (e.g. in the form of non-binding measures, or inter-
national rules that have not yet entered into force) will presumably be easier to 
justify than purely unilateral port State requirements.
In conclusion, there are few very concrete standards or limitations to rely 
upon in this area of law. The legality of any particular measure will need to be 
assessed based on all the interests involved, including those of ship operators 
118   Erik Jaap Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction: Toward Comprehensive, Mandatory and 
Global Coverage’ (2007) 38 (1–2) Ocean Development and International Law 225–257 at 229.
119   See Churchill n. 59 above, 450 et seq. See also Andrew Serdy, ‘The Shaky Foundations of 
the FAO Port State Measures Agreement: How Watertight Is the Legal Seal against Access for 
Foreign Fishing Vessels?’ (2016) 31 (3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 422.
120   Article 300, UNCLOS.
121   See e.g. Sophia Kopela, ‘Port-State Jurisdiction, Extraterritoriality, and the Protection 
of Global Commons’ (2016) 47 (2) Ocean Development and International Law 89; Cedric 
Ryngaert & Henrik Ringbom, ‘Introduction: Port State Jurisdiction: Challenges and 
Potential’ (2016) 31 (3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 379.
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in the region and the Arctic coastal States. Nevertheless, it is clear that port 
States have considerable latitude in deciding on the content of such require-
ments and hence also that the EU has some regulatory leeway to implement 
port State requirements aimed at improving safety and protecting the environ-
ment in the Arctic.122
3.3  Non-regulatory Measures
The EU can obviously contribute to the safety and efficiency of Arctic shipping 
in a number of other ways than by regulation. EU institutions have empha-
sized these types of measures when drafting their Arctic policy documents. 
Nonetheless, while these measures may be important, they are not of interest 
from the point of view of legal assessment and will be discussed only superfi-
cially here.
A particular feature of the development of the EU’s maritime policy in the 
past decade, which has not received much attention in literature, relates to 
maritime information. Through a variety of means, data relating to maritime 
safety, compliance and ship movements is being collected, in particular by the 
EU Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). A number of satellite and AIS-based data-
bases have been established which can be of key relevance not only for moni-
toring and surveillance of shipping activities in the Arctic, but also in assisting 
in rescue operations etc. Not only does available data include information on 
ship movements, safety standards and some information on hazardous car-
goes on board, but EMSA also operates a satellite service for detecting oil spills, 
which could be valuable for monitoring deliberate and accidental oil spills in 
Arctic waters, where other types of surveillance mechanisms are more limited.
Another aspect of EMSA’s operational work relates to pollution response 
activities. EMSA manages a small fleet of oil recovery vessels that can be 
brought in to assist with pollution emergencies in EU waters. Extending their 
potential scope of activity to the Arctic Ocean has not yet been proposed, but 
the collaboration between EMSA and the Arctic Council, notably through the 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Working Group, 
which was established under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS), is an indication of close collaboration between the two institutions in 
this field.
122   Generally, see Bevan Marten, Port State Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International 
Merchant Shipping (Springer 2014); Molenaar n. 118, above; and Ringbom, n. 97 above, 
section 5.1.
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4 Concluding Observations
Judging from the EU’s policy documents on Arctic policy, the Union is not 
going to play a significant role in the development of shipping in the Arctic 
region. The main impression that one derives from those documents is one of 
caution, in jurisdictional matters as well as regarding substantive standards. 
That tendency has been strengthened during the eight years since the adop-
tion of the Commission’s first communication on the topic, to the extent that 
the latest policy document hardly pronounces on shipping issues at all.
This chapter has sought to assess the EU’s legal latitude in a prospective way 
through an analysis of the relevant limitations of the law of the sea and other 
international law. The author concludes that there is room for a more ambi-
tious policy, certainly in terms of identifying regulatory ambitions at global 
(IMO) level, but also for the EU to adopt regulatory measures alone, notably 
in the form of requirements placed on ships trading in Arctic waters and visit-
ing ports of EU/EEA Member States. The fact that many of the ships that are 
expected to operate in the Arctic area in the future either fly the flag of an EU/
EEA Member State or travel to or from an EU/EEA port provides an important 
jurisdictional link that has not been utilized so far. Outside the realm of law 
of the sea, the EU could also introduce legislation aimed at conduct in the 
Arctic directed at citizens and companies under its jurisdiction, rather than 
at ships. As to rule enforcement, many of the operational tools and facilities 
developed by the EU and EMSA could easily be extended to or find specific 
application in the Arctic, which would contribute to sharing the implementa-
tion burden of the Arctic States.
The EU should not find it difficult to identify an interest or motivation to 
engage in this field. It has an interest in ensuring that regulation of Arctic 
shipping is handled in a responsible way that conforms with its own exter-
nal policy ambitions. EU members represent a significant proportion of flag 
States with interests in the Arctic, and the EU is one of the regions that have 
most to gain by further developments of shipping in the Arctic. Apart from 
that, ensuring safe and environmentally sustainable shipping in the Arctic is a 
global concern, and arguably any State or region with influence has a respon-
sibility to do its part to ensure that shipping in the Arctic can be developed in 
an orderly manner. The EU regularly emphasizes its responsibility for global 
environmental concerns in areas beyond its own jurisdiction.123 Indeed the 
Union’s “regular” maritime safety and environmental policy is not confined to 
123   See e.g. Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 23 (2) 
European Journal of International Law 469–494.
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the region’s coastal waters, but repeatedly extends further to the extent that 
has been deemed consistent with international law.124 A coherent policy on 
Arctic shipping would thus seem necessary if only to ensure consistency with 
the EU’s own more general policies for maritime safety, environmental poli-
cies, climate change etc.125
A separate question is whether such EU action on Arctic shipping is called 
for in a substantive sense.126 The brief review above has already identified sev-
eral areas in which the Arctic environment lacks adequate protection from the 
safety and pollution risks associated with ships. Examples include the absence 
of a ban on the carriage of heavy fuel oil, the lack of air emissions rules (includ-
ing soot particles), separate loadlines rules, PSSA, including routeing systems, 
reporting schemes etc. Others have pointed out that regulatory inadequacies 
may also be found in the realm of private maritime law, such as the lack of 
special marine insurance law requirements for Arctic conditions, the interpre-
tation of ‘seaworthiness’ in the context of polar navigation, or the insufficient 
availability of compensation for pollution damage occurring in the Arctic.127
The identification of regulatory gaps or inadequacies in the rules governing 
Arctic navigation does not necessarily indicate that the EU is the best institu-
tion to address those gaps. In most cases it is probably not, if the effectiveness 
of regulation is used as the relevant standard. Clearly both the formal cover-
age and political legitimacy of any rule would be enhanced if it were adopted 
at global level, by the IMO or another competent international organisation. 
The key strength of the EU in the regulation of shipping lies in its capacity to 
exert pressure on such organizations to implement their rules in a harmonized 
manner, and to act on its own if required to avoid results that are unacceptable 
from the point of view of its own policy objectives. This chapter has illustrated 
124   See e.g. the EU rules in relation to classification societies or various port state require-
ments that relate to matters taking place beyond the EU’s territories as assessed in 
Ringbom n. 59 above. See also Joanne Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension 
in EU Law’ (2014) 62 (1) American Journal of Comparative Law 87.
125   It may be noted in this context that under Article 7 of the TFEU “the Union shall ensure 
consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account 
and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers.”
126   The EU has sometimes been criticized for not taking a more active stance in relation to 
Arctic shipping. See e.g. Liu n. 77 above, 708, 717.
127   See e.g. AMSA n. 36 above 63–66 and Lars Rosenberg Overby et al., CMI Report (2016): ‘Report 
on the Legal Framework for Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Spills in Polar Regions’, 
available at <www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Work%20In%20Progress/Polar%20%28 
previously%29%20Arctic%20and%20Antarctic/Report%20on%20Civil%20Liability%20
%28Rosenbery%20Overby%20et%20al%29.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016.
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that the international regulatory framework offers scope for the EU to exercise 
all these functions even with respect to Arctic navigation, albeit recognizing 
that there exist certain legal limits to the actions available.
Accordingly, the most useful role for the EU is probably to exercise pres-
sure on the global legislator and to represent a fall-back solution, a second 
line of defence in case the global rule-makers fail to adopt the desired policies. 
Nonetheless, the EU’s failure to indicate its policy ambitions or priorities in 
this field, and its lack of willingness to exercise its regulatory powers, make it 
difficult for the EU to play such a role. The absence of signals on these matters 
represents a significant missed opportunity for the EU to play a role in shaping 
the future (global) Arctic shipping policy and beyond. Similar considerations 
apply to other related international discussions underway, including notably 
the negotiation of a new implementing agreement to UNCLOS on the protec-
tion of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.128 While this chapter 
has focused on EU’s Arctic shipping policy, it is possible—if not probable—
that a similar discrepancy between, on the one hand, the EU’s substantive 
interest, formal competence and jurisdictional opportunity to act and, on the 
other hand, its limited exercise of such powers or opportunities holds true for 
many other EU policies in the Arctic.
128   On the progress of these negotiations, which were initiated by the UN General Assembly 
through Resolution 69/292 (2015), see e.g. <www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom 
.htm> accessed 20 August 2016.
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CHAPTER �0
The European Union’s Potential Contribution  
to the Governance of High Sea Fisheries in the  
Central Arctic Ocean
Nengye Liu
1 Introduction
Fisheries1 have always been an essential part of the EU’s Arctic policy. The EU 
in its first Arctic policy published in 2008 (COM (2008) 763) noted that: “in 
spite of harsh conditions, melting of ice and new technologies will gradually 
increase access to Arctic living and non-living resources”.2 Section 3.2 of the 
COM (2008) 763 was devoted to fisheries. It is stated that the EU’s policy objec-
tive is to ensure exploitation of Arctic fisheries resources at sustainable levels 
whilst respecting the rights of local coastal communities.3 This was reaffirmed 
in the EU’s 2012 Arctic policy ( JOIN (2012) 19)4 and 2016 Arctic policy ( JOIN 
(2016) 21).5
* Nengye Liu, Senior Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide, Australia.
** This chapter was partly written when the author was a Marie Curie Fellow at Dundee 
Law School, University of Dundee, United Kingdom under Marie Curie Intra-European 
Fellowship (FP7-PEOPLE-2012-IEF, 328806, Euro-ArcticLab). The author would like to thank 
Robin Churchill, Tore Henriksen and Michelle Lim for their comments on an earlier draft.
1   In this chapter the focus is on marine capture fisheries rather than aquaculture.
2   European Commission Communication of 20 November 2008 on the European Union and 
the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763, 2 <eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
COM:2008:0763:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 26 October 2015.
3   COM (2008) 763, 7.
4   “The EU supports the exploitation of Arctic fisheries resources at sustainable levels 
based on sound scientific advice, while respecting the rights of local coastal communi-
ties.” Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 June 2012 on Developing 
a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 and Next Steps, JOIN 
(2012) 19, 10 <eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf> accessed 26 October 2015.
5   “It will be necessary……. to establish the appropriate international measures……… to 
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of resources in the Arctic high 
seas.” Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 27 April 2016 on An Integrated 
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Arctic sea ice is melting at an alarming rate. A recent report from NASA has 
found that the Arctic has lost almost 95% of its older ice cover since 1984.6 Due 
to this loss and other impacts of climate change, the marine ecosystems of the 
Arctic Ocean7 are experiencing unprecedented change.8 It is now widely rec-
ognized that fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean may occur both within areas under 
current fisheries’ jurisdiction of the coastal States, and in the high seas por-
tion of the central Arctic Ocean.9,10 The coastal States of the Arctic Ocean, the 
so-called Arctic Five—United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark—
believe they have a stewardship role in the conservation and management of 
Arctic marine living resources.11 However, freedom of fishing in the high seas 
is enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS),12 
which is applicable in the Arctic Ocean. To achieve sustainable management 
of fisheries in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean, key high sea 
fishing States, such as the EU, must also be involved in any regulatory efforts.
  European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN (2016) 21, 16 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0021&from=EN> accessed 6 September 2016.
6    ‘See How Arctic Sea Ice is Losing its Bulwark Against Warming Summers’ (NASA, 
29 October 2016) < http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-36587253> accessed 
18 December 2016.
7    There is no accepted definition of the Arctic Ocean. A widely used definition is adopted 
by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) of the Arctic Council, 
which uses the working definition of marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’N), 
and north of 62°N in Asia and 60°N in North America (as modified to include the marine 
areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean, 
including the Labrador Sea). See Timo Koivurova and Nengye Liu, ‘Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment’ in Daud Hassan and Saiful Karim (eds), International Marine 
Environmental Law and Policy (Routledge 2017) (forthcoming).
8    Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, Arctic Council Working Group Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna, 2013 <https://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/index.php/the-report/chapters/
introduction> accessed 10 April 2017.
9    Central Arctic Ocean is defined based on IBRU’s Arctic Maps: Status of Arctic waters 
beyond 200 nautical miles from shore <https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/
ArcticmapStatusofArcticWatersbeyond200NM.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017.
10   Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Sea Fishing in the Central 
Arctic Ocean, Oslo, 16 July 2015 <www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/
vedlegg/folkerett/declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-july-2015.pdf> accessed 27 October 
2015.
11   The Ilulissat Declaration, Ilulissat, Greenland, 28 May 2008 <http://www.oceanlaw.org/
downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf> accessed 15 March 2017.
12   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).
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In the context of the rise of the EU as a global actor (both as a multilat-
eral player and a bilateral actor),13 this chapter aims to discuss what roles the 
EU, as a non-Arctic entity, could play in the governance14 of potential high sea 
fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean. This chapter combines doctrinal analy-
sis and field research.15 It first briefly describes the current international and 
regional regime for the regulation of fisheries in the Arctic. Then the paper 
focuses on the EU’s potential internal and external actions that could help 
achieve sustainable management of potential fisheries in the high sea part of 
the central Arctic Ocean. The EU, as a global regulatory power, a key high sea 
fishing entity and an important market for fish products, could possibly make 
its unique contribution to enhance governance of high sea fisheries in the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean.
2 Current Regime
Most of the Arctic Ocean is under national jurisdiction of coastal States (the 
Arctic Five).16 There are four high seas pockets in the marine Arctic, namely 
the “Banana Hole” in the Norwegian Sea, the “Loophole” in the Barents Sea, the 
“Donut Hole” in the central Bering Sea and the “central Arctic Ocean” around 
the North Pole. So far, large-scale commercial fisheries are only taking place 
13   In details, see for example, A Global Actor in Search of a Strategy: European Union Foreign 
Policy between Multilateralism and Bilateralism, Directorate-General for Research and 
Innovation, European Commission, 2014.
14   The Commission on Global Governance in its publication Our Global Neighbourhood 
defines Governance as: “Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institu-
tions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through 
which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action 
taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, 
as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or 
perceived to be in their interest”. See also C. Pelaudeix, ‘What is “Arctic Governance”? 
A Critical Assessment of the Diverse Meanings of “Arctic Governance” ’ (2014) 6 Yearbook 
of Polar Law 398–426.
15   Between 9 and 18 February 2015, the author was funded by the Marie Curie Fellowship 
and conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with representatives from the 
Secretariat of the NEAFC (London), the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries of the European Commission (Brussels) and the EU’s Delegation to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (Rome). Interviews were ana-
lyzed, regarding the EU’s role in the governance of Arctic fisheries.
16   Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region, Arctic Maps, IBRU <https://
www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/Arcticmap04-08-15.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017.
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in the Sub-Arctic,17 which represents more than 10% of the global marine fish 
catch by weight and 5.3% of the crustacean catch.18 To date, no commercial 
fishing has occurred central Arctic Ocean. Nevertheless, one of the key impacts 
of climate change in Arctic marine ecosystem is the northward expansion of 
various subarctic as well as temperate species, while the abundance and repro-
ductive outcome of indigenous species are in decline.19 It is therefore a ques-
tion whether current governance regime of Arctic fisheries is ready for this 
change.
The international legal framework20 which applies to fisheries in the 
Arctic is complemented by regional fora and instruments. The UNCLOS deals 
broadly with the conservation and management of marine living resources 
in the high seas in Articles 116–120. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD)21 is another framework convention that provides obligations of its 
contracting parties for the protection of marine biodiversity. Moreover, in 
order to sustainably manage straddling22 and highly migratory fish stock,23 
17   Marine ecosystems and the shelf areas off the coasts of Labrador, Newfoundland, 
Greenland and Iceland, and the Bering and Barents Seas, are often referred to as sub-Arctic 
systems. See Factsheet, Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries? EU Arctic Impact Assessment 
2014; <http://www.arcticinfo.eu/images/Facksheet/Factsheets_Final/fishing_regular.pdf> 
accessed 18 November 2015.
18   S. Arnarsson and D. Justus, ‘Changing Nature of Arctic Fisheries’ in Adam Stepien, Timo 
Koivurova and Paula Kankaanpää (eds) Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic 
(Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, 2014) 57.
19   N. Wegge, ‘The Emerging Politics of the Arctic Ocean, Future Management of the Living 
Marine Resources’ (2015) 51 Marine Policy 333; J.S. Christiansen, C.W. Mecklenburg and 
L.V. Karamushko, ‘Arctic Marine Fishes and Their Fisheries in Light of Global Change’ 
(2014) 20 Global Change Biology 352.
20   See L. Weidemann, International Governance of the Arctic Marine Environment, with 
Particular Emphasis on High Sea Fisheries (Springer 2013) 142–159; E.J. Molenaar, 
‘International Law on Arctic Fisheries’ in N. Loukacheva (ed.) Polar Law and Resources 
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015) 79–90.
21   Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 
1993), (1992) 31 ILM 842–847.
22   Stocks occurring both within and in an area beyond and adjacent to the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, see E. Meltzer, ‘Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries’ (1994) 25 (3) Ocean 
Development and International Law 255.
23   Highly migratory species are defined as those species listed in Annex 1 of the 1982 
Convention. This list includes tuna, tuna-like species (billfish, dolphins, and sharks), and 
certain cetaceans. These species were categorized and so labeled because they move con-
siderable distances over vast expanses of ocean areas. See Meltzer n. 22 above.
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the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement)24 was adopted in 
1995. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has 
been actively managing global fisheries by adopting a series of legally bind-
ing and non-binding instruments. For example, the Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement)25 was 
adopted to cope with the problem of reflagging.26 Part of the FAO Compliance 
Agreement were reproduced in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries27 
in 1995. Furthermore, for combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, the FAO has produced instruments such as the 2001 International Plan 
of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA-IUU)28 and the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to 
Prevent IUU Fishing.29
International fisheries law however has generally failed to achieve sustain-
able management of fisheries globally. Churchill argues that it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that the UNCLOS has proved virtually useless in pre-
venting the adverse impacts of fisheries on the marine environment.30 The 
impact of current and future fisheries on the marine environment and 
24   United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 
4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001) (1995) 34(6) ILM 1542–1580.
25   The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (adopted 24 November 1993) 
(1993) 33 ILM 968.
26   The practice of vessel operators reflagging their vessels with flags of convenience, 
those from other countries or countries not party to fisheries agreements or arrange-
ments to avoid obligation to comply with conservation and management measures. See 
Weidemann, n. 20 above, 148.
27   Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/
v9878e00.HTM> accessed 19 November 2015.
28   International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing <www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm> accessed 
19 November 2015.
29   Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing (adopted 22 November 2009, not yet in force) <http://www.fao 
.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/2_037t-e.pdf> accessed 19 November 2015.
30   R.R. Churchill, ‘Fisheries and Their Impact on the Marine Environment: UNCLOS and 
Beyond’ in Marta Chantal Ribeiro (ed), 30 Years After the Signature of the United Nations 
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marine biodiversity in the Arctic is not likely to be fundamentally different 
from impacts on the marine environment and biodiversity in other parts of 
the globe.31 The physical harm caused by the often highly destructive methods 
used for fishing, have, in many parts of the world, had a severe impact on the 
marine ecosystem and it is likely that they will have the same types of impacts 
in the Arctic.32 Fishery collapse already happened in the Arctic. For example, 
the “Donut Hole” stock of Pollock in the Aleutian Basin of the central Bering 
Sea during the 1980s is the most spectacular fishery collapse in North American 
history.33 The key issue therefore is how to develop the current regime so as to 
achieve sustainable fisheries in the Arctic. Because the central Arctic Ocean 
has not been disturbed by fisheries so far, a regulatory regime should be in 
place before commercial fishing occurs. On the other hand, the central Arctic 
Ocean might be used as a testing ground for the development of international 
fisheries law that could provide lessons for other parts of the globe.
Many fora and instruments apply to parts of the marine Arctic at regional 
and bilateral level.34 Moreover, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) covers part of the Arctic Ocean. The NEAFC Convention Area cov-
ers the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans east of a line south of Cape Farewell—
the southern tip of Greenland (42° W), north of a line to the west of Cape 
Hatteras—the southern tip of Spain (36° N) and west of a line touching the 
western tip of Novya Semlya (51°E).35 Nevertheless, a gap remains for the regu-
lation of potential fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean.
Sponsored by Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, the United States Congress 
adopted the S.J. Res.17 in 2008, directing the United States to initiate interna-
tional discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate 
an agreement for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Protection of the Environment and the Future of the 
Law of the Sea (Coimbra Editora 2014) 31.
31   E.J. Molenaar, ‘Arctic Fisheries Conservation and Management: Initial Steps of Reform of 
the International Legal Framework’ (2009) 1 Yearbook of Polar Law 433.
32   N. Liu and E.A. Kirk, ‘The European Union’s Potential Contribution to Protect Marine 
Biodiversity in the Changing Arctic: a Roadmap’ (2015) 30 (2) International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 268.
33   K.M. Bailey, ‘An Empty Donut Hole: the Great Collapse of a North American Fishery’ 
(2011) 16 (2) Ecology and Society [online] <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/
art28/> accessed 25 November 2015.
34   E.J. Molenaar, ‘International Law on Arctic Fisheries’ in N. Loukacheva (ed.) Polar Law 
and Resources (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015) 84–85.
35   ‘Where is the NEAFC Regulatory Area?’ <http://www.neafc.org/what-neafc/117> accessed 
19 November 2015; See also ‘Map of the NEAFC Regulatory Area’ <http://www.neafc.org/
page/27> accessed 19 November 2015.
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Arctic Ocean.36 It is proposed that the United States should support inter-
national efforts to halt the expansion of commercial fishing activities in the 
high seas of the Arctic Ocean before the agreement comes into force.37 On 
July 16 2015, the Arctic Five adopted the Declaration Concerning the 
Prevention of Unregulated High Sea Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (Oslo 
Declaration).38 The Declaration acknowledges the interest of other States in 
preventing unregulated high seas fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean and has 
therefore initiated a so-called “broader process” of developing fisheries man-
agement measures for the central Arctic Ocean with non-Arctic States. As a 
result, China, the EU, Iceland, Japan and the Republic of Korea—the five 
leading non-Arctic high sea fishing States—have been invited to help 
develop a regional fisheries organisation or arrangement for the central Arctic 
Ocean. Known as the Arctic 5+5, the group held its first meeting on fisher-
ies in Washington in December 2015. A series of follow-up meetings has been 
held since in Washington, Iqualuit in Canada and Torshavn, in the Faroe 
Islands. The Arctic 5+5 negotiations have made significant progress. Held in 
Reykjavik, Iceland (15–18 March 2017), the group issued a statement empha-
sising that consensus had been reached on most issues and that there was 
a general commitment to conclude the negotiations with a legally binding 
arrangement soon.39 The EU has committed to support a multilateral agree-
ment that prevents unregulated high sea fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean 
until a Regional Fisheries Management Organization/Arrangement (RFMO/A) 
is in place.40 The EU’s potential actions to contribute to the establishment of 
the central Arctic RFMO/A will be further elaborated in section 3.4.
36   S.J.Res.17—110th Congress (2007–2008), Public Law No: 110–243 (06/03/2008) <https://
www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/17> accessed 16 December 
2015.
37   Ibid.
38   Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Sea Fishing in the Central 
Arctic Ocean, Oslo, 16 July 2015.
39   Chairman’s Statement, Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 
Reykjavik, Iceland, 15–18 March 2017 <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/
Files/Attached%20Files/Fiskeri_Fangst_Landbrug/Eng/Chairmans%20Statement%20
from%20Reykjavik%20Meeting%202017.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
40   Joint Communication of the European Commission and High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2016 on International ocean 
governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans, JOIN (2016) 49, 7.
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3 The EU and Arctic Fisheries
3.1 The EU’s Current Role in the Governance of Arctic Fisheries
The EU has no coast line in the Arctic. This subsequently limits the EU’s posi-
tion on receiving fishing rights: the EU receives rights either by grants from 
Arctic countries’ to fish within their EEZs or by being allocated rights with-
in a RFMO area regarding the high seas.41 For example, the EU has entered 
into a mixed sustainable fisheries agreement with Greenland, which provides 
access to a wide range of fish stocks in Greenland’s EEZ. It is reaffirmed in the 
2015 Joint Declaration between the EU and Greenland that “sustainably manag-
ing fish stocks and the marine environment as well as providing fishing oppor-
tunities for the vessels of EU Member States should remain an essential pillar 
of the partnership between the EU and Greenland and continue to be based on 
the EU Greenland Fisheries Partnership Agreement and its Protocols”.42
The EU accounts for over 5% of total fisheries production worldwide, 
which is 4,889,188 tonnes live weight in 2011.43 79% of EU catches are taken in 
EU waters; 8% are made in countries’ waters outside the EU; 13% are taken 
on the high seas.44 It is noted that Northeast Atlantic (FAO Fishing area 
code 27) is the most important fishing area for the EU. 69.62% of total EU 
catches in 2011 were taken from that area.45 In terms of value, the EU is the 
leading importer of fishery products in the world. The EU is the largest fish 
market in the world, which is about 26% of global fish import with a value 
about EUR 36 billion in 2011.46 Main suppliers for the EU include Norway 
(20%), China (8%), Iceland (5%), Ecuador (5%) and United States (5%).47 
41   B. Rudloff, ‘The EU as Fishing Actor in the Arctic’ (2010) SWP Berlin Working Paper 
<https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Rff_
WP_2010_02_ks.pdf> accessed 23 December 2015.
42   Joint Declaration by the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of 
Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other, on relations between the 
European Union and Greenland <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/
signed-joint-declaration-eu-greenland-denmark_en.pdf> accessed 13 January 2016.
43   5.1, Catches, Facts and Figures on the Common Fisheries Policy, Basic Statistical Data, 
2014, European Union <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/pcp_
en.pdf> accessed 13 January 2016.
44   EU SFPAs: Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/
documentation/publications/2015-sfpa_en.pdf> accessed 12 January 2016.
45   Facts and Figures on the Common Fisheries Policy, n. 43 above, 20.
46   Arnarsson and Justus, n. 17 above, 66.
47   Facts and Figures on the Common Fisheries Policy, n. 43 above, 35.
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One-third of fish caught in the sub-Arctic are sold on the European market.48 
From the perspective of the Arctic States, the EU often represents the domi-
nate export destination.49 For example, fisheries generated more than 90% of 
export earnings in Greenland and the Faroe Islands, around 40% in Iceland 
and about 6% in Norway in 2010.50
The EU however is a not a State. A clear picture about the EU’s competences 
and institutional matrix must be drawn so as to better understand how the 
EU could contribute to governance of high sea fisheries in the central Arctic 
Ocean.
3.2 Competences
The EU has international legal personality51 and is an international actor. 
Van Vooren and Wessel define the EU as:
an entity that interacts with third countries and international organiza-
tions, in ways which are legally and politically distinguishable from its 
constitutive Member States. In the global context, this entity has a stand-
alone identity composed of values, interests and policies which it seeks 
to define and promote internationally as its own.52
The EU shall act based on the principle of conferral.53 This means the EU 
can act only within the limits of the competences, conferred upon it by the 
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. The exis-
tence of competences could be either expressed or implied.”54
The EU has strong legal competence in fields of policy, such as trade, ship-
ping and high sea fisheries, that will figure prominently when sea ice on the 
Arctic Ocean further recedes and becomes predominantly first year ice.55 In 
particular, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) con-
fers on the EU’s exclusive competence in the conservation of marine biological 
48   JOIN (2012) 19, 10.
49   Rudloff, n. 41 above, 12.
50   Arnarsson and Justus, n. 18 above, 57.
51   Article 47, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) [2008] OJ C115/15.
52   B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law, Text, Cases and Materials (CUP, 
Cambridge 2014) 1.
53   Article 5, TEU.
54   Further discussions see Van Vooren and Wessle, n. 52 above, 76–91.
55   T. Koivurova, K. Kokko, S. Duyck, N. Sellheim and A. Stepien, ‘The Present and Future 
Competence of the European Union in the Arctic’ (2012) 48 (4) Polar Record 362.
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resources under the Common Fisheries Policy.56 The EU shares competence 
with Member States in the area of agriculture and fisheries, excluding the con-
servation of marine biological resources.57 In general, based on the famous 
Commission v. Council (AETR case) [1971] of the Court of Justice the European 
Union (CJEU),58 the material scope of the EU’s external competence/treaty-
making powers corresponds to the scope of the internal powers from which 
those treaty-making powers flow.59 The CJEU, first in the Kramer Case, has 
specifically held that the EU has implied treaty-making powers in relation 
to fisheries.60 It is provided that “it follows from the very duties and powers 
which Community law has established and assigned to the institutions of the 
Community on the internal level that the Community has authority to enter 
into international commitments for the conservation of the resources of the 
sea”.61 Moreover, it is clearly stated by the TFEU that “The Union shall also have 
exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when 
its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to 
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclu-
sion may affect common rules or alter their scope”.62 Therefore, when it comes 
to issues regarding the conservation of marine living resources in high sea por-
tion of the central Arctic Ocean, the EU has exclusive competence to act, both 
internally and externally. This explains why the EU, rather than Member States, 
such as Spain or Germany, was invited by the Arctic 5 to participate in the 
negotiations of regulating potential fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean.
56   Article 3 (1) (d), The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] OJ 
C326/47.
57   Article 4 (2) (d), TFEU.
58   Commission v. Council (Case C-22/70) [1971] ECR 263, Para. 19: “With regard to the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Treaty the system of internal Community measures 
may not therefore be separated from that of external relations” <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61970CJ0022&from=FR> accessed 9 December 2015.
59   Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen, The EC Community Fisheries Policy (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 305.
60   For detailed analysis of the Kramer Case, see ibid., 304–305.
61   Officier van Justitie v Kramer (Joined Cases 3,4, and 6/76) [1976] ECR 1279, Para. 33 <http://
www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2006/6/13/44f87937-c661-45e5-904c-58bdda2323ca/
publishable_en.pdf> accessed 9 December 2015.
62   Article 3 (2), TFEU.
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3.3 Institutional Matrix
One of the ten priorities for the European Commission, set out by its President, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, is to strengthen the role of the EU as a global actor.63 To 
further this goal, The European Commission has been keen to “speak with 
one voice in global affairs”.64 This is reflected in the development of the EU’s 
2016 Arctic policy, which is named “An Integrated European Union Policy 
for the Arctic”. The European Commission is the driving force for the devel-
opment of the EU’s Arctic policy. The Arctic is too complex for any single 
Directorate General (DG) of the European Commission to deal with. The Euro-
pean Commission has therefore established an inter-service group on the 
development of Arctic policy, which involves staff from several DGs to make 
the policy draft. These mainly include DG for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
(MARE), DG for Mobility and Transport (MOVE), DG for Energy (ENER), DG 
for Environment, DG for Research and Innovation as well as DG for Regional 
and Urban Policy. The DG MARE, which is the Commission department re-
sponsible for the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy and of the 
Integrated Maritime Policy, is playing a coordinating role in the inter-service 
group. The C1 Unit (Maritime policy, Atlantic, outermost regions and the 
Arctic) of the DG MARE is the specific unit that is working on the Arctic issues. 
Together with the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European 
Commission organized a series of stakeholder consultation workshops in 
Rovaniemi, Brussels and Reykjavik in 2015 for the development of the EU’s 
latest Arctic policy, which was adopted in April 2016.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is an institutional structure 
set up in 2010 against a decades-old struggle of the Union seeking to project 
a strong, coherent voice on the international scene, counterbalanced by the 
Member States’ wish to retain control over various aspects of international 
relations.65 It is placed under the authority of the High Representative to help 
fulfill his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the EU.66 As clearly mentioned in its name, it is an institution that 
provides service. The EEAS is not playing the role as policy makers, such as the 
European Commission and the High Representative, but rather assists policy 
63   President Juncker’s Political Guidelines <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf 
#page=11> accessed 11 December 2015.
64   A Stronger Global Actor—One Year on <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/global-actor/
docs/stronger-foreign-policy-actor-1-year_en.pdf> accessed 11 December 2015.
65   Van Vooren and Wessel, n. 52 above, 20.
66   Article 1 (3) and Article 2 (1), Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organization and functioning of the European External Action Service [2010] OJ L201/30.
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makers67 and ensures consistency between the different areas of the Union’s 
external action and between those areas and its other policies.68 The Council 
Decision 2010/427 establishing the EEAS states that “the EEAS and the services 
of the European Commission shall consult each other on all matters relating 
to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective func-
tions, except on matters covered by the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). The EEAS shall take part in the preparatory work and procedures relat-
ing to acts to be prepared by the Commission in this area.”69 The EEAS there-
fore has been actively involved in developing the EU’s Arctic policy over the 
past years. For example, as mentioned, the EEAS worked with the European 
Commission to organize a series of stakeholder consultation meetings for the 
development of the EU’s 2016 Arctic policy.
The European Council sets the EU’s policy agenda, traditionally by adopt-
ing ‘conclusions’ during European Council meetings which identify issues 
of concern and actions to take.70 It has adopted three Conclusions regarding 
the Arctic in 2009, 2014 and 2016. Although these Conclusions are not legally- 
binding, they are politically important because the European Council is 
the EU institution that identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the 
Union.71 The Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues in 2009 not only echoed 
the European Commission’s proposal in COM (2008) 763 to extend the NEAFC 
to the high sea area of central Arctic Ocean, but also moved further by sug-
gesting a temporary ban in those waters before a legal framework is in place.72 
The European Council is in the same line with the United States Congress. 
However, in the 2014 Council Conclusions on Developing a EU Policy to-
wards the Arctic Region, fisheries was not an issue that was emphasized. The 
2014 Council Conclusions only briefly mentioned that the EU should seek to 
strengthen its support for the protection of the Arctic environment through its 
policies regarding for example climate change, air pollutants including black 
67   “The EEAS shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the 
Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area 
of external relations.” Article 2 (2), Council Decision 2010/427/EU.
68   Article 3 (1), Council Decision 2010/42/EU.
69   Article 3 (2), Council Decision 2010/42/EU.
70   The European Council <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/> 
accessed 11 April 2017.
71   Article 22 (1), TEU.
72   Para. 10, Council conclusions on Arctic issues, 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
Brussels, 8 December 2009 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/111814.pdf> accessed 15 December 2015.
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carbon, biodiversity and fisheries.73 This might reflect the fact that the EU’s 
proposal in establishing a legal framework for commercial fishing in the high 
sea portion of the central Arctic Ocean did not make any progress between 
2008 and 2014. The European Council became even less ambitious in its lat-
est Council Conclusions on the Arctic. It merely states “the Council welcomes 
EU participation in the negotiations on an international agreement to prevent 
unregulated fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, in a field which falls under 
the EU’s exclusive external competence.”74
The European Parliament is proactive in commissioning studies, adopting 
non-binding resolutions, organizing hearings, carrying out fact finding mis-
sions and so on, to place a parliamentary stamp on EU external relations.75 
The European Parliament was a strong supporter of establishing a compre-
hensive Arctic Treaty for the protection of the Arctic, as modelled by the 
Antarctic Treaty.76 The initiative of an Arctic Treaty is clearly not favoured by 
any Arctic State.77 The European Parliament has gradually become more prag-
matic, by stating that the formulation of an EU policy on the Arctic should 
be based on the recognition of the existing international, multilateral and 
bilateral legal frameworks such as the comprehensive set of rules laid down in 
UNCLOS.78 The European Parliament had no specific interest in fisheries 
73   Para. 2, Council conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic 
Region, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014 <http://www.consilium 
.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142554.pdf> accessed 16 December 
2015.
74   Para. 9, Council conclusions on the Arctic, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 
20 June 2016 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10400-2016-INIT/en/
pdf> accessed 6 September 2016.
75   Van Vooren and Wessel, n. 52 above, 28.
76   Para. 15, P6_TA (2008) 0474, European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic 
governance <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&
reference=P6-TA-2008-474> accessed 18 December 2015.
77   “The law of the sea provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five 
coastal States and other users of Arctic Ocean through national implementation and 
application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new compre-
hensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.” The Ilulissat Declaration, 
Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008 <https://www.regjeringen 
.no/globalassets/upload/ud/080525_arctic_ocean_conference-_outcome.pdf> accessed 
19 December 2015.
78   Para. G, P7_TA (2011) 0024, European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sus-
tainable EU policy for the High North (2009/2214 (INI)) <http://www.europarl.europa 
.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0236> accessed 
19 December 2015.
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in its 2008 Resolution.79 The Parliament however pays much attention to 
Arctic fisheries in its 2011 Resolution. Internally, the European Parliament 
requests the European Commission to ensure a coherent, coordinated and 
integrated Arctic policy across key policy areas, including fisheries.80 Moreover, 
it is recommended by the European Parliament that DG MARE should be acting 
as a cross-sectoral coordinator of the Inter-Service Group within the European 
Commission.81 The European Commission followed the Parliament’s recom-
mendation. Externally, the European Parliament not only supports regulating 
fishing in the high seas portion of the Arctic by a RFMO that respects scientific 
advice and has robust control and surveillance programme to ensure compli-
ance, but also believes that fishing within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 
of Arctic coastal States must meet same standards.82 This might be seen by 
Arctic States as political intrusion. In its 2014 Arctic Resolution, the European 
Parliament focused on external actions. It once again shows support for the 
regulation of potential fishing in the high sea parts of the central Arctic Ocean. 
The European Parliament has however made another political statement, call-
ing for the protection of the international sea areas around the North Pole 
outside the EEZs of Arctic coastal States by establishing a network of Arctic 
conservation areas.83 In March 2017, the European Parliament adopted resolu-
tion “An Integrated EU Policy for the Arctic”,84 which echoed the JOIN (2016) 
21 published by the European Commission and High Representative. The 
Parliament reaffirmed its statement in 2014 resolution that fishing on the high 
seas and within EEZs must be regulated by a RFMO, which respects scientific 
advice and has a robust control and surveillance programme to ensure compli-
ance with management measures.85 The European Parliament is supportive 
79   P6_TA (2008) 0474, European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic 
governance.
80   Para. 56, P7_TA (2011) 0024, European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sus-
tainable EU policy for the High North.
81   Ibid.
82   Para. 22, P7_TA (2011) 0024, European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sus-
tainable EU policy for the High North.
83   Para. 38, P7_TA (2014) 0236, European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU 
strategy for the Arctic (2013/2595 (RSP)) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc 
.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0236> accessed 22 December 2015.
84   P8_TA-PROV (2017) 0093, European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2017 on an inte-
grated European Union policy for the Arctic (2016/2228 (INI)) <http://www.europarl 
.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0093+0+DOC+XML+ 
V0//EN&language=EN> accessed 31 March 2017.
85   Para. 7, P8_TA-PROV (2017) 0093.
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of a moratorium on industrial-scale fishing, including bottom-trawling, in the 
previously unfished waters of the Arctic.86
In general, the EU institutions are well coordinated and share the same view 
that a RFMO/A shall be in place for the high seas of central Arctic Ocean so as 
to achieve sustainable fisheries in the future when commercial fishing occurs. 
The following section will discuss concrete contributions that the EU might 
make to achieve this objective.
3.4 The EU’s Potential Contributions to Governance of High Sea Fisheries 
in the Central Arctic Ocean
3.4.1 Internal Actions
As an important flag State and market State for Arctic fisheries, the EU could 
potentially play a significant part in regulating future high sea fisheries of the 
central Arctic Ocean directly and indirectly by its internal measures.
It was admitted by the European Commission in 2009 that the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) then has not worked well enough to prevent problems 
in European fishing sector, including overfishing, fleet overcapacity, heavy 
subsidies, low economic resilience and decline in the volume of fish caught 
by European fishermen.87 While the EU is eager to promote good maritime 
governance and responsible fishing in the outside world, bad management of 
fisheries within the EU88 might make the EU’s effort less convincing for third 
countries. This is exactly the case, for example, between the EU and Iceland. 
For example, Gunnar Tomasson, Director of a major Icelandic fishing company 
Thorfish said, “Today the fishing stocks (in Icelandic waters) are sustainable 
and we are controlling them very well. But inside the European Union, it is 
totally the other way around. They are not controlling it; they are overfishing 
their stocks and they are even paying subsidies to their industry. We do not 
want to go into the European Union.”89
86   Ibid.
87   European Commission Communication of 22 April 2009 Green Paper Reform of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2009) 163, 4–5 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0163:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 27 September 2016.
88   The European Commission identified five structural failings for the CFP in 2009: 1) a deep-
rooted problem of fleet overcapacity; 2) imprecise policy objectives resulting in insuf-
ficient guidance for decisions and implementations; 3) a decision-making system that 
encourages a short-term focus; 4) a framework that does not give sufficient responsibility 
to the industry; 5) lack of political will to ensure compliance and poor compliance by the 
industry. See COM (2009) 163, 8.
89   Claire Marshall, ‘Iceland’s Fishing Industry Better Off Outside EU’ (BBC, 21 June 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-36587253> accessed 27 September 
2016.
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The EU’s CFP has been reformed and a new CFP is effective from 1 January 
2014. The European Commission believes that a whole-scale and fundamental 
reform of the CFP and remobilization of the fisheries sector can bring about the 
dramatic change that is needed.90 The reformed CFP, consisting of Regulation 
(EU) 1380/2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy and Regulation (EU) 2015/812 
as regards the landing obligation, introduces a number of measures and instru-
ments to achieve sustainability.91 These include, for example, 1) Fish stocks 
should be exploited at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels;92 2) Discarding 
of fish is no longer acceptable;93 3) Multi-annual management plans that will 
replace the single-stock-based approach, bringing the vast majority of stocks 
under multi-stock management plans;94 4) Regionalisation;95 5) Transferable 
fishing concessions96 aiming at eliminating overcapacity of fishing fleet and 
improving the economic result of the fishing industry as a whole.97 In partic-
ular, multi-annual management plans to manage resources at levels that are 
capable of producing MSY, together with the conservation proposal that is end-
ing the practice of discards and reducing unwanted catches, are considered by 
90   COM (2009) 163, 4–5.
91   Sustainability is at the heart of the proposed reform. See European Commission 
Communication of 13 July 2011 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2011) 417, 2 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0417&from
=EN> accessed 28 September 2016.
92   These levels can be defined as the highest catch that can be safely taken year after year 
and which maintains the fish population size at maximum productivity. COM (2011) 417, 3.
93   Ibid., 4. In 2015 the pelagic and industrial fisheries, and in the Baltic the salmon fisheries 
and fisheries for cod fall under the landing obligation. For all other fisheries, there is no 
change in 2015. In the fisheries that are not under the landing obligation from 1 January 
2015, all catches of undersized fish, not covered by quota, or in excess of catch composi-
tion and by-catch rules, must continue to be returned to the sea. See 1 January 2015: the 
Landing Obligation <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/landing-obligation/
index_en.htm> accessed 28 September 2016.
94   Ibid.
95   EU fisheries legislation adopted centrally should focus on objectives, targets, minimum 
common standards and results, and delivery timeframes. While key decisions remain at 
EU level, Member States will have the flexibility to decide on other measures for fisher-
ies management, under the supervision of the Commission, in full compliance with the 
provisions of EU law. COM (2011) 417, 7.
96   Transferability of fishing rights that would make it possible for the fishermen to adjust 
their quota holdings to fit their catch by buying or leasing fishing rights retroactively. See 
M. Salomon, T. Markus and M. Dross ‘Masterstroke or Paper Tiger—The Reform of the 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy’ (2014) 47 Marine Policy 79.
97   Council Regulation (EU) 1380/2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy [2013] OJ L354/22, 
art 21. See also COM (2011) 417, 5.
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the EU as two core elements for conservation of marine living resources.98 It 
might be too early to assess the effectiveness of the reformed CFP three years 
after its adoption. There are concerns and criticisms about the reformed CFP.99 
Nevertheless, both the introduction of the MSY-concept for fixing fishing oppor-
tunity and the landing obligation are quite positive steps towards better man-
agement of European stocks and the protection of marine biodiversity.100 The 
CFP will be applicable to EU-flagged fishing vessels in the central Arctic Ocean. 
A successful CFP would give the EU more credibility and enhance the EU’s role 
as a normative power to promote sustainable fisheries internationally (includ-
ing the Arctic).101
While the EU regulates only its internal market, multinational corporations 
often have an incentive to standardize their production globally and adhere 
to a single rule.102 The EU has succeeded in using market access as a tool to 
leverage the ‘migration’ of its frequently demanding norms abroad.103 One 
particularly example that may also have an impact on Arctic fisheries in the 
future could be the EU Regulation to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU).104 The Regulation establishes vari-
ous EU-wide mechanisms to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing,105 and 
to prevent the continued import of IUU fish into the EU market. These include 
98   European Commission Communication of 13 July 2011 Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2011) 
425, 7 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0425&
from=EN> accessed 28 September 2016.
99   P. Ørebech ‘ “Getting It Right”: The Birth of a New EU Common Fishery Policy?—
Legislative and Legal Perspectives on the Annulling of the “Five Structural Failings” ’ 
(2015) 6(2) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 111–131.
100   Salomon, Markus and Dross, n. 96 above, 83.
101   I. Manners ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40(2) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 235–58.
102   A. Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 (1) Northwestern University Law Review 5.
103   J. Scott, ‘Extraterritorial and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (2014) 62 (1) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 87.
104   Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter 
and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing [2008] OJ L286; Council 
Regulation (EC) 1010/2009 laying down a detailed rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 [2009] OJ L280.
105   For a latest overview of the EU IUU Regulation, see E. van der Marel, ‘An Opaque Blacklist: 
the Lack of Transparency in Identifying Non-Cooperating Countries under the EU IUU 
Regulation’ in Lawrence Martin, Constantinos Salonidis and Christina Hioureas (eds.), 
Natural Resources and the Law of the Sea: Exploration, Allocation, Exploitation of Natural 
Resources in Areas under National Jurisdiction and Beyond (Juris 2017) 237–256.
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the prior notification of and authorization to enter EU ports for third coun-
try fishing vessels;106 increased inspections in EU ports;107 an EU-wide alert 
system;108 an obligation for fishery products coming into the EU to be accom-
panied by a validated catch certificate;109 increased control over EU nationals’ 
support of and engagement in IUU fishing;110 the blacklisting of fishing ves-
sels known to have engaged in IUU fishing and a prohibition for blacklisted 
vessels to enter EU ports;111 and the possibility to blacklist third countries.112 
The EU IUU Regulation establishes a system of conditional access, using 
potential sanctions attached to their trade agreements as an incentive to 
ensure that States with vested interests in trading their fish on the EU market 
are compliant.113 In the future, when commercially viable fisheries occur in the 
central Arctic Ocean, the EU IUU Regulation may play as an effective tool to 
combat IUU fishing there as well. It will apply to any fishing taking place before 
any regime has been established (unregulated fishing). The EU IUU Regulation 
will also apply to any fishing after a regime has been developed in the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean if that is not consistent with it (illegal fishing). Though the 
potential impact of the EU IUU Regulation may depend in part on how far 
States fishing in the central Arctic Ocean export to the EU.
3.4.2 External Actions
The EU has emerged as a power that endeavors to extend its regulatory scope 
beyond EU Member States. This is conceived by scholars as a form of external 
governance in which internal and foreign policy goals come together.114 The 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy has an external dimension as well. As argued by 
the European Commission, “The EU is one of the very few major players with a 
strong presence in all of the world’s oceans through its fleets and investments, 
bilateral agreements with third countries and participation in most relevant 
RFMOs. It is also a main market for fishery products in terms of consumption 
106   IUU Regulation arts. 6, 7.
107   Id. arts. 9–11.
108   Id. art. 23.
109   Id. art. 12.
110   Id. art. 39.
111   Id. arts. 27, 37.
112   Id. arts. 31, 38.
113   A.M.M. Miller, S.R. Bush, A.P.J. Mol, ‘Power Europe: EU and the Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Tuna Fisheries Regulation in the West and Central Pacific Ocean’ (2014) 45 
Marine Policy 141.
114   S. Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’ ” (2004) 11 (4) Journal of European 
Public Policy 680–700.
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and imports. The EU consumes 11% of the world fishery resources in terms of 
volume and imports 24% of fishery products in terms of value. This confers a 
heavy responsibility on the EU to further engage in the tasks of conservation 
and sustainable management of international fish stocks.”115 As mentioned 
above, a successful CFP within the EU would enhance the EU’s credibility to 
promote good fisheries governance externally.
There are international (FAO) and regional (NEAFC, Arctic Council) bodies 
for the EU to exert influence on management of high sea fisheries in the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean. As discussed above, the EU (along with Iceland, Japan, Korea 
and China) has been invited by the Arctic Five to participate in the so-called 
‘Broader Process” on international regulation of high sea fishing in the Central 
Arctic Ocean since the Washington Meeting in December 2015,116 Apart from 
being a key high sea fishing entities, the EU could also make substantial con-
tributions (funding and expertise) to scientific research with the aim of im-
proving understanding of marine ecosystem of this area. The EU welcomes the 
broadening of negotiations to involve major fishing nations.117 Moreover, 
the EU recognizes the need to obtain more information on ecosystems in the 
Arctic Ocean before opening up this region to commercial fishing and is keen 
to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of resources in the 
Arctic high seas.118 However, it would be much better for the EU to be involved 
from the very beginning. Instead, the Arctic Five had reached a position by the 
Oslo Declaration in July 2015 before extending invitations to those key high 
sea entities. Furthermore, the EU could potentially play a more influential role 
if the negotiation would have been conducted in the Arctic Council, where 
Finland and Sweden, as members of both the Arctic Council and the EU, have 
voting rights. The Arctic Council is the primary forum for Arctic cooperation. 
The Arctic Council has not explicitly involved itself in fisheries management 
issues yet, though there is no jurisdictional obstacle for this.119 The Arctic 
115   European Commission Communication of 13 July 2011 on External Dimension of the 
Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2011) 424 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0424&from=EN> accessed 10 October 2016.
116   For an overview of the Washington Meeting, see E.J. Molenaar, The December 2015 
Washington Meeting on High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean, The JCLOS Blog 
<http://site.uit.no/jclos/2016/02/05/the-december-2015-washington-meeting-on-high-
seas-fishing-in-the-central-arctic-ocean/> accessed 10 October 2016.
117   JOIN (2016) 21, 16.
118   Ibid.
119   E.J. Molenaar, ‘Status and Reform of International Arctic Fisheries Law’ in Elizabeth 
Tedsen, Sandra Cavalieri and R. Andreas Kraemer (eds), Arctic Marine Governance, 
Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation (Springer 2014) 113.
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Council is established as a high level forum to provide a means for promoting 
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the 
involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabit-
ants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development 
and environmental protection in the Arctic.120 The Arctic Council has already 
sponsored numerous scientific studies that have been instrumental in alert-
ing the world to the transboundary pollution and climate change challenges 
facing the Arctic.121 The capacity of the Arctic Council was further strength-
ened by the official opening of its permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway in 
2013.122 After welcoming China, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Singapore as new Observer States in the Eighth Ministerial Meeting,123 it is an-
ticipated that the Arctic Council could play more important role in the future 
Arctic governance.124 This might be of particular importance for the develop-
ment of future governance of high sea fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean.
Although the EU has given up its idea on the extension of the NEAFC to 
cover the Central Arctic Ocean,125 the NEAFC is still an important platform for 
the EU to promote its objectives and principles to achieve sustainable fisheries 
in the Arctic. As mentioned above, the NEAFC, of which the EU is a contract-
ing party, covers a significant part of the Arctic Ocean. Moreover, the NEAFC 
is now trying to cooperate and coordinate with the OSPAR Commission to 
establish and manage high sea marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Northeast 
120   Article 1 (a), Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 
1996) <http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/ottdec-decott.aspx?lang=eng> 
accessed 26 November 2015.
121   T. Koivurova and D. VanderZwaag, ‘The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and 
Prospects’ (2007) 40 (1) University of British Columbia Law Review 121.
122   ‘Decide to strengthen the capacity of the Arctic Council to respond to the challenges and 
opportunities facing the Arctic by establishing a standing Arctic Council secretariat, here-
inafter the Secretariat, in Tromsø, Norway to be operational no later than at the begin-
ning of the Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2013’, Nuuk Declaration On 
the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (12 May 2011, Nuuk, 
Greenland) <http://arctic-council.npolar.no/accms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-
nuuk-ministerial/docs/Nuuk_Declaration_FINAL.pdf> accessed 26 November 2015.
123   Kiruna Declaration On the occasion of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the 
Arctic Council (15 May 2013, Kiruna, Sweden) <https://oaarchive.arctic-council 
.org/bitstream/handle/11374/93/MM08_Final_Kiruna_declaration_w_signature 
.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 26 November 2015.
124   N. Liu, ‘The European Union’s Potential Contribution to Enhanced Governance of Arctic 
Shipping’ (2013) 73 (4) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 716.
125   The EU never brought this proposal into discussions within the NEAFC. It was a policy 
suggestion published in the EU’s 2008 Arctic Policy.
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Atlantic. The NEAFC and the OSPAR are relying on the same scientific 
advice from the International Council for Exploitation of the Sea (ICES). The 
NEAFC has established areas closed for fishing to protect Vulnerable Marine 
Ecosystems (VMEs),126 which share almost the same boundaries with high sea 
MPAs designated by the OSPAR. Therefore, the NEAFC plays a key role in the 
management of cross-sectoral high sea MPAs. Although none of OSPAR high 
sea MPAs is in the sub-Arctic, they might provide lessons to central Arctic 
Ocean fisheries management regarding how to operationalize ecosystem 
approach in high seas.
Finally, the FAO is another forum where the EU may exert influence on gov-
ernance of high sea fisheries in general, which might be applicable in the Arctic 
as well. The EU became a member of the FAO in 1991, after the FAO constitu-
tion was amended to permit regional economic integration organizations to 
become members. The EU concluded a Framework Co-operation Agreement 
with the FAO in order to “step up their co-operation in the food and agriculture 
sectors including fisheries and forestry”.127 Because fisheries is under exclusive 
competence of the EU, the EU could vote on behalf of its 28 Member States in 
the FAO. When it speaks in one voice, the EU has significant power to play an 
important role in international decision making processes. This is evidenced 
by the EU’s influence within the International Maritime Organization to 
accelerate the process of phasing out single hull tankers globally after the 
Erika and Prestige oil spill disasters.128 The EU has already planned to reinforce 
support for the development of international instruments for the conservation 
and management of fish stocks in the context of the FAO, especially on the role 
of port States and flag States in combating IUU activities.129
126   Map of NEAFC Regulatory Area Showing Existing Fishing Areas and All Closures < http://
www.neafc.org/page/closures> accessed 10 October 2016.
127   Working Document, Strategic Partnership between the Commission of the European 
Communities and the Food and Agriculture Organization in the Field of Development 
and Humanitarian Affairs <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/fao_ec_working_doc_
final_en_0.pdf> accessed 11 October 2016.
128   For details, see Nengye Liu, Frank Maes, ‘The European Union and the International 
Maritime Organization: EU’s External Influence on the Prevention of Vessel-Source 
Pollution’ (2010) 41 (4) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 581–594.
129   COM (2011) 424, 7.
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4 Concluding Remarks
From 2008 to 2016, the EU’s Arctic ambition has appeared to diminish each 
year. The EU’s 2008 Arctic policy emphasised the importance of contributing 
to multi-level governance in the Arctic. The EU’s tone was softened in 2012 to 
‘constructive engagement’ with Arctic States. The EU’s latest Arctic policy 
merely addresses broad issues, such as climate change and sustainable devel-
opment, with a focus on the European Arctic. Nevertheless, as revealed by this 
paper, the EU could play a significant role in Arctic governance regarding fish-
eries. The EU is an important flag State and market State for fisheries in the 
Arctic. The EU is also a normative power and a market power. The EU’s inter-
nal actions, such as regulation of IUU fishing, could generate positive impacts 
on Arctic fisheries. Moreover, although the EU was only invited at a later stage 
to join the negotiation on the regulation of fisheries in the Central Arctic 
Ocean, the EU shares same value with Arctic Five for conservation and man-
agement of marine living resources in the Arctic. Whatever agreement or 
arrangement that might be achieved by the negotiation, the EU would be an 
essential partner to ensure compliance of such a deal.
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On Thin Ice? Arctic Indigenous Communities,  
the European Union and the Sustainable Use of 
Marine Mammals
Martin Hennig and Richard Caddell
It’s okay to eat fish, ‘cause they don’t have any feelings’.
Nirvana, Something in the Way
∵
1 Introduction
Since 2008, the strategic policy objectives of the European Union (EU) in the 
High North have been to protect and preserve the Arctic in unison with its 
population, to promote the sustainable use of resources and to contribute to 
enhanced multilateral governance for this region.1 More recently, the EU Arctic 
Policy statement of April 2016 has entrenched supranational commitments to 
taking account of the traditional livelihoods of the region’s indigenous inhabit-
ants and the impact of economic development on its fragile environment, so 
as to ‘contribute to enhancing the economic, social and environmental resil-
ience of societies in the Arctic’, while also promoting these objectives through 
pertinent international fora.2
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1   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The 
European Union and the Arctic Region COM (2008) 763, 3.
2   Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An Integrated European 
Union Policy for the Arctic JOIN (2016) 21, 3–4.
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Within this relatively truncated timeframe, however, few issues have argu-
ably straddled these overarching policy priorities less comfortably for the EU 
institutions than the regulation of marine mammals in this region. For many 
Arctic peoples, the sustainable use of marine mammals remains fundamental 
to their traditional ways of life and carries great cultural as well as economic 
significance. Nevertheless, in many European areas outside the Arctic, the 
hunting of seals and whales has long been considered highly controversial and 
frequently generates strong and vociferous concerns over animal welfare.3 This 
dichotomy has created significant legislative and policy difficulties for the EU 
institutions, requiring a delicate balancing act in upholding key human rights 
commitments towards indigenous peoples, while also promoting animal wel-
fare standards as mandated under the EU Treaty. Moreover, the EU has long 
opposed the commercial harvesting of marine mammals, advancing a com-
mon position against these activities in relevant multilateral organizations 
and adopting an array of legislation to bar such products from the internal 
market. While seeking to uphold the long-standing special status of traditional 
enterprises, significant shortcomings have nevertheless become apparent in 
the ability of the EU to legislate surgically to protect the economic and social 
rights of a full range of indigenous Arctic communities, while pursuing mea-
sures to inhibit the market presence of commercially-derived marine mammal 
products. This has proved to be especially true in the context of seal products, 
where the introduction of a series of flawed restrictions on the sale of such 
items within the common market has damaged the relationship between 
the EU institutions and Arctic communities in recent years. Although these 
measures were purportedly well-intentioned towards the Arctic peoples of 
Europe, concerns have nonetheless been raised within these communities as 
3   Indeed, early iterations of EU policies towards seals—which, as noted below, sought to 
address widespread public opprobrium over the bludgeoning of pups for their pelts—have 
been memorably described by EU officials as ‘the only EC directive which appeared to 
have universal support among the European public’: see Donald McGillivray, ‘Seal 
Conservation Legislation in the UK—Past, Present, Future’ (1995) 10 International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 19, 48. In a similar vein, the hunting of seals continues to raise 
‘serious concerns’ among members of the public and governments in EU Member States, 
as officially stated by Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products [2009] OJ L 286/36, preamblar 
recital (4). Meanwhile, commercial sealing has been largely banned by many other states 
outside the EU, including other Arctic jurisdictions, notably in the United States (US) under 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act 1972, which also applies an import exemption for non-
commercial products ‘owned by a Native inhabitant of Russia, Canada, or Greenland’ under 
section 108.b 2 (B) [16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.].
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to whether the EU can be truly considered a consistent and helpful partner in 
securing the survival of traditional activities involving the sustainable use of 
marine mammals.
This Chapter therefore seeks to evaluate the extent to which the EU has 
been able to reconcile its longstanding support for the traditional practices of 
Arctic communities with its distinct policy objectives towards marine mam-
mals, in the context of the ongoing development of its overarching strategy 
for the High North. To this end, Part 2 of this Chapter examines the ‘EU Seal 
Regime’ which, in 2009, introduced a general ban on the sale of seal products 
across the entirety of the EU.4 The ban, which came into effect in 2010, was 
met with fierce opposition from, among others, Canadian Inuit seal hunt-
ers, whose products were consequently excluded from the EU market. At the 
heart of the conflict lies the so-called ‘IC exception’, which creates a potential 
exemption from the ban for seal products derived from hunts conducted by 
indigenous communities, whereas access to EU markets is precluded for prod-
ucts yielded from purely ‘commercial’ hunts conducted by non-indigenous 
hunters. Thus far, however, due to the burdensome criteria incumbent in 
invoking the IC exception, these provisions have essentially operated to the 
sole benefit of Greenlandic Inuit seal hunters, in marked contrast to their 
counterparts from other indigenous Arctic communities. Opposition to the 
‘EU Seal Regime’ duly resulted in a series of actions before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), which now spans a total of four separate judg-
ments. The crux of this litigation involved the economic position of Canadian 
Inuit seal hunters, who contended that there is no basis within the EU Treaties 
to ban seal products and that these trade restrictions violated the fundamental 
rights of indigenous peoples. While these arguments having been rejected by 
the CJEU, this odyssey of litigation has continued further, with the ‘EU Seal 
4   For the purposes of this Chapter, the ‘EU Seal Regime’ refers to the series of provisions 
introduced by the EU since 2009, namely Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 (n. 3) as amended 
by Regulation (EU) 2015/1775 of the Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 amend-
ing Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 737/2010, [2015] OJ L 262/1, together with Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1850 of 13 October 2015 laying down detailed rules for the implemen-
tation of Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
trade in seal products [2015] OJ L 216/1.. These instruments, as well as their early and equally 
contentious forerunners, are discussed below. Given the extensive contemporaneous litera-
ture on the development of the individual Regulations, in assessing the treatment of seal 
products this Chapter focuses primarily on the implications of the recent case law for indig-
enous Arctic communities. For a comprehensive analysis of the development of Regulation 
1007/2009 see Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Neglected Tradition—The Genesis of the EU Seal 
Products Ban and Commercial Sealing’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 417, 419–444.
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Regime’ subject to lengthy proceedings before the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute settlement system. In 2014, the WTO appellate body eventually 
ruled that the de facto exclusion of Canadian Inuit seal products from the EU 
market was unlawful and discriminatory. Based on an analysis of the extensive 
case law and recent amendments to this legislation introduced in an attempt 
to excise the discriminatory aspects of the IC exception, it is asked whether the 
‘EU Seal Regime’ can now be considered to be in full compliance with the fun-
damental rights of indigenous peoples. This Chapter argues that while the EU 
lawmakers may have finally brought the Seal Regime into broad compliance 
with WTO law, the tacit promotion of Greenlandic interests and the long exclu-
sion from the market of products derived from other communities has already 
inflicted serious and long-term damage to the social and economic rights of 
the Canadian Inuit.
As with seal hunting, whaling is also a politically sensitive issue for the 
EU. As explored in Part 3 of this Chapter, the commercial harvesting of ceta-
ceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises) has been consistently and staunchly 
opposed by the EU institutions, with heavy restrictions having been imposed 
upon the trade in such products within the internal market. This position not-
withstanding, considerable allowances have been made for non-commercial 
hunting as practiced predominantly in the High North, with market restric-
tions applied in a manner that has largely avoided the controversies raised by 
the EU Seal Regime. Instead, the treatment of so-called ‘Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling’ and the trade in cetacean products presents a useful case-study 
of the role of the EU as a partner to indigenous Arctic communities within 
multilateral organizations. This is especially true in the context of Greenland 
which, while outside the formal auspices of the EU itself, has been reliant upon 
the support of the EU institutions—and the legal contortions of the Danish 
authorities within this broader process—to pursue its ambitions for larger 
whaling quotas within the global regulatory body, the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC). While the Greenlandic Inuit can, on balance, be gener-
ally seen to have benefitted from this partnership with regard to the global 
regulation of whaling, the EU has nevertheless exhibited limited enthusiasm 
to engage with regional regulatory processes concerning the sustainable use 
of marine mammals in the Arctic. Moreover, the continued hunting of whales 
and seals in ever increasing numbers has generated disquiet as to the alleged 
quasi-commercial nature of these activities, which has started to test the con-
ceptual limits of indigenous subsistence exemptions in pertinent regulatory 
and adjudicatory fora. Accordingly, as this Chapter demonstrates, the position 
of marine mammals will continue to pose an intriguing challenge to present 
and future EU Arctic policies, both within and beyond the formal borders of 
the Community.
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2 Sealing in the Arctic
2.1 The Background to the EU Seal Regime and its Legal Controversies
Animal welfare considerations, especially towards highly charismatic species 
such as cetaceans and pinnipeds (seals, sea lions and walruses), have long 
been a preoccupation of European citizens and legislators alike.5 In response 
to these concerns, and the heavy political pressures that invariably accompany 
popular environmental causes, the EU has incrementally adopted an extensive 
body of animal welfare legislation, motivated to a considerable degree to meet 
the vociferous public demand for regulation in this field.6 Nevertheless, such 
measures—however well-meaning in origin and intent—have regularly trans-
pired to be disproportionately problematic for the EU institutions, repeat-
edly generating political tensions with neighbouring States due to a marked 
over-reliance upon sweeping trade restrictions and a perceived lack of prior 
consultation.7 Furthermore, the purported exemption clauses contained 
5   See McGillivray (n. 3) 48 (noting that the legal debate over seal culling has often turned more 
on ‘ethics and popular sentiment’ than competing environmental and economic factors); 
see also Katie Sykes, ‘Sealing Animal Welfare into the GATT Exceptions: The International 
Dimension of Animal Welfare in WTO Disputes’ (2014) 13 World Trade Review 471 and 
Kate Cook and David Bowles, ‘Growing Pains: The Developing Relationship of Animal 
Welfare Standards and the World Trade Rules’ (2010) 19 Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 227. Marine mammal conservation is not confined to 
supranational concern: the development of EU provisions to address the trade in pinniped 
and cetacean products has been regularly necessitated by the potentially distortive impact 
upon the common market of purported restrictions on the part of individual Member States, 
as was repeatedly cited in both the EU Seal Regime itself and the various judgments of the 
CJEU in response to challenges to this legislation.
6   Much of the current EU legislation on animal welfare addresses livestock, animal transpor-
tation, scientific experimentation and zoological standards and is generally limited in its 
treatment of marine species. Instead, seal welfare considerations have emerged on a largely 
ad hoc basis within specific measures pertaining to sealing and the trade in seal products. On 
the EU animal welfare standards applicable to seals see Robert L. Howse and Joanna Langille, 
‘Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade 
Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International 
Law 367, 373–379.
7   Indeed, the timing of the first iteration of the EU seal provisions angered the Canadian 
authorities, having been unilaterally introduced at a delicate point in an extensive—and 
ongoing—national review of seal hunting. The Canadian Royal Commission, charged with 
examining this issue, had been especially concerned with assessing the sustainability of 
these operations and their significance for the traditional ways of life of Arctic indigenous 
communities in developing targeted national legislation—a process that was then largely 
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therein have often proved to be insufficiently nuanced to protect a full range 
of non-commercial interests from collateral economic harm, or have been 
rendered largely redundant since the practical effect of the measure in ques-
tion has been to fundamentally undermine the market demand for particular 
products, irrespective of any special circumstances incumbent in their pro-
duction. Consequently, such legislation rarely proceeds without challenge and 
frequently requires modification and subsequent interpretation based upon 
negotiations with external interests8 or, as in the context of seals, the interven-
tion of a leading international adjudicatory body.
EU market restrictions on particular seal products—and their propensity to 
compromise the economic interests of indigenous Arctic peoples—date back 
over thirty years, with the adoption in 1983 of an equally contentious Directive 
addressing the trade in pelts of harp and hooded seals.9 At the material time, 
and in a similar manner to the development of the more recent EU Seal Regime, 
a number of Member States were considering the unilateral imposition of 
usurped by the introduction of heavy restrictions by the EU on the trade in seal pelts; Albert 
H. Malouf, Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission: Volumes I and II 
(Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1986).
8   This position is exemplified by the controversies raised by the introduction of Council 
Regulation (EEC) 3254/91 of 4 November 1991 prohibiting the use of leghold traps in the 
Community and the introduction into the Community of pelts and manufactured goods of 
certain wild animal species originating in countries which catch them by means of leghold 
traps or trapping methods which do not meet international humane trapping standards, 
[1991] OJ EC L 308/1 (popularly known as the ‘Leghold Traps Regulation’). The Regulation, 
which was complemented by further standards listing countries from which specific prod-
ucts could be imported, drew a robust response from Canada, Russia and the US, which 
required its repeated postponement and a series of external agreements with these States. 
Attempts to reconstitute the Regulation as a more general measure addressing humane 
trapping standards were subsequently withdrawn by the Commission. For an illuminating 
discussion of the Regulation and its flaws see André Nollkaemper, ‘The Legality of Moral 
Crusades Disguised in Trade Laws: An Analysis of the EC “Ban” on Furs from Animals Taken 
by Leghold Traps’ (1996) 8 Journal of Environmental Law 237.
9   Council Directive 83/129/EEC of 28 March 1983 concerning the importation into Member 
States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom [1983] OJ L 91/30. 
The Directive was initially conceived as a temporary measure, hence the ban was further 
extended in 1985 (Council Directive 85/444/EEC of 27 September 1985 amending Council 
Directive 83/129/EEC concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain 
seal pups and products derived therefrom [1985] OJ L 259/70) and applied indefinitely from 
1989 onwards (Council Directive 89/370/EEC of 8 June 1989 amending Directive 83/129/EEC 
concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products 
derived therefrom [1989] OJ L 163/37).
Hennig and Caddell30�
trade restrictions upon sealskin, largely prompted by environmental cam-
paigns that had generated an outcry in Western Europe over the clubbing of 
seal pups. Accordingly, so as to avoid uneven access conditions across the 
common market, the EC imposed blanket restrictions upon the commercial 
importation of a series of products derived from seal pelts.10 Although osten-
sibly introduced due to environmental factors—the Directive cites ‘various 
studies’ (albeit which were not further substantiated) that had ‘raised doubts 
concerning the population status of the harp and hooded seals’11—critics con-
sider the ecological case for the legislation to have been exaggerated. Indeed, 
the prevailing scientific evidence indicated that stock numbers were in fact 
highly buoyant,12 hence as Gillespie argues the Directive was instead founded 
upon ‘considerations that had little to do with sustainability in a strict sense’13 
and was seemingly driven more by popular revulsion over the clubbing of 
anthropomorphically appealing (yet numerically plentiful) seal pups.
As with the current iteration of the EU Seal Regime, Directive 83/129/EEC 
specifically addressed commercial enterprises and established an exemption 
clause for products ‘resulting from traditional hunting by the Inuit people’.14 
To this end, the Directive pointedly—and perhaps with shades of undue 
paternalism—recognized such activities as ‘a natural and legitimate occupa-
tion’ that constituted ‘an important part of the traditional way of life and econ-
omy’ which is generally pursued in a manner that ‘leaves seal pups unharmed 
and it is therefore appropriate to see that the interests of the Inuit people are 
not affected’.15 The exemption clause itself was not without interpretative 
10   Article 1; the proscribed products were listed in an Annex to the Directive.
11   Preamble to the Directive.
12   In Canada, at least, from which a considerable proportion of commercial seal prod-
ucts were derived prior to the imposition of the EU restrictions, the Canadian Royal 
Commission concluded on the basis of considerable scientific evidence that ‘[t]he popu-
lations of most species of seals were therefore increasing’. This was especially the case for 
harp and hooded seals, whose elevated numbers actually presented new conservation 
problems in the form of increased scope for interactions with commercial and indigenous 
fisheries: Albert H. Malouf, Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission: 
Volume I (Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1986) 25.
13   Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 71–72; similar sentiments are expressed by Donald A. Reid, ‘The 
EC Directive concerning the Importation of Skins of Certain Seal Pups (83/129/EEC): 
Its Compatibility with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (1996) 5 European 
Environmental Law Review 344, 344.
14   Article 3.
15   Preamble to the Directive.
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difficulties, however, not least since the notion of ‘traditional hunting’ was 
never expressly defined within the Directive. Indeed, this provision attracted 
suspicion in particular quarters due to its potential scope to constrain products 
that, while derived from the Inuit, might not necessarily have involved ‘tradi-
tional’ hunting methods on a strict construction of that term.16 This was an 
uncomfortable irony of the legislation, since a number of Inuit traders had 
duly amended their longstanding hunting practices to include the use of fire-
arms in a bid to appease the animal welfare concerns raised by seal clubbing, 
which in turn increased the cost of production and rendered indigenous enter-
prises acutely vulnerable to market fluctuations.17 In the absence of any legal 
proceedings on this issue, these concerns appear to be somewhat unfounded 
in practice.18 Fears as to the adverse economic impacts of these provisions 
would, however, prove to be disconcertingly accurate. Despite the suppos-
edly surgical application of the Directive, its financial implications did not 
discriminate between producers of seal pup products. Instead the measures 
precipitated a swift implosion of the European market for pelts, irrespective 
of origin, which had a disproportionately severe effect upon Inuit producers.19 
An economically viable sealskin industry in Greenland was only restored some 
16   George Wenzel, Animal Rights, Human Rights: Ecology, Economy and Ideology in the 
Canadian Arctic (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991) 49 (attributing the wording 
of the exemption clause to the influence of ‘[a]nti-sealing activists’ upon the legislators).
17   See further Malouf (n. 12) 13.
18   The precise meaning of this term was never fully resolved. The more recent seal legis-
lation introduced by the EU has adopted a clearer—and more lenient—position on 
traditional hunting methods, although commentators have voiced concerns that there 
remains scope to restrict particular Inuit-derived products on this basis: Dorothée 
Cambou, ‘The Impact of the Ban on Seal Products on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A 
European Issue’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 389, 394–395.
19   Indeed, the Canadian Royal Commission observed that indigenous incomes plummeted 
by up to 85% in some instances: Malouf, (n. 12) 213. The drop in export value of seal-
skin consequently impinged significantly upon the ability of a number of indigenous 
communities to fund their regular subsistence activities: Wenzel (n. 16) 124. The human 
consequences of this dramatic reduction in income, as well as the loss of expression of 
traditional identities, are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, this prospect certainly trou-
bled the Canadian Royal Commission, which noted increased social hardships among 
its indigenous communities as a result: ibid., 245–256. In Greenland, significant ‘social 
pathologies’ were also observed in the wake of the ban, including a spike in suicides as 
individuals struggled with the loss of community respect attributed to non-participation 
in traditional hunting activities: M.M.R. Freeman et al., Inuit, Whaling, and Sustainability 
(Walnut Creek, AltaMira Press, 1998) 157.
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two decades subsequent to the introduction of these restrictions,20 while the 
social and cultural ramifications of the loss of these traditions for indigenous 
communities has been—and largely continues to be—overlooked in the 
ongoing review of market regulation.
Some twenty years subsequent to the indefinite application of the seal 
pup pelt ban, in September 2009 the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted Regulation 1007/2009 (the ‘Basic Regulation’), which imposed a gen-
eral prohibition on the import and marketing of all commercially-derived seal 
products within the EU internal market.21 This was a significant departure 
from the tenor of Directive 83/129/EC, which had prohibited the trade in prod-
ucts from particular seal pups but had left open the possibility of marketing 
pelts from older animals. Having been initially intended to reinforce the earlier 
Directives of the 1980s, so as to apply to all harp and hooded seal products, 
the Basic Regulation ultimately addressed ‘specimens of all species of pin-
nipeds’ following interventions within the European Parliament.22 Unlike its 
legislative forerunner, the 2009 Regulation made no claim as to the ecological 
necessity of a ban on such products,23 instead citing consumer anxieties over 
the origin of certain household products, the widespread concern for animal 
welfare and the practical need to pre-empt the distortive effect of differing 
national standards on market access to particular items. In 2010, in order to give 
practical effect to these amended trade standards, the European Commission 
adopted Regulation 737/2010 (the ‘Implementing Regulation’).24 Due to subse-
quent litigation before the WTO, this provision was later repealed and replaced 
by Regulation 2015/1850.25
The imposition of a blanket ban on trade in all forms of seal products would 
have been harmful to indigenous peoples, to whom seal hunting has significant 
cultural and economic implications. The EU, in the form of the so-called ‘IC 
20   Nordic Council, Seals and Society (Copenhagen, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2008) 43.
21   Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 (n. 3). The Basic Regulation was pre-empted by the intro-
duction of national restrictions upon seal products by Belgium and The Netherlands in 
2007.
22   Basic Regulation, art 2(1). On the legislative passage of these provisions, which included 
significant interventions by prominent animal welfare activists, see Sellheim (n. 4) 
434–440.
23   Indeed, from a conservation perspective many seal populations are now considered to be 
numerous: see www.iucnredlist.org.
24   Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010 of 10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on trade in seal products [2010] OJ L 216/1 (now repealed).
25   Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1850 (n. 4).
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exception’,26 has therefore expressly recognised the importance of permitting 
indigenous hunts and facilitating a degree of market access for such products.27 
This exception is intended in particular to protect the fundamental economic 
and social interests of Inuit communities engaged in hunting, so as to ensure 
that their subsistence will not be adversely affected.28 Traditional seal hunt-
ing constitutes an integral part of the culture and identity of members of the 
Inuit society, and would appear to be recognized as such by the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.29 This instrument calls inter 
alia for indigenous communities to be ‘secure in the enjoyment of their own 
means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their tradi-
tional and other economic activities’,30 and is expressly referenced in the pre-
amble of the Basic Regulation.31 While not legally binding, given the traditional 
reliance upon seal products by the Inuit as a primary form of external trade, 
this provision would appear to provide a moral and political imperative for the 
EU authorities to facilitate a clear and workable exception to any purported re-
strictions on trade in publicly sensitive products such as sealskin. Accordingly, 
the EU Seal Regime was drafted in a more flexible manner to the preceding 
seal pup restrictions, with the Basic Regulation applying an expansive defini-
tion of ‘Inuit’ hunters32 and softening the previously stricter requirements for 
26   The term ‘IC exception’ was used as shorthand by the WTO Dispute Settlement System to 
refer to the exemption granted to tradeable Inuit seal products that can be legitimately 
sold on the EU internal market; this Chapter accordingly uses this phrase in the same 
manner as the WTO.
27   Under art 3(1) of Regulation 737/2010, the IC exception provides that ‘[t]he placing on the 
market of seal products shall be allowed only where the seal products result from hunts 
traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to 
their subsistence’. Limited non-commercial exemptions were also applied to goods that 
were for the occasional use of travelers and their families, as well as products derived 
from hunting conducted pursuant to national law for the purposes of promoting the sus-
tainable management of marine resources (such as the culling of seals for stock control 
or veterinary reasons).
28   See Regulation 1007/2009, preambular recital (14). The recital further considers seal hunt-
ing to be an ‘integral part’ of the culture and society of Inuit communities.
29   UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295 of 13 September 2007.
30   Art 20(1). Furthermore, the Preamble to the Declaration recognises that ‘respect for 
indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and 
equitable development and proper management of the environment’.
31   Preambular recital (2).
32   Under art 2(4), the IC exception applies to ‘indigenous members of the Inuit homeland, 
namely those arctic and subarctic areas where, presently or traditionally, Inuit have 
aboriginal rights and interests, recognised by Inuit as being members of their people and 
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‘traditional’ activities.33 These clauses are significant since, with the exception 
of the 1983 seal Directive, ‘no other piece of EU secondary legislation has spe-
cial provisions for the Inuit’.34
At first glance, the formulation of the IC exception seemingly reflects 
the blend of obligations incumbent upon EU lawmakers to reconcile the need 
to uphold the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples, as derived from 
pertinent external commitments,35 with the demands of animal welfare, 
as expressly established under art 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU),36 which requires that:
[i]n formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, 
transport, internal market, research and technological development and 
space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are 
sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, 
while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of 
the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural tradi-
tions and regional heritage.37
includes Inupiat, Yupik (Alaska), Inuit, Inuvialuit (Canada), Kalaallit (Greenland) and 
Yupik (Russia)’. Broad recognition was also made of ‘other indigenous communities’ 
under art 2(1) of the 2010 Implementing Regulation, which raises an intriguing theoretical 
question as to the position of the small pockets of indigenous ethnic communities located 
elsewhere in the EU, albeit one that is highly unlikely ever to be invoked in practice. In 
contrast, art 3 of Directive 83/129/EEC merely referred to ‘the Inuit people’ with no further 
elaboration as to the specific communities within the contemplation of this legislation.
33   Art 3(1) of the 2009 Basic Regulation. In 2015 these provisions were revised and clarified 
further and the newly introduced art 3(1)(b) contemplates that ‘the hunt is conducted for 
and contributes to the subsistence of the community, including in order to provide food 
and income to support life and sustainable livelihood, and is not conducted primarily for 
commercial reasons’. In a subtle variation to the initial 1983 Directive on harp and hooded 
seal pup products, art 3(1)(a) now refers to hunts that have ‘traditionally been conducted 
by the community’. This phrasing does not specify that a hunt must exclusively use tradi-
tional methods, but instead requires a heritage of seal hunting and using the products for 
subsistence and small scale economic purposes.
34   Tamara Perišin, ‘Is the EU Seal Products Regulation a Sealed Deal? EU and WTO 
Challenges’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 373, 378.
35   In this regard, the terms of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was 
considered particularly significant, as reflected in preambular recital (14) of Regulation 
1007/2009. This issue is discussed further below.
36   Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012] 
OJ C 326/47.
37   Emphasis added.
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In the light of this overarching objective, Regulation 737/1009 also recognizes 
seals as ‘sentient beings that can experience pain, distress, fear and other forms 
of suffering’.38 Animal welfare concerns within the Regulation are accordingly 
centred on the ‘pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering which the kill-
ing and skinning of seals, as they are most frequently performed, cause to 
those animals’.39 This is deemed sufficiently serious as to necessitate ‘action 
to reduce the demand leading to the marketing of seal products and, hence, the 
economic demand driving the commercial hunting of seals’.40 While con-
ceding that it ‘might be possible’ to kills seals in a manner that avoids 
unnecessary pain and suffering, the animal welfare dimension is considered by 
the Regulation to be so essential that underlying difficulties in ensuring com-
pliance with these provisions require the draconian approach of preventing 
market access to most such products.41 Nevertheless, this tone appears to be 
at odds with other core elements of EU animal welfare legislation. While the 
offending killing methods are not expressly articulated within either the Basic 
Regulation or the Implementing Regulation, reference is made to the con-
cerns of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which called 
for a prohibition on cruel forms of killing, including the bludgeoning of seals.42 
However, extensive EU provisions on animal welfare—which were adopted a 
mere eight days subsequent to the Basic Regulation—expressly endorsed the 
use of a ‘percussive blow to the head’ as a legitimate method of killing smaller 
38   Preambular recital (1).
39   Preambular recital (4).
40   Preambular recital (10).
41   Preambular recital (11). As Fitzgerald observes, this contrasts unfavourably with the 
approach adopted by the Leghold Traps Regulation, which allowed for the trade in 
pelts taken by means that were compliant with more humane trapping standards. 
Notwithstanding concerns over the lack of consultation with interested parties, this legis-
lation therefore operated in a more targeted manner by discouraging the use of particular 
traps deemed unacceptable by the EU authorities, without imposing a blanket ban on 
the marketing of fur products per se (and were therefore more likely to meet the WTO 
standards for the protection of public morals): Peter L. Fitzgerald, ‘ “Morality” May Not be 
Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade 
Law’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 85, 125–126.
42   Recommendation 1776 (2006) of 17 November 2006 on seal hunting. The primary con-
cerns of the European Parliament, whose political input had a key role on the develop-
ment of the EU Sea Regime, were largely confined to ensuring that seals were not skinned 
prior to death, as had been reported by a number of NGOs: Declaration of the European 
Parliament on banning seal products in the European Union [2006] OJ C 306E 194.
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species.43 Given the recognised sentience of all animals, neither provision 
explains precisely how animal welfare considerations render the bludgeoning 
of seals to be morally unacceptable, yet the same killing method as applied to 
a ‘fur animal’ below 5kg in weight remains a valid activity, constrained only 
by a requirement not to despatch more than 70 individuals in such a manner 
in any given day.44
Inconsistencies in the underlying application of animal welfare standards 
within the EU Seal Regime were compounded by procedural difficulties in 
implementing this legislation, since the practical conditions for applying 
the IC exception proved to be unduly burdensome in practice. While the 
Basic Regulation was generally supportive of Inuit enterprises, the initial 
Implementing Regulation introduced a series of administrative requirements 
that would prove to be difficult for a number of indigenous communities to 
meet. In particular, the authenticity of such products required verification 
from a ‘recognized body’, necessitating the creation of an attestation mech-
anism to ensure that such items are derived from genuine Inuit hunts and 
contribute to the subsistence of the community. As the Appellate Body 
observed, creating a ‘recognized body’ may entail significant burdens in some 
instances.45 As the report in EC-Seal Products clearly demonstrates, this was 
indeed the case for the Canadian Inuit who were unable to establish such an 
entity prior to the entry into force of the regime in 2010. Accordingly, Canadian 
Inuit sealers were precluded from exporting their products into the EU, since 
they did not technically fulfill the criteria for applying the exception. The EU 
seal regime therefore resulted in the de facto exclusion of all Canadian seal 
products from the EU market, with commercial products expressly banned 
and the indigenous communities unable in practice to satisfy the requirements 
of the IC exception. Given the longstanding economic strength of EU-based fur 
traders, combined with the virtual lack of market disruption for Greenlandic 
communities, these provisions carried a discernible scent of protectionism, at 
least as far as the Canadian authorities were concerned.46
43   Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals 
at the time of killing [2009] OJ L 303/1.
44   Regulation 1099/2009: Annex I, Chapter II, para. 3.
45   See WTO Appellate Body Reports: European Communities Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (May 22, 2014) and 
European Communities Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014) paras 5.337–5.338 (‘EC-Seal Products’).
46   Pirišin (n. 34) 378.
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The exclusion of Canadian seal products from the common market duly 
prompted two distinct strands of litigation. Firstly, Canadian Inuit interest 
groups, hunters’ associations and individual hunters brought an action before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in an attempt to force an 
annulment of the Seal Regime.47 In EU Seal Case I, Regulation 1007/2009 was 
challenged on several grounds, including that the regime violated the rights of 
indigenous peoples under international law.48 However, the case was rejected 
as inadmissible under art 263 TFEU. According to the General Court, the con-
ditions incumbent in art 263(4), which govern the ability to bring an action 
for annulment, had not been met, since the contested regulation was not of 
‘direct and individual’ concern to those raising the case.49 The fact that 
Canadian sealers were effectively barred from the EU market did not alter 
this restrictive interpretation of the conditions for the judicial review of these 
particular legal measures. On appeal, the ECJ confirmed that the action was 
inadmissible, and emphasized that ‘the prohibition on the placing of seal 
products on the market laid down in the contested regulation is worded in 
general terms and applies indiscriminately to any trader falling within its 
scope’.50 Nevertheless, in the light of the recent decision by the WTO Appellate 
Body in EC-Seal Products analyzed below, the view of the European judiciary 
that the regulation applies indiscriminately must be regarded as flawed. 
Indeed, the Appellate Body would subsequently reject this interpretation and 
rule that Greenlandic and Canadian Inuit hunters had not been subject to 
equal treatment under the EU Seal Regime.
Whereas the actions in EU Seal Cases I and II were rejected as inadmissible, 
in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission (EU Seal Case III) 
the General Court decided to consider the substance of the claims brought 
47   See Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union ECR [2011] II-5599 [EU Seal Case I]. As outlined below, the case was 
then appealed, but subsequently rejected by the Court of Justice in Case C-583/11 Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 [EU Seal Case II]. For a full analysis of these cases, see Martin Hennig, 
‘The EU Seal Products Ban—Why Ineffective Animal Welfare Protection Cannot Justify 
Trade Restrictions under European and International Trade Law’ (2015) 6 Arctic Review on 
Law and Politics 74.
48   The compatibility of the EU Seal Regime with human rights norms addressing indigenous 
peoples is discussed further in section 2.2 below.
49   EU Seal Case I paras 68–92.
50   EU Seal Case II para. 73.
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by the litigants.51 In this third iteration of the litigation the General Court dis-
missed the action; the case was subsequently appealed for a final time to the 
Court of Justice.52 In the appeal, the appellants also sought the annulment 
of Regulation 1007/2009, but on the alternative basis that the contested mea-
sure had no legal foundation under the EU Treaties. Among the submissions 
made by the appellants, it was argued that the EU had erred in adopting the 
contested Regulation under art 114 TFEU (ex. art 95 EC). This provision allows 
the EU legislators to adopt secondary legislative measures ‘which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’, a consider-
ation that was repeatedly emphasized within the preambular paragraphs of 
the Regulation.53 With this in mind, the appellants contended that the primary 
objective of the regulation was clearly the protection of animal welfare, rather 
than seeking to improve the functioning of the internal market.54
The Court of Justice disagreed, however, and confirmed the finding of the 
General Court that the choice of legal basis for the regulation was correct.55 
According to the General Court, it was clear from the Regulation itself that 
the principal objective of the measure was to improve the functioning of the 
internal market, rather than to advance the protection of animal welfare.56 
The EU-wide ban on seal products would thereby remove national distinctions 
between the respective legal provisions governing the trade and marketing 
of seal products, which could otherwise have adversely affected the opera-
tion of the internal market.57 Furthermore, in the view of the General Court, 
the ban would ultimately prove beneficial since it would remove consumer 
hesitation towards buying common animal products that are not made from 
seals, but which might not be easily distinguishable from those that are, such 
as leather garments and Omega-3 capsules.58 These findings notwithstand-
ing, which largely and uncritically echo the originally-stated rationale for the 
51   Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:215 
[EU Seal Case III]. To a considerable degree, the litigants of this action were the same as 
those in EU Seal Case II.
52   Case C-398/13 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Commission ECLI: 
EU:C:2015:535.
53   See especially preambular recitals (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), (12), (13), (15) and (21) of Regulation 
737/2009.
54   See EU Seal Case III para. 26.
55   See EU Seal Case IV para. 32.
56   Ibid., para. 36.
57   Ibid., para. 38.
58   Ibid., para. 39; see also Regulation 1007/2009, preambular recital (3).
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Regulation,59 the actual effectiveness of a general ban in dispelling or reduc-
ing consumer concerns over the presence of seal products within the internal 
market is highly questionable.60 One important objection which can—and, 
indeed, should—be raised is the fact that any seal product that is approved 
under the IC exception may be freely sold throughout the entire EU internal 
market. Moreover by virtue of a free-trade clause, these provisions would in 
fact compel a Member State wishing to impose a national ban upon all seal 
products, irrespective of whether they are derived from either indigenous or 
‘commercial’ hunts, to accept the import and sale of ‘EU-approved’ seal prod-
ucts permitted under the IC exception. In certain jurisdictions, such as those 
that had introduced domestic restrictions pre-dating the EU provisions, the 
IC exception may accordingly necessitate an unsolicited liberalization of 
national animal protection laws.
Thus far, the CJEU has rejected pleas for the annulment of the EU Seal 
Regime that have been submitted by Inuit interest groups and individual seal-
ers. According to the Court, the legislation is in conformity with the broad 
tenets of EU law. Whereas the EU judiciary has been reluctant to annul the ban, 
external adjudicatory institutions have nonetheless stated unequivocally that 
the Seal Regime as it stood in 2009 was not in conformity with international 
trade law. In its May 2014 report to the EC-Seal Products case, the WTO Appellate 
Body found that these provisions violated the principle of non-discrimination. 
In this case, Canada and Norway claimed that the package of measures consti-
tuted a breach of WTO law and complaints were duly filed before the WTO dis-
pute settlement system. The parties argued that the EU rules on seal products 
exercised an unjustified exclusionary effect upon Canadian and Norwegian 
seal products. One obvious inconsistency in the regime, as pointed out by the 
claimants, was the fact that Greenlandic seal products originating from Inuit 
hunts were granted access to the EU market under the IC exception, whereas 
seal products derived from hunts by the Canadian Inuit were denied entry.61
The WTO Appellate Body confirmed that the regime was inconsistent with 
GATT art I:1 because it did not ‘immediately and unconditionally’ extend the 
same market access advantages to Canadian products as had been accorded 
to seal products originating from Greenland.62 The WTO Appellate Body 
affirmed that a trade ban on seal products could, in principle, be justified 
within the meaning of art XX(a) of the GATT 1994 as a measure ‘necessary to 
59   See especially preambular recital (3) of Regulation 737/2009 and n. 53 above.
60   See Hennig (n. 47) 78–79.
61   EC-Seal Products (n. 45) paras 5.329–5.332.
62   Ibid., para. 5.2.3.
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protect public morals’. However, in this particular case, the EU had failed to 
justify the unequal treatment of Greenlandic Inuit products, which were 
marketable in the EU under this exemption, and those of the Canadian Inuit, 
which were classified as prohibited products deriving from ‘commercial’ hunts 
and were therefore banned.63 The Appellate Body further noted that the IC 
exception constituted a significant derogation to the ban, and that the EU had 
failed to demonstrate ‘how the discrimination resulting from the manner in 
which the EU Seal Regime treats IC hunts as compared to “commercial” hunts 
can be reconciled with, or is related to, the policy objective of addressing EU 
public moral concerns regarding seal welfare’.64 In other words, the generous 
IC exemption granted solely to Greenlandic Inuit products could not be logi-
cally based on the objective of improving animal welfare conditions.
Further, the Appellate Body stressed that the IC exception was in essence 
available exclusively to Greenland, creating a discriminatory effect between 
countries in which essentially the same conditions prevail.65 The EU argued 
that it had engaged in ‘“multiple efforts” to assist the Inuit in Canada to ben-
efit from the IC exception’,66 although the WTO Appellate Body was not con-
vinced that it had made ‘comparable efforts’ to those made with respect to 
the Greenlandic Inuit.67 In this regard, as noted above, it was emphasized that 
one important flaw in the EU Seal Regime was the requirement for access to 
the IC exception to be dependent upon the establishment of a ‘recognized 
body’, which is to be responsible inter alia for verifying that seal products origi-
nate from genuine Inuit hunts.
In the wake of the report of the WTO Appellate Body, the EU has made con-
siderable adjustments to the Seal Regime in order to address the elements 
that were considered to have contravened WTO law, while seeking to preserve 
its underlying features. In an attempt to reconcile the IC exception with the 
overarching EU policy objective of addressing public concerns regarding seal 
welfare, the Basic Regulation has been substantively amended. Thus in the 
reformed Regulation 2015/1775, the new art 3(1)(c) provides that Inuit seal 
products can now only be placed on the EU market if ‘the hunt is conducted 
in a manner which has due regard to animal welfare, taking into consideration 
the way of life of the community and the subsistence purpose of the hunt.’
63   Ibid., para. 5.3.3.3.
64   Ibid., para. 5.320.
65   Ibid., para. 5.333.
66   Ibid., para. 5.337.
67   Ibid., para. 5.337.
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Besides addressing those aspects of the legislation that were considered to 
have contravened the WTO Rules, the EU has also engaged with the Canadian 
and Inuit authorities in order to facilitate the establishment of an attesta-
tion mechanism, which will, once again, allow the Canadian Inuit to export 
seal products into the EU market.68 More specifically, since 30 July 2015 the 
Government of Nunavut has been recognized as an attestation body quali-
fied to certify Inuit seal products under EU Seal Regime,69 thereby facilitating 
future trading and export opportunities within the common market.
It is certainly an encouraging sign towards future compliance with interna-
tional trade law that the EU has taken such steps towards addressing the dis-
criminatory features of the Seal Regime. Nevertheless, it remains questionable 
whether these legislative amendments and the subsequent re-engagement 
with the Canadian and Inuit authorities can rectify the damage that has been 
done to the economic interests of the Canadian Inuit sealing community. As 
observed by Canada in the course of the proceedings before the WTO dispute 
settlement system, the ban has already taken a heavy economic and social toll 
on the Inuit community:
The effect of the EU Seal Regime is to exclude from the EU market all seal 
products derived from seals killed in commercial hunts, regardless of whether 
they were harvested humanely. In doing so, the EU Seal Regime has effectively 
shut out Canadian seal products from the EU market. The negative economic 
impacts of this measure have reverberated through coastal communities in the 
Canadian Maritimes, where economic opportunities are limited, and in Canada’s 
Inuit communities, where the Inuit have historically relied on the income gener-
ated from seal skin sales to supplement their subsistence-oriented lives.70
Thus, in light of the legal amendments and the inclusion of the Nunavut 
Government as an attestation body, the EU is now convinced that the cur-
rent Seal Regime is in compliance with WTO law.71 This may very well be the 
68   See Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings 
in the Dispute European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products (WT/DS400 and WT/DS401), 16 October 2015.
69   See Commission Decision of 26 October 2015 recognising the Department of Environment, 
Government of Nunavut in accordance with Article 3 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1850 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 
1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products, 
C (2015) 7273 final (art 1).
70   See the Integrated executive summary of Canada, in European Communities—Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Reports of the Panel, WT/
DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, Addendum, Annex B-1, 25 November 2013, para. 2.
71   Status Report (n. 68).
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case in principle. However, as noted in section 2.2 below, it may be questioned 
whether the amended regime does indeed strike a fair balance between the 
protection of animal welfare and the protection of the human rights of indig-
enous peoples.
2.2 Animal Welfare v. the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples
In light of the report of the WTO Appellate Body in EC-Seal Products, which 
objectively revealed the discriminatory features of the EU Seal Regime, it is 
clear that this package of European measures has largely failed to effectively 
reconcile the protection of animal welfare and the human rights of indigenous 
peoples. As regards animal welfare protection, the current regime still allows 
for the unrestricted marketing of seal products that fall within the scope of 
the IC exception, and the generosity of the exemption neither eliminates nor 
efficiently reduces consumer fears over the availability of allegedly unde-
sirable seal products within the internal market, which had been a primary 
intention of the legislation in the first place. Similarly, in terms of protecting 
the human rights of indigenous peoples, the regime has thus far served only to 
promote the unlawful exclusion of Canadian Inuit hunters from the EU mar-
ket. It is also questionable whether the Canadian Inuit seal products will ulti-
mately be able to re-enter the EU market in a meaningful economic sense. Not 
only have prices for seal products plummeted in the wake of this legislation,72 
but market realities have also materially changed. Ironically, given that a cen-
tral motivation of the EU Seal Regime was to constrain the activities of com-
mercial operators, a particular problem presently confronting Inuit hunters 
is the absence of a large scale commercial seal industry in Canada. Prior to 
the introduction of the EU restrictions, the Canadian Inuit were reliant upon 
synergies with commercial producers in order to export their products to the 
EU.73 The disappearance of large-scale producers has therefore inhibited such 
mutually-supportive logistical collaborations with commercial operators and 
could negate the economic viability of Inuit hunts.74
It is striking that prior to the ruling of the WTO Appellate Body, the EU did 
not undertake a more thorough evaluation of the possibility that the funda-
mental rights of indigenous peoples caught by the terms of the Seal Regime 
72   The market value for sealskin decreased by over 50% within a year of the entry into force 
of Regulation 1007/2009, despite a significant reduction in the numbers of individuals 
harvested: Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Goals of the EU Seal Products Trade Regulation: From 
Effectiveness to Consequence’ (2015) 51 Polar Record 274, 284.
73   EC-Seal Products (n. 45) para. 5.334.
74   See Government of Nunavut, Report on the Impacts of the European Union Seal Ban, (EC) 
No 1007/2009, (Nunavut, Iqualit, 2012) 9.
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might be violated in the process of protecting animal welfare. Indeed, as 
observed by Hossain, a strong case can be made that the regime had under-
mined the human rights of Canadian Inuit sealers since its inception in 2009.75 
Of particular significance in this regard is art 27 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the religious, linguistic 
and cultural rights of minority groups:76
[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.
The notion of a ‘minority’ is not defined in the ICCPR. Nevertheless, as Hossain 
considers, it is ‘nonetheless a fact that indigenous peoples mostly comprise 
small minorities except only in a few countries in which they form a majority’.77 
Thus, minority groups like the Canadian Inuit—and, indeed, Greenlanders78—
should therefore fall within the scope of art 27. Furthermore, the UN Human 
Rights Committee has emphasized in a general comment to this particu-
lar provision that the term ‘culture” includes the particular ways of life of 
minority communities, such as hunting and fishing.79 Moreover, in Länsman v 
Finland, the Human Rights Committee established that art 27 ICCPR requires 
that members of a minority shall not be ‘denied’ the right to enjoy his or her 
75   Kamrul Hossain, ‘The EU Ban on the Import of Seal Products and the WTO Regulations: 
Neglected Human Rights of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples?’ (2013) 49 Polar Record 154, 
163–164.
76   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966; 999 UNTS 171.
77   Hossein (n. 75), 161.
78   It would appear that the Greenlandic Inuit are also protected by art 27 ICCPR. Whereas 
the Inuit of Greenland constitute a majority of the population within Greenland 
itself, the territory of Greenland is still far from an independent entity. In recent years, 
while Greenland has attained a marked degree of autonomy from Denmark it is not yet a 
fully autonomous state. From this perspective, the Greenlandic Inuit can be considered 
to constitute a minority of the Danish population and should therefore continue to fall 
within the scope of art 27 ratione personae.
79   Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, art 27 (Fiftieth session, 1994), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), p. 209.
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culture.80 It is certainly debatable whether the EU seal products ban serves 
to deny outright the Canadian Inuit the right to enjoy their culture. Likewise, 
due to their inherently cumulative and subjective nature, it is difficult to 
establish definitively that the collapse of the sealing industry directly triggered a 
spate of social malaises within indigenous communities that would amount to 
a violation of this provision. Indeed, as Sellheim observes, ‘it may be difficult 
to provide satisfactory legal evidence that the seal products ban adversely affects 
Inuit culture’.81 Nevertheless, the discriminatory aspects of the EU Seal Regime, 
combined with the significant economic losses that market restrictions have 
inflicted upon such communities, clearly indicate that this legislation presents 
scope for conflict with the broad spirit—if not necessarily the strict letter— 
of art 27.
As a concluding remark, it is apparent that the current EU Seal Regime has 
proved to be insufficient in terms of protecting both animal welfare rights and 
the fundamental human rights of indigenous peoples, which in this case stand 
out as conflicting objectives. Consequently, it remains to be seen how the EU 
plans to make reparations for the financial injustice suffered by Canadian Inuit 
sealers. A mere re-establishment of EU market access is not, in and of itself, 
sufficient to remedy this five-year exclusion from the market, which has had a 
dire negative economic impact upon Canadian Inuit sealers.
3 Whaling in the Arctic
As with the hunting of seals, the harvesting of cetaceans by the indigenous 
peoples of the High North has occurred since the commencement of human 
settlement in the Arctic. Archaeological evidence suggests that Alaskan 
whaling may date back as far as 8000 years,82 while whaling activities in the 
Canadian Arctic are known to have occurred over the course of 3000 years.83 
Hunting in Greenland may be traced back to 2400 BC,84 while whaling and 
80   Human Rights Committee Jouni E. Länsman et al. v Finland, Communication No. 671/1995, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996).
81   Sellheim (n. 72) 281.
82   International Whaling Commission, Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling (With Special 
Reference to Alaska and Greenland Fisheries) (Cambridge, IWC, 1982) 36.
83   G.G. Monks, ‘Quit Blubbering: An Examination of Nuu’chah’nulth (Nootkan) Whale 
Butchery’ (2001) 11 International Journal of Osteoarchaeology 136.
84   Richard A. Caulfield, Greenlanders, Whales and Whaling: Sustainability and Self-
Determination in the Arctic (Hanover, University Press of New England, 1997) 81.
 3�7On Thin Ice?
sealing have been continuously conducted by Greenlanders since at least 
1050 AD with the settlement of the island by the Thule Inuit.85 Indigenous 
hunting therefore significantly pre-dates what has since been identified as 
the first systematic commercial harvesting activities of the Eleventh Century 
and the later advent of the era of modern whaling.86 This long-standing and 
unbroken heritage of the consumption of marine mammals remains highly 
significant to many Arctic indigenous communities. Participation in hunting 
activities confers social status within the community, while the fruits of these 
labours represent an improtant source of nutrition in a challenging living 
environment, as well as a key element of the Inuit identity. Indeed, in many 
such communities ‘true’ Inuit status is often connected to the consumption of 
traditional food sources,87 notably whales and seals, which are distinguished 
from ‘white man’s foods’ to which non-wild caught products (and their con-
sumers) are derogatorily referred.88
The continued harvesting of whales by Arctic indigenous communities gives 
rise to the same regulatory dichotomy encountered by the EU in the context 
of seal hunting: there remains considerable popular support and sympathy 
for the cultural and nutritional needs of the Inuit, notwithstanding trenchant 
opposition from the EU institutions and the vast majority of the Member 
States to the killing of cetaceans. As with the seal provisions, the EU has 
actively opposed commercial harvesting and, as outlined in section 3.1 below, 
imposed heavy restrictions upon the marketing of cetacean products within 
the internal market, subject to limited exemptions for items intended for non- 
commercial purposes. This specific legislation has generally avoided the 
opprobrium associated with the EU Seal Regime. Instead, as discussed in sec-
tion 3.2, the primary legal issues raised by the convergence of the stated EU 
position towards cetaceans and the interests of indigenous peoples in harvest-
ing whales have involved the multilateral regulation of marine mammals. To 
this end, the collective negotiating positon adopted by the EU towards sub-
sistence whaling represents an intriguing case-study of its approach to key 
85   Ibid., 26.
86   The first coordinated attempts at commercial whaling commenced in the Basque region 
of Northern Spain. Modern whaling is considered to have commenced in the 1860s with 
the introduction of the exploding harpoon: J.N. Tønnessen and A.O. Johnsen, The History 
of Modern Whaling (London, C Hurst & Co, 1982) 3.
87   Wenzel (n. 16) 139.
88   Richard A. Caulfield, ‘Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling in West Greenland’ in Milton 
M.R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter (eds) Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? 
(Amsterdam, Gordon and Breach, 1994) 261, 282.
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Arctic-centric issues within pertinent international for a, as clearly envisaged 
within the 2016 Arctic Policy Statement.89
3.1 The Regulation of Cetacean Products under EU Law
As with the corresponding seal provisions outlined above, specific measures 
have been introduced by the EU to restrict the market presence of cetacean 
products, which were also largely inspired by popular and institutional oppo-
sition to the hunting of whales. Like the EU seal regime, these measures were 
largely intended to undermine the global market for commercially-derived 
cetacean products, while simultaneously seeking to preserve the long-standing 
subsistence hunting entitlements of recognised indigenous communities. The 
EU cetacean provisions encompass two complementary yet relatively over-
looked measures adopted in 1981, namely Regulation 348/8190 and its imple-
menting legislation, Regulation 3786/81.91 Regulation 348/81 emerged from the 
somewhat unexpected context of industrial restrictions upon leather tanning, 
instituted by the incoming Thatcher administration in the UK in 1979. At the 
material time, domestic restrictions had been imposed upon the importa-
tion of whale products by a number of EU Member States, with the general 
exception of sperm whale oil, which was still used in a dwindling number of 
industrial processes. In 1979, proposals for a full moratorium on sperm whaling 
were narrowly defeated within the global regulatory body, the IWC.92 These 
developments nevertheless prompted the UK authorities to immediately lobby 
for Community-wide restrictions on the importation of whale oil and deriva-
tive items.93 While partly a manifestation of governmental opposition to the 
89   Arctic Policy Statement (n. 2) 7.
90   Council Regulation (EEC) No. 348/81 of 20 January 1981 on common rules for imports of 
whales or other cetacean products [1981] Official Journal L39/1.
91   Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3786/81 of 22 December 1981 laying down provisions 
for the implementation of the common rules for imports of whale or other cetacean 
products [1981] Official Journal L377/42.
92   On these endeavours see Patricia Birnie, ‘The Role of Developing Countries in Nudging 
the International Whaling Commission from Regulating Whaling to Encouraging 
Nonconsumptive Uses of Whales’ (1985) 12 Ecology Law Quarterly 937, 957–959. A mora-
torium on sperm whaling was eventually adopted at the Thirty-Third Meeting of the IWC 
in 1981, with this motion co-sponsored by France, the Netherlands and the UK, acting in 
their capacity as independent contracting parties in the absence of an allied EEC negoti-
ating positon.
93   Anonymous, ‘UK Harpoons Whalers’, New Scientist, 12 July 1979 85.
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commercial harvesting of whales,94 these entreaties were also motivated by 
concerns that the increasingly stringent national constraints on cetacean 
products could exert a potentially distortionary effect upon the national 
leather industry, since sperm whale oil was still used to a significant degree by 
rival producers, for which domestic manufacturers ‘rightly feared that its hard-
pressed industry could experience unfair competition from non-Community 
countries’.95
Such calls would ultimately find fertile ground within the institutions of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), with whale conservation occupying a 
position of some significance upon its operational agenda. In November 1980, 
both the Commission and the European Parliament considered this issue in 
considerable depth, advocating legislation to restrict the commercial use of 
cetacean products, albeit with differing approaches. The Commission pro-
posed a general ban on the importation of whale meat, as well as products that 
had been treated with whale oil.96 Meanwhile, in a more extensive interven-
tion, the Parliament called not only for a ban on ‘all products which can be 
shown to derive from cetaceans or to contain products derived from cetaceans’ 
but for the EEC and its Member States to formally pursue a moratorium upon 
commercial whaling within the IWC.97 Although a number of Member States 
would eventually play a significant role in securing a moratorium on commer-
cial hunting at the IWC’s historic Thirty-Fourth Meeting in 1982,98 the EEC ulti-
mately favoured the more targeted proposal of the Commission and confined 
its policies towards whaling to the specific arena of international trade.
94   On the growing opposition in Europe to commercial whaling since the 1960s see Charlotte 
Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of An Anti-Whaling Discourse 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2008) 258–259.
95   House of Commons Debate, 8 December 1980, Hansard, Vol. 995 cc.721, 722.
96   COM (80) 788.
97   Resolution Embodying the Opinion of the European Parliament on the Proposal from the 
Commission of the European Communities and the Council for a Regulation on Common 
Rules for Imports of Whale Products [1980] OJ C 291/49.
98   At this juncture, paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule to the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling 161 UNTS 72 (ICRW) was famously amended so as to set com-
mercial catch limits at zero, a position that may subsequently be amended by a three- 
quarters majority of the contracting parties present and voting, although the stated posi-
ton against whaling by a significant majority of the parties renders this a remote prospect 
at present. On the events of the Meeting and voting patterns towards this historic pro-
posal see Patricia Birnie, ‘Countdown to Zero’ (1983) 7 Marine Policy 68.
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To this end, Regulation 348/81 established that the importation of a rela-
tively small and specific set of items, listed on an Annex to the provision and 
including meat, offal, fats, oils and products treated with cetacean oil, would 
from 1 January 1982 require an import licence99 to be overseen by a Committee 
on Cetacean Products.100 Although Regulation 348/81 was initially requested 
as a means of stabilising market conditions for cetacean products, this pro-
vision was ultimately adopted on explicitly environmental grounds. Indeed, 
the preamble observes that trade restrictions are an inevitable consequence 
of the need to ensure the ‘conservation of cetacean species’. Moreover, legal 
concerns had initially been raised over the UK’s proposals as to whether any 
future measures could be adopted pursuant to the EEC’s then nascent fish-
eries competences, as had been favoured by a considerable majority of the 
Member States at the time. Strong opposition to this approach from Denmark 
and Germany meant that Regulation 348/81 was ultimately adopted under 
the auspices of what was previously art 235 of the EEC Treaty (now art 352 TFEU) 
and was hence a measure of broader environmental law, rather than a fisheries 
matter.101 Unlike the various provisions addressing seal products, Regulation 
348/81 makes no reference to the Inuit or the exigencies of indigenous subsis-
tence hunting. Accordingly, this provision authorises the trade in Inuit-derived 
items essentially by default, with import restrictions applying solely to ‘prod-
ucts to be used for commercial purposes’.102 Instead, as outlined further in 
section 3.2.2 below, the position of traditional subsistence users of cetacean 
products—specifically in the context of Greenlanders—is addressed more 
comprehensively under legislation intended to give effect to commitments 
99   Art 1(1). Under art 3 the Council may amend the Annex following a qualified majority 
vote, with individual Member States permitted to ban additional products pending such 
a decision; this process has not occurred to date. Conditions for the practical operation 
of import licenses were subsequently established under Regulation 3786/81.
100   Art 2(1). The work of the Committee has remained generally obscure, with the sole refer-
ence to its activities arising in response to a question from the European Parliament in 
1982, in which it was recommended that the Annex of products subject to the controls 
of Regulation 348/81 ought not to be extended until the provision had been in force for a 
longer period of time: [1982] OJ C 218. The cetacean provisions therefore offer few obvi-
ous lines of comparison with the ‘recognised body’ for attestation envisaged under the 
amended EU legislation on seal products.
101   A.M. Farmer (ed) Manual of European Environmental Policy (London, Routledge, 2012) 
9.12. This appears to have been a source of frustration to the UK government, which 
saw this wrangling as delaying the regulation of its original market-related concerns 
(n. 95) 723.
102   Art 1(1).
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pursuant to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora 1973 (CITES).103 Indeed, the preambular intentions 
of Regulation 348/81 identify this provision as a temporary measure pending 
the adoption of more general legislation on the trade in endangered species, 
hence whale products might have been eventually expected to have been 
addressed holistically in the context of CITES commitments. Nevertheless, 
Regulation 348/81 was not ultimately repealed by the first EU CITES Regulation 
in 1982,104 nor indeed has it been explicitly subsumed into any of the succes-
sive iterations of this legislation, hence it remains the primary regulatory 
regime for such products vis-à-vis the internal market.
The restrictions upon the trade in cetacean products intended for commer-
cial use established under Regulation 348/81 have also been bolstered to some 
extent by the application of the Habitats Directive,105 the cornerstone provi-
sion of EU nature conservation law. Under the Directive, the Member States 
adopt a two-pronged approach to the conservation of threatened species. 
In the first instance, Member States are obliged to identify and, in tandem with 
the EU institutions, designate Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) for species 
of community importance.106 Moreover, the Habitats Directive mandates that 
Member States ‘shall take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict 
protection for the animal species listed in Annex IV(a) in their natural range’.107 
At present, ‘all species’ of cetaceans have been so listed, but only one seal spe-
cies. Thus, under the system of strict protection envisaged by the Directive, 
art 12(1) prohibits inter alia all forms of deliberate capture or killing of ceta-
ceans in the wild. While this provision has obstructed the commercial whaling 
aspirations of potential new Arctic EU Member States, there is nonetheless 
scope for subsistence whaling by recognised indigenous communities to be 
permitted under the Directive. In this respect, art 16(1)(e) allows for the tak-
ing of Annex IV(a) species ‘under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective 
basis and to a limited extent … in limited numbers specified by the competent 
national authorities’. Although untested in this context, and contingent upon 
103   993 UNTS 243.
104   Council Regulation (EEC) No 3626/82 of 3 December 1982 on the implementation in 
the Community of the Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild 
fauna and flora [1982] OJ L 384/1 (subsequently repealed).
105   Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats of 
wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ L 206/7.
106   These species are listed on Annex II to the Directive. From the standpoint of marine 
mammals, these specific obligations apply solely to harbour porpoises and bottlenose 
dolphins, as well as grey and harbour seals.
107   Art 12(1).
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the support of both a sponsoring Member State and the European Commission, 
this derogation could serve to reconcile broad EU support for the subsistence 
and cultural needs of indigenous peoples with the core conservation objec-
tives advanced by the Directive.
At present, however, the Habitats Directive has no application to the marine 
Arctic, since its scope is restricted to ‘the European territory of the Member 
States’.108 Accordingly it does not apply to whales taken in the jurisdictional 
waters of Greenland, which formally left the EEC in January 1985,109 or Arctic 
whaling states such as Norway and Iceland, which have rejected the prospect of 
EU membership in national referenda, with the uncompromising stance of 
the Commission towards commercial whaling recognised as a key factor in 
this regard.110 Nevertheless, from a trade perspective, these provisions may 
still exert an influence upon the eventual fate of species harvested beyond its 
jurisdictional reach, since art 12(2) prohibits the keeping, transport, sale or 
exchange or offering for sale or exchange of ‘specimens taken from the wild’.111 
Specimens are defined in art 1(m) of the Directive as:
108   Art 2(1). This term gave rise to considerable confusion and the initial transposing legisla-
tion of a number of Member States applied the Directive solely to the territorial sea, hence 
for highly mobile species such as marine mammals, the Directive was initially considered 
to be of limited value. The ECJ subsequently confirmed the application of the Directive 
to the full range of jurisdictional waters in Commission v UK [2005] ECR I-9017 (para. 
117). On the jurisdictional scope of the Directive see Richard Caddell, ‘The Maritime 
Dimensions of the Habitats Directive: Past Challenges and Future Opportunities’ in 
Gregory Jones QC (ed) The Habitats Directive: A Developer’s Obstacle Course? (Oxford, 
Hart, 2012) 183, 187–189.
109   Treaty, amending with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities [1985] OJ L 29/1. See also Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on 
relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom 
of Denmark on the other [2014] OJ L 76/1.
110   On the role of whaling in the Norwegian referendum see Steinar Andresen, ‘The Making 
and Implementation of Whaling Policies: Does Participation Make a Difference?’ in 
David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (eds), The Implementation and 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998) 431, 455–456. On the whaling aspects of the Icelandic 
accession negotiations see Peter Davies, ‘Iceland and European Union Accession: The 
Whaling Issue’ (2011) 24 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 23.
111   Art 12(2) applies only to animals taken after the entry into force of the Directive, thereby 
allowing free trade in pre-existing products, most notably on the lucrative antiquities 
market. Items taken after this period remain subject to regulation under CITES which, 
as discussed in section 3.2.2, has generated sporadic controversies over products derived 
from narwhal tusks.
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any animal or plant, whether alive or dead, of the species listed in 
Annex IV and Annex V, any part or derivative thereof, as well as any other 
goods which appear, from an accompanying document, the packaging or 
a mark or label, or from any other circumstances, to be parts or deriva-
tives of animals or plants of those species.
This definition serves to further restrict the importation of whale products into 
the EU, which thereby ‘diminishes a potential loophole, namely that the pro-
hibition on the killing of animals outside Community waters is not provided 
for in the Habitats Directive’.112 Thus, while the Habitats Directive itself offers 
no formal protection to marine mammals outside EU waters, it does prevent 
the importation into the internal market of products derived from hunts con-
ducted beyond the physical boundaries of the EU.
In contrast to the EU seal provisions, import restrictions on cetacean prod-
ucts have proved to be relatively uncontroversial. No specific litigation has been 
generated under these auspices, nor has there been any meaningful assertion of 
cultural injury or unfair treatment sustained by any indigenous constituency. 
This may be attributed to three key factors that did not arise in the context of 
the EU’s seal regime. In the first instance, Regulation 348/81 coincided with 
a precipitous decline in the demand for whale products, for both economic 
and ecological reasons. At the material time, cheaper alternatives to baleen 
whale oil were being developed by manufacturers, a process that was some-
what accelerated by the IWC’s graduated restrictions on commercial whaling 
that rendered sourcing this product increasingly cost-prohibitive.113 Allied 
to this, a concerted environmental lobby helped to steer consumer demand 
towards alternative oils as an essential component in industrial manufactur-
ing and, in particular, domestic products.114 Accordingly, Regulation 348/81 has 
addressed a niche market within the EU of products that are essentially 
112   Peter G.G. Davies, ‘The Legality of Norwegian Commercial Whaling under the Whaling 
Convention and its Compatibility with European Community Law’ (1994) 43 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 270, 281 (original emphasis).
113   On this process see Heidi Scott, ‘Whale Oil Culture, Consumerism and Modern Ecology’ in 
Ross Barrett and Daniel Worden (eds) Oil Culture (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014) 3.
114   In the UK, for example, retailers of leather goods came under increasing pressure to dis-
continue the use of whale oil: ‘UK Harpoons Whalers’ (n. 93) 85. There is also clear evi-
dence that consumer concerns were shared by a number of Parliamentarians, with strong 
opposition within the House of Commons to the continued use of any whale products in 
the UK (n. 95) 724. This was a microcosm of a wider global movement to eschew whale 
products: see further Epstein (n. 94) 87–164.
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marketed to the Inuit diaspora and does not generate the same economic 
repercussions encountered by the sealing industry with its wider array of 
potential consumers. Second, the cetacean provisions were unencumbered 
by the problematic administrative requirements established under the later 
seal provisions and did not therefore discriminate between importers of non- 
commercial products in a manner that would disrupt market access by par-
ticular communities. Third, and perhaps most significant, the EU provisions on 
cetacean products have essentially reflected trade entitlements that have been 
established on a multilateral basis and are widely accepted as a legitimate spe-
cial case by the international community. Indeed, unlike seals, for which the 
emergence of a circumpolar supervisory body remains an unlikely prospect, 
the volume of indigenous whaling in any given season has been largely pre- 
determined by a recognised global regulatory institution. While this process 
has generated increasing consternation among particular states in recent 
years, as outlined below, its outcomes have nonetheless been faithfully imple-
mented in a non-discriminatory manner by the EU through these provisions.
3.2 The EU and the Multilateral Regulation of Cetaceans in the Arctic
In addition to the regulatory challenges experienced in the development of 
internal legislation to address marine mammal products, another key objective 
of the EU in its engagement with the Arctic—the enhancement of multilateral 
governance for this region through pertinent multilateral fora—also invites 
further scrutiny in the specific context of marine mammals. In the 2008 Joint 
Communication, this was identified as one of the three main policy priorities 
for the EU vis-à-vis the Arctic,115 which sought to facilitate the ‘full implemen-
tation of already existing obligations’ within relevant regulatory frameworks.116 
These aspirations were expressed in somewhat more detail in the recent Arctic 
Policy Statement of April 2016, in which it was considered that the EU ‘should 
continue its engagement in multilateral environmental agreements that also 
have particular relevance to the Arctic, and encourage their implementation’.117 
The earlier Joint Communication provided little indication of the specific fora 
through which this mandate was considered best pursued. However, while 
neither document expressly referred to marine mammals as such, the 2016 
Statement nonetheless identified particular organizations of significance, 
which might therefore be considered operative priorities for the EU institu-
tions in their external dealings. These include a number of regimes with a clear 
115   Joint Communication (n. 1) 3.
116   Ibid., 10.
117   Arctic Policy Statement (n. 2) 7.
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relevance to cetaceans and the hunting activities of Arctic indigenous peoples, 
notably the ICRW and CITES. To this end, in engaging with these particular 
fora, the EU intends to take an ‘active negotiating position … to encourage all 
countries and regions to assume their responsibilities’.118
As a negotiating bloc of contracting parties to a particular treaty, the EU can 
wield considerable power within multilateral organizations,119 even those with 
an extensive cohort of participants. Therefore, from the perspective of Arctic 
indigenous peoples seeking to secure particular entitlements within such 
bodies, the EU may constitute a significant ally—or a formidable opponent. 
In this regard, the sustainable use of cetaceans by indigenous communities 
presents an illuminating case-study of the implementation of the EU’s part-
nership objectives, engaging three separate regimes in the form of the IWC, 
CITES and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). As 
this section demonstrates, a review of collective practices towards the issue 
of indigenous whaling reveals that the EU has generally proved to be a sup-
portive partner to indigenous communities in promoting subsistence hunting 
activities, notwithstanding its wider objectives in opposing the commercial 
exploitation of marine mammals. Nevertheless, this support is not unqualified 
and the EU has also opposed indigenous demands and insisted upon stricter 
controls over these activities where concerns have arisen over the conservation 
status of particular species. Moreover, the EU has steadfastly avoided active 
engagement with NAMMCO, the regional regulator charged with the oversight 
of the sustainable use of marine mammals in the Arctic, further highlighting 
the complexities that this particular issue poses for EU policies towards the 
High North.
3.2.1 Qualified Support: The EU and the IWC
On a multilateral level, whaling in the Arctic is regulated predominantly 
under the auspices of the ICRW and, more specifically, its constituent man-
agement body, the IWC. Inaugurated in 1949 to facilitate the stated objectives 
of the ICRW ‘to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus 
make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry’120 the IWC 
has become an increasingly fractious institution as public and governmental 
attitudes towards the continued commercial hunting of whales has become 
118   Ibid., 14.
119   For an illuminating discussion of the collective bargaining of the EU in particular 
regimes see Tom Delreux, The EU as an International Environmental Negotiator (Farnham, 
Ashgate, 2011) 61–134.
120   Preamble to the ICRW.
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steadily more polarised.121 As observed above, in 1982 the IWC imposed a 
moratorium on the commercial hunting of whales. A considerable degree of 
whaling has nonetheless continued within the Arctic, pursuant to objections 
or reservations entered against the commercial moratorium,122 for scientific 
purposes as provided under Article VIII of the ICRW123 and, most pertinently 
from the perspective of Arctic indigenous communities, under a recognised 
exemption ‘to satisfy aboriginal subsistence need’.124
The aboriginal subsistence exception has been a long-standing feature 
of multilateral whaling governance, having been introduced in the first 
global treaty to regulate whaling in 1931.125 Although absent from subse-
quent arrangements,126 it was reinstated within the ICRW Schedule in 1946 
following a proposal by the USSR in respect of its indigenous Chukotkan 
communities.127 Since 1950, the aboriginal subsistence provisions of the 
121   There is a voluminous literature on the travails of the IWC and the processes by which 
this organisation has become steadily more beleagured, hence constraints of focus and 
space necessaitate a peripheral treatment of these issues in this Chapter. Nevertheless, 
as noted below, the febrile atmosphere within the IWC has impacted to a degree upon 
negotiations for subsistence quotas for Arctic indigenous communities. For a thorough 
discussion of the IWC generally see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Whaling and International 
Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 29–121; the emergence of a sus-
tained anti-whaling agenda and its repercussions for multilateral management are out-
lined comprehensively by Epsetin (n. 94) 87–163 and Sarah Suhre, ‘Misguided Morality: 
The Repercussions of the International Whaling Commission’s Shift from a Policy of 
Regulation to One of Preservation’ (1999) 12 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 305.
122   Norway entered an immediate objection to the moratorium and has continued to con-
duct commercial whaling activities in the Arctic. Iceland withdrew from the Convention 
in 1991 and rejoined in 2002, subject to a contentious reservation to the moratorium: 
see further Alexander Gillespie, ‘Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling 
Commission’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 977.
123   A limited degree of scientific whaling has been conducted by Iceland, although little 
research whaling has occurred in the Arctic in recent years. The scientific research exemp-
tion has been primarily—and contentiously—invoked by Japan, which the Internatonal 
Court of Justice recently considered to have fallen short of the standards required of 
Article VIII: Case Concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand 
Intervening); Judgment of 31 March 2014.
124   Section 13 of the ICRW Schedule.
125   Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1931; 155 LNTS 349. Art 3 prescribed specific 
entitlements for ‘aborigines dwelling on the coasts of the territories of the High 
Contracting Parties’.
126   International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling 1937; 190 LNTS 79.
127   Resolution 10 of the 1946 International Whaling Conference.
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ICRW Schedule have been successively expanded and amended to establish 
particular tribal requirements and restrictions on certain stocks.128 Ultimately, 
aboriginal subsistence whaling (ASW) is largely regulated on a national level by 
the parties in question, acting in conjunction with hunting standards and quo-
tas prescribed by the IWC, with the ‘parent’ government required to apply for 
a share of the aboriginal allocation on particular stocks, on the basis of a ‘need 
statement’ quantifying the volume of whale meat required by the communities 
in question.129 Despite widespread opposition to commercial whaling within 
the IWC, aboriginal hunting has been generally accepted as a distinct category 
of activity that is of fundamental importance to particular communities; broad 
endorsement is therefore accorded in principle for hunts that do not endanger 
the populations in question and to which precautionary monitoring and man-
agement measures are applicable.130
Nevertheless, subsistence quotas—and their interpretation—have generated 
occasional discord within the IWC. The aboriginal exemption first received 
sustained scrutiny in the mid-1970s due to concerns over the potential im-
pact of bowhead whaling by Arctic indigenous communities.131 This resulted 
in a contentious decision by the IWC in 1977 to temporarily ban aboriginal 
hunts for grey and bowhead whales,132 which would eventually trigger the 
repudiation by Canada of the Convention in 1981.133 The bowhead whaling con-
troversy demonstrated that the IWC possessed ‘a strong scientific committee 
but essentially no expertise within its ranks for addressing the socio-economic, 
cultural and nutritional dimensions of aboriginal whaling’.134 Consequently, 
128   Alexander Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in International Environmental 
Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2005) 195.
129   The uncomfortably paternalistic title of this administrative requirement appears likely to 
be reformulated in the near future: Report of the Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (ASW ) 
Sub-Committee 2016; Document IWC/66/Rep03, 20.
130   Randall R. Reeves, ‘The Origins and Character of “Aboriginal Subsistence” Whaling: 
A Global Review’ (2002) 32 Mammal Review 71, 73.
131   John Walsh, “Moratorium for the Bowhead: Eskimo Whaling on Ice?” (1977) 197 Science 
847.
132   For a full account of this issue see IWC (n. 82) 2.
133   See further Ted L. McDorman, “Canada and Whaling: An Analysis of Article 65 of the 
Law of the Sea Convention” (1998) 29 Ocean Development and International Law 179. 
Canada therefore regulates Inuit whaling outside the auspices of the IWC; of the other 
Arctic coastal states that practice Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, Demark (in respect of 
Greenland), the US and Russia remain parties to the Convention and follow these specific 
processes.
134   Reeves (n. 130) 72.
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an Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Sub-Committee (ASWSC) was established 
in 1983 to review quota applications and provide advice on technical manage-
ment measures. Under the auspices of this body, the IWC has subsequently 
focused on reducing the numbers of whales struck but not landed,135 ensur-
ing the sustainability of specific aboriginal hunts136 and improving humane 
killing methods.137 Since 2012, the ASWSC has been supported by an Ad Hoc 
Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Working Group to address a number of con-
ceptual difficulties with the ASW regime,138 including challenges to the alleged 
commercialisation of such hunts, as discussed further below.
In the specific context of Arctic ASW, complications have arisen over pur-
ported quotas for the Greenlandic Inuit. As noted above, the harvesting of 
particular species by indigenous hunters has been sporadically controversial 
within the IWC; aside from the bowhead whaling restrictions of 1977, concerns 
were raised over the hunting of humpback whales by Greenlanders in 1985, 
which also resulted in significant quota reductions for this constituency.139 As 
a result of the considerable short-term difficulties raised by this development, 
Greenland has formed part of the Danish delegation to the IWC since 1985,140 
although Denmark remains the competent negotiating authority concern-
ing Greenlandic ASW. In 1991 the IWC’s Scientific Committee endorsed a need 
statement submitted by Denmark that 670 tons of whale meat was required 
annually to meet indigenous subsistence demand, a volume that was reap-
proved by this body in 2007.141 While there is minimal dissent to the grant of 
an ASW to Greenland,142 elements of Greenlandic activities under this broad 
135   Resolution 1981–4: Resolution to the Government of the United States on the Behring Sea 
Bowhead Whale.
136   Resolution 1998–9: Resolution on Directed Takes of White Whales; Resolution 1994–4 
Resolution on a Review of Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling.
137   In this respect, particular concerns have been raised over the Faroese drive hunt— 
see Resolution 1993–2: Resolution on Pilot Whales and Resolution 1995–1: Resolution 
on Killing Methods in the Pilot Whale Drive Hunt. More generally the IWC has sought 
to improve the humane killing element of all aboriginal hunts—see Resolution 
1985–3: Resolution on Humane Killing in Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling; Resolution 
1997–1: Resolution on Improving the Humaneness of Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling; 
and Resolution 2001–2: Resolution on Whale Killing Methods.
138   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2011 (Cambridge, IWC, 
2011) 18.
139   Caulfield (n. 84) 127.
140   Ibid., 129.
141   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2008 (Cambridge, IWC, 
2008) 19.
142   The only meaningful conceptual opposition to ASW has been raised by India, which 
has called for indigenous communities globally to find alternative food sources: IWC 
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umbrella have grown steadily more contentious within the IWC, with concerns 
raised by the particular species intended to be harvested to meet these nutri-
tional requirements, as well as the alleged commercialization of subsistence 
catches.
Greenlandic whaling quotas provide an illuminating example of the col-
lective bargaining practices of the EU, as well as the position of individual 
Member States in seeking to further the objectives of indigenous communities 
within their dependent territories. Membership of the IWC was first mooted 
by the EEC in 1979,143 with a proactive common position against whaling con-
sidered as a potential political goal in 1980.144 The ICRW currently precludes 
accession by non-states,145 hence formal membership of the IWC would require 
an amendment of the Convention as advocated by the European Commission 
in 1992.146 Accordingly, none of these proposed approaches were ultimately 
applied and the EU currently maintains observer status at the IWC. However, 
in 2007 the Commission adopted a further proposal to advance a common EU 
position to be followed by the Member States party to the ICRW at future IWC 
Meetings.147 To this end, the Commission argued that the current ‘EC policy 
on whales will not be effective in Community waters if it is not backed by 
coherent worldwide action’,148 calling for an aligned position on inter alia 
the continuation of the moratorium on commercial hunting and support for 
aboriginal subsistence hunting, and for all Member States to become parties 
(n. 138) 15. India acceded to the ICRW in 1985 with the specific aim of ending all catego-
ries of whaling, including ASW: Anthony D’Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra, ‘Whales: Their 
Emerging Right to Life’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 21, 47. Ironically, 
the main constituency objecting to the categorisation of Greenlandic whaling as ‘aborigi-
nal’ is the Greenlanders themselves, who seek the eventual allocation of a commercial 
quota: Nordic Council (n. 20) 48. At the IWC’s 2016 Meeting a contentious draft Resolution 
on Food Security tabled by a cohort of African parties was defeated, although it appears 
likely to be raised again in 2018. While ostensibly a measure that might be viewed as bol-
stering aboriginal claims, the draft Resolution ultimately sought the official recognition 
of whales as a general food source of global significance—a proposition that was deemed 
objectionable by a considerable number of parties, including the EU bloc.
143   COM (79) 364.
144   European Parliament (n. 96).
145   Article III refers to the Membership of ‘Contracting Governments’ within the IWC 
(emphasis added).
146   COM (92) 316.
147   COM (2007) 871. The common position was ultimately adopted in EU Council Decision 
9818/08.
148   Ibid., 6.
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to the ICRW.149 An official EU common position on whaling was therefore 
advanced for the first time at the IWC’s Sixtieth Meeting in 2008, a develop-
ment that drew the ire of a number of contracting parties since a ‘blocking 
majority’ was now held and coordinated by a non-member that could not be 
realistically lobbied by other parties at this forum.150 Despite these concerns, a 
common position has been elaborated for subsequent Meetings to 2011,151 and 
for the medium-term.152 Meanwhile, Denmark has opted out of the common 
positon by invoking Declaration 25 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty,153 which 
allows a Member States to depart from such policies in respect of overseas 
countries and territories. Denmark continues to represent Greenland at IWC 
Meetings in a manner that has led to both conflict and consensus with the EU 
over ASW quotas.
The conflict between Greenlandic whaling aspirations and the EU centres 
upon EU endorsement of ASW on the condition that ‘conservation is not com-
promised, whaling operations are properly regulated and catches remain with 
the scope of documented and recognised sustainable needs’.154 While the met-
ric tonnage of whale meat sought by Greenland has received broad acceptance 
within the IWC’s institutions, there has been profound disagreement over the 
means by which this is to be secured. In essence, Greenland has sought an ASW 
quota that incorporates an elevated number of humpback whales, a species 
that would yield a higher quantity of meat and thus reduce the number of 
individual animals required, but drawn from stocks for which there remains 
a degree of conservation concern. Despite having the support of the Scientific 
Committee, proposals to this effect tabled in 2008 were defeated due to the 
EU’s collective bloc vote, which drew an aggrieved response from Denmark’s 
indigenous representatives.155 Similar proposals failed to gain sufficient sup-
port in 2009, although in 2010 negotiations between Denmark and the EU bloc 
149   Ibid., 9. The current cohort of EU Member States Party to the ICRW numbers twenty-five, 
with Latvia and Malta yet to accede, while Greece formally withdrew from the Convention 
in 2013. This also includes the UK, in advance of its prospective withdrawal from the EU 
in 2019.
150   IWC 2008 (n. 141) 21. Similar concerns have been directed at the EU in its collective activi-
ties in other fora: Richard Caddell, ‘Biodiversity Loss and the Prospects for International 
Co-Operation: EU Law and the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals’ 
(2008) 8 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 218, 247.
151   EU Council Decision 7146/09.
152   EU Council Decision 17641/11.
153   Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191. On the development of the Danish position see 
Fitzmaurice (n. 121) 213–214.
154   (n. 147) 9.
155   IWC 2008 (n. 141) 23.
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over a reduction in catches of fin whales resulted in a compromise settlement 
that served to ‘reconcile Greenland’s requirements while also addressing the 
European Union’s concern for not seeing an increase in the number of large 
whales struck’,156 thus forming an irresistible majority and securing the requi-
site consensus to permit a quota on this basis.
Nevertheless, having benefitted from the voting power of the EU bloc in 
2010, a subsequent quota request by Greenland submitted in 2012 involving a 
higher number of humpback whales was again defeated by collective action, 
with the EU ‘unable to support the proposal described’, despite reaffirming its 
general commitment to ‘protecting the lives of indigenous peoples, including 
the protection of livelihoods’.157 The failure to secure sufficient support for an 
ASW quota at this meeting would have significant consequences, as admin-
istrative restructuring meant that the IWC would meet on a two-yearly basis 
subsequent to this meeting and Greenlandic quotas would not therefore be 
reconsidered until 2014. In the meantime the harvesting of particular whales 
by Greenlanders, which occurred in both 2012 and 2013, was instituted uni-
laterally by Denmark. Since this was technically conducted without the for-
mal amendment of the ICRW Schedule, a group of (non-EU) parties sought to 
censure Denmark before the IWC’s Infractions Committee. This motion was 
ultimately rejected,158 but the frustrations of the Inuit prompted the Danish 
authorities to warn the IWC that repudiation of the Convention was being seri-
ously contemplated.159
In 2014 a solution to the immediate problem of Greenlandic ASW was bro-
kered at the IWC, with the express support and co-leadership of the EU bloc. 
This time, the Danish proposals were accompanied by an updated need state-
ment, calling for 799 tons of meat drawn primarily from the most abundant 
available stocks as advised by the Scientific Committee, and explicit recogni-
tion that these requests constituted a ‘package’ alongside an EU-sponsored 
156   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2010 (Cambridge, IWC, 
2010) 19.
157   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2012 (Cambridge, IWC, 2012) 
20–22.
158   Report of the Infractions Sub-Committee; Document IWC/65/Rep04 2. It has, however, 
been convincingly argued that the Danish actions constituted a technical breach of the 
Convention, although the consequences may be unclear since there is no clear consensus 
on the meaning of an ‘infraction’ for the purposes of the ICRW: Chris Wold and Michael D. 
Kearney, ‘The Legal Effect of Greenland’s Unilateral Aboriginal Subsistence Whale Hunt’ 
(2015) 30 American University International Law Review 561, 607.
159   Letter of 1 July 2013 from Denmark to the IWC; reproduced at https://iwc.int/
document_3323.
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Resolution on ASW.160 This change in policy was necessitated by continued 
opposition among a vociferous minority of parties to the perceived commer-
cial nature of at least some elements of the Greenlandic quota, an issue that 
the resultant Resolution sought to prioritise within the Ad Hoc ASW Working 
Group.161 Despite some initial misgivings that the Resolution was overly 
focused on Greenlandic activities rather than ASW generally, the spirit of part-
nership between the EU and Greenland—as well as the assistance of a formi-
dable voting majority—ultimately persuaded a sufficient cohort of parties to 
endorse this package deal in full.162
Conceptually, however, the spectre of commercialization continues to defy 
a clear consensus on the harvesting of marine mammals by indigenous com-
munities. In a whaling context, the IWC has long recognized that a degree of 
commerciality is inherent in ASW activities. In 1981, in light of the bowhead 
whaling controversy, the IWC sought to clarify the ASW regime, observing 
that commercial considerations played a key role in the continued viability of 
indigenous hunting, since ‘the contemporary whaling system depends on cash 
income for purchasing equipment’.163 Nevertheless, objections to a perceived 
creeping commercialization of Greenlandic operations have been raised with-
in the IWC since 1985.164 In 2004 the IWC adopted a more extensive definition 
of aboriginal subsistence use, accepting that:
The barter, trade or sharing of whale products in their harvested form 
with relatives of the participants in the harvest, with others in the local 
community or with persons in locations other than local community with 
whom local residents share familial, social cultural or economic ties. A gen-
eralized currency is involved in this barter and trade, but the predominant 
portion of the products from such whales are originally directly con-
sumed or utilised in their harvested form within the local community.165
Greenland has contended that the distinction between ASW and commercial 
whaling is ‘artificial’, since there is no concerted effort to secure a profit from 
these endeavours and that any resultant income merely serves to underwrite 
160   IWC, Report of the 65th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 
IWC, 2014) 10.
161   Resolution 2014–1: Resolution on Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling.
162   IWC 2014 (n. 160) 11.
163   IWC 1982 (n. 82) 38.
164   Caulfield (n. 88) 264.
165   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2004 (Cambridge, IWC, 
2004) 15–17 (emphasis added).
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the costs of future whaling operations and the increasingly stringent animal 
welfare requirements for subsistence hunting.166 Concerns have nonetheless 
been expressed that whale meat has been sold in increasing quantities to 
tourists in Greenland, with some parties suggesting that the ASW quotas are 
being manipulated to generate enhanced revenue streams within a limited 
economic environment.167
The precise threshold by which commercialization is triggered within 
indigenous activities remains a controversial and ambiguous issue, not least 
since many Inuit societies have a complex relationship with hard currency.168 
Notwithstanding long-standing support for Inuit hunting activities, the num-
ber of whales taken for ASW purposes has approached commercial levels in 
recent years,169 a trend that has also raised alarm in the context of seals. 
Indeed, in EC-Seal Products, the WTO’s Appellate Body expressly rejected the 
assertion by the EU that questions of commercialization became ‘irrelevant’ 
once a hunt had been approved under the IC exception, ruling that the subsis-
tence or partial use criteria of the seal provisions ‘would appear to call for, if 
not continuous, at least regular reassessments, at a sufficiently disaggregated 
level, of whether the requirements of the IC exception are fulfilled’.170 Similar 
concerns are apparent in the context of whaling, where the ‘predominant por-
tion’ test remains largely unexplored. Greenland has suggested that the pre-
dominant portion of an ASW catch should be construed as comprising at least 
half of the volume of meat taken.171 This would appear at first blush to be a 
relatively low threshold, albeit one that is heavily complicated by questions 
over the degree of financial supplementation necessary in any given whaling 
season to meet the ASW hunting conditions imposed by the IWC. At present, 
given its stated intention to be ‘guided by the precautionary principle and by 
the advice of the Scientific Committee and also taking into account the work 
of the IWC’s ASW Working Group’172 the EU continues to endorse a degree of 
local commercialization in Greenlandic subsistence whaling, which ‘provides 
a balanced solution to a complex issue in a manner which is fully consistent 
166   IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009 (Cambridge, IWC, 
2009) 23.
167   IWC 2012 (n. 157) 22–24.
168   Caulfield (n. 84) 143–144.
169   Indeed, in 2014 ASW accounted for over 9700 individual whales, compared to some 16,039 
for scientific purposes and 23,484 taken under reservations to the commercial morato-
rium: IWC statistics, reproduced in Wold and Kearney (n. 158) 564.
170   EC-Seal Products (n. 45) para. 5.326.
171   IWC 2008 (n. 141) 20.
172   IWC 2012 (n. 157) 20.
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with the established EU position on whaling’.173 Nevertheless, given the previ-
ous practice of the EU in the pursuit of its common position, this approach 
may be subject to modification in the light of further IWC clarification of its 
rules on commercial uses of ASW quotas.
3.2.2 Compliance Monitoring: The EU and CITES
In addition to the governance of ASW under the ICRW, oversight of the trade in 
cetacean products derived from indigenous hunting activities—and their 
propensity to engage the regulatory attentions of the EU negotiating bloc—
has also been addressed through CITES. Unlike more holistic regimes, CITES 
maintains a highly specific focus upon the conservation problems posed by the 
international trade in endangered species. CITES operates by listing protected 
species in one of three Appendices according to their individual conservation 
status. Under Article II(1), Appendix I includes all species threatened with 
extinction which are or may be threatened by trade. Trade in these species is 
subject to ‘particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their 
survival and must only be authorised in exceptional circumstances’. At present 
twenty-one species of cetaceans are listed on Appendix I, predominantly the 
larger species of whales. Appendix II addresses all species which ‘although not 
necessarily threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in speci-
mens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilisa-
tion incompatible with their survival’.174 Additionally, species may be listed in 
Appendix II if they do not fulfil this criterion, but nevertheless require protec-
tion in order to bring trade in such species under effective control; ‘all species’ 
of cetaceans not currently listed in Appendix I have been listed in Appendix II. 
CITES and the IWC have endured a somewhat fractious relationship concern-
ing whales, however, due predominantly to attempted forum shopping by mu-
tual parties seeking to undermine the moratorium on commercial hunting.175
The EU maintains a powerful collective presence within CITES. While 
initially open to participation solely by states, the Convention had nonethe-
less recognised that its provisions could have implications for treaties that 
173   Answer of 5 January 2015 to Written Question E-008007-14.
174   Article II(2).
175   See Alexander Gillespie, ‘Forum Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC, 
CITES and the Management of Cetaceans’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International 
Law 17; on the current relationship between CITES and the IWC see Richard Caddell, 
‘Inter-Treaty Cooperation, Biodiversity Conservation and the Trade in Endangered 
Species’ (2013) 22 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 
264, 267–269.
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maintain a common customs union or removed customs controls between 
particular countries.176 In 1983 the so-called ‘Gabarone amendment’ to CITES 
permitted the accession of ‘regional economic integration organisations’.177 
The amendment entered into effect in 2013, permitting the EU to become a for-
mal party in July 2015.178 Prior to this, the EU formulated a collective position 
to be advanced by its Member States at CITES meetings. The EU still bargains 
collectively within the CITES institutions and each of the EU’s current comple-
ment of Member States also remains party to the Convention in an individual 
capacity. The formal accession of the EU to CITES will not, however, effect the 
extent of its bloc vote, which will continue to be commensurate with the num-
ber of its constituent Member States.179
Despite being initially precluded from acceding to CITES, since 1982 the EU 
has adopted periodic legislation to give effect to the terms of the Convention.180 
As with CITES itself, the EU provisions apply a list-based regime. However, 
the CITES Regulation departs from CITES practice by allowing for the listing 
of some Appendix II species in its Annex A which denotes species subject to 
the most significant restrictions on trade. This is significant since all species of 
cetaceans are listed on the Regulation’s Annex A.181 An exemption is however 
granted to specimens listed on CITES Appendix II ‘including products and 
derivatives other than meat products for commercial purposes, taken by the 
people of Greenland under licence granted by the competent authority con-
cerned’, which are instead listed in Annex B of the Regulation.182 This listing 
176   Art XIV(3).
177   Art XXI(2) (as amended).
178   Council Decision (EU) 2015/451 of 6 March concerning the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) [2015] OJ L 75/1. The EU accordingly participated for the first time as 
an official party to CITES at its Seventeenth Conference of the Parties (COP) to CITES, 
convened in September and October 2016.
179   Theoretically the EU could be entitled to claim an additional vote as a CITES party in its 
own right, but has declared that this will not be exercised. The EU will accordingly cast 
the bloc vote for matters within its competence, whereas individual Member States will 
vote, based on the pre-established common position: Implications of the EU’s Accession to 
CITES; Document CoP 17 Inf. 20.
180   The inaugural CITES Regulation was adopted by the EEC in 1982 (n. 103); the current 
iteration of these provisions is Council Regulation 338/97/EC of 3 March 1997 on the pro-
tection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein [1997] OJ L 61/1.
181   For a full discussion of the machinations of the EU CITES Regulation in relation to whal-
ing activities see Davies (n. 110) 46–51.
182   Annex 12, x703.
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allows for the importation of small amounts of whale products from Greenland, 
subject to particular administrative and veterinary requirements.183
This exemption has proved to be sporadically contentious, primarily in the 
specific context of the trade in narwhal products. Since 1979 narwhals have 
been listed on Appendix II of CITES and are hunted and consumed solely by 
the Inuit of Greenland and Canada,184 notwithstanding a lucrative market for 
trinkets carved from the tusks and teeth of these animals. In 1995, concerns 
over the conservation status of narwhals led to a Review of Significant Trade 
(RST) in narwhal products under the auspices of CITES, a process that allows 
for additional scrutiny of the national protection accorded to Appendix II 
species that are subject to elevated levels of trade.185 In 2004, the recommen-
dations arising from the RST were considered to have been complied with 
by both Greenland and Canada.186 Nevertheless, the trade in narwhal items 
has attracted the sustained concern of the EU, which has exercised a degree 
of influence over subsequent regulatory events. In December 2004 the EU’s 
Scientific Review Group (SRG), the advisory authority charged with reviewing 
compliance with CITES for the purposes of allowing imports of animal prod-
ucts into the internal market, delivered a mixed verdict on narwhals, form-
ing a negative view of Greenlandic products and a positive view of Canadian 
imports.187 At the next meeting of the CITES Animals Committee in 2005, how-
ever, the EU bloc sought a new RST,188 a position that was heavily criticised by 
Denmark (on behalf of Greenland) ‘for having been produced without con-
sultation with the range States and for presenting misleading information’.189 
In 2006, a further RST was averted through the adoption of new legislation in 
Greenland, albeit with significant loopholes—not least an exemption for the 
183   Commission Regulation (EC) No 206/2009 of 5 March 2009 on the introduction into 
the Community of personal consignments of products of animal origin and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 136/2004 [2009] OJ L 77/1.
184   Narwhals are primarily regulated on a bilateral basis through the Canada-Greenland Joint 
Commission on Beluga and Narwhal established in 1991, although a series of other multi-
lateral arrangements are applicable to this species: see further Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
‘So Much Law So Little Protection! A Case Study of the Protection of the Narwhal’ (2009) 
1 Yearbook of Polar Law 21.
185   Resolution Conf. 12.8: Review of Significant Trade in Specimens of Appendix-II Species.
186   Fitzmaurice (n. 121) 291.
187   Tanya Shadbolt, Ernest W.T. Cooper and Peter J. Ewins, Breaking the Ice: International 
Trade in Narwhals, in the Context of a Changing Arctic (Toronto, WWF, 2015) 39.
188   The Need for a New Review of Significant Trade in the Narwhal; Document AC21 Inf.1 (Rev 1).
189   Summary Record of the Twenty-first Meeting of the Animals Committee of CITES (Geneva, 
CITES, 2005) 11.
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export of tusks as household items for citizens relocating overseas, permitting 
substantial transfers of narwhal products to Denmark among the Greenlandic 
diaspora.190 Moreover, in 2009 the SRG amended its opinion of Canadian prod-
ucts, thereby allocating the final decision (and an effective veto) over imports 
from these producers to the national authorities of the individual Member 
States.191 Notwithstanding a minuscule market for narwhal products beyond 
Greenlandic émigré communities, this position evokes an uncomfortable 
comparison with the more objectionable aspects of the EU’s seal provisions: 
the import exemptions in the EU CITES Regulation apply only to Greenland, 
whose products are treated under Annex B of the legislation, yet those derived 
from the Canadian Inuit continue to fall under the more stringent require-
ments of Annex A.
3.2.3 Splendid Isolation: The EU and NAMMCO
A further forum for the regulation of marine mammals in the High North 
arises in the somewhat more contentious regional context of NAMMCO. The 
formation of NAMMCO is commonly perceived as a cautionary tale regard-
ing the uncompromising nature of whaling negotiations in the early 1990s.192 
Nonetheless, while disillusionment with IWC practices provided a significant 
political spur to the establishment of this organisation, NAMMCO also pro-
vides management advice on the sustainable use of pinnipeds and on fisher-
ies interactions within the region. NAMMCO has been operational since 1992, 
although an official basis for the coordination of common policies within the 
region was established through a series of intergovernmental conferences con-
vened between 1988 and 1992. These initiatives led to the adoption in 1990 of 
a Memorandum of Understanding, which created the scope to develop a for-
mal management body to advance this process further.193 In September 1992, 
the Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management 
190   See further Fitzmaurice (n. 121) 294.
191   Shadbolt, Cooper and Ewins (n. 187) 39.
192   See David D. Caron, ‘The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic 
Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual 
Structures’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 154.
193   On the development and early operation of NAMMCO see Alf Håkan Hoel, ‘Regionalization 
of International Whale Management: The Case of the North Atlantic Marine Mammals 
Commission’ (1993) 46 Arctic 116, at 118–21 and Brettny Hardy, ‘A Regional Approach to 
Whaling: How the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission is Shifting the Tides for 
Whale Management’ (2006) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 169, 
179–187.
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of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic194 was signed between Iceland, 
Norway, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, thereby formally bringing NAMMCO 
into effect. NAMMCO has nevertheless been treated with a degree of suspicion 
by a number of anti-whaling states, concerned at the possible proliferation of 
regulatory alternatives to the IWC.
In marked contrast to its practices within the IWC and CITES, the EU has 
exhibited minimal interest in working with NAMMCO. Indeed, while the EU 
holds official observer status within this body,195 it has yet to attend a single 
meeting of the NAMMCO Council. This is perhaps unsurprising given the stated 
collective intent to derive management advice on whaling issues—including 
ASW matters, on which NAMMCO would appear well-placed to consult—from 
the IWC,196 while the EU has tended to hold regional marine mammal organi-
zations in relatively limited regard, exercising similarly minimal engagement 
even with fora that are considerably more preservationist in outlook.197 The 
most profound divisions between these bodies nevertheless relate to seal 
hunting, with NAMMCO representing an obvious forum for the airing of griev-
ances against the seal products legislation and for which the NAMMCO Council 
has directed sharply-worded criticism of the EU’s refusal to engage with the 
wealth of available expertise on sustainable hunting issues in the High North.198 
Indeed, despite submitting a series of expert reports on the hunting and killing 
of seals to the EU,199 there is little evidence to suggest that the specific work of 
NAMMCO in this regard exercised even cursory influence over the trajectory 
of the EU seal regime, a position reflective of the EU’s somewhat haphazard 
approach to consultations with Inuit interests in the context of the sustainable 
use of marine mammals.
194   Reproduced at www.nammco.no.
195   In 2016 the NAMMCO Council adopted a set of Rules and Procedures for Observers, under 
which such status will be suspended for an observer that ‘engages in activities which are 
at odds with the NAMMCO Agreement’. While this appears primarily intended to discour-
age uncooperative personal behaviour at meetings, it may be mischievously speculated 
whether the EU’s position on seal hunting technically meets this requirement from the 
perspective of a number of NAMMCO participants.
196   (N. 147) 9.
197   Caddell (n. 150) 247–250; see also Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen, The EC Common 
Fisheries Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 383–385.
198   EU Import Ban on Seal Products Contrary to International Principles for Conservation and 
Sustainable Management, NAMMCO Statement of 2 September 2010.
199   NAMMCO, Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the NAMMCO Council (Tromsø, NAMMCO, 
2008) 20.
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4 Concluding Remarks
The position of marine mammals remains one of the more complicated 
elements of the international regulation of marine living resources. In an era 
of profound change in the High North, the harvesting and consumption of 
whales and seals continues to form an integral part of the culture, society and 
diet of many Arctic indigenous communities. Despite popular support for the 
preservation of these ancient ways of life, it is equally clear that the killing of 
charismatic marine mammals provokes significant concerns within Western 
societies, often resulting in legislative and policy responses that have a pro-
pensity to cause inadvertent harm to indigenous interests. Few current issues 
have illustrated this complicated regulatory dichotomy more explicitly than 
the purported regulation of marine mammals by the EU, which has exposed 
significant challenges both in governing the presence of particular products 
within the internal market, as well as advancing wider policy objectives at an 
international level.
In this regard, the various provisions on seal hunting have greatly under-
mined the EU’s aspirations and credentials for a significant partnership role 
within the Arctic. While the EU has acted peremptorily in a number of instances 
to impose market restrictions upon particular animal products deemed mor-
ally objectionable, notably to protect particular species200 or to promote 
improved trapping standards, few such provisions have provoked the sustained 
political and legal backlash precipitated by the EU Seal Regime. The initial EEC 
seal pup pelt ban severely hampered the global market for seal products and 
damaged Inuit interests in a manner that raised sharp questions as to whether 
the Community genuinely understood the unique socio-economic conditions 
of the Arctic.201 These concerns have been compounded by the seal products 
ban, which has proved to be insufficiently nuanced to protect Inuit enterprises 
and has led to a saga of highly damaging litigation that has reflected poorly 
upon the EU as a regulatory authority and harmed its wider interests among 
Arctic governance structures. In this context, the various iterations of the seal 
legislation can be considered to have clearly failed to meet the EU’s stated 
objectives for the Arctic: traditional livelihoods have suffered greatly as a 
result of the ban, for which the social and cultural ramifications remain poorly 
200   See, for instance, the comparatively more obscure Regulation (EC) No 1523/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 banning the placing on 
the market and the import to, or export from, the Community of cat and dog fur, and 
products containing such fur [2007] OJ L 343/1.
201   Wenzel (n. 16) 129.
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understood, while these provisions have contributed little to promote sustain-
able development, to engage the native population or to enhance multilateral 
governance in the region.
At an international level, the EU’s policies towards the whaling interests 
of indigenous peoples exhibits tentative promise that it may have a valuable 
partnership role to play within the Arctic. Indeed the EU has proved to be a 
key constituency in the promotion of subsistence whaling rights, helping to 
secure aboriginal quotas within the IWC—but essentially on its own terms, 
using its powerful bloc vote to veto purported allocations from particular stocks. 
In this manner, while indigenous interests (especially those of Greenland) 
have benefitted from accepting the EU’s interpretation of aboriginal whaling 
entitlements, a number of adverse consequences have also been apparent 
for the IWC itself: Inuit hunters have been forced to adopt unilateral quotas 
when outvoted, there has been a marked deterioration in the transparency of 
quota allocations due to the prior elaboration of package deals and the issue 
of ASW has become increasingly polarized in recent years. Of greater concern 
from the perspective of Arctic constituents is the steadfast refusal of the EU to 
engage meaningfully with the notion of sustainable hunting, which remains 
key to the management ideals of the High North, while there is little evidence 
to suggest that the significant expertise concerning the sustainable use of 
marine mammals aggregated within NAMMCO will exert any material influence 
over the future trajectory of the EU’s marine mammal policies. Consequently, 
there is likely to be limited consideration of sustainable use as a distinct man-
agement concept in subsequent approaches by the EU towards marine mam-
mals, which leaves the Community vulnerable to similar regulatory missteps 
as experienced in the seal context, and to wider criticisms that it still does not 
fully appreciate the unique governance conditions of the Arctic. Moreover, as 
with an increasing number of regulatory issues affecting the High North, ques-
tions have been raised as to whether the EU has genuinely adopted an Arctic-
centric approach, or whether such matters have been advanced on an ad hoc 
basis with little coordination with wider policy objectives for this region.202 Its 
treatment of marine mammals to date suggests that the EU has largely main-
tained a single-issue focus and that broader policies towards such species have 
yet to be effectively integrated into its strategic objectives for the Arctic.
A series of regulatory challenges will continue to confront the EU in 
addressing marine mammals—and their consumers—in the Arctic. Chief 
among these will be repairing the damage inflicted upon Inuit communities 
202   Adam Stępién, ‘Internal Contradictions and External Anxieties: One Coherent Arctic 
Policy for the European Union (2015) 7 Yearbook of Polar Law 249, 280–281.
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by the seal products ban, not least in Canada where the sustained discrimina-
tory nature of these provisions has had a particularly significant impact, while 
Greenland remains deeply aggrieved by the effects of this legislation upon 
traditional livelihoods. This has already significantly undermined the EU’s 
aspirations for observer status within the Arctic Council, which appears to 
be contingent upon progress towards a more sympathetic treatment of seal 
products.203 In connection with this, a deeper conceptual question is raised 
by the increasingly commercial nature of the hunting of marine mammals, 
which has been exposed both by the seal litigation and ongoing difficulties 
in regulating ASW within the IWC. The threshold by which a subsistence hunt 
will graduate to a commercial activity—and the regulatory consequences 
thereto—raises challenging questions of the current system, but will increas-
ingly require further consideration. Ultimately, however, an effective treat-
ment of these delicate issues is likely to require a more nuanced appreciation 
of Arctic conditions, as well as greater restraints on EU unilateralism, than has 
previously been applied in the specific context of marine mammals.
203   Indeed the Nuuk Observer Rules of 2011 expressly addressed the issue of seals: see further 
Piotr Graczyk and Timo Koivurova, ‘A New Era in the Arctic Council’s External Relations? 
Broader Consequences of the Nuuk Observer Rules for Arctic Governance?’ (2014) 50 
Polar Record 225.
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Joint Approaches and Best Practices—An 
Integrated and Coherent EU Arctic Policy in 
Support of Articles 208 and 214 UNCLOS
Henning Jessen
1 Introduction: A Principle-Fuelled Integrated Arctic Policy of the 
European Union
Key principles of international environmental law have gradually been inte-
grated into the European Treaties, above all, into the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) itself.1 In order to focus on the Arctic relevance of 
some EU legal acts, this first section provides a short overview of internation-
ally accepted legal principles of marine environmental law and the applicable 
EU law, which is generally more progressive in substance as compared to a 
number of other legal orders.
In a 2016 Joint Communication, the European Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy reiter-
ated that “the EU is well placed to shape international ocean governance on 
the basis of its experience in developing sustainable ocean management”.2 
This introductory section shall clarify the kind of “experience in developing 
sustainable ocean management” the Joint Communication refers to. Generally, 
just like in any other regulatory field, the EU applies its own unique legal 
instruments, in particular, secondary legislation imposed on its Members in 
* Henning Jessen, Associate Professor for Maritime Law & Policy, World Maritime University 
(WMU), Malmö, Sweden.
** This contribution partly draws from the author’s article ‘The EU’s Offshore Oil and Gas 
Directive (2013/30/EU) and Arctic Governance: Does Regulatory Activity of Third Parties 
Have Any Impact?’ (2016) 2 OGEL (Oil, Gas and Energy Law, Special Issue on Emerging 
Issues in Polar Energy Law and Governance) <www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=3609> accessed 
1 November 2016.
1   Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) OJ 
C306/50.
2   Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: International ocean governance: an 
agenda for the future of our oceans (2016) Brussels, JOIN (2016) 49 final, 4.
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accordance with Article 288 TFEU. This legislation takes the form of legally 
binding Regulations and more flexible Directives to further the EU’s primary 
policy objectives. For example, in 2005, as part of the EU’s overall “Integrated 
Maritime Policy”, the Commission proposed the adoption of a Directive to 
implement a broad thematic strategy—the Marine Strategy Framework3— 
to address marine pollution through a long-term programme of diagnosis 
and action carried out by competent authorities in the Member States and 
under European regional seas conventions. The continuously evolving EU 
Arctic policy is a good example for the inclusion of a global environmental 
policy dimension in EU instruments as advocated since 2008 by the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive, which represents the environmental pillar of 
the EU’s “Integrated Maritime Policy”.4 While the Directive does not address 
specifically the environmental impacts of maritime transport, Arctic matters 
or other uses of the sea, it has served as a catalyst for governance mechanisms, 
which, over time, generate new EU actions having direct implications for any 
marine-related sector. As such, it promotes and applies several internationally- 
accepted environmental principles, such as:
– the principle of sustainable development,5
– the principle of environmental integration,
– the precautionary principle,6
3   Directive 2008/56/EC establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine 
environmental policy, (2008) OJ L164/19; see generally Till Markus/Sabine Schlacke/Nina 
Maier, ‘Legal Implementation of Integrated Ocean Policies: The EU’s Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive’, (2011) 26 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 59–90; 
Ronán Long, ‘The Marine Strategy Framework Directive: A new European approach to the 
regulation of the marine environment, marine natural resources and marine ecological ser-
vices’, (2011) 29 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 1–44.
4   See Recital (7) of Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC 
(2013) OJ L 178/66.
5   See generally Ronán Long, ‘Principles and Normative Trends in EU Ocean Governance’, in 
Clive Schofield/Seokwoo Lee/Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, 
Boston/Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 2014, 699–726, at 716.
6   The precautionary principle requires States to take measures to protect the environment 
where there is evidence of serious environmental damage even if scientific certainty is 
lacking, see Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law, Brill Nijhoff 
2007, 204. Historically, the principle is set out in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, adopted at the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, (1992) 31 ILM 874 <http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm> accessed 1 November 2016.
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– the polluter pays principle,7 and
– the ecosystem approach.8
In addition, Article 191(2) TFEU provides that the EU’s policy on the environ-
ment shall contribute to the pursuit of a number of objectives, including the 
precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle.9 However, Article 
191(2) TFEU refers explicitly only to “the regions of the Union”. In particular, 
the first sentence of Article 191(4) TFEU postulates that, “within their respec-
tive spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States shall cooper-
ate with third countries and with the competent international organisations”. 
The EU is cautious not to give an outside impression of being a self-appointed 
global environmental regulator and the direct effect of EU legal measures is, 
consequently, generally confined to the EU itself. Nevertheless, explicit intra- 
EU endorsements of principles of international environmental law—as 
also confirmed on various occasions by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union10—are of fundamental legal importance. They are especially relevant 
for the intra-EU persuasiveness of the European Commission’s actions in 
performing its multiple functions of being the guardian of the EU Treaties, 
the EU’s primary executive organ and the most active policy-proposing and 
agenda-setting EU institution.
Given the transboundary nature of the marine environment and given 
the original roots of the EU’s emerging Arctic policy, strict territorial and 
“aquitorial”11 confinement is not particularly helpful in implementation of 
efficient international environmental rules. This also explains why the EU 
7    See, for example, Ling Zhu, ‘Is the Polluter Paying for Vessel-Source Pollution?’ (2015) 
Journal of Business Law, 348.
8    All applicable principles have been discussed in the context of the EU’s Integrated 
Maritime Policy by Long, n. 4 above 699–726.
9    The provision states that: “Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of 
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preven-
tive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified 
at source and that the polluter should pay.”
10   See, for example, Case 240/83 Procureur de la Republique v ADBHU (1985) ECR 531; Case 
C-379/92 Re Peralta (1994) ECR I-3453; Case T-13/99 Pfizer v European Commission (2002) 
ECR II-3305.
11   The term aquitorial relates to the territorial sea as defined in Article 3 (et seq.) of UNCLOS 
but not, however, to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or the Continental Shelf regime 
as also regulated by UNCLOS.
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evaluated its own Arctic carbon footprint in 2010.12 In the wider context, 
including climate change and the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG), it has even been argued that if the EU could show that it enforces 
stricter environmental rules to protect (inter alia) the Arctic environment 
as compared to the Arctic littoral States, this could also increase the EU’s 
legitimacy and its political influence on Arctic environmental questions.13 In 
any case, such steps confirm the general policy objectives of Article 11 TFEU, 
which broadly states that, “environmental protection requirements must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and 
activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.”
In sum, since 2005, the EU has followed a long-term, principle-fuelled and 
goal-based marine environmental policy. In seeking to achieve “good environ-
mental status” of marine waters by 2020, the EU is fully aware of the fact that 
it cannot create legal obligations for third (non-EU) parties. However, both the 
sustainability approach and the cooperative elements of the EU’s marine envi-
ronmental policy have a global dimension, extending to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction and thus far beyond the formal territorial and “aquitorial” bound-
aries of the EU itself to include areas such as the Arctic region.14
2 Arctic Governance and Intensifying Political Efforts of the EU
From a historic viewpoint, it has been argued that the EU’s initial interest 
in developing its own Arctic Policy has been largely motivated by geopoliti-
cal considerations, in particular by Russia planting its flag on the sea bottom 
beneath the North Pole on 1 August 2007.15 It is true that this unilateral sym-
bolic act (also largely geared towards the global media and allegedly privately 
sponsored) coincides with the EU beginnings to evaluate its own political 
stance in the Arctic more systematically since 2007–2008. However, it also 
12   ‘EU Arctic footprint and policy assessment: Final report’ (2010, Berlin, Ecologic Institute); 
see also Kristine Offerdal, ‘The EU in the Arctic’ (2011) International Journal 861, 872.
13   See Offerdal, n. 12 above, at 872.
14   Although associated with the EU Member State Denmark, it must be stressed that (since 
1 February 1985) Greenland is not part of the EU (then EEC) territory anymore, following 
the results of a referendum of 1982. Rather it is included in the list of overseas countries 
and territories set out in Annex II to the TFEU. In accordance with Article 198 TFEU, the 
purpose of the association of the overseas countries and territories with the EU is to pro-
mote the economic and social development of the overseas countries and territories and 
to establish close economic relations between them and the EU as a whole.
15   See Offerdal, n. 12, 863.
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overlaps with the EU highlighting its own responsibilities in global environ-
mental matters and specifying its own Integrated Maritime Policy in more 
detail, for example, by passing the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, as 
discussed above. In fact, the reasons for the EU Commission to deploy more 
manpower on Arctic issues since 2007/2008 are multi-layered and composed 
of a number of different political motivations.16 At the forefront of those EU 
motives are issues commonly associated with the buzzword sustainable devel-
opment, in particular relating to global climate change, as well as other envi-
ronmental concerns.
The emerging EU Arctic policy itself is made up of a continuously evolv-
ing network of “soft law” instruments:17 The Foreign Affairs Council passed 
Council conclusions in 2009,18 in 201419 and in 2016.20 Generally, EU Council 
conclusions are non-binding political instruments. However, a series of official 
Council conclusions will often pave the way for future legally-binding intra-EU 
instruments. If the Commission can refer to a series of “bottom up” Council 
conclusions the desire to enter into a new “hardened” phase of EU policy 
integration gets more and more persuasive. Remarkably, the title of the Arctic-
related conclusions developed from merely addressing an incoherent variety 
of “Arctic Issues” in 2009 to a more institutionalized “Developing a European 
Union Policy towards the Arctic Region” in 2014. This may reflect a gradual for-
mulation of a policy on Arctic issues to address EU interests and responsibili-
ties. In particular, paragraph 6 of the 2014 Council conclusions recognised “the 
efforts of the Arctic states to develop joint approaches and best practice to 
address the potential environmental impact and safety concerns related to in-
creasing activities in the region” calling for a strengthened collaboration of the 
EU and its agencies with Arctic Council bodies in addressing “common Arctic 
16   See Offerdal, n. 12, 861–877, who does not deny the EU’s multi-purpose approach to the 
Arctic and specifically stresses the changing role of Norway in first motivating the EU in a 
proactive way (to discover the Arctic at all as a dormant policy area) while later having to 
slow down the Commission and taking a more defensive approach.
17   All EU instruments discussed below are available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/
maritimeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/arctic_ocean/index_en.htm> accessed 1 November 
2016.
18   Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Arctic issues (2009) 2985th 
Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels. On the substance of these Council conclusions see 
Offerdal, n. 12, 871.
19   Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on developing a European Union 
Policy towards the Arctic Region (2014) Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels.
20   Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the Arctic (2016) (Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting, Brussels).
 347Joint Approaches and Best Practices
challenges”. However, in 2016, the coordinated position of the Commission and 
the EU Member States was reduced in ambition and substance. These conclu-
sions merely reiterated issues raised and addressed by the preceding Council 
conclusions.
2012 and 2016 witnessed the publications of two more, ambitious, Joint 
Communications by the European Commission and the High Representative 
of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security.21 In contrast to EU Council con-
clusions, a Joint Communication (and also a Communication issued solely 
by the Commission) does not reflect a coordinated approach between the EU 
Commission, other participating EU institutions and the EU Member States. 
Rather, a Communication represents a vision of its originator(s) setting out 
the details for the most important cornerstones of a certain EU policy area. It 
has been rightly pointed out that sometimes such documents are mistaken for 
representing official positions of the EU as a whole.22 However, this is not the 
case and this is also a reason why Communications can be far more extensive 
and detailed in nature as compared to Council conclusions.
The 2012 Arctic Joint Communication was built on a broader 2008 joint 
paper (from the same originators) on climate change and international 
security23 and on an earlier 2008 Commission Communication on “the EU 
and the Arctic Region”.24 The 2012 Joint Communication included a total 
of 28 action points adopting the strapline of “knowledge, responsibility, 
engagement”.25 In particular, the 2012 Arctic Joint Communication stressed 
the considerable financial engagement and contribution of the EU to Arctic 
research and the EU’s support for a sustainable use and management of 
Arctic resources. The document avoided addressing politically contentious 
issues (such as the earlier idea of creating a new Arctic Treaty System). The 
2016 Joint Communication builds on its 2012 predecessor, stressing that 
the EU’s primary objective is an “integrated” policy for the Arctic, which also 
21   Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Developing a 
European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps 
(2012) Brussels, JOIN (2012) 19 final; Joint Communication to the European Parliament 
and the Council: An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (2016) Brussels, JOIN 
(2016) 21 final.
22   See Offerdal, n. 12, 862.
23   Climate change and international security, Paper from the High Representative and the 
European Commission to the European Council (2008) S113/08.
24   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The 
European Union and the Arctic Region (2008) Brussels, COM (2008) 763 final.
25   See Jason Chuah, ‘The Development of an EU Arctic Policy? Perhaps Not …’ (2012) 18 
Journal of International Maritime Law, 251–252.
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ensures effective synergies between the various EU funding instruments in the 
Arctic region. That is also why “knowledge, responsibility, engagement” are still 
the three cornerstones of an integrated EU Arctic Policy which will highlight, 
in the future, three key further policy objectives of the EU to
 • protect and preserve the Arctic environment in cooperation with the people 
who live there, and in particular relating to climate change,
 • promote sustainable use of resources in and around the Arctic, and
 • foster international cooperation on Arctic issues, emphasizing enhanced 
scientific cooperation.26
Finally, the European Parliament passed relevant (non-binding) Resolutions, 
in particular, an Arctic-specific Resolution of 201427 which is based on a 
broader Resolution of 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for the High North.28 In 
sum, the continuously intensified effort of the EU to establish a fully-fledged 
Arctic strategy has not yet led to any EU hard law (in the form of Directives or 
even directly binding Regulations). Rather, the evolving EU policy highlights, 
more and more, the necessity of integrating different policy aspects, such as 
scientific research, climate mitigation and adaptation strategies or sustainable 
innovation and investment, in a more coherent way. This political process is 
characterized by a visible shift from an initial EU approach, which was more 
focussed on geopolitics, to a more innovation-centred and research-related 
attitude. For example, the EU has devoted financial resources to create and 
develop Arctic observatory networks, and to facilitate access to research facili-
ties in the Arctic to scientists from Europe and beyond. This is done by fund-
ing projects such as INTERACT, a multi-disciplinary network of 58 land-based 
Arctic and northern research stations, building capacity throughout the Arctic 
for environmental monitoring, research, education and outreach.29 The EU 
is also initiating a new five-year project (2016–2021) coordinated by Norway 
to develop an Integrated Arctic Observing System (INTAROS)30 and two new 
26   Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated 
European Union policy for the Arctic, Brussels (2016), JOIN (2016) 21 final, 4.
27   European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic 
(2013/2595 (RSP)).
28   European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on a sustainable EU policy for the High 
North (2009/2214 (INI)).
29   <http://www.eu-interact.org/> accessed 1 November 2016.
30   The INTAROS project will involve scientists in 14 European countries as well as in a num-
ber of countries elsewhere in the world and has a €15.5 million budget.
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projects to understand the impact of the changing Arctic on the weather and 
climate of the Northern Hemisphere. The projects APPLICATE (Advanced 
Prediction in Polar Regions and Beyond: Modelling, Observing System Design 
and Linkages Associated with a Changing Arctic Climate) (2016–2020, €8 mil-
lion budget) and Blue-Action (2016–2021, €7.5 million budget) will involve sci-
entists in 13 European countries as well as in a number of countries elsewhere 
in the world.31
All in all, the evolving integrated EU Arctic policy addresses the whole 
spectrum of practical measures to promote the sustainable use of Arctic 
resources. A reply given by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign 
Affairs and Security on behalf of the Commission to a question of a Member of 
the European Parliament can serve as a “diplomatic showcase” for the state 
of EU affairs in Arctic matters. In 2014, the parliamentarian simply asked (inter 
alia): “Does the EU have specific interests in the Arctic region?”32 The writ-
ten reply of the High Representative explicitly referred to the 2012 Arctic Joint 
Communication and to the other EU soft law instruments. It stressed that the 
EU would be stepping up its engagement with its partners, under the Joint 
Communication’s notion of “knowledge, responsibility, engagement”, to jointly 
meet the challenge of safeguarding the environment while ensuring the sus-
tainable and peaceful development of the Arctic region, in particular through 
investment in knowledge, promoting responsible approaches to arising com-
mercial opportunities and constructive engagement with Arctic partners.
The question then becomes: Where should the EU pursue these policies? 
With which partners should it cooperate? The obvious location would appear 
to be with the Arctic Council. From a global perspective, the Arctic Council is 
the key international policy coordination forum in Arctic matters.33 Recent 
discussions about its continuous enlargement in relation to its governmental, 
31   <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/28/fact-sheet-united-states-
hosts-first-ever-arctic-science-ministerial> accessed 1 November 2016.
32   See: Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the 
Commission, 24 June 2014 “Question for written answer E-002847/14 to the Commission”, 
S.P.F. Silvestris (PPE), “Subject: The race for the Arctic: European prospects” (11 March 
2014), OJ 2014/C 326/01 (written questions by Members of the European Parliament and 
their answers given by a European Union institution).
33   See generally on the Arctic Council, for example, Betsy Baker, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development in the Arctic: What the Arctic Council and International Law Can—
and Cannot—Do’, (2013) ASIL Proceedings, 275–279; Lilly Weidemann, International 
Governance of the Arctic Marine Environment (Springer International Publishing, 2014), 
49; Svein Vigeland Rottem, ‘A Note on the Arctic Council Agreements’, (2015) 46 Ocean 
Development & International Law, 50–59; Olav Schram Stokke, ‘International institutions 
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intergovernmental and non-governmental “non-Arctic” recurring observers 
demonstrate the political willingness of various third-party stakeholders to 
participate more actively in emerging Arctic governance.34 Quite naturally, 
this political process of continuous “procedural enlargement” includes the EU, 
which has—on various occasions—already been an ad hoc observer to Arctic 
Council meetings. Although it is not yet among the list of accepted recurring 
(“non ad hoc”) observers to the Arctic Council—in contrast to more than 
30 other stakeholders—this is likely to be only a temporary, diplomatic side 
note.35 Despite this, it appears prudent for the EU to look for alternative routes 
to influence the development of policies relating to the Arctic. In the following 
sections, the EU’s regulation of Arctic offshore operations is discussed as an 
example of how its regulation can—at least potentially—generate both inter-
nal and external policy ramifications in a particular regulatory area with or 
without cooperation with the Arctic Council.
3 A Regulatory Example: The EU’s Offshore Directive and its  
“Arctic Relevance”
By 2011, the European Commission had warned that the likelihood of a major 
offshore accident in European waters remained “unacceptably high” refer-
ring to 14 past major accidents—globally—in offshore oil and gas operations 
since the 1980s (for example, well blow-outs and total loss of production 
platforms).36 In response to the “wake up call” of the 2010 “Deepwater Horizon” 
disaster37 and—less prominently, also as a reaction to the 2009 Montara oil 
and Arctic governance’, in Olav Schram Stokke, Geir Hønneland (eds), International 
Cooperation and Arctic Governance (Routledge, 2007), 164–184.
34   As of 2016, there were twelve non-Arctic States, nine Intergovernmental and Inter-
Parliamentary Organizations and eleven Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with 
recurring observer status in the Arctic Council. It can be expected that this list is will be 
extended in the years to come.
35   The Arctic Council received the application of the EU for observer status affirmatively, 
but deferred a final decision on implementation until the Council Ministers agree by con-
sensus, with the understanding that the EU may observe Council proceedings until such 
time as the Council acts on the application, see “Roadmaps for international coopera-
tion”, Commission Staff Working Document (2014) Brussels, SWD (2014) 276 final, at 15.
36   See European Commission Press Release (2011) IP/11/1260, 1.
37   See generally: Melissa K. Merry, Framing Environmental Disaster—Environmental 
Advocacy and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, (Routledge, 2014), 77; Sergei Vinogradov, 
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spill38—the Commission prepared legislative action in this policy area. One 
of the reasons for this initiative was also the fact that—since “Deepwater 
Horizon”—the tolerance of the general public for environmental damage had 
reached an all-time low.39 The intra-EU conciliation efforts finally resulted in 
Directive 2013/30/EU.
Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations, entered 
into force on 18 July 2013 and rests on the broad foundation of Article 191 
TFEU.40 It is explicitly based on the EU’s long-term sustainability objectives, as 
stressed by the Marine Strategy Framework Directive.41 In particular, it aims 
to address “the cumulative impacts from all activities on the marine environ-
ment”, and seeks to establish “the linking of particular concerns from each 
economic sector with the general aim of ensuring a comprehensive under-
standing of the oceans, seas and coastal areas, with the objective of developing 
a coherent approach to the seas taking into account all economic, environ-
mental and social aspects (…)”.42
The Directive is a complex legal act of 44 Articles and nine Annexes. 
Highlighting first some of the general administrative requirements, the act 
mandates the EU Member States to introduce or update legal rules on different 
levels such as:
‘The Impact of the Deepwater Horizon: The Evolving International Legal Regime for 
Offshore Accidental Pollution Prevention, Preparedness, and Response’ (2013) 44 Ocean 
Development & International Law, 335–362; Greg Gordon, ‘The Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster: the Regulatory Response in the United Kingdom and Europe’, in Richard 
Caddell/Rhidian Thomas (eds), Shipping, Law and the Marine Environment in the 21st 
Century: Emerging Challenges for the Law of the Sea—Legal Implications and Liabilities 
(Lawtext Publishing Ltd., 2013), 181–210.
38   See Stephen Tromans, ‘Pollution from Offshore Rigs and Installations’ in Bariş Soyer and 
Andrew Tettenborn (eds), Offshore Contracts and Liabilities (Informa Law, 2014), 253, 257.
39   See Interview with Eero Ailio, Deputy Head of Unit Retail Markets, Coal and Oil at the 
European Commission: <http://www.dnv.com/industry/oil_gas/publications/updates/
Oil_and_Gas_Update/2013/02_2013/Preventing_major_offshore_accidents_in_Europe 
.asp> accessed 1 November 2016.
40   See Recital (1) of Directive 2013/30/EU, n. 4.
41   See Recital (6) of Directive 2013/30/EU, n. 4, stating that “(…) By reducing the risk of pol-
lution of offshore waters, this Directive should therefore contribute to ensuring the pro-
tection of the marine environment and in particular to achieving or maintaining good 
environmental status by 2020 at the latest, an objective set out (by the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive)”.
42   See Recital (7) of Directive 2013/30/EU, n. 4.
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 • independence and objectivity of the competent authority within each EU 
Member State ensuring it has adequate human and financial resources;
 • efficient and early public participation in decisions regarding potential off-
shore oil and gas exploration operations on the environment;
 • participation of the employees in matters affecting safety and human health 
at work;43
 • warranties and continued verifications of comprehensive concepts on envi-
ronmental management and of preventing major accidents by operators/
owners;44
 • updated documentary obligations of the owners/operators to be verified by 
the competent authority;
 • the formulation and continuous improvement of norms and strategies to 
prevent major accidents, in particular, analysis of causes of accidents;
 • the introduction of coordinated internal and external emergency response 
plans and transboundary cooperation;
 • international exchange of information and public transparency.
According to Recital (17) of the Directive, “within the (EU), there are already 
examples of good standards in national regulatory practices relating to offshore 
oil and gas operations. However, these are inconsistently applied throughout 
the (EU) and no Member State has yet incorporated all of the best regulatory 
practices in its legislation for preventing major accidents or limiting the con-
sequences for human life and health, and for the environment.” Consequently, 
the Directive seeks to introduce and to serve as a catalyst for implementing 
those best regulatory practices, necessary to deliver effective regulation, which 
secures the highest safety standards and protects the environment. Thus, the 
Directive supports the view that internationally-accepted standards are needed 
to help ensure safe, environmentally responsible, and effective oil and gas op-
erations since these help establish performance requirements and to main-
stream best practices.45
43   See Gordon, n. 37 above, at 207.
44   The term “operator” is legally defined in Article 2(5) of the Directive as “the entity 
appointed by the licensee or licensing authority to conduct offshore oil and gas opera-
tions, including planning and executing a well operation or managing and controlling 
the functions of a production installation”. The term “owner” is legally defined in Article 
2(27) of the Directive as meaning “an entity legally entitled to control the operation of a 
non-production installation.”
45   See Stephen Green, Paul Steenhof and Brian Walsh, ‘Development of Operational 
Standards for Arctic Oil and Gas Operations’ (2014) Oceans—St. John’s, 1, 3 (DOI: 10.1109/
OCEANS.2014.7003107).
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Moreover, the Directive has also introduced a legal obligation of regulatory 
cooperation and it includes some provisions on offshore oil and gas operations 
outside of the EU. This is particularly important in the context of this paper 
because the Directive also has some “Arctic Relevance”. The act is inter alia 
intended to serve as a future “diplomatic tool” for the EU to further promote 
the highest standards of offshore safety globally, sharing best practices and 
improving standards in cooperation with third countries, with a particular 
emphasis on sensitive sea areas, such as the Arctic. In this context, Recital (52) 
and Article 33(3) of the Directive addresses matters of possible significance for 
Arctic governance.
On the policy level, Recital (52) of the Directive classifies the Arctic waters 
as “a neighbouring marine environment of particular importance for the EU” 
which plays an important role in mitigating climate change. As a result, the 
serious environmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters would require 
“special attention to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic in 
relation to any offshore oil and gas operation, including exploration, taking 
into account the risk of major accidents and the need for effective response”. 
After that, Recital (52) specifically addresses Denmark, Finland and Sweden as 
concomitant EU/Arctic Council Member States, encouraging them in particu-
lar “to actively promote the highest standards with regard to environmental 
safety in this vulnerable and unique ecosystem, such as through the creation 
of international instruments on prevention, preparedness and response to 
Arctic marine oil pollution, and through building, inter alia, on the work of the 
Task Force established by the Arctic Council and the existing Arctic Council 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines.”46
On the material level of legal obligations, Article 33 of the Directive intro-
duces three sub-provisions on a “coordinated approach towards the safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations at the international level”. The provision specifi-
cally authorizes the European Commission
1. to promote cooperation with third countries that undertake offshore oil 
and gas operations in the same marine regions as Member States,
2. to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States with 
offshore oil and gas operations and adjacent third countries with similar 
operations in order to promote preventive measures and regional emer-
gency response plans, and
46   The 2009 guidelines are available online <http://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/
offshore-oil-and-gas> accessed 1 November 2016.
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3. to promote high safety standards for offshore oil and gas operations at 
the international level in relevant global and regional fora, including 
those relating to Arctic waters.
Although, only Article 33(1) of the Directive includes explicit references to 
internal “close cooperation” of the Commission with the EU Members “with-
out prejudice to relevant international agreements”, it is clear that intensified 
intra-EU cooperation and observance of the relevant international agreements 
by the European Commission is anticipated throughout the Directive. For 
example, EU Directive 2013/30/EU refers eleven times to “best practices and 
standards”. Thus, the act acknowledges that the safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations is governed by a set of rules which are often drafted and substan-
tiated by private business actors and which regularly follow a performance-
based approach rather than being based on more inflexible (governmentally 
imposed) prescriptive requirements.47 A good example of relevant standards 
is found in the work of the International Standardization Organization 
(ISO). One of its specialized committees, Committee ISO/TC 67 on Materials, 
Equipment and Offshore Structures for Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural 
Gas Industries, has already developed close to 200 globally applicable business 
standards for the offshore oil and gas industry. In 2012, a new Sub-Committee 
on Arctic Operations (ISO TC 67/SC8) was formed. It followed up with “ISO 
19906:2010” which had successfully established Arctic design standards for 
material, equipment, and offshore structures. ISO TC 67/SC8 has established 
seven further expert working groups on the technical working level to address 
questions going beyond the design of offshore structures.48 The aim of the 
ISO TC 67/SC8 is nothing less than the “standardization of operations associ-
ated with exploration, production and processing of hydrocarbons in onshore 
and offshore Arctic regions, and other locations characterized by low ambient 
temperatures and the presence of ice, snow, and/or permafrost”. As a result, 
completely new standards for offshore oil and gas operations in cold climate 
47   This topic is also discussed by Myron H. Nordquist and Aimee Fausser, ‘Offshore Drilling 
in the Outer Continental Shelf: International Best Practices and Safety Standards in the 
Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill’, in Michael W. Lodge and Myron 
H. Nordquist (eds), Peaceful Order in the World’s Oceans (Brill Academic Publishers, 2014), 
115–145.
48   Green, Steenhof & Walsh, n. 45 above.
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regions are being developed, thus potentially closing a gap in the international 
standards landscape.49
Nevertheless, a remaining weakness is that there is insufficient coordina-
tion of existing best practices and standards across institutions. This results in 
a patchwork of rules. The Arctic Council’s guidelines, for example, are based on 
the same environmental principles and concepts and could possibly be inte-
grated with the works of the ISO,50 but this is yet to happen. For example, the 
approach of the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group 
(PAME)51 aims to improve the safety culture in the oil and gas industry where 
a huge gap between theory and practice still exists.52 The PAME working group 
on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management meets twice a year to assess the 
progress made and to develop its work plans. Its 2009 Arctic Offshore Oil and 
Gas Guidelines stressed in particular that: “Good and transparent governance, 
comprehensive but responsive regulatory regimes, and the use of internation-
al standards and practices coupled with evolving advances in technology and 
best practices have lessened the effects of oil and gas activities over time, 
including those in the offshore. But risks may arise as conditions change or new 
areas are explored and developed and evidence also shows that accidents will 
happen and best practices will not always be followed. Governments should 
continue to ensure that best practices, including oil spill response mecha-
nisms, are in place before activities begin.”53
Moreover, the Working Group’s 2014 Report on “Systems Safety Management 
and Safety Culture” included a whole section on regulatory regimes and stan-
dards, stressing, in particular, Arctic standards and best practices.54 This 
report has also identified nine key Arctic safety elements and applies those 
safety elements in relation to the regulatory requirements for Norway, Canada, 
49   See <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid= 
652790> accessed 1 November 2016.
50   On the application of general environmental principles by the Arctic Council see Baker, 
n. 33 above, at 276.
51   See <http://www.pame.is/> accessed 1 November 2016.
52   Lloyd’s List of 29 September 2015, ‘Safety issue under-reporting ‘endemic’, offshore report 
finds’.
53   Available online at <http://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/offshore-oil-and-gas> 
accessed 1 November 2016, at p. 8.
54   At 11–14, available online at <http://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/offshore-oil-and-
gas/systems-safety-management-and-safety-culture> accessed 1 November 2016.
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Greenland and the United States.55 Notably, Russia is missing in this compara-
tive analysis as conducted by the Arctic Council working group. Thus, the regu-
latory picture is still not complete. However, in contrast to the Arctic Council 
working group, Russia is actively present at the ISO and has even taken on a 
leading role in the follow-up to the “Barents 2020” project which was initially 
(from 2007) a bilateral Russian-Norwegian project with the aim of assessing 
the standards needed for safeguarding people, environment and asset values 
in the Barents Sea.56
There is, therefore, potential for more institutionalized ways of cooperation 
to agree on international standards to be developed and for better coordina-
tion of those standards. There are examples of how such cooperation and coor-
dination may work. For example, the European Committee for Standardization 
(CEN) has cooperated generally with the ISO under the framework of the 
Vienna Agreement since 1991.57 The Vienna Agreement provides a framework 
for continuous technical cooperation between CEN and ISO, including regular 
exchanges of information, mutual representation at meetings, and a parallel 
adoption of standards at European and international levels. The existing coop-
eration between CEN and ISO has yet to be translated to the Arctic context in 
the future. In sum, there is scope and potential to bring some of these regula-
tions together in a more coherent way.
In any case, the finalization of the work of ISO TC 67/SC8 will contribute 
to ensuring safer and more effective Arctic oil and gas operations while also 
ensuring the protection of the environment and the people working and liv-
ing in the region. Probably, the biggest advantage of successfully drafting ISO 
standards for Arctic offshore oil and gas operations is the fact that it would 
be possible to reference those standards in future regulations or guidelines by 
Arctic Council Members. Other national States and also the CEN (under the 
framework of the 1991 Vienna Convention) as well as EU secondary legislation 
could follow and a good start has been achieved by Directive 2013/30/EU.58 The 
EU could therefore continue with this route to influence offshore installations 
55   Ibid., Appendix A—Table A1 (Summary Table of Selected Safety Management Systems 
Regulatory Requirements for Norway, Canada, Greenland and the United States).
56   Barents 2020 Final Report 2009, Assessment of international standards for safe explora-
tion, production and transportation of oil and gas in the Barents Sea Harmonisation 
of Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection Standards for the Barents Sea, <http://
www.dnvusa.com/Binaries/Barents_2020_report_%20phase_3_tcm153‐519577.pdf> 
accessed 1 November 2016.
57   The text of the Vienna Agreement is available at <http://www.cencenelec.eu/intcoop/
StandardizationOrg/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 1 November 2016.
58   Green, Steenhof and Walsh, n. 45 above, at 6.
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activities in the Arctic. Indeed this route—involving indirect cooperation with 
the Arctic Council could prove more beneficial than attempting direct.
Alternative routes include influencing actions by EU national companies 
in the Arctic and influencing the development of legislation in other States. 
The first of these is provided for in the EU’s Offshore Directive discussed 
above. The directive has established a stringent and complex safety regime to 
bring the risk of EU-related offshore accidents down to an absolute minimum. 
It sets out clear—but nevertheless lengthy—rules covering the whole life-
cycle of all exploration and production operations from initial design to the 
final abandonment or decommissioning of platforms and rigs. The EU rec-
ognizes that “it may not be possible to enforce application of the corporate 
major accident prevention policy outside of the EU” (see Recital (38) of the 
Offshore Directive). However, as a result of Article 19(8) of the Directive, the EU 
Members will nevertheless ensure that operators and owners also have to 
include their offshore oil and gas operations outside of EU marine waters in 
their corporate major accident prevention policy documents. This is a com-
mendable step, as “backing out” for purely geographic reasons will not be tol-
erated by the European regulators at the national level. At some point of time, 
this provision might even apply to Arctic offshore operations of EU oil majors 
such as the Italian Eni SpA which began pumping in late 2015 at the Goliat oil 
field, an offshore oil field in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea.
The second can be seen in a recent study focussing on some identified 
weaknesses of the Brazilian offshore oil and gas safety regime specifically 
took the UK, Norway and the United States as possible legal role models for a 
future reform of the applicable domestic Brazilian rules.59 Remarkably, in 2015, 
the United States published proposed rules on exploratory drilling on the US. 
Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, which also added to an emerging patchwork of 
best practices of national regulators in this sensitive area.60 Just like the appli-
cable European regime(s) the US legislative proposal implemented a mixture 
of performance-based and prescriptive safety standards. Of course, the draft 
59   See Pietro A.S. Mendes, Jeremy Hall, Stelvia Matos and Bruno Silvestre, ‘Reforming Brazil’s 
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Regulatory Framework: Lessons from Norway, the United 
Kingdom and the United States’ (2014) 74 Energy Policy, 443–453; see also a description of 
a recent fatal offshore oil and gas accident in Brazilian waters: “Explosion Kills At Least 3 
at Petrobras Oil Platform”, <http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/explosion-kills-
at-least-3-at-petrobras-oil-platform> accessed 1 November 2016.
60   See: US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, 
30 CFR Parts 250 and 254, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 30 CFR Part 550, (2015) 
‘Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Requirements 
for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf; Proposed Rule’, Federal 
Register, vol. 80, No. 36, Part III.
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law made no explicit references to the law of foreign nations. Nevertheless, it 
could be tentatively inferred from recent literature that other national regimes 
had not been completely disregarded in the informal consultative process.61 
Additionally, the proposed rules addressed specifically some “multilateral-
ized” guidelines of the Arctic Council on Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas 
operations.62
4 Final Thoughts and Conclusions
The combined and coordinated rule standardization driven by multiple and 
largely different stakeholders including, inter alia,
– the eight Arctic Council Members,
– the (currently) 32 recurring observers of the Arctic Council,
– the EU as a unique legal entity,
– the International Standardization Organisation (ISO), possibly in coopera-
tion with the European Committee for Standardization (CEN)
– certain national regulators combined, such as the EUOAG,63 the NSOAF64 or 
the IRF65 and,
– industry associations, such as the International Oil and Gas Producers 
Association (OGP)66
should lead to a “race to the top” of international best practices and safety 
standards. This has already occurred, for example, as a result of implementing 
61   See, for example, Betsy Baker and Roman Sidortsov, ‘The Legal and Regulatory Regime for 
Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources in the U.S. Arctic’ (2014) <http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/environment_energy_resources/resources/energy_law_us_russia.html> accessed 
1 November 2016, see especially the concluding sentence of the paper: “Taking a critical 
and open look at how other Arctic countries address similar issues can help the United 
States improve its own laws and regulations and to take a leadership role in setting region-
appropriate standards for operations in the Arctic offshore.”
62   For example, the 2009 Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines of the Arctic Council and 
the 2014 Arctic Council Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines on Systems Safety Management 
and Safety Culture.
63   The EUOAG was established in 2012 with Commission Decision C 18/17 (2012) OJ C 18/8. It 
is formed by Member States’ authorities covering both offshore safety and related marine 
environmental protection, <http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/> accessed 1 November 2016.
64   <http://www.psa.no/nsoaf/category999.html> accessed 1 November 2016.
65   <http://www.irfoffshoresafety.com/> accessed 1 November 2016.
66   <http://www.iogp.org/Safety> accessed 1 November 2016.
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strict private vetting standards in the oil tanker industry. A real challenge, 
however, will be a more efficient and visible coordination of this multidimen-
sional race in implementation of Article 208 UNCLOS (“Pollution from seabed 
activities subject to national jurisdiction”) as well as Article 214 (“Enforcement 
with respect to pollution from seabed activities”). This will be a difficult task. 
Nevertheless, the fourth and fifth paragraph of Article 208 UNCLOS request 
the Members (including the EU) to “endeavour to harmonize their policies in 
this connection at the appropriate regional level” and “to establish global and 
regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to pre-
vent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment (…)”.
In academic literature, progressive calls have even been made suggesting 
a new UNCLOS implementation agreement relating to Article 208 and for 
international standards for offshore drilling.67 This is currently, however, far 
from practical reality. For example, there is still no “Arctic Offshore Regulators 
Forum” on the horizon (as proposed by the PAME working group in 2014). 
However, the ultimate advantages of such a forum and enhanced international 
standardization are quite clear. For example, gaps in the international stan-
dards landscape could be closed more efficiently. Second, more possibilities 
would be created to reference emerging or accepted international standards 
in national laws. This also includes easier methodology for updates via the 
built-in change process applicable to the international standards themselves. 
Finally, performance-based approaches could emanate even further as being 
more safety-efficient in comparison to more prescriptive, governmentally- 
imposed laws.
Mindful of the already existing multi-stakeholder coordination fora, it 
would nevertheless be a good development if UNCLOS Member States would 
recall that Articles 208, 214 UNCLOS do actually exist and that the provisions 
require a higher degree of harmonization and defragmentation in the 21st cen-
tury. A comprehensively standardized regulation of the offshore oil and gas 
industry operating in the Arctic and in other recognized particularly sensitive 
sea areas will be able to avoid the application of “sub-standards” in the absence 
of efficient enforcement by national (flag) States (a problem known in the 
shipping industry for some time).68 On the contrary, intensified coordination 
of international and national standards and enhanced international coopera-
tion could lead to better chances of higher safety standards and more efficient 
mitigation of remaining environmental risks.
67   See Nordquist and Fausser, n. 47 above, at 143.
68   See generally Jörn-Ahrend Witt, Obligations and Control of Flag States (Lit Verlag 2007), 
274.
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CHAPTER �3
Conclusion
Nengye Liu, Elizabeth A. Kirk and Tore Henriksen
1 Introduction
Although the Arctic territory of the EU (the European Arctic) was mentioned 
in the EU’s 2016 Arctic policy, it is fair to say the EU mainly sees the Arctic 
as an external affair. This is evidenced by the fact that the European External 
Action Service has been heavily involved in the formation of the EU’s Arctic 
policy. From the Arctic States’ perspective, the EU has always been seen as an 
external power to the region. It is clear from the Ilulissat Declaration that they 
believe that only the Arctic States, especially the five coastal States, should 
hold the stewardship of the Arctic.1 So what kind of power does the EU have in 
the Arctic?
The questions of the EU’s power in the Arctic should be seen in the con-
text of the wider “EU as a power” debate, which has been running for decades. 
Manners argues that the EU, owing to its particular historical evolution, its 
hybrid polity, and its constitutional configuration, has a normatively different 
basis for its external affairs than States do.2 Meanwhile, Damro believes that 
because it is fundamentally a large single market with significant institutional 
features and competing interest groups, the EU could be best understood 
as exercising its power through the externalization of economic and social 
market-related policies and regulatory measures.3 The Arctic has proved to 
be an interesting testing ground for the EU’s power which both illustrates the 
ways in which the EU wields power and provides some important lessons. In 
* Dr Nengye Liu, Senior Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide, Australia; Prof 
Elizabeth A. Kirk, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom; 
Prof Tore Henriksen, K.G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, UiT/Arctic University of 
Norway.
1   The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008. 
<http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf> accessed 11 June 
2017.
2   I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40 (2) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 235–58.
3   C. Damro, ‘Market Power Europe’ (2012) 19 (5) Journal of European Public Policy 682–699.
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this chapter we draw out these conclusions, before going on to explore how 
these lessons could be applied in future.
2 Lessons Learnt
An initial response to the question of the role of the EU in the Arctic is to 
focus on its role in the Arctic Council and to examine the routes to strength-
ening that role. There are, however, a number of challenges to this. As we 
have seen, the Arctic States are not always receptive to EU influence. The EU 
itself has not always helped its cause, sometimes scoring an own goal in inter-
national policy and harming its reputation in the Arctic. As the contributors 
to this book make clear the Arctic Council is not the only route to EU influ-
ence, nor should it be considered the gold standard for interaction. If the EU is 
to exert “power” in the Arctic a more nuanced approach is required. It has to 
address the focus of its own EU Arctic policies; recognise the benefits of alter-
native routes to influence and take a more sophisticated approach to its inter-
actions with and impacts on indigenous and local populations in the Arctic.
At present EU Arctic policies address the Arctic as a whole. As Stępień and 
Koivurova demonstrate, there are in fact two dimensions to the EU’s engage-
ment with the Arctic—the Circumpolar and the European Arctic—and the 
differences between these need to be teased out more. The focus of the EU 
in each is different. In the Circumpolar Arctic the focus is on maritime and 
environmental issues, in the European Arctic it is on terrestrial and economic 
issues. So too is the role the EU plays in each. In the European Arctic it is a key 
player, but this is not the case in the Circumpolar Arctic, where it acts as an 
observer, or a less important player. As such it is not easy for the EU to have 
a single, coherent, Arctic policy. Stępień and Koivurova suggest that the EU 
should develop a separate strategy for the European Arctic and note that the 
2016 Joint Communication begins this process.
The second step to securing power is, as Bailes and Ólafsson demonstrate, to 
use the soft power afforded by membership of sub-regional Arctic bodies. The 
EU’s membership of these bodies affords it the opportunity to build relations 
through, for example, joint projects. This route is, however, at some risk due 
to the lack of understanding of some EU politicians of the benefit of such de-
politicised cooperation, particularly as the fruits of such cooperation may ap-
pear quite limited at first.
As several of the authors point out, the EU’s policies can and frequently do 
impact negatively on indigenous peoples and this in turn diminishes the EU’s 
power in the Arctic by reducing the willingness of key actors to cooperate with 
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it. A key example of such negative impact is the effect of the EU’s policies on 
sealing and whaling discussed by Hennig and Caddell. The status of indig-
enous peoples in the Arctic is somewhat unusual: their sovereign rights are, 
for example, respected in States such as Canada. The EU also proclaims to protect 
such rights and yet EU policies on, for example, sealing, have undermined the 
sovereignty of indigenous peoples. There are, however, positive examples that 
the EU can draw on. Fakhri, for example, compares the EU approach to seal-
ing with that taken by the USA, drawing out similarities in approach of the EU 
and USA and demonstrating how alternative forms of regulation can be devel-
oped that would support indigenous sovereignty rather than undermining it. 
As Campins demonstrates, though the EU policies have had a negative impact 
in the EU’s relations with Greenland, here again the EU has the opportunity to 
make a more positive impact through helping Greenland to diversify its econ-
omy. There are also less obvious examples of the negative impact the EU can 
have on indigenous or other stakeholders in the Arctic.
As Stępień and Koivurova note the EU can be “thoughtless” in its interac-
tions with Arctic stakeholders, in that its procedures may lead the stakehold-
ers to have to interact repeatedly with the EU in various contexts. While such 
interaction will not be problematic for the EU, it stretches the resources of 
local and indigenous stakeholders. Again solutions to these problems can be 
found. Stępień and Koivurova, for example, suggest that the EU should focus 
on procedural aspects of integration, such as reducing the number of interac-
tions required.
One of the challenges in achieving this more nuanced approach is, how-
ever, that the Arctic States have differing views of the benefits of working with 
the EU and this is coupled with the challenge that the EU’s relations with the 
Arctic States is never confined to Arctic issues. The result is that developments 
in other areas may influence relations in the Arctic, or at least how those 
relations are interpreted. Norway, for example, may be considered as having a 
good relationship with the EU, but it views the relationship with the EU in the 
Arctic as part of their wider relationship. The result is that Norway’s cautious 
approach to integration with the EU in general influences their relationships in 
the Arctic. And, like many EU Member States, Norway has a tendency to blame 
the EU when things do not go according to plan. Canada, by contrast, has been 
portrayed as being at loggerheads with the EU, yet the EU and Canada have 
signed a declaration welcoming “the deepening ties in Arctic cooperation”.4 
The EU’s emphasis on the European Arctic and its focus on sustainability, 
are seen by Lackenbauer and Lalonde to both chime with Canada’s aims for 
4   Joint Canada-EU Declaration Ottawa, 26 September 2014, see Lackenbauer and Lalond, 
Chapter 6.
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the Canadian Arctic and diminish the possibility of conflict between the EU 
and Canada. This is particularly so as Canada tends to focus on national issues 
within its Arctic policy. In this way both then are supporting the concept that 
sub-regional policies are required along side the “One Arctic” focus of the US 
Arctic Council Chairmanship for 2015–17 and the Inuit Circumpolar Council. 
The same type of misconception applies in EU-Russian Arctic relations. These 
relations have to some degree been clouded by Russian military operations 
elsewhere. Thus Russian re-militarisation of the Arctic has been viewed as 
a threat. The reality, as Hunter demonstrates, is however that the military 
is being used to support resource extraction because the military is the only 
body with the capacity to provide the support required and Russian Arctic 
policies in fact align with EU interests in the Arctic, in particular in using the 
Northern Sea Route and in accessing resources within Russian jurisdiction.
The papers presented in the Part 2 on EU-Arctic State relations, therefore 
go some way to addressing misconceptions about relations between these 
States and the EU. They demonstrate again, the need for greater clarity and a 
more nuanced understanding of these relations if the EU is to exert power in 
the Arctic. By understanding where interests and policies align, the EU will be 
better placed to forge alliances, either directly, or through regional and sub- 
regional bodies. Such alliances will enable the EU to better wield its “soft 
power” in the Arctic and it is by doing this that it is most likely to achieve influ-
ence in the Arctic.
A second challenge to taking a more nuanced approach is that the various 
sectors of interest to the EU may require different approaches. In shipping 
and fisheries, for example, the key appears to be for the EU to adopt inter-
nal measures, or rather measures that apply to its vessels and in its ports. In 
relation to shipping, however, Ringbom suggests that it is more useful for the 
EU to exert pressure within the global regulator, the International Maritime 
Organisation, to secure the adoption of appropriate measures there. In rela-
tion to fisheries, Liu emphasizes that the EU is, and should, play a role in the 
negotiation of any regional fisheries management organisation in relation 
to potential fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean high seas. In relation to the 
hunting of marine mammals and in relation to oil and gas activities the EU 
is urged to rely less on a unilateral approach. In relation to oil and gas this is 
because a regional approach is required (both under international law and 
in practice) as Jessen demonstrates. In relation to marine mammals coopera-
tion is urged because the EU’s tendency to act alone has caused significant 
harm to indigenous peoples in the Arctic. It is, therefore, urged, by Hennig 
and Caddell, to work with the States and indigenous peoples involved in seal-
ing and whaling in order to arrive at a more nuanced approach to the regula-
tion of these activities.
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These conclusions are of importance to Arctic governance as much as to 
the EU as they demonstrate the interconnectedness of regimes and that the 
development and implementation of obligations (or norms) in interna-
tional law is not a linear process. Rather, actors influence their development 
and implementation in a variety of locations, often in less obvious locales 
than may be anticipated, and must be flexible in their approach to regulation 
and governance. It also demonstrates that even seemingly interconnected 
issues may require States and actors such as the EU to take quite different 
approaches to the development and implementation of international obliga-
tions for their governance.
3 Future Application
The Arctic faces a number of challenges some of which (such as how to 
develop sustainabily, how to respond to climate change) chime with the inter-
ests of the EU. At the same time, the EU has strong political will to get involved 
and shape the development of Arctic governance. In this section we outline 
some key issues for the Arctic and illustrate how the EU may learn from the les-
sons outlined above to ensure it wields its soft power in the Arctic effectively.
As a normative power, the EU is expected to project its core norms: peace, 
liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law5 to the Arctic. Further, it is 
suggested by Manners that in addition to core norms, there are four minor 
norms—social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and 
good governance—within the constitution and practices of the EU.6 In the 
EU’s 2016 Arctic policy, the EU addresses sustainable development in and 
around the Arctic as one of its priority areas. However, although the United 
Nations Agenda 2030 sets out 17 concrete sustainable development goals,7 the 
meaning of sustainable development and how to achieve is still debated. 
The Arctic, arguably a pristine frontier, could possibly provide lessons for the 
rest of the world about sustainable development by providing an opportuni-
ty to demonstrate how to strike the right balance between economic, social 
and environmental interests. The EU could play a part in achieving this, not 
only by providing research funding, technical support and investment in the 
Arctic,8 but also by testing and/or transfering the EU’s ideas about sustainable 
5   See Manners n. 1 above, 242.
6   Ibid.
7   UN Sustainable Development Goals <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/
sustainable-development-goals/> accessed 12 June 2017.
8   JOIN (2016) 21, An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic.
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development in this region, through for example cooperation with Arctic 
States. In turn, the EU may also learn from its Arctic experience to enhance 
its domestic policies regarding sustainable development. Some suggestions for 
how this may be achieved are discussed below along side suggestions for a sec-
ond issue area of focus.
Climate change has been recognised as a major challenge for the Arctic. For 
example, on the occasion of the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, 
the Fairbanks Declaration recognized that “activities taking place outside the 
Arctic region, including activities occurring in Arctic States, are the main con-
tributors to climate change effects and pollution in the Arctic.”9 This underlines 
the need for climate actions at the local, national, regional and international 
level to protect the Arctic. The Arctic is warming at more than twice the rate 
of the global average, resulting in widespread social, environmental, and eco-
nomic impacts in the Arctic and worldwide, and the pressing and increasing 
need for mitigation and adaptive actions and to strengthen resilience.10
As one of most industrialised regions near the Arctic, the EU has responsi-
bility to combat climate change so as to protect the Arctic. The EU climate and 
energy package was adopted in 2009 to implement the targeted 20% reduction 
of GHG emissions compared with 1990 by 2020 along with generation of a 20% 
share of renewables in EU energy production, and 20% improvement in energy 
efficiency.11 Climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment is also 
one of three priority areas in the EU’s 2016 Arctic policy. The EU sees its Arctic 
policy as an important element in implementing the Paris Agreement,12 which 
sets out a global action plan to limit global warming to well below 2°C.13 The 
EU believes that the Paris Agreement is an ambitious, balanced, equitable and 
legally binding agreement, which marks a decisive turning point towards com-
prehensive and collective global action against climate change.14 However, 
the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement under the Trump 
Administration.15 This has the potential to undermine global efforts in dealing 
9    Fairbanks Declaration 2017, Arctic Council <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
handle/11374/1910> accessed 12 June 2017.
10   Ibid.
11   EU Climate Change Policies, European Environment Agency <https://www.eea.europa 
.eu/themes/climate/policy-context> accessed 12 June 2017.
12   The Paris Agreement, United Nations 2015. <http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/
items/9485.php> accessed 12 June 2017.
13   JOIN (2016) 21, An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic.
14   Ibid.
15   President Trump Announces US Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, The 
White House <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/06/01/president-donald-j-trump-
announces-us-withdrawal-paris-climate-accord> accessed 12 June 2016.
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with climate change, since the US is the second largest greenhouse gas emitter 
in the world, next to China. In these challenging times, a strong EU is needed 
to take global leadership, for example to work with China and accelerate joint 
efforts to reduce global carbon emissions.16
The EU has identified sustainable development and climate change as two 
priority areas of the EU’s Arctic policy. These are global concerns and par-
ticularly important for the Arctic. In order to effectively implement its policy 
objectives, there are three aspects that the EU could further address in the 
future.
3.1 Direct Application of the EU Law in the Arctic
The EU already regulates EU citizens and companies and could use this power 
to help achieve sustainable development and/or combat climate change in the 
Arctic. For example, as discussed by Jessen, inspired by the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, Directive 2013/30 on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations, was 
adopted with specific reference to the Arctic waters. In particular, Article 20 of 
Directive 2013/30 provides that ‘Member States shall require companies reg-
istered in their territory and conducting, themselves or through subsidiaries, 
offshore oil and gas operations outside the Union as licence holders or opera-
tors to report to them, on request, the circumstances of any major accident 
in which they have been involved’. This may provide a model for further 
action by the EU in relation to the Arctic. Regulations could be adopted, for 
example, placing restrictions on drilling in particularly fragile environments, 
or requiring far more stringent measures to be in place to prevent an oil spill 
than is normally the case to help ensure sustainable development. Given that 
EU companies such as Shell (Netherlands) and Total (France) are major play-
ers in offshore oil and gas activities, any such regulation could have a major 
impact in the Arctic even without impacting on non-EU companies.
Moreover, with the adoption and subsequent implementation of the Erika 
III package, the EU now has one of the world’s most comprehensive and 
advanced regulatory frameworks for shipping. The EU maritime safety leg-
islation is applicable to EU-flagged vessels in the Arctic (See Chapter 9). In 
addition, the EU could lead the international community by enforcing higher 
standards in Arctic waters. A great example would be to ban the use of heavy 
fuel oil in the Arctic for all EU vessels. Although vessels are encouraged by the 
Polar Code not to use such fuel in the Arctic, there is no ban at present.
16   China and EU Strengthened Promise to Paris Deal with US Poised to Step Away, The 
Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/31/china-eu-climate 
-lead-paris-agreement> accessed 12 June 2017.
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3.2 The EU as a Market Power
The EU has the world’s largest internal market, supported by strong regulatory 
institutions. The European single market represents the EU’s material existence 
and the most salient aspect of its presence in the international system.17 Trading 
with the EU requires foreign companies to adjust their conduct or production 
to EU standards. While the EU regulates only its internal market, multinational 
corporations often have an incentive to standardize their production globally 
and adhere to a single rule. This has the potential to convert the EU rule into a 
global rule, labelled by Anu Bradford as the ‘de facto Brussels effect’.18
The EU has been using its market power to exert influence in the Arctic. The 
seal trade ban, which was discussed by Hennig and Caddell provides an 
example, albeit it caused a lot of concerns and protest from the Arctic States. 
The EU’s market power however does provide teeth for the EU’s normative 
power when it comes to projecting EU norms to the rest of the world. As dis-
cussed by Liu, the EU’s Regulation against illegal, unregulated and unreported 
fishing could be applied in the future, when fisheries occurs in the central 
Arctic Ocean. With the fact that 1/3 of fish caught in the Arctic are sold in the 
EU, it is expected that the EU IUU Regulation could play a significant role in 
regulating fisheries in the Arctic waters by implementing EU standards. A 
similar case could be drawn in respect of Arctic shipping. When commercial 
shipping across the Northeast Passage finally becomes viable, most ships’ des-
tinations will be the European market, calling at big European ports such as 
Hamburg, Rotterdam or Antwerp. At that point, EU maritime safety standards 
could be applicable to Arctic shipping through port State jurisdiction. If the EU 
is going to incorporate shipping into its emission trading scheme (ETS), then 
the EU ETS will also have an impact on reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from Arctic shipping.
3.3 The EU Playing a Supportive Role in Regional and International 
Cooperation
The EU has developed solid relations with all Arctic States, as explained in 
Part II of the book. In the foreseeable future, the Arctic Council will keep being 
the most important forum for regional cooperation in the Arctic. Although not 
an official observer, the EU could exert its influence through its Member States 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, or even Norway, who is a member of the European 
Economic Area. Other EU Member States France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain and Italy all have observer status in the Arctic Council. By 
17   D. Allen and M. Smith, ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International 
Arena’ (1990) 16 (1) Review of International Studies 19–37.
18   A. Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 (1) Northwestern University Law Review 1–67.
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speaking in one voice, the EU will be able to influence Arctic Council decision-
making processes even without official observer status.
In the 2016 EU Arctic policy, the EU identified international negotiation 
processes that might have direct relevance to the Arctic. Here it may be able 
to learn from the discussion in the chapters relating to EU relations with in-
dividual States. As Part II of this book made clear, the EU often has shared 
interests with Arctic States. While these interests may not at first be apparent, 
they do play a key role in shaping EU-Arctic relations. The EU may then wish to 
draw on shared interests in these other negotiations to develop an approach 
to influence, for example, sustainable development, in the Arctic. Examples 
of areas in which the EU could develop this approach include the multilateral 
negotiations on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction: a key ongoing negotiation that will be of 
relevance to the Arctic high seas. The EU is also invited and has been attending 
the Arctic 5 +5 negotiations on fisheries management in the high sea portion 
of the central Arctic Ocean. It must be pointed out that the EU cannot expect 
to play a leading role in these processes, but it could be a cooperative partner. 
Shared interests between the EU and one Arctic State are particularly obvious 
in the Arctic 5+5 process, where the US takes the initiative and the EU’s posi-
tion is more or less in line with the US. In addition, as mentioned above, the EU 
is taking on leadership of climate change actions as the US is retreating from 
the field. Here, the EU could do more, using its diplomacy to ally with other big 
emitters such as China and India to deal with this global problem.
4 Conclusions
The world has witnessed significant geopolitical change after the Second 
World War. The EU is now facing a challenging time, addressing issues such 
as the refugee crisis and Brexit. Nevertheless, as the EU High Representative 
Federica Mogherini has noted, in a difficult time, the world and Europe need 
a strong European Union that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts 
together.19 The EU has set out its vision of its role in the Arctic. This book has 
demonstrated that there are a variety of ways in which the EU can  achieve that 
vision. In this concluding chapter we have also suggested some areas in which 
the EU may wish to focus its efforts. We wish the EU good luck in its mission to 
protect the Arctic in the era of the Anthropocene.
19   Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016. <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/
top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf> accessed 9 June 2017.
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